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"CONSIDER HISTORY WITH THE BEGINNINGS OF IT STRETCHING DIMLY INTO THE REMOTE TIME, EMERGING DARKLY OVT OF THE MYSTERIOVS ETERNITY: THE TRVE EPIC POEM AND VNIVERSAL DIVINE SCRIPTVRE. . . ."

CARLYLE

# A HISTORY OF GREECE

I. LEGENDARY GREECE

II. GRECIAN HISTORY TO THE REIGN OF PEISISTRATUS AT ATHENS

BY GEORGE GROTE

VOLUME II

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# HISTORY OF GREECE

## PART I

## LEGENDARY GREECE

*(Continued)*

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### CHAPTER XVI

#### GRECIAN MYTHES, AS UNDERSTOOD, FELT AND INTERPRETED BY THE GREEKS THEMSELVES

THE preceding sections have been intended to exhibit a sketch of that narrative matter, so abundant, so characteristic, and so interesting, out of which early Grecian history and chronology have been extracted. Raised originally by hands unseen and from data unassignable, it existed first in the shape of floating talk among the people, from whence a large portion of it passed into the song of the poets, who multiplied, transformed and adorned it in a thousand various ways.

These mythes or current stories, the spontaneous and earliest growth of the Grecian mind, constituted at the same time the entire intellectual stock of the age to which they belonged. They are the common root of all those different ramifications into which the mental activity of the Greeks subsequently diverged; containing, as it were, the preface and germ of the positive history and philosophy, the dogmatic theology and the professed romance, which we shall hereafter trace each in its separate development. They furnished aliment to the curiosity, and solution to the vague doubts and aspirations of the age; they explained the origin of those customs and standing peculiarities with which men were familiar; they impressed moral lessons, awakened patriotic sympathies, and exhibited in detail the shadowy, but anxious, presentiments of the vulgar as to the agency of the gods: moreover they satisfied that craving for adventure and appetite for the marvellous, which has in modern times become the province of fiction proper.

It is difficult, we may say impossible, for a man of mature age to carry back his mind to his conceptions such as they stood when he was a child, growing naturally out of his imagination and feelings, working upon a scanty stock of materials, and borrowing from authorities whom he blindly followed but imperfectly apprehended. A similar difficulty occurs when we attempt to place ourselves in the historical and quasi-philosophical point of view which the ancient mythes present to us. We can follow perfectly the imagination and feeling which dictated these tales, and we can admire and sympathise with them as animated, sublime, and affecting poetry; but we are too much accustomed to matter of fact and philosophy of a positive kind to be able to conceive a time when these beautiful fancies were construed literally and accepted as serious reality.

Nevertheless it is obvious that Grecian mythes cannot be either understood or appreciated except with reference to the system of conceptions and belief of the ages in which they arose. We must suppose a public not reading and writing, but seeing, hearing and telling—destitute of all records, and careless as well as ignorant of positive history with its indispensable tests, yet at the same time curious and full of eagerness for new or impressive incidents—strangers even to the rudiments of positive philosophy and to the idea of invariable sequences of nature either in the physical or moral world, yet requiring some connecting theory to interpret and regularise the phænomena before them. Such a theory was supplied by the spontaneous inspirations of an early fancy, which supposed the habitual agency of beings intelligent and voluntary like themselves, but superior in extent of power, and different in peculiarity of attributes. In the geographical ideas of the Homeric period, the earth was flat and round, with the deep and gentle ocean-stream flowing around and returning into itself: chronology, or means of measuring past time, there existed none. Nevertheless, unobserved regions might be described, the forgotten past unfolded, and the unknown future predicted—through particular men specially inspired by the gods, or endowed by them with that peculiar vision which detected and interpreted passing signs and omens.

If even the rudiments of scientific geography and physics, now so universally diffused and so invaluable as a security against error and delusion, were wanting in this early stage of society, their place was abundantly supplied by vivacity of imagination and by personifying sympathy. The unbounded

tendency of the Homeric Greeks to multiply fictitious persons, and to construe interesting or formidable phenomena into manifestations of design, is above all things here to be noticed, because the form of personal narrative, universal in their mythes, is one of its many consequences. Their polytheism (comprising some elements of an original fetichism, in which particular objects had themselves been supposed to be endued with life, volition, and design) recognised agencies of unseen beings identified and confounded with the different localities and departments of the physical world. Of such beings there were numerous varieties, and many gradations both in power and attributes; there were differences of age, sex, and local residence, relations both conjugal and filial between them, and tendencies sympathetic as well as repugnant. The gods formed a sort of political community of their own, which had its hierarchy, its distribution of ranks and duties, its contentions for power and occasional revolutions, its public meetings in the agora of Olympus, and its multitudinous banquets or festivals.[1] The great Olympic gods were in fact only the most exalted amongst an aggregate of quasi-human or ultra-human personages,—dæmons, heroes, nymphs, eponymous (or name giving) genii, identified with each river, mountain,[2] cape,

[1] Homer, Iliad, i. 603; xx. 7. Hesiod, Theogon. 802.

[2] We read in the Iliad that Asteropæus was grandson of the beautiful river Axius, and Achilles, after having slain him, admits the dignity of this parentage, but boasts that his own descent from Zeus was much greater, since even the great river Achelôus and Oceanus himself is inferior to Zeus (xxi. 157–191). Skamander fights with Achilles, calling his brother Simoïs to his aid (213–308). Tyrô, the daughter of Salmôneus, falls in love with Enipeus, the most beautiful of rivers (Odyss. xi. 237). Achelôus appears as a suitor of Deianira (Sophokl. Trach. 9).

There cannot be a better illustration of this feeling than what is told of the New Zealanders at the present time. The chief Heu-Heu appeals to his ancestor, the great mountain Tonga Riro: "I am the Heu-Heu, and rule over you all, just as my ancestor, Tonga Riro, the mountain of snow, stands above all this land." (E. J. Wakefield, Adventures in New Zealand, vol. i. ch. 17, p. 465). Heu-Heu refused permission to any one to ascend the mountain, on the ground that it was his *tipuna*, or ancestor: "he constantly identified himself with the mountain and called it his sacred ancestor" (vol. ii. c. 4, p. 113). The mountains in New Zealand are accounted by the natives masculine and feminine: Tonga Riro, and Taranaki, two male mountains, quarrelled about the affections of a small volcanic female mountain in the neighbourhood (ibid. ii. c. 4, p. 97).

The religious imagination of the Hindoos also (as described by Colonel Sleeman in his excellent work, Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official), affords a remarkable parallel to that of the early Greeks. Colonel Sleeman says—

"I asked some of the Hindoos about us why they called the river

town, village, or known circumscription of territory,—besides horses, bulls, and dogs, of immortal breed and peculiar attributes, and monsters of strange lineaments and combinations, "Gorgons and Harpies and Chimæras dire." As there were in every *gens* or family special gentile deities and foregone ancestors who watched over its members, forming in each the characteristic symbol and recognised guarantee of their union, so there seem to have been in each guild or trade peculiar beings whose vocation it was to co-operate or to impede in various stages of the business.[1]

Mother Nerbudda, if she was really never married. Her majesty (said they with great respect) would really never consent to be married after the indignity she suffered from her affianced bridegroom the Sohun: and we call her *mother* because she blesses us all, and we are anxious to accost her by the name which we consider to be the most respectful and endearing.

"Any Englishman can easily conceive a poet in his highest calenture of the brain, addressing the Ocean as a steed that knows his rider, and patting the crested billow as his flowing mane. But he must come to India to understand how every individual of a *whole community of many millions can address a fine river as a living being—a sovereign princess who hears and understands all they say, and exercises a kind of local superintendence over their affairs*, without a single temple in which her image is worshipped, or a single priest to profit by the delusion. As in the case of the Ganges, *it is the river itself to whom they address themselves, and not to any deity residing in it, or presiding over it*—the stream itself is the deity which fills their imaginations, and receives their homage." (Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official, ch. iii. p. 20.) Compare also the remarks in the same work on the sanctity of *Mother Nerbudda* (chapter xxvii. p. 261); also of the holy personality of the earth.—"The land is considered as the MOTHER of the prince or chief who holds it, the great parent from whom he derives all that maintains him, his family, and his establishments. If well-treated, she yields this in abundance to her son; but if he presumes to look upon her with the eye of *desire*, she ceases to be fruitful; or the Deity sends down hail or blight to destroy all that she yields. The measuring the surface of the fields, and the frequently inspecting the crops by the chief himself or his immediate agents, were considered by the people in this light—either it should not be done at all or the duty should be delegated to inferior agents, whose close inspection of the *great parent* could not be so displeasing to the Deity" (ch. xxvii. p. 248).

See also about the Gods who are believed to reside in trees—the Peepul-tree, the cotton-tree, &c. (ch. ix. p. 112), and the description of the annual marriage celebrated between the sacred pebble, or pebble-god, Saligram, and the sacred shrub Toolsea, celebrated at great expense and with a numerous procession (ch. xix. p. 158; xxiii. p. 185).

[1] See the song to the potters, in the Homeric Epigrams (14)—

Εἰ μὲν δώσετε μισθὸν, ἀείσω, ὦ κεραμῆες·
Δεῦρ' ἄγ' Ἀθηναίη, καὶ ὑπείρεχε χεῖρα καμίνου.
Εὖ δὲ μελανθείεν κότυλοι, καὶ πάντα κάναστρα
Φρυχθῆναί τε καλῶς, καὶ τιμῆς ὦνον ἀρέσθαι.
. . . . Ἢν δ' ἐν' ἀναιδείην τραφθέντες ψευδῆ ἄρησθε,
Σὺγκαλέω δὴ πάντα καμίνῳ δηλητῆρας·
Σύντριβ' ὅμως, Σμάραγόν τε, καὶ Ἄσβετον ἠδὲ, Σαβάκτην,
Ὠμόδαμόν θ', ὃς τῆδε τέχνῃ κακὰ πολλὰ πορίζει, &c.

The extensive and multiform personifications, here faintly sketched, pervaded in every direction the mental system of the Greeks, and were identified intimately both with their conception and with their description of phænomena, present as well as past. That which to us is interesting as the mere creation of an exuberant fancy, was to the Greek genuine and venerated reality. The earth and the solid heaven (Gæa and Uranos) were both conceived and spoken of by him as endowed with appetite, feeling, sex, and most of the various attributes of humanity. Instead of a sun such as we now see, subject to astronomical laws, and forming the centre of a system the changes of which we can ascertain and foreknow, he saw the great god Hêlios, mounting his chariot in the morning in the east, reaching at midday the height of the solid heaven, and arriving in the evening at the western horizon, with horses fatigued and desirous of repose. Hêlios, having favourite spots wherein his beautiful cattle grazed, took pleasure in contemplating them during the course of his journey, and was sorely displeased if any man slew or injured them: he had moreover sons and daughters on earth, and as his all-seeing eye penetrated everywhere, he was sometimes in a situation to reveal secrets even to the gods themselves—while on other occasions he was constrained to turn aside in order to avoid contemplating scenes of abomination.[1] To us these now appear

A certain kindred between men and serpents (*συγγένειάν τινα πρὸς τοὺς ὄφεις*) was recognised in the peculiar gens of the *ὀφιογενεῖς* near Parion, who possessed the gift of healing by their touches the bite of the serpent: the original hero of this gens was said to have been transformed from a serpent into a man (Strabo, xiii. p. 588).

[1] Odyss. ii. 388; viii. 270; xii. 4, 128, 416; xxiii. 362. Iliad, xiv. 344. The Homeric Hymn to Dêmêtêr expresses it neatly (63)—

*Ἠέλιον δ' ἵκοντο, θεᾶν σκοπὸν ἠδὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν.*

Also the remarkable story of Eucnius of Apollônia, his neglect of the sacred cattle of Hêlios, and the awful consequences of it (Herodot. ix. 93: compare Theocr. Idyll. xxv. 130).

I know no passage in which this conception of the heavenly bodies as Persons is more strikingly set forth than in the words of the German chief Boiocalus, pleading the cause of himself and his tribe the Ansibarii before the Roman legate Avitus. This tribe, expelled by other tribes from its native possessions, had sat down upon some of that wide extent of lands on the Lower Rhine which the Roman Government reserved for the use of its soldiers, but which remained desert, because the soldiers had neither the means nor the inclination to occupy them; The old chief, pleading his cause before Avitus, who had issued an order to him to evacuate the lands, first dwelt upon his fidelity of fifty years to the Roman cause, and next touched upon the enormity of retaining so large an area in a state of waste (Tacit. Ann. xiii. 55): "Quotam partem campi jacere, in quam pecora et

puerile, though pleasing fancies, but to an Homeric Greek they seemed perfectly natural and plausible. In his view, the description of the sun, as given in a modern astronomical treatise, would have appeared not merely absurd, but repulsive and impious. Even in later times, when the positive spirit of inquiry had made considerable progress, Anaxagoras and other astronomers incurred the charge of blasphemy for dispersonifying Hêlios, and trying to assign invariable laws to the solar phænomena.[1] Personifying fiction was in this way blended by

armenta militum aliquando transmitterentur? Servarent sane receptos gregibus, inter hominum famam: modo ne vastitatem et solitudinem mallent, quam amicos populos. Chamavorum quondam ea arva, mox Tubantum, et post Usipiorum fuisse. Sicuti cœlum Diis, ita terras generi mortalium datas: quæque vacuæ, eas publicas esse. *Solem* deinde respiciens, et *cætera sidera vocans, quasi coram* interrogabat—*vellentne contueri inane solum? potius mare superfunderent adversus terrarum ereptores.* Commotus his Avitus," &c. The legate refused the request, but privately offered to Boiocalus lands for himself apart from the tribe, which that chief indignantly spurned. He tried to maintain himself in the lands, but was expelled by the Roman arms, and forced to seek a home among the other German tribes, all of whom refused it. After much wandering and privation, the whole tribe of the Ansibarii was annihilated: its warriors were all slain, its women and children sold as slaves.

I notice this afflicting sequel, in order to show that the brave old chief was pleading before Avitus a matter of life and death both to himself and his tribe, and that the occasion was one least of all suited for a mere rhetorical prosopopœia. His appeal is one sincere and heartfelt to the personal feelings and sympathies of Hêlios.

Tacitus, in reporting the speech, accompanies it with the gloss "quasi coram," to mark that the speaker here passes into a different order of ideas from that to which himself or his readers were accustomed. If Boiocalus could have heard, and reported to his tribe, an astronomical lecture, he would have introduced some explanation, in order to facilitate to his tribe the comprehension of Hêlios under a point of view so new to them. While Tacitus finds it necessary to illustrate by a comment the *personification of the sun*, Boiocalus would have had some trouble to make his tribe comprehend the *daification of the god Hêlios.*

[1] Physical astronomy was both new and accounted impious in the time of the Peloponnesian war: see Plutarch, in his reference to that eclipse which proved so fatal to the Athenian army at Syracuse, in consequence of the religious feelings of Nikias: *οὐ γὰρ ἠνείχοντο τοὺς φυσικοὺς καὶ μετεωρολέσχας τότε καλουμένους, ὡς εἰς αἰτίας ἀλόγους καὶ δυνάμεις ἀπρονοήτους καὶ κατηναγκασμένα πάθη διατρίβοντας τὸ θεῖον* (Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23, and Periklês, c. 32; Diodôr. xii. 39; Dêmêtr. Phaler. ap. Diogen. Laërt. ix. 9. 1).

"You strange man, Melêtus," said Sokratês, on his trial, to his accuser, "are you seriously affirming that I do not think Hêlios and Selênê to be gods, as the rest of mankind think?" "Certainly not, men of the Dikastery; (*this is the reply of Melêtus*), Sokratês says that the sun is a stone, and the moon earth." "Why, my dear Melêtus, you think you are preferring an accusation against Anaxagoras! You account these Dikasts so contemptibly ignorant as not to know that the books of Anaxagoras are full

the Homeric Greeks with their conception of the physical phænomena before them, not simply in the way of poetical ornament, but as a genuine portion of their every-day belief.

The gods and heroes of the land and the tribe belonged, in the conception of a Greek, alike to the present and to the past: he worshipped in their groves and at their festivals; he invoked their protection, and believed in their superintending guardianship, even in his own day: but their more special, intimate, and sympathising, agency was cast back into the unrecorded past.[1] To give suitable utterance to this general sentiment—to furnish body and movement and detail to these divine and heroic pre-existences, which were conceived only in shadowy outline,—to lighten up the dreams of what the past must have been,[2] in the minds of those who knew not

of such doctrines! Is it from me that the youth acquire such teaching, when they may buy the books for a drachma in the theatre, and may thus laugh me to scorn if I pretended to announce such views as my own—*not to mention that they are in themselves so extravagant?*"—(ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα, Plato, Apolog. Sokrat. c. 14, p. 26.)

The divinity of Hêlios and Selênê is emphatically set forth by Plato, Legg. x. p. 886, 889. He permits physical astronomy only under great restrictions and to a limited extent. Compare Xenoph. Memor. iv. 7, 7; Diogen. Laërt. ii. 8; Plutarch, De Stoicor. Repugnant. c. 40, p. 1053; and Schaubach ad Anaxagoræ Fragmenta, p. 6.

[1] Hesiod, Catalog. Fragm. 76, p. 48, ed. Düntzer—

> Ἕυναὶ γὰρ τότε δαῖτες ἔσαν ξυνοί τε θόωκοι,
> Ἀθανάτοις τε θεοῖσι καταθνητοῖς τ' ἀνθρώποις.

Both the Theogonia and the Works and Days bear testimony to the same general feeling. Even the heroes of Homer suppose a preceding age, the inmates of which were in nearer contact with the gods than they themselves (Odyss. viii. 223; Iliad, v. 304; xii. 382). Compare Catullus, Carm. 64; Epithalam. Peleôs et Thetidos, v. 382–408.

Menander the Rhetor (following generally the steps of Dionys. Hal. Art. Rhetor. cap. 1–8) suggests to his fellow-citizens at Alexandria Trôas, proper and complimentary forms to invite a great man to visit their festival of the Sminthia:—ὥσπερ γὰρ Ἀπόλλωνα πολλάκις ἐδέχετο ἡ πόλις τοῖς Σμινθίοις, ἡνίκα ἐξῆν θεοὺς προφανῶς ἐπιδημεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὕτω καὶ σὲ ἡ πόλις νῦν προσδέχεται (περὶ Ἐπιδεικτικ. s. iv. c. 14, ap. Walz. Coll. Rhetor. t. ix. p. 304). Menander seems to have been a native of Alexandria Trôas, though Suidas calls him a Laodicean (see Walz. Præf. ad t. ix. p. xv.–xx.; and περὶ Σμινθιακῶν, sect. iv. c. 17). The festival of the Sminthia lasted down to his time, embracing the whole duration of paganism from Homer downwards.

[2] P. A. Müller observes justly in his *Saga-Bibliothek*, in reference to the Icelandic mythes, "In dem Mythischen wird das Leben der Vorzeit dargestellt, wie es wirklich dem kindlichen Verstande, der jugendlichen Einbildungskraft, und dem vollen Herzen, erscheint." (Lange's Untersuchungen über die Nordische und Deutsche Heldensage, translated from P. A. Müller, Introd. p. 1.)

what it really had been—such was the spontaneous aim and inspiration of productive genius in the community, and such were the purposes which the Grecian mythes pre-eminently accomplished.

The love of antiquities, which Tacitus notices as so prevalent among the Greeks of his day,[1] was one of the earliest, the most durable, and the most widely diffused of the national propensities. But the antiquities of every state were divine and heroic, reproducing the lineaments, but disregarding the measure and limits, of ordinary humanity. The gods formed the starting-point, beyond which no man thought of looking, though some gods were more ancient than others: their progeny, the heroes, many of them sprung from human mothers, constitute an intermediate link between god and man. The ancient epic usually recognises the presence of a multitude of nameless men, but they are introduced chiefly for the purpose of filling the scene, and of executing the orders, celebrating the valour, and bringing out the personality, of a few divine or heroic characters.[2] It was the glory of bards and storytellers to be able to satisfy those religious and patriotic predispositions of the public which caused the primary demand for their tales, and which were of a nature eminently inviting and expansive. For Grecian religion was many-sided and many-coloured; it comprised a great multiplicity of persons, together with much diversity in the types of character; it divinised every vein and attribute of humanity, the lofty as well as the mean—the tender as well as the warlike—the self-devoting and adventurous as well as the laughter-loving and sensual. We shall hereafter reach a time when philosophers protested against such identification of the gods with the more vulgar appetites and enjoyments, believing that nothing except the spiritual attributes of man could properly be transferred to superhuman beings, and drawing their predicates respecting the gods exclusively from what was awful,

[1] Titus visited the temple of the Paphian Venus in Cyprus, "spectatâ opulentiâ donisque regum, quæque *alia lætum* antiquitatibus Græcorum genus *incertæ vetustati adfingit*, de navigatione primum consuluit." (Tacit. Hist. ii. 4–5.)

[2] Aristotel. Problem. xix. 48. Οἱ δὲ ἡγεμόνες τῶν ἀρχαίων μόνοι ἦσαν ἥρωες· αἱ δὲ λαοὶ ἄνθρωποι. Istros followed this opinion also: but the more common view seems to have considered all who combated at Troy as heroes (see Schol. Iliad. ii. 110; xv. 231), and so Hesiod treats them (Opp. Di. 158).

In reference to the Trojan war, Aristotle says—καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Ἡρωϊκοῖς περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύεται. (Ethic. Nicom. i. 9; compare vii. 1.)

majestic, and terror-striking, in human affairs. Such restrictions on the religious fancy were continually on the increase, and the mystic and didactic stamp which marked the last century of paganism in the days of Julian and Libanius, contrasts forcibly with the concrete and vivacious forms, full of vigorous impulse and alive to all the capricious gusts of the human temperament, which people the Homeric Olympus.[1] At present, however, we have only to consider the early, or Homeric and Hesiodic paganism, and its operations in the genesis of the mythical narratives. We cannot doubt that it supplied the most powerful stimulus, and the only one which the times admitted, to the creative faculty of the people;

[1] Generation by a god is treated in the old poems as an act entirely human and physical (ἐμίγη—παρελέξατο); and this was the common opinion in the days of Plato (Plato, Apolog. Socrat. c. 15, p. 15); the hero Astrabakus is father of the Lacedæmonian king Demaratus (Herod. vi. 66). [Herodotus does not believe the story told him at Babylon respecting Belus (i. 182).] Euripidês sometimes expresses disapprobation of the idea (Ion, 350), but Plato passed among a large portion of his admirers for the actual son of Apollo, and his reputed father Aristo on marrying was admonished in a dream to respect the person of his wife Periktionê, then pregnant by Apollo, until after the birth of the child Plato (Plutarch, Quæst. Sympos. p. 717. viii. 1; Diogen. Laërt. iii. 2; Origen, cont. Cels. i. p. 29). Plutarch (in Life of Numa, c. 4; compare Life of Thêseus, 2) discusses the subject, and is inclined to disallow everything beyond mental sympathy and tenderness in a god: Pausanias deals timidly with it, and is not always consistent with himself; while the later rhetors spiritualise it altogether. Menander, περὶ Ἐπιδεικτικῶν (towards the end of the third century B.C.), prescribes rules for praising a king: you are to praise him for the gens to which he belongs: perhaps you may be able to make out that he really is the son of some god; for many who seem to be from men, are really *sent down by God* and are *emanations from the Supreme Potency*—πολλοὶ τὸ μὲν δοκεῖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων εἰσὶ, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καταπέμπονται καὶ εἰσιν ἀπόῤῥοιαι ὄντως τοῦ κρείττονος· καὶ γὰρ Ἡρακλῆς ἐνομίζετο μὲν Ἀμφιτρύωνος, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ ἦν Διός. Οὕτω καὶ βασιλεὺς ὁ ἡμέτερος τὸ μὲν δοκεῖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ τὴν καταβολὴν οὐρανόθεν ἔχει, &c. (Menander ap. Walz. Collect. Rhetor. t. ix. c. i. p. 218). Again—περὶ Σμινθιακῶν—Ζεὺς γένεσιν παιδῶν δημιουργεῖν ἐνευόησε—Ἀπόλλων τὴν Ἀσκληπιοῦ γένεσιν ἐδημιούργησε, p. 322–327; compare Hermogenês, about the story of Apollo and Daphnê, Progymnasm. c. 4; and Julian. Orat. vii. p. 220.

The contrast of the pagan phraseology of this age (Menander had himself composed a hymn of invocation to Apollo—περὶ Ἐγκωμίων, c. 3, t. ix. p. 136, Walz.) with that of Homer is very worthy of notice. In the Hesiodic Catalogue of Women much was said respecting the marriages and amours of the gods, so as to furnish many suggestions, like the love-songs of Sapphô, to the composers of Epithalamic Odes (Menand. ib. sect. iv. c. 6, p. 268).

Menander gives a specimen of a prose hymn fit to be addressed to the Sminthian Apollo (p. 320); the spiritual character of which hymn forms the most pointed contrast with the Homeric hymn to the same god.

as well from the sociability, the gradations, and the mutual action and reaction of its gods and heroes, as from the amplitude, the variety, and the purely human cast, of its fundamental types.

Though we may thus explain the mythopœic fertility of the Greeks, I am far from pretending that we can render any sufficient account of the supreme beauty of their chief epic and artistical productions. There is something in the first-rate productions of individual genius which lies beyond the compass of philosophical theory: the special breath of the Muse (to speak the language of ancient Greece) must be present in order to give them being. Even among her votaries, many are called, but few are chosen; and the peculiarities of those few remain as yet her own secret.

We shall not however forget that Grecian language was also an indispensable requisite to the growth and beauty of Grecian mythes—its richness, its flexibility and capacity of new combinations, its vocalic abundance and metrical pronunciation; and many even among its proper names, by their analogy to words really significant, gave direct occasion to explanatory or illustrative stories. Etymological mythes are found in sensible proportion among the whole number.

To understand properly then the Grecian mythes, we must try to identify ourselves with the state of mind of the original mythopœic age; a process not very easy, since it requires us to adopt a string of poetical fancies not simply as realities, but as the governing realities of the mental system;[1] yet a process

[1] The mental analogy between the early stages of human civilisation and the childhood of the individual is forcibly and frequently set forth in the works of Vico. That eminently original thinker dwells upon the poetic and religious susceptibilities as the first to develope themselves in the human mind, and as furnishing not merely connecting threads for the explanation of sensible phœnomena, but also aliment for the hopes and fears, and means of socialising influence to men of genius, at a time when reason was yet asleep. He points out the *personifying instinct* ("istinto d' animazione") as the spontaneous philosophy of man, "to make himself the rule of the universe," and to suppose everywhere a quasi-human agency as the determining cause. He remarks that in an age of fancy and feeling, the conceptions and language of poetry coincide with those of reality and common life, instead of standing apart as a separate vein. These views are repeated frequently (and with some variations of opinion as he grew older) in his Latin work *De Uno Universi Juris Principio*, as well as in the two successive *rédactions* of his great Italian work, *Scienza Nuova* (it must be added that Vico as an expositor is prolix, and does not do justice to his own powers of original thought): I select the following from the second edition of the latter treatise, published by himself in 1744, *Della Metafisica Poetica* (see vol. v. p. 189 of Ferrari's edition of his Works, Milan, 1836):

which would only reproduce something analogous to our own childhood. The age was one destitute both of recorded history and of positive science, but full of imagination and sentiment and religious impressibility. From these sources sprung that multitude of supposed persons around whom all combinations

"Adunque la sapienza poetica, che fu la prima sapienza della Gentilità, dovette incominciare de una Metafisica, non *ragionata ed astratta*, qual è questa or degli addottrinati, ma *sentita ed immaginata*, quale dovett' essere di tai primi uomini, siccome quelli ch' erano di niun raziocinio, e tutti robusti sensi e vigorosissime fantasie, come è stato nelle degnità (the *Axioms*) stabilito. Questa fu la loro propria poesia, la qual in essi fu una facultà loro connaturale, perche erano di tali sensi e di si fatte fantasie naturalmente forniti, nata da *ignoranza di cagioni*—la qual fu loro madre di maraviglia di tutte le cose, che quelli ignoranti di tutte le cose fortemente ammiravano. Tal poesia incominciò in essi divina: perchè nello stesso tempo ch' essi immaginavano le cagioni delle cose, che sentivano ed ammiravano, essere Dei, come ora il confermiamo con gli Americani, i quali tutte le cose che superano la loro picciol capacità, dicono esser Dei . . . nello stesso tempo, diciamo, alle cose ammirate davano l' essere di sostanze dalla propria lor idea: ch' è appunto la natura dei fanciulli, che osserviamo prendere tra mani cose inanimate, e trastullarsi e favellarvi, come fussero quelle persone vive. In cotal guisa i primi uomini delle nazioni gentili, come fanciulli del nascente genere umano, della lor idea creavan essi le cose . . . per la loro robusta ignoranza, il facevano in forza d' una corpulentissima fantasia, e perch' era corpolentissima, il facevano con una maravigliosa sublimità, tal e tanta, che perturbava all' eccesso essi medesimi, che fingendo le si creavano . . . Di questa natura di cose umane restò eterna proprietà spiegata con nobil espressione da Tacito, che vanamente gli uomini spaventati *fingunt simul creduntque*."

After describing the condition of rude men, terrified with thunder and other vast atmospheric phænomena, Vico proceeds (ib. p. 172)—"In tal caso la natura della mente umana porta ch' ella attribuisca all' effetto la sua natura: e la natura loro era in tale stato d' uomini tutti robuste forze di corpo, che urlando, brontolando, spiegavano le loro violentissime passioni, si finsero il cielo esser un gran corpo animato, che per tal aspetto chiamavano Giove, che col fischio dei fulmini e col fragore die tuoni volesse lor dire qualche cosa . . . E si fanno di tutta la natura un vasto corpo animato, che senta passioni ed affetti."

Now the contrast with modern habits of thought—

"Ma siccome *ora* per la natura delle nostre umane menti troppo ritirata dai sensi nel medesimo volgo—con le tante astrazioni, di quante sono piene le lingue—con tanti vocaboli astratti—e di troppo assottigliata con l' arti dello scrivere, e quasi spiritualezzata con la pratica dei numeri—*ci è naturalmente niegato di poter formare* la vasta imagine di cotal donna che dicono Natura simpatetica, che mentre con la bocca dicono, non hanno nulla in lor mente, perocchè la lor mente è dentro il falso, che è nulla; nè sono soccorsi dalla fantasia a poterne formare una falsa vastissima imagine. Così *ora ci è naturalmente niegato di poter entrare nella vasta immaginativa di quei primi uomini*, le menti dei quali di nulla erano assottigliate, di nulla astratte, di nulla spiritualezzate . . . Onde dicemmo sopra ch' *ora appena intender si può, affatto immaginar non si può*, come pensassero i primi uomini che fondarono la umanità gentilesca."

of sensible phænomena were grouped, and towards whom curiosity, sympathies and reverence were earnestly directed. The adventures of such persons were the only aliment suited at once both to the appetites and to the comprehension of an early Greek; and the mythes which detailed them, while powerfully interesting his emotions, furnished to him at the same time a quasi-history and quasi-philosophy. They filled up the vacuum of the unrecorded past, and explained many of the puzzling incognita of the present.[1] Nor need we wonder that the same plausibility which captivated his imagination and his feelings, was sufficient to engender spontaneous belief; or rather that no question, as to truth or falsehood of the narrative, suggested itself to his mind. His faith is ready, literal and uninquiring, apart from all thought of discriminating fact from fiction, or of detecting hidden and symbolised meaning; it is enough that what he hears be intrinsically plausible and seductive, and that there be no special cause to provoke doubt.

[1] O. Müller, in his *Prolegomena zu einer wissenschaftlichen Mythologie* (cap. iv. p. 108), has pointed out the mistake of supposing that there existed originally some nucleus of pure reality as the starting-point of the mythes, and that upon this nucleus fiction was superinduced afterwards: he maintains that the real and the ideal were blended together in the primitive conception of the mythes. Respecting the general state of mind out of which the mythes grew, see especially pages 78 and 110 of that work, which is everywhere full of instruction on the subject of the Grecian mythes, and is eminently suggestive, even where the positions of the author are not completely made out.

The short *Heldensage der Griechen* by Nitzch (Kiel, 1842, t. v.) contains more of just and original thought on the subject of the Grecian mythes than any work with which I am acquainted. I embrace completely the subjective point of view in which he regards them; and although I have profited much from reading his short tract, I may mention that, before I ever saw it, I had enforced the same reasonings on the subject in an article in the Westminster Review, May, 1843, on the *Heroen-Geschichten* of Niebuhr.

Jacob Grimm, in the preface to his *Deutsche Mythologie* (p. 1, 1st edit. Gött. 1835), pointedly insists on the distinction between "*Sage*" and history, as well as upon the fact that the former has its chief root in religious belief. "Legend and history (he says) are powers each by itself, adjoining indeed on the confines, but having each its own separate and exclusive ground;" also p. xxvii. of the same introduction.

A view substantially similar is adopted by William Grimm, the other of the two distinguished brothers whose labours have so much elucidated Teutonic philology and antiquities. He examines the extent to which either historical matter of fact or historical names can be traced in the *Deutsche Heldensage*; and he comes to the conclusion that the former is next to nothing, the latter not considerable. He draws particular attention to the fact that the audience for whom these poems were intended had not learned to distinguish history from poetry (W. Grimm, *Deutsche Heldensage*, pp. 8, 337, 342, 345, 399, Gött. 1829).

And if indeed there were, the poet overrules such doubts by the holy and all-sufficient authority of the Muse, whose omniscience is the warrant for his recital, as her inspiration is the cause of his success.

The state of mind, and the relation of speaker to hearers, thus depicted, stand clearly marked in the terms and tenor of the ancient epic, if we only put a plain meaning upon what we read. The poet—like the prophet, whom he so much resembles—sings under heavenly guidance, inspired by the goddess to whom he has prayed for her assisting impulse. She puts the word into his mouth and the incidents into his mind: he is a privileged man, chosen as her organ and speaking from her revelations.[1] As the Muse grants the gift of song to whom she will, so she sometimes in her anger snatches it away, and the most consummate human genius is then left silent and helpless.[2] It is true that these expressions, of the Muse inspiring and the poet singing a tale of past times, have passed from the ancient epic to compositions produced under very different circumstances, and have now degenerated into unmeaning forms of speech; but they gained currency originally in their genuine and literal acceptation. If poets had from the beginning written or recited, the predicate of singing would never have been ascribed to them; nor would it ever have become customary to employ the name of the Muse as a die to be stamped on licensed fiction, unless the practice had begun when her agency was invoked and hailed in perfect good faith. Belief, the fruit of deliberate inquiry and a rational scrutiny of evidence, is in such an age unknown. The simple faith of the time slides in unconsciously, when the imagination and feeling

[1] Hesiod, Theogon. 32—

> . . . . ἐνέπνευσαν δέ (the Muses) μοι αὐδὴν
> Θείην, ὡς κλείοιμι τά τ' ἐσσόμενα, πρό τ' ἐόντα,
> Καί με κέλονθ' ὑμνεῖν μακάρων γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων, &c.

Odyss. xxii. 347; viii. 63, 73, 481, 489. Δημόδοκ' . . . . ἦ σέ γε Μοῦσ' ἐδίδαξε, Διὸς παῖς, ἦ σέγ' Ἀπόλλων: that is, Demodokus has either been inspired as a poet by the Muse, or as a prophet by Apollo: for the Homeric Apollo is not the god of song. Kalchas the prophet receives his inspiration from Apollo, who confers upon him the same knowledge both of past and future as the Muses give to Hesiod (Iliad, i. 69)—

> Κάλχας Θεστορίδης, οἰωνοπόλων ὄχ' ἄριστος
> Ὃς ἤδη τά τ' ἐόντα, τά τ' ἐσσόμενα, πρό τ' ἐόντα
> Ἦν διὰ μαντοσύνην, τὴν οἱ πόρε Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων.

Also Iliad, ii. 485.

Both the μάντις and the ἀοιδός are standing, recognised professions (Odyss. xvii. 383), like the physician and the carpenter, δημιοεργοί.

[2] Iliad, ii. 599.

are exalted; and inspired authority is at once understood, easily admitted, and implicitly confided in.

The word mythe (*μῦθος, fabula*, story), in its original meaning, signified simply a statement or current narrative, without any connotative implication either of truth or falsehood. Subsequently the meaning of the word (in Latin and English as well as in Greek) changed, and came to carry with it the idea of an old personal narrative, always uncertified, sometimes untrue or avowedly fictitious.[1] And this change was the result of a silent alteration in the mental state of the society,—of a transition on the part of the superior minds (and more or less on the part of all) to a stricter and more elevated canon of credibility, in consequence of familiarity with recorded history and its essential tests, affirmative as well as negative. Among the original hearers of the mythes, all such tests were unknown: they had not yet learned the lesson of critical disbelief: the mythe passed unquestioned from the mere fact of its currency, and from its harmony with existing sentiments and preconceptions. The very circumstances which contributed to rob it of literal belief in after-time, strengthened its hold upon the mind of the Homeric man. He looked for wonders and unusual combinations in the past; he expected to hear of gods, heroes and men, moving and operating together upon earth; he pictured to himself the fore-time as a theatre in which the gods interfered directly, obviously, and frequently, for the protection of their favourites and the punishment of their foes. The rational conception, then only dawning in his mind, of a systematic course of nature, was absorbed by this fervent and lively faith. And if he could have been supplied with as perfect and philosophical a history of his own real past time, as we

[1] In this later sense it stands pointedly opposed to *ἱστορία, history*, which seems originally to have designated matter of fact, present and seen by the describer, or the result of his personal inquiries (see Herodot. i. 1; Verrius Flacc. ap. Aul. Gell. v. 18; Eusebius, Hist. Eccles. iii. 12; and the observations of Dr. Jortin, Remarks on Ecclesiastical History, vol. i. p. 59).

The original use of the word *λόγος* was the same as that of *μῦθος*—a current tale true or false, as the case might be; and the term designating a person much conversant with the old legends (*λόγιος*) is derived from it (Herod. i. 1; ii. 3). Hekatæus and Herodotus both use *λόγος* in this sense. Herodotus calls both Æsop and Hekatæus *λογοποιοί* (ii. 134–143).

Aristotle (Metaphys. i. p. 8, ed. Brandis) seems to use *μῦθος* in this sense, where he says—*διὸ καὶ φιλόμυθος ὁ φιλόσοφός πώς ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ μῦθος σύγκειται ἐκ θαυμασίων*, &c. In the same treatise (xi. p. 254), he uses it to signify fabulous amplification and transformation of a doctrine true in the main.

are now enabled to furnish with regard to the last century of England or France, faithfully recording all the successive events, and accounting for them by known positive laws, but introducing no special interventions of Zeus and Apollo—such a history would have appeared to him not merely unholy and unimpressive, but destitute of all plausibility or title to credence. It would have provoked in him the same feeling of incredulous aversion as a description of the sun (to repeat the previous illustration) in a modern book on scientific astronomy.

To us these mythes are interesting fictions; to the Homeric and Hesiodic audience they were "rerum divinarum et humanarum scientia,"—an aggregate of religious, physical, and historical revelations, rendered more captivating, but not less true and real, by the bright colouring and fantastic shapes in which they were presented. Throughout the whole of "mythe-bearing Hellas"[1] they formed the staple of the uninstructed Greek mind, upon which history and philosophy were by so slow degrees superinduced; and they continued to be the aliment of ordinary thought and conversation, even after history and philosophy had partially supplanted the mythical faith among the leading men, and disturbed it more or less in the ideas of all. The men, the women, and the children of the remote dêmes and villages of Greece, to whom Thucydidês, Hippokratês, Aristotle, or Hipparchus were unknown, still continued

[1] M. Ampère, in his *Histoire Littéraire de la France* (ch. viii. v. i. p. 310), distinguishes the Saga (which corresponds as nearly as possible with the Greek *μῦθος*, *λόγος*, *ἐπιχώριος λόγος*), as a special product of the intellect, not capable of being correctly designated either as history, or as fiction, or as philosophy—

"Il est un pays, la Scandinavie, où la tradition racontée s'est développée plus complètement qu'ailleurs, où ses produits ont été plus soigneusement recueillis et mieux conservés: dans ce pays, ils ont reçu un nom particulier, dont l'équivalent exact ne se trouve pas hors des langues Germaniques: c'est le mot *Saga*, *Sage*, *ce qu'on dit*, *ce qu'on raconte*,—la tradition orale. Si l'on prend ce mot non dans une acception restreinte, mais dans le sens général où le prenait Niebuhr quand il l'appliquoit, par example, aux traditions populaires qui ont pu fournir à Tite Live une portion de son histoire, la Saga doit être comptée parmi les produits spontanés de l'imagination humaine. La Saga a son existence propre comme la poësie, comme l'histoire, comme le roman. Elle n'est pas la poësie, parcequ'elle n'est pas chantée, mais parlée; elle n'est pas l'histoire, parcequ'elle est dénuée de critique; elle n'est pas le roman, parcequ'elle est sincère, parcequ'elle a foi à ce qu'elle raconte. Elle n'invente pas, mais répète: elle peut se tromper, mais elle ne ment jamais. Ce récit souvent merveilleux, que personne ne fabrique sciemment, et que tout le monde altère et falsifie sans le vouloir, qui se perpétue à la manière des chants primitifs et populaires,—ce récit, quand il se rapporte, non à un héros, mais à un saint, s'appelle une légende."

to dwell upon the local fables which formed their religious and patriotic antiquity. And Pausanias, even in his time, heard everywhere divine or heroic legends yet alive, precisely of the type of the old epic; he found the conceptions of religious and mythical faith co-existent with those of positive science, and contending against them at more or less of odds, according to the temper of the individual. Now it is the remarkable characteristic of the Homeric age, that no such co-existence or contention had yet begun. The religious and mythical point of view covers, for the most part, all the phænomena of nature; while the conception of invariable sequence exists only in the background, itself personified under the name of the Mœræ, or Fates, and produced generally as an exception to the omnipotence of Zeus for all ordinary purposes. Voluntary agents, visible and invisible, impel and govern everything. Moreover this point of view is universal throughout the community,—adopted with equal fervour, and carried out with equal consistency, by the loftiest minds and by the lowest. The great man of that day is he who, penetrated like others with the general faith, and never once imagining any other system of nature than the agency of these voluntary Beings, can clothe them in suitable circumstances and details, and exhibit in living body and action those types which his hearers dimly prefigure.

History, philosophy, &c., properly so called and conforming to our ideas (of which the subsequent Greeks were the first creators), never belonged to more than a comparatively small number of thinking men, though their influence indirectly affected more or less the whole national mind. But when positive science and criticism, and the idea of an invariable sequence of events, came to supplant in the more vigorous intellects the old mythical creed of omnipresent personification, an inevitable scission was produced between the instructed few and the remaining community. The opposition between the scientific and the religious point of view was not slow in manifesting itself: in general language, indeed, both might seem to stand together, but in every particular case the admission of one involved the rejection of the other. According to the theory which then became predominant, the course of nature was held to move invariably on, by powers and attributes of its own, unless the gods chose to interfere and reverse it; but they had the power of interfering as often and to as great an extent as they thought fit. Here the question was at once opened, respecting a great variety of particular phænomena,

whether they were to be regarded as natural or miraculous. No constant or discernible test could be suggested to discriminate the two: every man was called upon to settle the doubt for himself, and each settled it according to the extent of his knowledge, the force of his logic, the state of his health, his hopes, his fears, and many other considerations affecting his separate conclusion. In a question thus perpetually arising, and full of practical consequences, instructed minds, like Periklês, Thucydidês, and Euripidês, tended more and more to the scientific point of view,[1] in cases where the general public were constantly gravitating towards the religious.

[1] See Plutarch, Perikl. capp. 5, 32, 38; Cicero, De Republ. i. 15–16 ed. Maii.

The phytologist Theophrastus, in his valuable collection of facts respecting vegetable organisation, is often under the necessity of opposing his scientific interpretation of curious incidents in the vegetable world to the religious interpretation of them which he found current. Anomalous phænomena in the growth or decay of trees were construed as signs from the gods, and submitted to a prophet for explanation (see Histor. Plantar. ii. 3; iv. 16; v. 3).

We may remark, however, that the old faith had still a certain hold over his mind. In commenting on the story of the willow-tree at Philippi, and the venerable old plane-tree at Antandros (more than sixty feet high, and requiring four men to grasp it round in the girth), having been blown down by a high wind, and afterwards spontaneously resuming their erect posture, he offers some explanation how such a phænomenon might have happened, but he admits, at the end, that there *may* be something extra-natural in the case, Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως ἔξω φυσικῆς αἰτίας ἐστιν, &c. (De Caus. Plant. v. 4): see a similar miracle in reference to the cedar-tree of Vespasian (Tacit. Hist. ii. 78).

Euripidês, in his lost tragedy called Μελανίππη Σοφή, placed in the mouth of Melanippê a formal discussion and confutation of the whole doctrine of *τέρατα*, or supernatural indications (Dionys. Halicar. Ars Rhetor. p. 300–356, Reisk.). Compare the Fables of Phædrus, iii. 3; Plutarch, Sept. Sap. Conviv. c. 3, p. 149; and the curious philosophical explanation by which the learned men of Alexandria tranquillised the alarms of the vulgar, on occasion of the serpent said to have been seen entwined round the head of the crucified Kleomenês (Plutarch, Kleomen. c. 39).

It is one part of the duty of an able physician, according to the Hippokratic treatise called Prognosticon (c. 1, t. 2, p. 112, ed. Littré), when he visits his patient, to examine whether there is anything divine in the malady, ἅμα δὲ καὶ εἴ τι θεῖον ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇσι νούσοισι: this, however, does not agree with the memorable doctrine laid down in the treatise, De Aëre, Locis et Aquis (c. 22, p. 78, ed. Littré), and cited hereafter, in this chapter. Nor does Galen seem to have regarded it as harmonising with the general views of Hippokratês. In the excellent Prolegomena of M. Littré to his edition of Hippokratês (t. i. p. 76) will be found an inedited scholium, wherein the opinion of Baccheius and other physicians is given, that the affections of the plague were to be looked upon as divine, inasmuch as the disease came from God; and also the opinion of Xenophon, the friend of Praxagoras, that the "genus of days of crisis" in fever was

The age immediately prior to this unsettled condition of thought is the really mythopœic age; in which the creative faculties of the society know no other employment, and the mass of the society no other mental demand. The perfect expression of such a period, in its full peculiarity and grandeur, is to be found in the Iliad and Odyssey,—poems of which we cannot determine the exact date, but which seem both to have existed prior to the first Olympiad, 776 B.C., our earliest trustworthy mark of Grecian time. For some time after that event, the mythopœic tendencies continued in vigour (Arktinus, Leschês, Eumêlus, and seemingly most of the Hesiodic poems, fall within or shortly after the first century of recorded Olympiads); but from and after this first century, we may trace the operation of causes which gradually enfeebled and narrowed them, altering the point of view from which the mythes were looked at. What these causes were, it will be necessary briefly to intimate.

The foremost and most general of all is, the expansive force of Grecian intellect itself,—a quality in which this remarkable people stand distinguished from all their neighbours and contemporaries. Most, if not all nations have had mythes, but no nation except the Greeks have imparted to them immortal charm and universal interest; and the same mental capacities, which raised the great men of the poetic age to this exalted level, also pushed forward their successors to outgrow the early faith in which the mythes had been generated and accredited.

One great mark, as well as means, of such intellectual expansion, was the habit of attending to, recording, and combining,

divine; "For (said Xenophôn) just as the Dioskuri, being gods, appear to the mariner in the storm and bring him salvation, so also do the days of crisis, when they arrive, in fever." Galen, in commenting upon this doctrine of Xenophôn, says that the author "has expressed his own individual feeling, but has no way set forth the opinion of Hippokratês:" Ὁ δὲ τῶν κρισίμων γένος ἡμερῶν εἰπὼν εἶναι θεῖον, ἑαυτοῦ τι πάθος ὡμολόγησεν· οὐ μὴν Ἱπποκράτους γε τὴν γνώμην ἔδειξεν (Galen, Opp. t. v. p. 120, ed. Basil).

The comparison of the Dioskuri appealed to by Xenophôn is a precise reproduction of their function as described in the Homeric Hymn (Hymn xxxiii. 10): his personification of the "days of crisis" introduces the old religious agency to fill up a gap in his medical science.

I annex an illustration from the Hindoo vein of thought—"It is a rule with the Hindoos to bury, and not to burn, the bodies of those who die of the smallpox; for (say they) the smallpox is not only caused by the goddess Davey, but is, in fact, *Davey herself*; and to burn the body of a person affected with this disease, is, in reality, neither more nor less than *to burn the goddess.*" (Sleeman, Rambles and Recollections, &c., vol. i. ch. xxv. p. 221.)

positive and present facts, both domestic and foreign. In the genuine Grecian epic, the theme was an unknown and aoristic past; but even as early as the "Works and Days" of Hesiod, the present begins to figure. The man who tills the earth appears in his own solitary nakedness, apart from gods and heroes—bound indeed by serious obligations to the gods, but contending against many difficulties which are not to be removed by simple reliance on their help. The poet denounces his age in the strongest terms, as miserable, degraded, and profligate. He looks back with reverential envy to the extinct heroic races who fought at Troy and Thêbes. Yet bad as the present time is, the Muse condescends to look at it along with him, and to prescribe rules for human life—with the assurance that if a man be industrious, frugal, provident, just and friendly in his dealings, the gods will recompense him with affluence and security. Nor does the Muse disdain, while holding out such promise, to cast herself into the most homely details of present existence, and to give advice thoroughly practical and calculating. Men whose minds were full of the heroes of Homer, called Hesiod in contempt the poet of the Helots. The contrast between the two is certainly a remarkable proof of the tendency of Greek poetry towards the present and the positive.

Other manifestations of the same tendency become visible in the age of Archilochus (B.C. 680–660). In an age when metrical composition and the living voice are the only means whereby the productive minds of a community make themselves felt, the invention of a new metre, new forms of song and recitation, or diversified accompaniments, constitute an epoch. The iambic, elegiac, choric, and lyric poetry, from Archilochus downwards, all indicate purposes in the poet, and impressibilities of the hearers, very different from those of the ancient epic. In all of them the personal feeling of the poet and the specialties of present time and place, are brought prominently forward; while in the Homeric hexameter the poet is a mere nameless organ of the historical Muse—the hearers are content to learn, believe, and feel, the incidents of a foregone world—and the tale is hardly less suitable to one time and place than to another. The iambic metre (we are told) was first suggested to Archilochus by the bitterness of his own private antipathies; and the mortal wounds inflicted by his lampoons, upon the individuals against whom they were directed, still remain attested, though the verses themselves have perished. It was the metre (according to the well-known judgement of Aristotle) most nearly approaching to common speech, and well suited

both to the coarse vein of sentiment, and to the smart and emphatic diction of its inventor.[1] Simonidês of Amorgus, the younger contemporary of Archilochus, employed the same metre, with less bitterness, but with an anti-heroic tendency not less decided. His remaining fragments present a mixture of teaching and sarcasm, having a distinct bearing upon actual life,[2] and carrying out the spirit which partially appears in the Hesiodic "Works and Days." Of Alkæus and Sapphô, though unfortunately we are compelled to speak of them upon hearsay only, we know enough to satisfy us that their own personal sentiments and sufferings, their relations private or public with the contemporary world, constituted the soul of those short effusions which gave them so much celebrity.[3] Again in the few remains of the elegiac poets preserved to us—Kallinus, Mimnermus, Tyrtæus—the impulse of some present motive or circumstance is no less conspicuous. The same may also be said of Solôn, Theognis and Phokylides, who preach, encourage, censure, or complain, but do not recount—and in whom a profound ethical sensibility, unknown to the Homeric poems, manifests itself. The form of poetry (to use the words of Solôn

[1] Horat. de Art. Poet. 79—

"Archilochum proprio rabies armavit Iambo," &c.

Compare Epist. i. 19, 23, and Epod. vi. 12; Aristot. Rhetor. iii. 8, 7, and Poetic. c. 4—also Synesius de Somniis—*ἅσπερ Ἀλκαῖος καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος, οἱ δεδαπανήκασι τὴν εὐστομίαν εἰς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἑκάτερος.* (Alcæi Fragment. Halle, 1810, p. 205.) Quintilian speaks in striking language of the power of expression manifested by Archilochus (x. 1, 60).

[2] Simonidês of Amorgus touches briefly, but in a tone of contempt, upon the Trojan war—*γυναικὸς οὕνεκ' ἀμφιδηριωμένους* (Simonid. Fragm. 8, p. 36, v. 118); he seems to think it absurd that so destructive a struggle should have taken place "*pro unâ mulierculâ*," to use the phrase of Mr. Payne Knight.

[3] See Quintilian, x. 1, 63. Horat. Od. i. 32; ii. 13. Aristot. Polit. iii. 10, 4. Dionys. Halic. observes (Vett. Scriptt. Censur. v. p. 421) respecting Alkæus—*πολλαχοῦ γοῦν τὸ μέτρον εἴ τις περιέλοι, ῥητορικὴν ἂν εὕροι πολιτείαν*; and Strabo (xiii. p. 617), *τὰ στασιωτικὰ καλούμενα τοῦ Ἀλκαίου ποιήματα.*

There was a large dash of sarcasm and homely banter aimed at neighbours and contemporaries in the poetry of Sapphô, apart from her impassioned love-songs—*ἄλλως σκώπτει τὸν ἄγροικον νυμφίον καὶ τὸν θυρωρὸν τὸν ἐν τοῖς γάμοις, εὐτελέστατα καὶ ἐν πεζοῖς ὀνόμασι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν ποιητικοῖς. Ὥστε αὐτῆς μᾶλλόν ἐστι τὰ ποιήματα ταῦτα διαλέγεσθαι ἢ ᾄδειν· οὐδ' ἂν ἁρμόσαι πρὸς τὸν χορὸν ἢ πρὸς τὴν λύραν, εἰ μή τις εἴη χορὸς διαλεκτικός* (Dêmêtr. Phaler. De Interpret. c. 167).

Compare also Herodot. ii. 135, who mentions the satirical talent of Sapphô, employed against her brother for an extravagance about the courtezan Rhodôpis.

himself) is made the substitute for the public speaking of the agora.[1]

Doubtless all these poets made abundant use of the ancient mythes, but it was by turning them to present account, in the way of illustration, or flattery, or contrast,—a tendency which we may usually detect even in the compositions of Pindar, in spite of the lofty and heroic strain which they breathe throughout. That narrative or legendary poetry still continued to be composed during the seventh and sixth centuries before the Christian æra, is a fact not to be questioned. But it exhibited the old epical character without the old epical genius; both the inspiration of the composer and the sympathies of the audience had become more deeply enlisted in the world before them, and disposed to fasten on incidents of their own actual experience. From Solôn and Theognis we pass to the abandonment of all metrical restrictions and to the introduction of prose writing,—a fact, the importance of which it is needless to dwell upon,—marking as well the increased familiarity with written records, as the commencement of a separate branch of literature for the intellect, apart from the imagination and emotions whereon the old legends had their exclusive root.

Egypt was first unreservedly opened to the Greeks during the reign of Psammetichus, about B.C. 660; gradually it became much frequented by them for military or commercial purposes, or for simple curiosity. It enlarged the range of their thoughts and observations, while it also imparted to them that vein of mysticism, which overgrew the primitive simplicity of the Homeric religion, and of which I have spoken in a former chapter. They found in it a long-established civilisation, colossal wonders of architecture, and a certain knowledge of astronomy and geometry, elementary indeed, but in advance of their own. Moreover it was a portion of their present world, and it contributed to form in them an interest for noting and describing the actual realities before them. A sensible progress is made in the Greek mind during the two centuries from B.C. 700 to B.C. 500, in the record and arrangement of historical

[1] Solôn, Fragm. iv 1, ed. Schneidewin—

Αὐτὸς κήρυξ ἦλθον ἀφ' ἱμερτῆς Σαλαμῖνος
Κόσμον ἐπέων ᾠδὴν ἀντ' ἀγορῆς θεμενος, &c.

See *Brandis*, Handbuch der Griechischen Philosophie, sect. xxiv.–xxv. Plato states that Solôn, in his old age, engaged in the composition of an epic poem, which he left unfinished, on the subject of the supposed island of Atlantis and Attica (Plato, Timæus, p. 21, and Kritias, p. 113). Plutarch, Solôn, c. 31.

facts: an *historical sense* arises in the superior intellects, and some idea of evidence as a discriminating test between fact and fiction. And this progressive tendency was further stimulated by increased communication and by more settled and peaceful social relations between the various members of the Hellenic world: to which may be added material improvements, purchased at the expense of a period of turbulence and revolution, in the internal administration of each separate state. The Olympic, Pythian, Nemean, and Isthmian games became frequented by visitors from the most distant parts of Greece: the great periodical festival in the island of Dêlos brought together the citizens of every Ionic community, with their wives and children, and an ample display of wealth and ornaments.[1] Numerous and flourishing colonies were founded in Sicily, the south of Italy, the coasts of Epirus, and of the Euxine Sea: the Phokæans explored the whole of the Adriatic, established Massalia, and penetrated even as far as the south of Ibêria, with which they carried on a lucrative commerce.[2] The geographical ideas of the Greeks were thus both expanded and rectified: the first preparation of a map, by Anaximander the disciple of Thalês, is an epoch in the history of science. We may note the ridicule bestowed by Herodotus both upon the supposed people called Hyperboreans and upon the idea of a circumfluous ocean-stream, as demonstrating the progress of the age in this department of inquiry.[3] And even earlier than Herodotus—Xanthus and Xenophanes had noticed the occurrence of fossil marine productions in the interior of Asia Minor and elsewhere, which led them to reflections on the changes of the earth's surface with respect to land and water.[4]

If then we look down the three centuries and a half which elapsed between the commencement of the Olympic æra and

[1] Homer, Hymn. ad Apollin. 155; Thucyd. iii. 104.

[2] Herodotus. i. 163.

[3] Herodotus. iv. 36. γελῶ δὲ ὁρέων Γῆς περιόδους γράψαντας πολλοὺς ἤδη, καὶ οὐδένα νόον ἔχοντας ἐξηγησάμενον· οἳ Ὠκεανόν τε ῥέοντα γράφουσι πέριξ τὴν γῆν ἐοῦσαν κυκλοτερέα ὡς ἀπὸ τόρνου, &c., a remark probably directed against Hekatæus.

Respecting the map of Anaximander, Strabo, i. p. 7; Diogen. Laërt. ii. 1; Agathemer. ap. Geograph. Minor. i. 1. πρῶτος ἐτόλμησε τὴν οἰκουμένην ἐν πίνακι γράψαι.

Aristagoras of Milêtus, who visited Sparta to solicit aid for the revolted Ionians against Darius, brought with him a brazen tablet or map, by means of which he exhibited the relative position of places in the Persian empire (Herodot. v. 49).

[4] Xanthus ap. Strabo. i. p. 50; xii. p. 579. Compare Creuzer, Fragmenta Xanthi, p. 162.

the age of Herodotus and Thucydidês, we shall discern a striking advance in the Greeks,—ethical, social, and intellectual. Positive history and chronology has not only been created, but in the case of Thucydidês, the qualities necessary to the historiographer, in their application to recent events, have been developed with a degree of perfection never since surpassed. Men's minds have assumed a gentler as well as a juster cast; and acts come to be criticised with reference to their bearing on the internal happiness of a well-regulated community, as well as upon the standing harmony of fraternal states. While Thucydidês treats the habitual and licensed piracy, so coolly alluded to in the Homeric poems, as an obsolete enormity—many of the acts described in the old heroic and Theogonic legends were found not less repugnant to this improved tone of feeling. The battles of the gods with the Giants and Titans,—the castration of Uranus by his son Kronus,—the cruelty, deceit and licentiousness, often supposed both in the gods and heroes, provoked strong disapprobation. And the language of the philosopher Xenophanês, who composed both elegiac and iambic poems for the express purpose of denouncing such tales, is as vehement and unsparing as that of the Christian writers, who, eight centuries afterwards, attacked the whole scheme of paganism.[1]

It was not merely as an ethical and social critic that Xenophanês stood distinguished. He was one of a great and eminent triad—Thalês and Pythagoras being the others—who, in the sixth century before the Christian æra, first opened up those veins of speculative philosophy which occupied afterwards so large a portion of Grecian intellectual energy. Of the material differences between the three I do not here speak; I regard them only in reference to the Homeric and Hesiodic philosophy which preceded them, and from which all three deviated by a step, perhaps the most remarkable in all the history of philosophy.

They were the first who attempted to disenthral the philosophic intellect from all-personifying religious faith, and to constitute a method of interpreting nature distinct from the spontaneous inspirations of untaught minds. It is in them that we first find the idea of Person tacitly set aside or limited, and an impersonal Nature conceived as the object of study. The divine husband and wife, Oceanus and Têthys, parents of many gods and of the Oceanic nymphs, together with the avenging

[1] Xenophan. ap. Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathemat. ix. 193. Fragm. 1. Poet. Græc. ed. Schneidewin. Diogen. Laërt. ix. 18.

goddess Styx, are translated into the material substance *water*, or, as we ought rather to say, the Fluid: and Thalês set himself to prove that water was the primitive element, out of which all the different natural substances had been formed.[1] He, as well as Xenophanês and Pythagoras, started the problem of physical philosophy, with its objective character and invariable laws, to be discoverable by a proper and methodical application of the human intellect. The Greek word Φύσις, denoting *nature*, and its derivatives *physics* and *physiology*, unknown in that large sense to Homer or Hesiod, as well as the word *Kosmos* to denote the mundane system, first appears with these philosophers.[2] The elemental analysis of Thalês—the one unchangeable cosmic substance, varying only in appearance, but not in reality, as suggested by Xenophanês,—and the geometrical and arithmetical combinations of Pythagoras,—all these were different ways of approaching the explanation of physical phænomena, and each gave rise to a distinct school or succession of philosophers. But they all agreed in departing from the primitive method, and in recognising determinate properties, a material substratum, and objective truth, in nature—either independent of willing or designing agents, or serving to these latter at once as an indispensable subject-matter and as a limiting condition. Xenophanês disclaimed openly all knowledge respecting the gods, and pronounced that no man could have any means of ascertaining when he was right and when he was wrong, in affirmations respecting them:[3] while Pythagoras represents in part the scientific tendencies of his age, in part also the spirit of mysticism and of special fraternities for religious and ascetic observance, which became diffused throughout Greece in the sixth century before the Christian æra. This was another point which placed him in antipathy with the simple, unconscious,

[1] Aristotel. Metaphys. i. 3.

[2] Plutarch, Placit. Philos. ii. 1; also Stobæus, Eclog. Physic. i. 22, where the difference between the Homeric expressions and those of the subsequent philosophers is seen. Damm, Lexic. Homeric. v. *Φύσις*; Alexander von Humboldt, *Kosmos*, p. 76, the note 9 on page 62 of that admirable work.

The title of the treatises of the early philosophers (Melissus, Dêmokritus, Parmenidês, Empedoklês, Alkmæôn, &c.) was frequently Περὶ *Φύσεως* (Galen, Opp. t. i. p. 56, ed. Basil).

[3] Xenophan. ap. Sext. Empiric. vii. 50; viii. 326—

> Καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν, οὐδέ τις ἔστιν
> Εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ὅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων·
> Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών,
> Αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε, δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

Compare Aristotel. De Xenophane, Zenone, et Gorgiâ, cap. 1–2.

and demonstrative faith of the old poets, as well as with the current legend.

If these distinguished men, when they ceased to follow the primitive instinct of tracing the phænomena of nature to personal and designing agents, passed over, not at once to induction and observation, but to a misemployment of abstract words, substituting metaphysical *eidôla* in the place of polytheism, and to an exaggerated application of certain narrow physical theories —we must remember that nothing else could be expected from the scanty stock of facts then accessible, and that the most profound study of the human mind points out such transition as an inevitable law of intellectual progress.[1] At present we have to compare them only with that state of the Greek mind[2] which they partially superseded, and with which they were in decided opposition. The rudiments of physical science were conceived and developed among superior men; but the religious feeling of the mass was averse to them; and the aversion, though gradually mitigated, never wholly died away. Some of the philosophers were not backward in charging others with irreligion, while the multitude seems to have felt the same sentiment more or less towards all—or towards that postulate of constant sequences, with determinate conditions of occurrence, which scientific study implies, and which they could not reconcile with their belief in the agency of the gods, to whom they were constantly praying for special succour and blessings.

The discrepancy between the scientific and the religious point of view was dealt with differently by different philosophers. Thus Sokratês openly admitted it, and assigned to each a distinct and independent province. He distributed phænomena into two classes: one wherein the connexion of antecedent and consequent was invariable and ascertainable by human study, and therefore future results accessible to a well-instructed foresight; the other, and those, too, the most comprehensive and important, which the gods had reserved for themselves and their own unconditional agency, wherein there was no invariable or

[1] See the treatise of M. Auguste Comte (*Cours de Philosophie Positive*), and his doctrine of the three successive stages of the human mind in reference to scientific study—the theological, the metaphysical and the positive;—a doctrine laid down generally in his first lecture (vol. i. p. 4–12), and largely applied and illustrated throughout his instructive work. It is also re-stated and elucidated by Mr. John Stuart Mill in his System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, vol. ii. p. 610.

[2] "Human wisdom (*ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία*), as contrasted with the primitive theology (*οἱ ἀρχαῖοι καὶ διατρίβοντες περὶ τὰς θεολογίας*)," to take the words of Aristotle (Meteorolog. ii. 1, p. 41–42, ed. Tauchnitz).

ascertainable sequence, and where the result could only be foreknown by some omen, prophecy, or other special inspired communication from themselves. Each of these classes was essentially distinct, and required to be looked at and dealt with in a manner radically incompatible with the other. Sokratês held it wrong to apply the scientific interpretation to the latter, or the theological interpretation to the former. Physics and astronomy, in his opinion, belonged to the divine class of phænomena, in which human research was insane, fruitless, and impious.[1]

On the other hand, Hippokratês, the contemporary of Sokratês, denied the discrepancy, and merged into one those two classes of phænomena,—the divine and the scientifically determinable,—which the latter had put asunder. Hippokratês treated all phænomena as at once both divine and scientifically determinable. In discussing certain peculiar bodily disorders found among the Scythians, he observes, "The Scythians themselves ascribe the cause of this to God, and reverence and bow down to such sufferers, each man fearing that he may suffer the like: and I myself think too that these affections, as well as all others, are divine: no one among them is either more divine or more human than another, but all are on the same footing, and all divine; nevertheless each of them has its own physical conditions, and not one occurs without such physical conditions."[2]

[1] Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 6–9. Τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα (Σωκράτης) συνεβούλευε καὶ πράττειν, ὡς ἐνόμιζεν ἄριστ' ἂν πραχθῆναι· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδήλων ὅπως ἀποβήσοιτο, μαντευσομένους ἔπεμπεν, εἰ ποιητέα. Καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας οἴκους τε καὶ πόλεις καλῶς οἰκήσειν μαντικῆς ἔφη προσδεῖσθαι· τεκτονικὸν μὲν γὰρ ἢ χαλκευτικὸν ἢ γεωργικὸν ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχικὸν, ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἔργων ἐξεταστικὸν, ἢ λογιστικὸν, ἢ οἰκονομικὸν, ἢ στρατηγικὸν γενέσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθήματα καὶ ἀνθρώπου γνώμῃ αἱρετέα ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι· τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἔφη τοὺς θεοὺς ἑαυτοῖς καταλείπεσθαι, ὧν οὐδὲν δῆλον εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις . . . . . Τοὺς δὲ μηδὲν τῶν τοιούτων οἰομένους εἶναι δαιμόνιον, ἀλλὰ πάντα τῇς ἀνθρωπίνης γνώμης, δαιμονᾷν ἔφη· δαιμονᾷν δὲ καὶ τοὺς μαντευομένους ἃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ μαθοῦσι διακρίνειν . . . . Ἔφη δὲ δεῖν, ἃ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ, μανθάνειν· ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔστι, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι· τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ, οἷς ἂν ὄσιν ἵλεῳ, σημαίνειν. Compare also Memorab. iv. 7, 7; and Cyropæd. i. 6, 3, 23–46.

Physical and astronomical phænomena are classified by Sokratês among the divine class, interdicted to human study (Memor. i. 1, 13): τὰ θεῖα or δαιμόνια as opposed to τἀνθρώπεια. Plato (Phileb. c. 16; Legg. x. p. 886–889; xii. p. 967) held the sun and stars to be gods, each animated with its special soul: he allowed astronomical investigation to the extent necessary for avoiding blasphemy respecting these beings—μέχρι τοῦ μὴ βλασφημεῖν περὶ αὐτά (vii. 821).

[2] Hippokratês, De Aëre, Locis et Aquis, c. 22 (p. 78, edit. Littré, sect.

A third distinguished philosopher of the same day, Anaxagoras, allegorising Zeus and the other personal gods, proclaimed the doctrine of one common pervading Mind, as having first originated movement in the primæval Chaos, the heterogeneous constituents of which were so confused together that none of them could manifest themselves, each was neutralised by the rest, and all remained in rest and nullity. The movement originated by Mind disengaged them from this imprisonment, so that each kind of particle was enabled to manifest its properties with some degree of distinctness. This general doctrine obtained much admiration from Plato and Aristotle; but they at the same time remarked with surprise, that Anaxagoras never made any use at all of his own general doctrine for the explanation of the phænomena of nature,—that he looked for nothing but physical causes and connecting laws,[1]—so that in fact the spirit of his particular researches was not materially different from those of Demokritus or Leukippus, whatever might be the difference in their general theories. His investigations in meteorology and astronomy, treating the heavenly bodies as subjects for calculation, have been already noticed as offensive, not only to the general public of Greece, but even to Sokratês himself among them. He was tried at Athens,

106, ed. Petersen): *Ἔτι τε πρὸς τουτέοισι εὐνούχιαι γίγνονται οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐν Σκύθῃσι, καὶ γυνακήια ἐργάζονται καὶ ὡς αἱ γυναῖκες διαλέγονταί τε ὁμοίως· καλεῦνταί τε οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἀνανδριεῖς. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπιχώριοι τὴν αἰτίην προστιθέασι θεῷ καὶ σέβονται τουτέους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ προσκυνέουσι, δεδοικότες περὶ ἑωῦτέων ἕκαστοι. Ἐμοὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτέῳ δοκέει ταῦτα τὰ πάθεα θεῖα εἶναι, καὶ τἄλλα πάντα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἑτέρου θειότερον οὐδὲ ἀνθρωπινώτερον, ἀλλὰ πάντα θεῖα· ἕκαστον δὲ ἔχει φύσιν τῶν τοιουτέων, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄνευ φύσιος γίγνεται. Καὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὡς μοι δοκέει γίγνεσθαι, φράσω*, &c.

Again, sect. 112. *Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον ἔλεξα, θεῖα μὲν καὶ ταῦτά ἐστι ὁμοίως τοῖσι ἄλλοισι, γίγνεται δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἕκαστα.*

Compare the remarkable treatise of Hippokratês, De Morbo Sacro, capp. 1 & 18, vol. vi. p. 352–394, ed. Littré. See this opinion of Hippokratês illustrated by the doctrines of some physical philosophers stated in Aristotle, Physic. ii. 8. *ὥσπερ ὅει ὁ Ζεὺς, οὐχ ὅπως τὸν σῖτον αὐξήσῃ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης*, &c. Some valuable observations on the method of Hippokratês are also found in Plato, Phædr. p. 270.

[1] See the graphic picture in Plato, Phædon. p. 97–98 (cap. 46–47): compare Plato, Legg. xii. p. 967; Aristotel. Metaphysic. i. p. 13–14 (ed. Brandis); Plutarch. Defect. Oracul. p. 435.

Simplicius, Commentar. in Aristotel. Physic. p. 38. *καὶ ὅπερ δὲ ὁ ἐν Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ Ἀναξαγόρᾳ, τὸ ἐν ταῖς τῶν κατὰ μέρος αἰτιολογίαις μὴ τῷ νῷ κεχρῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ ταῖς ὑλικαῖς ἀποδόσεσιν, οἰκεῖον ἦν τῇ φυσιολογίᾳ.* Anaxagoras thought that the superior intelligence of man, as compared with other animals, arose from his possession of hands (Aristot. de Part. Animal. iv. 10, p. 687, ed. Bekk.).

and seems to have escaped condemnation only by voluntary exile.[1]

The three eminent men just named, all essentially different from each other, may be taken as illustrations of the philosophical mind of Greece during the last half of the fifth century B.C. Scientific pursuits had acquired a powerful hold, and adjusted themselves in various ways with the prevalent religious feelings of the age. Both Hippokratês and Anaxagoras modified their ideas of the divine agency, so as to suit their thirst for scientific research. According to the former, the gods were the really efficient agents in the production of all phænomena,—the mean and indifferent not less than the terrific or tutelary. Being thus alike connected with all phænomena, they were specially associated with none—and the proper task of the inquirer was, to find out those rules and conditions by which (he assumed) their agency was always determined, and according to which it might be foretold. Now such a view of the divine agency could never be reconciled with the religious feelings of the ordinary Grecian believer, even as they stood in the time of Anaxagoras: still less could it have been reconciled with those of the Homeric man, more than three centuries earlier. By him Zeus and Athênê were conceived as definite Persons, objects of special reverence, hopes and fears, and animated with peculiar feelings, sometimes of favour, sometimes of wrath, towards himself or his

[1] Xenophôn, Memorab. iv. 7. Sokratês said, καὶ παραφρονῆσαι τὸν ταῦτα μεριμνῶντα οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ Ἀναξαγόραν παρεφρόνησεν, ὃ μέγιστον φρονήσας ἐπὶ τῷ τὰς τῶν θεῶν μηχανὰς ἐξηγεῖσθαι, &c. Compare Schaubach, Anaxagoræ Fragment. p. 50–141; Plutarch, Nikias, 23, and Periklês, 6–32; Diogen. Laërt. ii. 10–14.

The Ionic philosophy, from which Anaxagoras receded more in language than in spirit, seems to have been the least popular of all the schools, though some of the commentators treat it as conformable to vulgar opinion, because it confined itself for the most part to phænomenal explanations, and did not recognise the *noumena* of Plato, or the τὸ ἓν νοητόν of Parmenidês,—"qualis fuit Ionicorum, quæ tum dominabatur, ratio, vulgari opinione et communi sensu comprobata" (Karsten, Parmenidis Fragment., De Parmenidis Philosophiâ, p. 154). This is a mistake: the Ionic philosophers, who constantly searched for and insisted upon physical laws, came more directly into conflict with the sentiment of the multitude than the Eleatic school.

The larger atmospheric phænomena were connected in the most intimate manner with Grecian religious feeling and uneasiness (see Demokritus ap. Sect. Empiric. ix. sect. 19–24, p. 552–554, Fabric.); the attempts of Anaxagoras and Demokritus to explain them were more displeasing to the public than the Platonic speculations (Demokritus ap. Aristot. Meteorol. ii. 7; Stobæus, Eclog. Physic. p. 594: compare Mullach, Democriti Fragmenta, lib. iv. p. 394).

family or country. They were propitiated by his prayers, and prevailed upon to lend him succour in danger—but offended and disposed to bring evil upon him if he omitted to render thanks or sacrifice. This sense of individual communion with them, and dependence upon them, was the essence of his faith. While he prayed with sincerity for special blessings or protection from the gods, he could not acquiesce in the doctrine of Hippokratês, that their agency was governed by constant laws and physical conditions.

That radical discord between the mental impulses of science and religion, which manifests itself so decisively during the most cultivated ages of Greece, and which harassed more or less so many of the philosophers, produced its most afflicting result in the condemnation of Sokratês by the Athenians. According to the remarkable passage recently cited from Xenophôn, it will appear that Sokratês agreed with his countrymen in denouncing physical speculations as impious,—that he recognised the religious process of discovery as a peculiar branch, co-ordinate with the scientific,—and that he laid down a theory, of which the basis was, the confessed divergence of these two processes from the beginning—thereby seemingly satisfying the exigencies of religious hopes and fears on the one hand, and those of reason, in her ardour for ascertaining the invariable laws of phænomena, on the other. We may remark that the theory of this religious and extra-scientific process of discovery was at that time sufficiently complete; for Sokratês could point out, that those anomalous phænomena which the gods had reserved for themselves, and into which science was forbidden to pry, were yet accessible to the seekings of the pious man, through oracles, omens, and other exceptional means of communication which divine benevolence vouchsafed to keep open.

Now the scission thus produced between the superior minds and the multitude, in consequence of the development of science and the scientific point of view, is a fact of great moment in the history of Greek progress, and forms an important contrast between the age of Homer and Hesiod and that of Thucydidês; though in point of fact, even the multitude, during this later age, were partially modified by those very scientific views which they regarded with disfavour. And we must keep in view the primitive religious faith, once universal and unobstructed, but subsequently disturbed by the intrusions of science; we must follow the great change, as well in respect to enlarged intelligence as to refinement of social and

ethical feeling, among the Greeks, from the Hesiodic times downward, in order to render some account of the altered manner in which the ancient mythes came to be dealt with. These mythes, the spontaneous growth of a creative and personifying interpretation of nature, had struck root in Grecian associations at a time when the national faith required no support from what we call evidence. They were *now* submitted not simply to a feeling, imagining, and believing public, but also to special classes of instructed men,—philosophers, historians, ethical teachers, and critics,—and to a public partially modified by their ideas[1] as well as improved by a wider practical experience. They were not intended for such an audience; they had ceased to be in complete harmony even with the lower strata of intellect and sentiment,—much more so with the higher. But they were the cherished inheritance of a past time; they were interwoven in a thousand ways with the religious faith, the patriotic retrospect, and the national worship, of every Grecian community; the general type of the mythe was the ancient, familiar and universal form of Grecian thought, which even the most cultivated men had imbibed in their childhood from the poets,[2] and by which they

[1] It is curious to see that some of the most recondite doctrines of the Pythagorean philosophy were actually brought before the general Syracusan public in the comedies of Epicharmus: "In comœdiis suis personas sæpe ita colloqui fecit, ut sententias Pythagoricas et in universum sublimia vitæ præcepta immisceret." (Grysar, De Doriensium Comœdiâ, p. 111, Col. 1828.) The fragments preserved in Diogen. Laërt. (iii. 9–17) present both criticisms upon the Hesiodic doctrine of a primæval chaos, and an exposition of the archetypal and immutable ideas (as opposed to the fluctuating phænomena of sense) which Plato afterwards adopted and systematised.

Epicharmus seems to have combined with this abstruse philosophy a strong vein of comic shrewdness and some turn to scepticism (Cicero, Epistol. ad Attic. i. 19): "ut crebro mihi vafer ille Siculus Epicharmus insusurret cantilenam suam." Clemens Alex. Strom. v. p. 258. Νᾶφε καὶ μέμναο· ἀπιστεῖν· ἄρθρα ταῦτα τῶν φρενῶν. Ζῶμεν ἀριθμῷ καὶ λογισμῷ· ταῦτα γὰρ σώζει βροτούς. Also his contemptuous ridicule of the prophetesses of his time who cheated foolish women out of their money, pretending to universal knowledge, καὶ πάντα γιγνώσκοντι τῷ τήναν λόγῳ (ap. Polluc. ix. 81). See, about Epicharmus, O. Müller, Dorians, iv. 7, 4.

These dramas seem to have been exhibited at Syracuse between 480–460 B.C., anterior even to Chionidês and Magnês at Athens (Aristot. Poet. c. 3): he says πολλῷ πρότερος, which can hardly be literally exact. The critics of the Horatian age looked upon Epicharmus as the prototype of Plautus (Hor. Epistol. ii. 1, 58).

[2] The third book of the Republic of Plato is particularly striking in reference to the use of the poets in education: see also his treatise De Legg. vii. p. 810–811. Some teachers made their pupils learn whole poets by heart (ὅλους ποιητὰς ἐκμανθάνων), others preferred extracts and selections.

were to a certain degree unconsciously enslaved. Taken as a whole the mythes had acquired prescriptive and ineffaceable possession. To attack, call in question, or repudiate them, was a task painful even to undertake, and far beyond the power of any one to accomplish.

For these reasons, the anti-mythic vein of criticism was of little effect as a destroying force. But nevertheless its dissolving, decomposing and transforming influence was very considerable. To accommodate the ancient mythes to an improved tone of sentiment and a newly created canon of credibility, was a function which even the wisest Greeks did not disdain, and which occupied no small proportion of the whole intellectual activity of the nation. The mythes were looked at from a point of view completely foreign to the reverential curiosity and literal imaginative faith of the Homeric man. They were broken up and recast in order to force them into new moulds such as their authors had never conceived. We may distinguish four distinct classes of minds, in the literary age now under examination, as having taken them in hand—the poets, the logographers, the philosophers, and the historians.

With the poets and logographers, the mythical persons are real predecessors, and the mythical world an antecedent fact. But it is divine and heroic reality, not human; the present is only half-brother of the past (to borrow[1] an illustration from Pindar in his allusion to gods and men) remotely and generically, but not closely and specifically, analogous to it. As a general habit, the old feelings and the old unconscious faith, apart from all proof or evidence, still remain in their minds; but recent feelings have grown up, which compel them to omit, to alter, sometimes even to reject and condemn, particular narratives.

Pindar repudiates some stories and transforms others, because they are inconsistent with his conceptions of the gods. Thus he formally protests against the tale that Pelops had been killed and served up at table by his father, for the immortal gods to eat. Pindar shrinks from the idea of imputing to them so horrid an appetite; he pronounces the tale to have been originally fabricated by a slanderous neighbour. Nor can he bring himself to recount the quarrels between different gods.[2] The amours of Zeus and Apollo are noway displeasing to him; but he occasionally suppresses some of the simple details of the old mythe, as deficient in dignity. Thus, according to the

[1] Pindar, Nem. vi. 1. Compare Simonidês, Fragm. 1 (Gaisford).
[2] Pindar, Olymp. i. 30–55; ix. 32–45.

Hesiodic narrative, Apollo was informed by a raven of the infidelity of the nymph Korônis: but the mention of the raven did not appear to Pindar consistent with the majesty of the god, and he therefore wraps up the mode of detection in vague and mysterious language.[1] He feels considerable repugnance to the character of Odysseus, and intimates more than once that Homer has unduly exalted him, by force of poetical artifice. With the character of the Æakid Ajax, on the other hand, he has the deepest sympathy, as well as with his untimely and inglorious death, occasioned by the undeserved preference of a less worthy rival.[2] He appeals for his authority usually to the Muse, but sometimes to "ancient sayings of men," accompanied with a general allusion to story-tellers and bards,—admitting however that these stories present great discrepancy, and sometimes that they are false.[3] Yet the marvellous and the supernatural afford no ground whatever for rejecting a story: Pindar makes an express declaration to this effect in reference to the romantic adventures of Perseus and the Gorgon's head.[4] He treats even those mythical characters, which conflict the most palpably with positive experience, as connected by a real genealogical thread with the world before him. Not merely the heroes of Troy and Thêbes, and the demigod seamen of Jasôn in the ship Argô, but also the Centaur Cheirôn, the hundred headed Typhôs, the giant Alkyoneus, Antæus, Bellerophôn and Pegasus, the Chimæra, the Amazons and the Hyperboreans—all appear painted on the same canvas, and touched with the same colours, as the men of the recent and recorded past, Phalaris and Krœsus: only they are thrown back to a greater distance in the perspective.[5] The heroic ancestors of those great Æginetan, Thessalian, Thêban, Argeian, &c. families, whose present members the poet celebrates for their agonistic victories, sympathise with the exploits and second the efforts of their descendants: the inestimable value of a privileged breed, and of the stamp of

[1] Pyth. iii. 25. See the allusions to Semelê, Alkmêna, and Danaê, Pyth. iii. 98; Nem. x. 10. Compare also *supra*, chap. ix.

[2] Pindar, Nem. vii. 20–30; viii. 23–31. Isthm. iii. 50–60.

It seems to be sympathy for Ajax, in odes addressed to noble Æginetan victors, which induces him thus to depreciate Odysseus; for he eulogises Sisyphus, specially on account of his cunning and resources (Olymp. xiii. 50), in the ode addressed to Xenophôn the Corinthian.

[3] Olymp. i. 28; Nem. viii. 20; Pyth. i. 93; Olymp. vii. 55; Nem. vi. 43. *φάντι δ' ἀνθρώπων παλαιαὶ ῥήσιες*, &c.

[4] Pyth. x. 49. Compare Pyth. xii. 11–22.

[5] Pyth. i. 17; iii. 4–7; iv. 12; viii. 16. Nem. iv. 27–32; v. 89. Isthm. v. 31; vi. 44–48. Olymp. iii. 17; viii. 61; xiii. 61–87.

nature, is powerfully contrasted with the impotence of unassisted teaching and practice.[1] The power and skill of the Argeian Theæus and his relatives as wrestlers, are ascribed partly to the fact that their ancestor Pamphaês in aforetime had hospitably entertained the Tyndarids Kastôr and Pollux.[2] Perhaps however the strongest proof of the sincerity of Pindar's mythical faith is afforded when he notices a guilty incident with shame and repugnance, but with an unwilling confession of its truth, as in the case of the fratricide committed on Phokus by his brothers Pêleus and Telamôn.[3]

Æschylus and Sophoklês exhibit the same spontaneous and uninquiring faith as Pindar in the legendary antiquities of Greece, taken as a whole; but they allow themselves greater licence as to the details. It was indispensable to the success of their compositions that they should recast and group anew the legendary events, preserving the names and general understood relation of those characters whom they introduced. The demand for novelty of combination increased with the multiplication of tragic spectacles at Athens: moreover the feelings of the Athenians, ethical as well as political, had become too critical to tolerate the literal reproduction of many among the ancient stories.

Both of these poets exalted rather than lowered the dignity of the mythical world, as something divine and heroic rather than human. The Promêtheus of Æschylus is a far more exalted conception than his keen-witted namesake in Hesiod, and the more homely details of the ancient Thêbaïs and Œdipodia were modified in the like spirit by Sophoklês.[4] The religious agencies of the old epic are constantly kept prominent by both. The paternal curse,—the wrath of deceased persons against those from whom they have sustained wrong,—the judgements of the Erinnys against guilty or foredoomed persons, sometimes inflicted directly, sometimes brought about through dementation of the sufferer himself (like the Homeric Atê),—are frequent in their tragedies.[5]

[1] Nem. iii. 39; v. 40. *συγγενὴς εὐδοξία—πάτριος συγγενής*; v. 8. Olymp. ix. 103. Pindar seems to introduce *φύᾳ* in cases where Homer would have mentioned the divine assistance.

[2] Nem. x. 37–51. Compare the family legend of the Athenian Dêmokratês, in Plato, Lysis, p. 205.

[3] Nem. v. 12–16.

[4] See vol. i. chap. xlv. on the Legend of the Siege of Thebês.

[5] The curse of Œdipus is the determining force in the Sept. ad Theb., *Ἀρά τ', Ἐρινὺς πατρὸς ἡ μεγασθενής* (v. 70); it reappears several times in the course of the drama, with particular solemnity in the mouth of

Æschylus in two of his remaining pieces brings forward the gods as the chief personages. Far from sharing the objection of Pindar to dwell upon dissensions of the gods, he introduces Promêtheus and Zeus in the one, Apollo and the Eumenidês in the other, in marked opposition. The dialogue, first superinduced by him upon the primitive chorus, gradually became the most important portion of the drama, and is more elaborated in Sophoklês than in Æschylus. Even in Sophoklês, however, it still generally retains its ideal majesty as contrasted with the rhetorical and forensic tone which afterwards crept in: it grows out of the piece, and addresses itself to the emotions more than to the reason of the audience. Nevertheless, the effect of Athenian political discussion and democratical feeling is visible in both these dramatists. The idea of rights and legitimate privileges as opposed to usurping force, is applied by Æschylus even to the society of the gods. The Eumenidês accuse Apollo of having, with the insolence of

Eteoklês (695–709, 725, 785, &c.); he yields to it as an irresistible force, as carrying the family to ruin—

Ἐπεὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα κάρτ' ἐπισπέρχει θεὸς,
Ἰτω κατ' οὖρον, κῦμα Κωκυτοῦ λαχὸν,
Βοίβῃ στυγηθὲν πᾶν τὸ Λαΐου γένος.
* * * * *
Φίλου γὰρ ἐχθρά μοι πατρὸς τέλει' ἀρὰ
Ξηροῖς ἀκλαύστοις ὄμμασιν προσιζάνει, &c.

So again at the opening of the Agamemnôn, the *μνάμων μῆνις τεκνόποινος* (v. 155) and the sacrifice of Iphigenia are dwelt upon as leaving behind them an avenging doom upon Agamemnôn, though he took precautions for gagging her mouth during the sacrifice and thus preventing her from giving utterance to imprecations—*Φθόγγον ἀραῖον οἴκοις Βίᾳ χαλινῶν τ' ἀναύδῳ μένει (κατασχεῖν)*, v. 246. The Erinnys awaits Agamemnôn even at the moment of his victorious consummation at Troy (467; compare 762–990, 1336–1433): she is most to be dreaded after great good fortune: she enforces the curse which ancestral crimes have brought upon the house of Atreus—*πρώταρχος ἄτη—παλαιαὶ ἁμαρτίαι δόμων* (1185–1197, Choëph. 692) —the curse imprecated by the outraged Thyestês (1601). In the Choëphorœ, Apollo menaces Orestês with the wrath of his deceased father, and all the direful visitations of the Erinnys, unless he undertakes to revenge the murder (271–296). Αἶσα and Ἐρινὺς bring on blood for blood (647). But the moment that Orestês, placed between these conflicting obligations (925), has achieved it, he becomes himself the victim of the Erinnyes, who drive him mad even at the end of the Choëphorœ (*ἕως δ' ἔτ' ἔμφρων εἰμὶ*, 1026), and who make their appearance bodily, and pursue him throughout the third drama of this fearful trilogy. The Eidôlon of Klytæmnestra impels them to vengeance (Eumenid. 96), and even spurs them on when they appear to relax. Apollo conveys Orestês to Athens, whither the Erinnyes pursue him, and prosecute him before the judgement-seat of the goddess Athênê, to whom they submit the award; Apollo appearing as his defender. The debate between "the daughters of Night" and the god, accusing and defending, is eminently curious (576–730): the Erinnyes are

youthful ambition, "ridden down" their old prerogatives[1]—while the Titan Promêtheus, the champion of suffering humanity against the unfriendly dispositions of Zeus, ventures to depict the latter as a recent usurper reigning only by his superior strength, exalted by one successful revolution, and destined at some future time to be overthrown by another,—a fate which cannot be averted except through warnings communicable only by Promêtheus himself.[2]

Though Æschylus incurred reproaches of impiety from Plato, and seemingly also from the Athenian public, for particular

deeply mortified at the humiliation put upon them when Orestês is acquitted, but Athênê at length reconciles them, and a covenant is made whereby they become protectresses of Attica, accepting of a permanent abode and solemn worship (1006): Orestês returns to Argos, and promises that even in his tomb he will watch that none of his descendants shall ever injure the land of Attica (770). The solemn trial and acquittal of Orestês formed the consecrating legend of the Hill and Judicature of Areiopagus.

This is the only complete trilogy of Æschylus which we possess, and the avenging Erinnyes (416) are the movers throughout the whole—unseen in the first two dramas, visible and appalling in the third. And the appearance of Kassandra under the actual prophetic fever in the first, contributes still further to impart to it a colouring different from common humanity.

The general view of the movement of the Oresteia given in Welcker (Æschyl. Trilogie, p. 445) appears to me more conformable to Hellenic ideas than that of Klausen (Theologumena Æschyli, p. 157–169), whose valuable collection and comparison of passages is too much affected, both here and elsewhere, by the desire to bring the agencies of the Greek mythical world into harmony with what a religious mind of the present day would approve. Moreover he sinks the personality of Athênê too much in the supreme authority of Zeus (p. 158–168).

[1] Eumenidês, 150—

> Ἰὼ παῖ Διὸς, ἐπίκοποις πέλαι,
> Νέος δὲ γραίας δαίμονας καθιππάσω, &c.

The same metaphor again, v. 731. Æschylus seems to delight in contrasting the young and the old gods: compare 70–162, 882.

The Erinnyes tell Apollo that he assumes functions which do not belong to him, and will thus desecrate those which do belong to him (715–754)—

> Ἀλλ' αἱματηρὰ πράγματ', οὐ λαχὼν, σέβεις,
> Μαντεῖα δ' οὐκ ἔθ' ἁγνὰ μαντεύσει μέρων.

The refusal of the king Pelasgos, in the Supplices, to undertake what he feels to be the sacred duty of protecting the suppliant Danaïdes, without first submitting the matter to his people and obtaining their expressed consent, and the fear which he expresses of their blame (*κατ' ἀρχὰς γὰρ φιλαίτιος λεὼς*), are more forcibly set forth than an old epic poem would probably have thought necessary (see Supplices, 369, 397, 485, 519). The solemn wish to exclude both anarchy and despotism from Athens bears still more the mark of political feeling of the time—*μήτ' ἄναρχον μήτε δεσποτούμενον* (Eumenid. 527–696).

[2] Promêtheus, 35, 151, 170, 309, 524, 910, 940, 956.

speeches and incidents in his tragedies,[1] and though he does not adhere to the received vein of religious tradition with the

[1] Plato, Republ. ii. 381–383; compare Æschyl. Fragment. 159, ed. Dindorf. He was charged also with having divulged in some of his plays secret matters of the mysteries of Dêmêtêr, but is said to have excused himself by alleging ignorance: he was not aware that what he had said was comprised in the mysteries (Aristot. Ethic. Nicom. iii. 2; Clemens Alex. Strom. ii. p. 387); the story is different again in Ælian, V. H. v. 19.

How little can be made out distinctly respecting this last accusation may be seen in Lobeck, Aglâophamus p. 81.

Cicero (Tusc. Dis. ii. 10) calls Æschylus "almost a Pythagorean:" upon what the epithet is founded we do not know.

There is no evidence to prove to us that the Promêtheus Vinctus was considered as impious by the public before whom it was represented; but its obvious meaning has been so regarded by modern critics, who resort to many different explanations of it, in order to prove that when properly construed it is not impious. But if we wish to ascertain what Æschylus really meant, we ought not to consult the religious ideas of modern times; we have no test except what we know of the poet's own time and that which had preceded him. The explanations given by the ablest critics seem generally to exhibit a predetermination to bring out Zeus, as a just, wise, merciful, and all-powerful Being; and all, in one way or another, distort the figures, alter the perspective, and give far-fetched interpretations of the meaning of this striking drama, which conveys an impression directly contrary (see Welcker, Trilogie Æsch. p. 90–117, with the explanation of Dissen there given; Klausen, Theologum. Æsch. p. 140–154; Schömann, in his recent translation of the play, and the criticism of that translation in the Wiener Jahrbucher, vol. cix. 1845, p. 245, by F. Ritter). On the other hand, Schutz (Excurs. ad Prom. Vinct. p. 149) thinks that Æschylus wished by means of this drama to enforce upon his countrymen the hatred of a despot. Though I do not agree in this interpretation, it appears to me less wide of the truth than the forcible methods employed by others to bring the poet into harmony with their own religious ideas.

Of the Promêtheus Solutus, which formed a sequel to the Promêtheus Vinctus (the entire trilogy is not certainly known), the fragments preserved are very scanty, and the guesses of critics as to its plot have little base to proceed upon. They contend that, in one way or other, the apparent objections which the Promêth. Vinctus presents against the justice of Zeus were in the Promêth. Solutus removed. Hermann, in his *Dissertatio de Æschyli Prometheo Soluto* (Opuscula, vol. iv. p. 256), calls this position in question: I transcribe from his Dissertation one passage, because it contains an important remark in reference to the manner in which the Greek poets handled their religious legends: "while they recounted and believed many enormities respecting individual gods, they always described the Godhead in the abstract as holy and faultless." . . .

"Immo illud admirari oportet, quod quum de singulis Diis indignissima quæque crederent, tamen ubi sine certo nomine Deum dicebant, immunem ab omni vitio, summâque sanctitate præditum intelligebant. Illam igitur Jovis sævitiam ut excusent defensores Trilogiæ, et jure punitum volunt Prometheum—et in sequente fabulâ reconciliato Jove, restitutam arbitrantur divinam justitiam. Quo invento, vereor ne non optime dignitati consuluerint supremi Deorum, quem decuerat potius non sævire omnino, quam placari eâ lege, ut alius Promethei vice lueret."

same strictness as Sophoklês—yet the ascendency and interference of the gods are never out of sight, and the solemnity with which they are represented, set off by a bold, figurative, and elliptical style of expression (often but imperfectly intelligible to modern readers), reaches its maximum in his tragedies. As he throws round the gods a kind of airy grandeur, so neither do his men or heroes appear like tenants of the common earth. The mythical world from which he borrows his characters, is peopled only with "the immediate seed of the gods, in close contact with Zeus, in whom the divine blood has not yet had time to degenerate:"[1] his individuals are taken, not from the iron race whom Hesiod acknowledges with shame as his contemporaries, but from the extinct heroic race which had fought at Troy and Thêbes. It is to them that his conceptions aspire, and he is even chargeable with frequent straining, beyond the limits of poetical taste, to realise his picture. If he does not consistently succeed in it, the reason is because consistency in such a matter is unattainable, since, after all, the analogies of common humanity, the only materials which the most creative imagination has to work upon, obtrude themselves involuntarily, and the lineaments of the man are thus seen even under a dress which promises superhuman proportions.

Sophoklês, the most illustrious ornament of Grecian tragedy, dwells upon the same heroic characters, and maintains their grandeur, on the whole, with little abatement; combining with it a far better dramatic structure, and a wider appeal to human sympathies. Even in Sophoklês, however, we find indications that an altered ethical feeling, and a more predominant sense of artistic perfection, are allowed to modify the harsher religious agencies of the old epic. Occasional misplaced effusions[2] of

[1] Æschyl. Fragment. 146, Dindorf.; ap. Plato. Repub. iii. p. 391; compare Strabo, xii. p. 580—

> . . . . . οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι
> Οἱ Ζηνὸς ἐγγὺς, οἷς ἐν Ἰδαίῳ πάγῳ
> Διὸς πατρῴου βωμὸς ἐστ' ἐν αἰθέρι,
> Κοὔπω σφὶν ἐξίτηλον αἷμα δαιμόνων.

There is one real exception to this statement—the Persæ—which is founded upon an event of recent occurrence; and one apparent exception—the Promêtheus Vinctus. But in that drama no individual mortal is made to appear; we can hardly consider Iô as an ἐφήμερος (253).

[2] For the characteristics of Æschylus see Aristophan. Ran. 755, *ad fin. passim.* The competition between Æschylus and Euripidês turns upon γνῶμαι ἀγαθαί, 1497; the weight and majesty of the words, 1362; πρῶτος τῶν Ἑλλήνων πυργώσας ῥήματα σεμνά, 1001, 921, 930 ("sublimis et gravis et grandiloquus sæpe usque ad vitium," Quintil. x. 1); the imposing appear-

rhetoric, as well as of didactic prolixity, may also be detected. It is Æschylus, not Sophoklês, who forms the marked antithesis to Euripidês; it is Æschylus, not Sophoklês, to whom Aristophanês awards the prize of tragedy, as the poet who assigns most perfectly to the heroes of the past those weighty words, imposing equipments, simplicity of great deeds with little talk, and masculine energy superior to the corruptions of Aphroditê, which beseem the comrades of Agamemnôn and Adrastus.[1]

How deeply this feeling, of the heroic character of the mythical world, possessed the Athenian mind, may be judged by the bitter criticisms made on Euripidês, whose compositions were pervaded, partly by ideas of physical philosophy learnt under Anaxagoras, partly by the altered tone of education and the wide diffusion of practical eloquence, forensic as well as political, at Athens.[2] While Aristophanês assails Euripidês as the representative of this "young Athens," with the utmost keenness of sarcasm,—other critics also concur in

ance of his heroes, such as Memnôn and Kyknus, 961; their reserve in speech, 908; his dramas "full of Arês," and his lion-hearted chiefs, inspiring the auditors with fearless spirit in defence of their country,—1014, 1019, 1040; his contempt of feminine tenderness, 1042—

> Æsch. Οὐδ' οἶδ' οὐδεὶς ἥντιν' ἐρῶσαν πώποτ' ἐποίησα γυναῖκα.
> Eurip. Μὰ Δί', οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης οὐδέν σοι.
> Æsch. μηδέ γ' ἁπαίη·
> Ἀλλ' ἀπὸ σοί τοι καὶ τοῖς σοῖσιν πολλὴ πολλοῦ πικάθοιτο.

To the same general purpose Nubes (1347–1356), composed so many years earlier. The weight and majesty of the Æschylean heroes (*θάρος, τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές*) is dwelt upon in the life of Æschylus, and Sophoklês is said to have derided it—*Ὅσπερ γὰρ ὁ Σοφοκλῆς ἔλεγε, τὸν Αἰσχύλου διαπεπαιχὼς ὄγκον*, &c. (Plutarch, De Profect. in Virt. Sent. c. 7), unless we are to understand this as a mistake of Plutarch quoting Sophoklês instead of Euripidês as he speaks in the Frogs of Aristophanês, which is the opinion both of Lessing in his Life of Sophoklês and of Welcker (Æschyl. Trilogie, p. 525).

[1] See vol. i. chapters xiv. and xv.

Æschylus seems to have been a greater innovator as to the matter of the mythes than either Sophoklês or Euripidês (Dionys. Halic. Judic. de Vet. Script. p. 422, Reisk.). For the close adherence of Sophoklês to the Homeric epic see Athenæ. vii. p. 277; Diogen. Laërt. iv. 20; Suidas, v. *Πολέμων*. Æschylus puts into the mouth of the Eumenidês a serious argument derived from the behaviour of Zeus in chaining his father Kronos (Eumen. 640).

[2] See Valckenaer, Diatribe in Euripid. Fragm. capp. 5 and 6.

The fourth and fifth lectures among the *Dramatische Vorlesungen* of August Wilhelm Schlegel depict both justly and eloquently the difference between Æschylus, Sophoklês and Euripidês, especially on this point of the gradual sinking of the mythical colossus into an ordinary man; about Euripidês especially in lecture 5, vol. i. p. 206, ed. Heidelberg 1809.

designating him as having vulgarised the mythical heroes, and transformed them into mere characters of common life,—loquacious, subtle, and savouring of the market-place.[1] In some of his plays, sceptical expressions and sentiments were introduced, derived from his philosophical studies, sometimes confounding two or three distinct gods into one, sometimes translating the personal Zeus into a substantial Æther with determinate attributes. He put into the mouths of some of his unprincipled dramatic characters, apologetic speeches which were denounced as ostentatious sophistry, and as setting out a triumphant case for the criminal.[2] His thoughts, his words,

[1] Aristot. Poetic. c. 46. Οἷον καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη, αὐτὸς μὲν οἵους δεῖ ποιεῖν, Εὐριπίδης δὲ, οἷοί εἰσι.

The Ranæ and Acharneis of Aristophanês exhibit fully the reproaches urged against Euripidês: the language put into the mouth of Euripidês in the former play (vv. 935–977) illustrates especially the point here laid down. Plutarch (De Gloriâ Atheniens. c. 5) contrasts ἡ Εὐριπίδου σοφία καὶ ἡ Σοφοκλεοῦς λογιότης. Sophoklês either adhered to the old mythes or introduced alterations into them in a spirit conformable to their original character, while Euripidês refined upon them. The comment of Dêmêtrius Phalereus connects τὸ λόγιον expressly with the maintenance of the dignity of the tales. Ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ὅπερ νῦν λόγιον ὀνομάζουσιν (c. 38).

[2] Aristophan. Ran. 770, 887, 1066.

Euripidês says to Æschylus, in regard to the language employed by both of them—

Ἦν οὖν σὺ λέγῃς Λυκαβήττους
Καὶ Παρνάσσων ἡμῖν μεγέθη, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ χρηστὰ διδάσκειν,
Ὅν χρὴ φράζειν ἀνθρωπείως;

Æschylus replies—

Ἀλλ', ὦ κακόδαιμον, ἀνάγκη
Μεγάλων γνωμῶν καὶ διανοιῶν ἴσα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα τίκτειν.
Κἄλλως εἰκὸς τοὺς ἡμιθέους τοῖς ῥήμασι μαίζοσι χρῆσθαι·
Καὶ γὰρ τοῖς ἱματίοις ἡμῶν χρῶνται πολὺ σεμνοτέροισι.
Ἅ 'μοῦ χρηστῶς καταδείξαντος διελυμήνω σύ.

EURIP. Τί δράσας;

ÆSCH. Πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς βασιλεύοντας ῥάκι' ἀμπισχών, ἵν' ἐλεινοὶ
Τοῖς ἀνθρώποις φαίνοιντ' εἶναι.

For the character of the language and measures of Euripidês, as represented by Æschylus, see also v. 1297, and Pac. 527. Philosophical discussion was introduced by Euripidês (Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhetor. viii. 10–ix. 11) in the Melanippê, where the doctrine of prodigies (τέρας) appears to have been argued. Quintilian (x. 1) remarks that to young beginners in judicial pleading, the study of Euripidês was much more specially profitable than that of Sophoklês: compare Dio Chrysostom, Orat. xviii. vol. p. 477, Reisk.

In Euripidês the heroes themselves sometimes delivered moralising discourses,—εἰσάγων τὸν Βελλεροφόντην γνωμολογοῦντα (Welcker, Griechisch Tragöd. Eurip. Stheneb. p. 782). Compare the fragments of his Bellerophôn (15–25, Matthiæ), and of his Chrysippus (7, ib.). A striking story is found in Seneca, Epistol. 115; and Plutarch, de Audiend. Poetis, c. 4, t. i. p. 70, Wytt.

and the rhythm of his choric songs, were all accused of being deficient in dignity and elevation. The mean attire and miserable attitude in which he exhibited Œneus, Têlephus, Thyestês, Inó, and other heroic characters, were unmercifully derided,[1] though it seems that their position and circumstances had always been painfully melancholy; but the effeminate pathos which Euripidês brought so nakedly into the foreground, was accounted unworthy of the majesty of a legendary hero. And he incurred still greater obloquy on another point, on which he is allowed even by his enemies to have only reproduced in substance the pre-existing tales,—the illicit and fatal passion depicted in several of his female characters, such as Phædra and Sthenobœa. His opponents admitted that these stories were true, but contended that they ought to be kept back, and not produced upon the stage,—a proof both of the continued mythical faith and of the more sensitive ethical criticism of his age.[2] The marriage of the six daughters to the six sons of Æolus is of Homeric origin, and stands now, though briefly, stated, in the Odyssey; but the incestuous passion of Makareus and Kanakê, embodied by Euripidês[3] in

[1] Aristophan. Ran. 840—

ὦ στωμυλιοσυλλεκτάδη
Καὶ πτωχοποιὲ καὶ ῥακιοσυρραπτάδη·

See also Aristophan. Acharn. 385–422. For an unfavourable criticism upon such proceeding, see Aristot. Poet. 27.

[2] Aristophan. Ran. 1050—

Eurip. Πότερον δ' οὐκ ὄντα λόγον τοῦτον περὶ τῆς Φαίδρας ξυνέθηκα;
Æsch. Μὰ Δί' ἀλλ' ὄντ'· ἀλλ' ἀποκρύπτειν χρὴ τὰ πονηρὸν τόν γε ποιητὴν,
Καὶ μὴ παράγειν μηδὲ διδάσκειν.

In the Hercules Furens, Euripidês puts in relief and even exaggerates the worst elements of the ancient mythes: the implacable hatred of Hêrê towards Hêraklês is pushed so far as to deprive him of his reason (by sending down Iris and the unwilling Λύσσα), and thus intentionally to drive him to slay his wife and children with his own hands.

[3] Aristoph. Ran. 849, 1041, 1080; Thesmophor. 547; Nubes, 1354. Grauert, De Mediâ Græcorum Comœdiâ in Rheinisch. Museum. 2nd Jahrs. 1 Heft, p. 51. It suited the plan of the drama of Æolus, as composed by Euripidês, to place in the mouth of Makareus a formal recommendation of incestuous marriages: probably this contributed much to offend the Athenian public. See Dionys. Hal. Rhetor. ix. p. 355.

About the liberty of intermarriage among relatives, indicated in Homer, parents and children being alone excepted, see Terpstra, Antiquitas Homerica, cap. xiii. p. 104.

Ovid, whose poetical tendencies led him chiefly to copy Euripidês, observes (Trist. ii. 1, 380)—

"Omne genus scripti gravitate Tragœdia vincit,
Hæc quoque materiam sumpsit amoris habet.
Nam quid in Hippolyto nisi cæcæ flamma novercæ?
Nobilis est Canace fratris amore sui."

This is the reverse of the truth in regard to Æschylus and Sophoklês, and only very partially true in respect to Euripidês.

the lost tragedy called *Æolus*, drew upon him severe censure. Moreover he often disconnected the horrors of the old legends with those religious agencies by which they had been originally forced on, prefacing them by motives of a more refined character, such as carried no sense of awful compulsion. Thus the considerations by which the Euripidean Alkmæôn was reduced to the necessity of killing his mother, appeared to Aristotle ridiculous.[1] After the time of this great poet, his successors seem to have followed him in breathing into their characters the spirit of common life. But the names and plot were still borrowed from the stricken mythical families of Tantalus, Kadmus, &c.: and the heroic exaltation of all the individual personages introduced, as contrasted with the purely human character of the Chorus, is still numbered by Aristotle among the essential points of the theory of tragedy.[2]

The tendency then of Athenian tragedy—powerfully manifested in Æschylus, and never wholly lost—was to uphold an unquestioning faith and a reverential estimate of the general mythical world and its personages, but to treat the particular narratives rather as matter for the emotions than as recitals of actual fact. The logographers worked along with them to the first of these two ends, but not to the second. Their grand object was, to cast the mythes into a continuous readable series, and they were in consequence compelled to make selection between inconsistent or contradictory narratives; to reject some narratives as false, and to receive others as true. But their preference was determined more by their sentiments as to what was appropriate, than by any pretended historical test. Pherekydês, Akusilaus, and Hellanikus[3] did not seek to banish miraculous or fantastic incidents from the mythical world. They regarded it as peopled with loftier beings, and expected to find in it phænomena not paralleled in their own degenerate days. They reproduced the fables as they found them in the poets, rejecting little except the discrepancies, and producing

[1] Aristot. Ethic. Nicom. iii. 1, 8. *καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγκάσαντα μητροκτονῆσαι.* (In the lost tragedy called Ἀλκμαίων ὁ διὰ Ψωφῖδος.)

[2] Aristot. Poetic. 26-27. And in his Problemata also, in giving the reason why the Hypo-Dorian and Hypo-Phrygian musical modes were never assigned to the Chorus, he says—

*Ταῦτα δὲ ἅμφω χορῷ μὲν ἀναρμοστὰ, τοῖς δὲ ἀπὸ σκηνῆς οἰκειότερα. Ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ ἡρώων μιμηταί· οἱ δὲ ἡγεμόνες τῶν ἀρχαίων μόνοι ἦσαν ἥρωες, οἱ δὲ λαοὶ ἄνθρωποι, ὧν ἐστὶν ὁ χορός. Διὸ καὶ ἁρμόζει αὐτῷ τὸ γοερὸν καὶ ἡσύχιον ἦθος καὶ μέλος· ἀνθρωπικὰ γάρ.*

[3] See Müller, Prolegom. zu einer wissenschaftlichen Mythologie, c. iii. p. 93.

ultimately what they believed to be not only a continuous, but an exact and trustworthy, history of the past—wherein they carry indeed their precision to such a length, that Hellanikus gives the year, and even the day, of the capture of Troy.[1]

Hekatæus of Milêtus (500 B.C.), anterior to Pherekydês and Hellanikus, is the earliest writer in whom we can detect any disposition to disallow the prerogative and specialty of the mythes, and to soften down their characteristic prodigies, some of which however still find favour in his eyes, as in the case of the speaking ram who carried Phryxus over the Hellespont. He pronounced the Grecian fables to be "many and ridiculous;" whether from their discrepancies or from their intrinsic improbabilities we do not know. And we owe to him the first attempt to force them within the limits of historical credibility; as where he transforms the three-headed Cerberus, the dog of Hadês, into a serpent inhabiting a cavern on Cape Tænarus—and Geryôn of Erytheia into a king of Epirus rich in herds of oxen.[2] Hekatæus traced the genealogy of himself and the gens to which he belonged through a line of fifteen progenitors up to an initial god,[3]—the clearest proof both of his profound faith in the reality of the mythical world, and of his religious attachment to it as the point of junction between the human and the divine personality.

We have next to consider the historians, especially Herodotus

[1] Hellanic. Fragment. 143, ed. Didot.

[2] Hekatæi Fragm. ed. Didot, 332, 346, 349; Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. i. 256; Athenæ. ii. p. 133; Skylax, c. 26.

Perhaps Hekatæus was induced to look for Erytheia in Epirus by the brick-red colour of the earth there in many places, noticed by Pouqueville and other travellers (Voyage dans la Grèce, vol. ii. 248; see Klausen, Æneas und die Penaten, vol. i. p. 222). Ἑκαταῖος ὁ Μιλήσιος—λόγων εὗρεν εἰκότα, Pausan. iii. 25, 4. He seems to have written expressly concerning the fabulous Hyperboreans, and to have upheld the common faith against doubts which had begun to rise in his time: the derisory notice of Hyperboreans in Herodotus is probably directed against Hekatæus, iv. 36; Schol. Apollôn. Rhod. ii. 675; Diodôr. ii. 47.

It is maintained by Mr. Clinton (Fast. Hell. ii. p. 480) and others (see not. ad Fragment. Hecataei, p. 30, ed. Didot), that the work on the Hyperboreans was written by Hekatæus of Abdera, a literary Greek of the age of Ptolemy Philadelphus—not by Hekatæus of Milêtus. I do not concur in this opinion. I think it much more probable that the earlier Hekatæus was the author spoken of.

The distinguished position held by Hekatæus at Milêtus is marked not only by the notice which Herodotus takes of his opinions on public matters, but also by his negotiation with the Persian satrap Artaphernes on behalf of his countrymen (Diodôr. Excerpt. xlvii. p. 41, ed. Dindorf).

[3] Herodot. ii. 143.

and Thucydidês. Like Hekatæus, Thucydidês belonged to a gens which traced its descent from Ajax, and through Ajax to Æakus and Zeus.[1] Herodotus modestly implies that he himself had no such privilege to boast of.[2] The curiosity of these two historians respecting the past had no other materials to work upon except the mythes, which they found already cast by the logographers into a continuous series, and presented as an aggregate of antecedent history, chronologically deduced from the times of the gods. In common with the body of the Greeks, both Herodotus and Thucydidês had imbibed that complete and unsuspecting belief in the general reality of mythical antiquity, which was interwoven with the religion and the patriotism, and all the public demonstrations, of the Hellenic world. To acquaint themselves with the genuine details of this foretime, was an inquiry highly interesting to them. But the increased positive tendencies of their age, as well as their own habits of personal investigation, had created in them an *historical sense* in regard to the past as well as to the present. Having acquired a habit of appreciating the intrinsic tests of historical credibility and probability, they found the particular narratives of the poets and logographers, inadmissible as a whole even in the eyes of Hekatæus, still more at variance with their stricter canons of criticism. And we thus observe in them the constant struggle, as well as the resulting compromise, between these two opposite tendencies; on one hand a firm belief in the reality of the mythical world, on the other hand an inability to accept the details which their only witnesses, the poets and logographers, told them respecting it.

Each of them however performed the process in his own way. Herodotus is a man of deep and anxious religious feeling. He often recognises the special judgements of the gods as determining historical events: his piety is also partly tinged with that mystical vein which the last two centuries had gradually infused into the religion of the Greeks—for he is apprehensive of giving offence to the gods by reciting publicly what he has heard respecting them. He frequently stops short in his narrative, and intimates that there *is* a sacred legend, but that he will not tell it. In other cases, where he feels compelled to speak out, he entreats forgiveness for doing so from the gods and heroes. Sometimes he will not even mention the name of a god, though he generally thinks himself authorised to do so,

[1] Marcellin. Vit. Thucyd. init.
[2] Herodot. ii. 143.

the names being matter of public notoriety.[1] Such pious reserve, which the open-hearted Herodotus avowedly proclaims as chaining up his tongue, affords a striking contrast with the plain-spoken and unsuspecting tone of the ancient epic, as well as of the popular legends, wherein the gods and their proceedings were the familiar and interesting subjects of common talk as well as of common sympathy, without ceasing to inspire both fear and reverence.

Herodotus expressly distinguishes, in the comparison of Polykratês with Minôs, the human race to which the former belonged, from the divine or heroic race which comprised the latter.[2] But he has a firm belief in the authentic personality and parentage of all the names in the mythes, divine, heroic and human, as well as in the trustworthiness of their chronology computed by generations. He counts back 1600 years from his own day to that of Semelê, mother of Dionysus; 900 years to Hêraklês, and 800 years to Penelopê, the Trojan war being a little earlier in date.[3] Indeed even the longest of these periods must have seemed to him comparatively short, seeing that he apparently accepts the prodigious series of years which the Egyptians professed to draw from a recorded chronology—17,000 years from their god Hêraklês, and 15,000 years from their god Osiris or Dionysus, down to their king Amasis[4] (550 B.C.). So much was his imagination familiarised with these long chronological computations barren of events, that he treats Homer and Hesiod as "men of yesterday," though separated from his own age by an interval which he reckons as four hundred years.[5]

Herodotus had been profoundly impressed with what he saw

[1] Herodot. ii. 3, 51, 61, 65, 170. He alludes briefly (c. 51) to an ἱρὸς λόγος which was communicated in the Samothracian mysteries, but he does not mention what it was; also about the Thesmophoria, or τελετή of Dêmêtêr (c. 171).

Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων τοσαῦτα ἡμῖν εἰποῦσι, καὶ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν καὶ ἡρώων εὐμένεια εἴη (c. 45).

Compare similar scruples on the part of Pausanias (viii. 25 and 37).

The passage of Herodotus (ii. 3) is equivocal, and has been understood in more ways than one (see Lobeck, Aglaopham. p. 1287).

The aversion of Dionysius of Halikarnassus to reveal the divine secrets is not less powerful (see A. R. i. 67, 68).

[2] Herod. iii. 122.

[3] Herod. ii. 145.

[4] Herodot. ii. 43–145. Καὶ ταῦτα Αἰγύπτιοι ἀτρεκέως φασὶ ἐπίστασθαι, ἀεί τε λογιζόμενοι καὶ ἀεὶ ἀπογραφόμενοι τὰ ἔτεα.

[5] Herodot. ii. 53. μέχρι οὗ πρώην τε καὶ χθὲς, ὡς εἰπεῖν λόγῳ. Ἡσίοδον γὰρ καὶ Ὅμηρον ἡλικίην τετρακοσίοισι ἔτεσι δοκέω μευ πρεσβυτέρους γενέσθαι, καὶ οὐ πλέοσι.

and heard in Egypt. The wonderful monuments, the evident antiquity, and the peculiar civilisation of that country, acquired such preponderance in his mind over his own native legends, that he is disposed to trace even the oldest religious names or institutions of Greece to Egyptian or Phœnician original, setting aside in favour of this hypothesis the Grecian legends of Dionysus and Pan.[1] The oldest Grecian mythical genealogies are thus made ultimately to lose themselves in Egyptian or Phœnician antiquity, and in the full extent of these genealogies Herodotus firmly believes. It does not seem that any doubt had ever crossed his mind as to the real personality of those who were named or described in the popular mythes: all of them have once had reality, either as men, as heroes, or as gods. The eponyms of cities, dêmes and tribes, are all comprehended in this affirmative category; the supposition of fictitious personages being apparently never entertained. Deukaliôn, Hellên, Dôrus,[2]—Iôn, with his four sons, the eponyms of the old Athenian tribes,[3]—the autochthonous Titakus and Dekelus,[4]—Danaus, Lynkeus, Perseus, Amphitryôn, Alkmêna, and Hêraklês,[5]—Talthybius, the heroic progenitor of the privileged heraldic gens at Sparta,—the Tyndarids and Helena,[6]—Agamemnôn, Menelaus, and Orestês,[7]—Nestôr and his son Peisistratus,—Asôpus, Thêbê, and Ægina,—Inachus and Iô, Æêtês and Mêdea,[8]—Melanippus, Adrastus, and Amphiaräus, as well as Jasôn and the Argô[9]—all these are occupants of the real past time, and predecessors of himself and his contemporaries. In the veins of the Lacedæmonian kings flowed the blood both of Kadmus and of Danaus, their splendid pedigree being traceable to both of these great mythical names: Herodotus carries the lineage up through Hêraklês first to Perseus and Danaê, then through Danaê to Akrisius and the Egyptian Danaus; but he drops the paternal lineage when he comes to Perseus (inasmuch as Perseus is the son of Zeus by Danaê, without any reputed human father, such as Amphitryôn was to Hêraklês), and then follow the higher members of the series through Danaê alone.[10] He also pursues the same regal gene-

[1] Herodot. ii. 146.
[2] Herod. i. 56.
[3] Herod. v. 66.
[4] Herod. ix. 73.
[5] Herod. ii. 43–44, 91–98, 171–182 (the Egyptians admitted the truth of the Greek legend, that Perseus had come to Libya to fetch the Gorgon's head).
[6] Herod. ii. 113–120; iv. 145; vii. 134.
[7] Herod. i. 67–68; ii. 113; vii. 159.
[8] Herod. i. 1, 2, 4; v. 81, 65.
[9] Herod. i. 52; iv. 145; v. 67; vii. 193.
[10] Herod. vi. 52–53.

alogy, through the mother of Eurysthenês and Proklês, up to Polynikês, Œdipus, Laius, Labdakus, Polydôrus and Kadmus: and he assigns various ancient inscriptions which he saw in the temple of the Ismenian Apollo at Thêbes, to the ages of Laius and Œdipus.[1] Moreover the sieges of Thêbes and Troy,—the Argonautic expedition,—the invasion of Attica by the Amazons,—the protection of the Herakleids, and the defeat and death of Eurystheus, by the Athenians,[2]—the death of Mêkisteus and Tydeus before Thêbes by the hands of Melanippus, and the touching calamities of Adrastus and Amphiaraüs connected with the same enterprise,—the sailing of Kastôr and Pollux in the Argô,[3]—the abductions of Iô, Eurôpa, Mêdea and Helena,—the emigration of Kadmus in quest of Eurôpa, and his coming to Bœôtia, as well as the attack of the Greeks upon Troy to recover Helen,[4]—all these events seem to him portions of past history, not less unquestionably certain, though more clouded over by distance and misrepresentation, than the battles of Salamis and Mykalê.

But though Herodotus is thus easy of faith in regard both to the persons and to the general facts of Grecian mythes, yet when he comes to discuss particular facts taken separately, we find him applying to them stricter tests of historical credibility, and often disposed to reject as well the miraculous as the extravagant. Thus even with respect to Hêraklês, he censures the levity of the Greeks in ascribing to him absurd and incredible exploits. He tries their assertion by the philosophical standard of nature, or of determinate powers and conditions governing the course of events. "How is it consonant to *nature* (he asks), that Hêraklês, being, as he was, according to the statement of the Greeks, *still a man* (*i. e.* having not yet been received among the gods), should kill many thousand persons? I pray that indulgence may be shown to me both by gods and heroes for saying so much as this." The religious feelings of Herodotus here told him that he was trenching upon the utmost limits of admissible scepticism.[5]

[1] Herod. iv. 147; v. 59-61.
[2] Herod. v. 61; ix. 27-28.
[3] Herod. i. 52; iv. 145; v. 67.
[4] Herod. i. 1-4; ii. 49, 113; iv. 147; v. 94.
[5] Herod. ii. 45. *Λέγουσι δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα ἀνεπισκέπτως οἱ Ἕλληνες· εὐήθης δὲ αὐτέων καὶ ὅδε μῦθός ἐστι, τὸν περὶ τοῦ Ἡρακλέος λέγουσι . . . Ἔτι δὲ ἕνα ἐόντα τὸν Ἡρακλέα, καὶ ἔτι ἄνθρωπον ὡς δή φασι, κῶς φύσιν ἔχει πολλὰς μυριάδας φονεῦσαι; Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων τοσαῦτα ἡμῖν εἰποῦσι, καὶ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡρώων εὐμένεια εἴη.*

We may also notice the manner in which the historian criticises the stratagem whereby Peisistratus established himself as despot at Athens—by dressing up the stately Athenian woman Phyê in the costume of the

Another striking instance of the disposition of Herodotus to rationalise the miraculous narratives of the current mythes, is to be found in his account of the oracle of Dôdôna and its alleged Egyptian origin. Here, if in any case, a miracle was not only in full keeping, but apparently indispensable to satisfy the exigencies of the religious sentiment; anything less than a miracle would have appeared tame and unimpressive to the visitors of so revered a spot, much more to the residents themselves. Accordingly, Herodotus heard both from the three priestesses and from the Dodonæans generally, that two black doves had started at the same time from Thêbes in Egypt: one of them went to Libya, where it directed the Libyans to establish the oracle of Zeus Ammon; the other came to the grove of Dôdôna, and perched on one of the venerable oaks, proclaiming with a human voice that an oracle of Zeus must be founded on that very spot. The injunction of the speaking dove was respectfully obeyed.[1]

Such was the tale related and believed at Dôdôna. But Herodotus had also heard, from the priests at Thêbes in Egypt, a different tale, ascribing the origin of all the prophetic establishments, in Greece as well as in Libya, to two sacerdotal women, who had been carried away from Thêbes by some Phœnician merchants and sold, the one in Greece, the other in Libya. The Theban priests boldly assured Herodotus that much pains had been taken to discover what had become of these women so exported, and that the fact of their having been taken to Greece and Libya had been accordingly verified.[2]

The historian of Halicarnassus cannot for a moment think of admitting the miracle which harmonised so well with the feelings of the priestesses and the Dodonæans.[3] "How (he asks) could

goddess Athênê, and passing off her injunctions as the commands of the goddess: the Athenians accepted her with unsuspecting faith, and received Peisistratus at her command. Herodotus treats the whole affair as a piece of extravagant silliness, *πρᾶγμα εὐηθέστατον μακρῷ* (i. 60).

[1] Herod. ii. 55. *Δωδωναίων δὲ αἱ ἱρήϊαι . . . ἔλεγον ταῦτα, συνωμολόγεον δέ σφι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Δωδωναῖοι οἱ περὶ τὸ ἱρόν.*

The miracle sometimes takes another form; the oak at Dôdôna was itself once endued with speech (Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhetoric. i. 6; Strabo).

[2] Herod. ii. 54.

[3] Herod. ii. 57. *Ἐπεὶ τέῳ τρόπῳ ἂν πελειὰς γε ἀνθρωπηίῃ φωνῇ ἐφθέγξατο;*

According to one statement, the word Πελειὰς in the Thessalian dialect meant both a dove and a prophetess (Scriptor. Rer. Mythicarum, ed. Bode, i. 96). Had there been any truth in this, Herodotus could hardly have failed to notice it, inasmuch as it would exactly have helped him out of the difficulty which he felt.

a dove speak with human voice?" But the narrative of the priests at Thêbes, though its prodigious improbability hardly requires to be stated, yet involved no positive departure from the laws of nature and possibility, and therefore Herodotus makes no difficulty in accepting it. The curious circumstance is, that he turns the native Dodonæan legend into a figurative representation, or rather a misrepresentation, of the supposed true story told by the Theban priests. According to his interpretation, the woman who came from Thêbes to Dôdôna was called a dove, and affirmed to utter sounds like a bird, because she was non-Hellenic and spoke a foreign tongue: when she learned to speak the language of the country, it was then said that the dove spoke with a human voice. And the dove was moreover called black, because of the woman's Egyptian colour.

That Herodotus should thus bluntly reject a miracle, recounted to him by the prophetic women themselves as the prime circumstance in the *origines* of this holy place, is a proof of the hold which habits of dealing with historical evidence had acquired over his mind; and the awkwardness of his explanatory mediation between the dove and the woman, marks not less his anxiety, while discarding the legend, to let it softly down into a story quasi-historical and not intrinsically incredible.

We may observe another example of the unconscious tendency of Herodotus to eliminate from the mythes the idea of special aid from the gods, in his remarks upon Melampus. He designates Melampus "as a clever man, who had acquired for himself the art of prophecy;" and had procured through Kadmus much information about the religious rites and customs of Egypt, many of which he introduced into Greece[1]—especially the name, the sacrifices, and the phallic processions of Dionysus: he adds, "that Melampus himself did not accurately comprehend or bring out the whole doctrine, but wise men who came after him made the necessary additions."[2] Though the name of Melampus is here maintained, the character described[3] is something in the vein of Pythagoras—totally different from the great seer and leech of the old epic mythes—

[1] Herod. ii. 49. Ἐγὼ μὲν νύν φημι Μελάμποδα γενόμενον ἄνδρα σοφὸν, μαντικήν τε ἑωυτῷ συστῆσαι, καὶ πυθόμενον ἀπ' Αἰγύπτου, ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἐσηγήσασθαι Ἕλλησι, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον, ὀλίγα αὐτῶν παραλλάξαντα.

[2] Herod. ii. 49. Ἀτρεκέως μὲν οὐ πάντα συλλαβὼν τὸν λόγον ἔφηνε (Melampus)· ἀλλ' οἱ ἐπιγενόμενοι τούτῳ σοφισταὶ μειζόνως ἐξέφηναν.

[3] Compare Herod. iv. 95; ii. 81. Ἑλλήνων οὐ τῷ ἀσθενεστάτῳ σοφιστῇ Πυθαγόρᾳ.

the founder of the gifted family of the Amythaonids, and the grandfather of Amphiaraus.[1] But that which is most of all at variance with the genuine legendary spirit, is the opinion expressed by Herodotus (and delivered with some emphasis as *his own*), that Melampus "was a clever man who had acquired for himself prophetic powers." Such a supposition would have appeared inadmissible to Homer or Hesiod, or indeed to Solôn in the preceding century, in whose view even inferior arts come from the gods, while Zeus or Apollo bestows the power of prophesying.[2] The intimation of such an opinion by Herodotus, himself a thoroughly pious man, marks the sensibly diminished omnipresence of the gods, and the increasing tendency to look for the explanation of phænomena among more visible and determinate agencies.

We may make a similar remark on the dictum of the historian respecting the narrow defile of Tempê, forming the embouchure of the Pêneus and the efflux of all the waters from the Thessalian basin. The Thessalians alleged that this whole basin of Thessaly had once been a lake, but that Poseidôn had

[1] Homer, Odyss. xi. 290; xv. 225. Apollodôr. i. 9, 11–12. Hesiod, Eoiai, Fragm. 55, ed. Düntzer (p. 43)—

> Ἀλκὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκεν Ὀλύμπιος Αἰακίδῃσι,
> Νοῦν δ' Ἀμυθαονίδαις, πλοῦτον δ' ἅπορ' Ἀτρείδῃσι.

also Frag. 34 (p. 38), and Frag. 65 (p. 45); Schol. Apoll. Rhod. i. 118.

Herodotus notices the celebrated mythical narrative of Melampus healing the deranged Argive women (ix. 34); according to the original legend, the daughters of Prœtus. In the Hesiodic Eoiai (Fr. 16, Düntz.; Apollod. ii. 2) the distemper of the Prœtid females was ascribed to their having repudiated the rites and worship of Dionysus (Akusilaus indeed assigned a different cause), which shows that the old fable recognised a connexion between Melampus and these rites.

[2] Homer, Iliad, i. 72–87; xv. 412. Odyss. xv. 245–252; iv. 233. Sometimes the gods inspired prophecy for the special occasion, without conferring upon the party the permanent gift and *status* of a prophet (compare Odyss. i. 202; xvii. 383). Solôn, Fragm. xi. 48–53, Schneidewin—

> Ἄλλον μάντιν ἔθηκεν ἄναξ ἑκάεργος Ἀπόλλων,
> Ἔγνω δ' ἀνδρὶ κακὸν τηλόθεν ἐρχόμενον,
> Ὧι συνομαρτήσωσι θεοί . . . .

Herodotus himself reproduces the old belief in the special gift of prophetic power by Zeus and Apollo, in the story of Eucnius of Apollônia (ix. 94).

See the fine ode of Pindar describing the birth and inspiration of Jamus, eponymous father of the great prophetic family in Elis called the Jamids (Herodot, ix. 33), Pindar, Olymp. vi. 40–75. About Teiresias, Sophoc. Œd. Tyr. 283–410. Neither Nestôr nor Odysseus possesses the gift of prophecy.

split the chain of mountains and opened the efflux;[1] upon which primitive belief, thoroughly conformable to the genius of Homer and Hesiod, Herodotus comments as follows: "The Thessalian statement is reasonable. For whoever thinks that Poseidôn shakes the earth, and that the rifts of an earthquake are the work of that god, will, on seeing the defile in question, say that Poseidôn has caused it. For the rift of the mountains is, as appeared to me (when I saw it), the work of an earthquake." Herodotus admits the reference to Poseidôn, when pointed out to him, but it stands only in the background: what is present to his mind is, the phænomenon of the earthquake, not as a special act, but as part of a system of habitual operations.[2]

[1] More than one tale is found elsewhere, similar to this about the defile of Tempê—

"A tradition exists that this part of the country was once a lake, and that Solomon commanded two deeves or genii, named Ard and Beel, to turn off the water into the Caspian, which they effected by cutting a passage through the mountains; and a city, erected in the newly-formed plain, was named after them Ard-u-beel." (Sketches on the shores of the Caspian, by W. R. Holmes.)

Also about the plain of Santa Fe di Bogota, in South America, that it was once under water, until Bochica cleft the mountains and opened a channel of egress (Humboldt, Vues des Cordillères, p. 87–88); and about the plateau of Kashmir (Humboldt, Asie Centrale, vol. i. p. 102), drained in a like miraculous manner by the saint Kâsyapa. The manner in which conjectures, derived from local configuration or peculiarities, are often made to assume the form of *traditions*, is well remarked by the same illustrious traveller:—"Ce qui se présente comme une tradition, n'est souvent que le reflet de l'impression que laisse l'aspect des lieux. Des bancs de coquilles à demi-fossiles, répandues dans les isthmes ou sur des plateaux, font naître, même chez les hommes les moins avancés dans la culture intellectuelle, l'idée de grandes inondations, d'anciennes communications entre des bassins limitrophes. Des opinions, que l'on pourroit appeler systématiques, se trouvent dans les forêts de l'Orénoque comme dans les îles de la Mer du Sud. Dans l'une et dans l'autre de ces contrées, elles ont pris la forme des traditions." (A. von Humboldt, Asie Centrale, vol. ii. p. 147.) Compare a similar remark in the same work and volume, p. 286–294.

[2] Herodot. vii. 129. (Poseidôn was worshipped as Πετραῖος in Thessaly, in commemoration of this geological interference: Schol. Pindar. Pyth. iv. 245.) *Τὸ δὲ παλαιὸν λέγεται, οὐκ ἐόντος κω τοῦ αὐλῶνος καὶ διεκρέου τούτου, τοὺς ποταμοὺς τούτους . . . ῥέοντας ποιεῖν τὴν Θεσσαλίην πᾶσαν πέλαγος. Αὐτοὶ μέν νυν Θέσσαλοι λέγουσι Ποσειδέωνα ποιῆσαι τὸν αὐλῶνα, δι' οὗ ῥέει ὁ Πηνειὸς, οἰκότα λέγοντες. Ὅστις γὰρ νομίζει Ποσειδέωνα τὴν γῆν σείειν, καὶ τὰ διεστεῶτα ὑπὸ σεισμοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ τούτου ἔργα εἶναι, καὶ ἂν ἐκεῖνο ἰδὼν φαίη Ποσειδέωνα ποιῆσαι. Ἐστὶ γὰρ σεισμοῦ ἔργον, ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐφαίνετο εἶναι, ἡ διάστασις τῶν οὀρέων.* In another case (viii. 129), Herodotus believes that Poseidôn produced a preternaturally high tide in order to punish the Persians, who had insulted his temple near Potidæa: here was a special motive for the god to exert his power.

This remark of Herodotus illustrates the hostile ridicule cast by Aristo-

Herodotus adopts the Egyptian version of the legend of Troy, founded on that capital variation which seems to have originated with Stesichorus, and according to which Helen never left Sparta at all—her *eidôlon* had been taken to Troy in her place. Upon this basis a new story had been framed, midway between Homer and Stesichorus, representing Paris to have really carried off Helen from Sparta, but to have been driven by storms to Egypt, where she remained during the whole siege of Troy, having been detained by Prôteus, the king

phanês (in the Nubes) upon Sokratês, on the score of alleged impiety, because he belonged to a school of philosophers (though in point of fact he discountenanced that line of study) who introduced physical laws and forces in place of the personal agency of the gods. The old man Strepsiades inquires from Sokratês, *Who rains? Who thunders?* To which Sokratês replies, *Not Zeus*, but the Nephelæ, *i.e. the clouds:* you never saw rain without clouds. Strepsiades then proceeds to inquire—"But who is it that compels the clouds to move onward? is it not Zeus?" Sokratês—"Not at all; it is æthereal rotation." Strepsiades—"Rotation? that had escaped me: Zeus then no longer exists, and Rotation reigns in his place."

STREPS. Ὁ δ' ἀναγκάζων ἐστὶ τίς αὐτὰς (Νεφέλας), οὐχ ὁ Ζεὺς, ὥστε φέρεσθαι;
SOKRAT. Ἥκιστ', ἀλλ' αἰθέριος δῖνος.
STREPS. Δῖνος; τουτί μ' ἐλελήθει—
Ὁ Ζεὺς οὐκ ὤν, ἀλλ' ἀντ' αὐτοῦ Δῖνος νυνὶ βασιλεύων.

To the same effect v. 1454, Δῖνος βασιλεύει τὸν Δί' ἐξεληλακώς—"Rotation has driven out Zeus, and reigns in his place."

If Aristophanês had had as strong a wish to turn the public antipathies against Herodotus as against Sokratês and Euripidês, the explanation here given would have afforded him a plausible show of truth for doing so; and it is highly probable that the Thessalians would have been sufficiently displeased with the view of Herodotus to sympathise in the poet's attack upon him. The point would have been made (waiving metrical considerations)—

Σεισμὸς βασιλεύει, τὸν Ποσειδῶν' ἐξεληλακώς.

The comment of Herodotus upon the Thessalian view seems almost as if it were intended to guard against this very inference.

Other accounts ascribed the cutting of the defile of Tempê to Hêraklês (Diodôr. iv. 18).

Respecting the ancient Grecian faith which recognised the displeasure of Poseidôn as the cause of earthquakes, see Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 3, 2; Thucydid. i. 127; Strabo, xii. p. 579; Diodôr. xv. 48–49. It ceased to give universal satisfaction even so early as the time of Thalês and Anaximenês (see Aristot. Meteorolog. ii. 7–8; Plutarch, Placit. Philos. iii. 15; Seneca, Natural. Quæst. vi. 6–23); and that philosopher, as well as Anaxagoras, Democritus, and others, suggested different physical explanations of the fact. Notwithstanding a dissentient minority, however, the old doctrine still continued to be generally received: and Diodôrus, in describing the terrible earthquake in 373 B.C., by which Helikê and Bura were destroyed, while he notices those philosophers (probably Kallisthenês, Senec. Nat. Quæst. vi. 23) who substituted physical causes and laws in place of the divine agency, rejects their views and ranks himself with the religious public who traced this formidable phænomenon to the wrath of Poseidôn (xv. 48–49).

of the country, until Menelaus came to reclaim her after his triumph. The Egyptian priests, with their usual boldness of assertion, professed to have heard the whole story from Menelaus himself—the Greeks had besieged Troy, in the full persuasion that Helen and the stolen treasures were within the walls, nor would they ever believe the repeated denials of the Trojans as to the fact of her presence. In intimating his preference for the Egyptian narrative, Herodotus betrays at once his perfect and unsuspecting confidence that he is dealing with genuine matter of history, and his entire distrust of the epic poets, even including Homer, upon whose authority that supposed history rested. His reason for rejecting the Homeric version is, that it teems with historical improbabilities. If Helen had been really in Troy (he says), Priam and the Trojans would never have been so insane as to retain her to their own utter ruin; but it was the divine judgement which drove them into the miserable alternative of neither being able to surrender Helen nor to satisfy the Greeks of the real fact that they never had possession of her—in order that mankind might plainly read, in the utter destruction of Troy, the great punishments with which the gods visit great misdeeds. Homer (Herodotus thinks) had heard this story, but designedly departed from it, because it was not so suitable a subject for epic poetry.[1]

Enough has been said to show how wide is the difference between Herodotus and the logographers with their literal transcript of the ancient legends. Though he agrees with them in admitting the full series of persons and generations, he tries the circumstances narrated by a new standard. Scruples have arisen in his mind respecting violations of the laws of nature: the poets are unworthy of trust, and their narratives must be brought into conformity with historical and ethical conditions, before they can be admitted as truth. To accomplish this conformity, Herodotus is willing to mutilate the old legend in one of its most vital points. He sacrifices the personal presence of Helena in Troy, which ran through every one of the ancient

[1] Herod. ii. 116. δοκέει δέ μοι καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν λόγον τοῦτον πυθέσθαι· ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως εὐπρεπὴς ἦν ἐς τὴν ἐποποιΐην ἢν τῷ ἑτέρῳ τῷ περ ἐχρήσατο· ἐς ὃ μετῆκε αὐτὸν, δηλώσας ὡς καὶ τοῦτον ἐπίσταιτο τὸν λόγον.

Herodotus then produces a passage from the Iliad, with a view to prove that Homer knew of the voyage of Paris and Helen to Egypt: but the passage proves nothing at all to the point.

Again (c. 120), his slender confidence in the epic poets breaks out—εἰ χρή τι τοῖσι ἐποποιοῖσι χρεώμενον λέγειν.

It is remarkable that Herodotus is disposed to identify Helen with the ξείνη Ἀφροδίτη whose temple he saw at Memphis (c. 112).

epic poems belonging to the Trojan cycle, and is indeed, under the gods, the great and present moving force throughout.

Thucydidês places himself generally in the same point of view as Herodotus with regard to mythical antiquity; yet with some considerable differences. Though manifesting no belief in present miracles or prodigies,[1] he seems to accept without reserve the pre-existent reality of all the persons mentioned in the mythes, and of the long series of generations extending back through so many supposed centuries. In this category, too, are included the eponymous personages, Hellen, Kekrops, Eumolpus, Pandiôn, Amphilochus the son of Amphiaräus, and Akarnan. But on the other hand, we find no trace of that distinction between a human and an heroic ante-human race, which Herodotus still admitted,—nor any respect for Egyptian legends. Thucydidês, regarding the personages of the mythes as men of the same breed and stature with his own contemporaries, not only tests the acts imputed to them by the same limits of credibility, but presumes in them the same political views and feelings as he was accustomed to trace in the proceedings of Peisistratus or Periklês. He treats the Trojan war as a great political enterprise, undertaken by all Greece; brought into combination through the imposing power of Agamemnôn, not (according to the legendary narrative) through the influence of the oath exacted by Tyndareus. Then he explains how the predecessors of Agamemnôn arrived at so vast a dominion—beginning with Pelops, who came over (as he says) from Asia with great wealth among the poor Peloponnêsians, and by means of this wealth so aggrandised himself, though a foreigner, as to become the eponym of the peninsula. Next followed his son Atreus, who acquired after the death of Eurystheus the dominion of Mykênæ, which had before been possessed by the descendants of Perseus: here the old legendary tale, which described Atreus as having been

[1] "Ut conquirere fabulosa (says Tacitus, Hist. ii. 50, a worthy parallel of Thucydidês) et fictis oblectare legentium animos, procul gravitate cœpti operis crediderim, ita vulgatis traditisque demere fidem non ausim. Die, quo Bebriaci certabatur, avem inusitatâ specie, apud Regium Lepidum celebri vico consedisse, incolæ memorant; nec deinde cœtu hominum aut circumvolitantium alitum, territam pulsamque, donec Otho se ipse interficeret; tum ablatam ex oculis: et tempora reputantibus, initium finemque miraculi cum Othonis exitu competisse." Suetonius (Vesp. 5) recounts a different miracle, in which three eagles appear.

This passage of Tacitus occurs immediately after his magnificent description of the suicide of the emperor Otho, a deed which he contemplates with the most fervent admiration. His feelings were evidently so wrought up, that he was content to relax the canons of historical credibility.

banished by his father Pelops in consequence of the murder of his elder brother Chrysippus, is invested with a political bearing, as explaining the reason why Atreus retired to Mykênæ. Another legendary tale—the defeat and death of Eurystheus by the fugitive Herakleids in Attica, so celebrated in Attic tragedy as having given occasion to the generous protecting intervention of Athens—is also introduced as furnishing the cause why Atreus succeeded to the deceased Eurystheus: "for Atreus, the maternal uncle of Eurystheus, had been entrusted by the latter with his government during the expedition into Attica, and had effectually courted the people, who were moreover in great fear of being attacked by the Herakleids." Thus the Pelopids acquired the supremacy in Peloponnêsus, and Agamemnôn was enabled to get together his 1200 ships and 100,000 men for the expedition against Troy. Considering that contingents were furnished from every portion of Greece, Thucydidês regards this as a small number, treating the Homeric Catalogue as an authentic muster-roll, perhaps rather exaggerated than otherwise. He then proceeds to tell us why the armament was not larger. Many more men could have been furnished, but there was not sufficient money to purchase provisions for their subsistence: hence they were compelled, after landing and gaining a victory, to fortify their camp, to divide their army, and to send away one portion for the purpose of cultivating the Chersonese, and another portion to sack the adjacent towns. This was the grand reason why the siege lasted so long as ten years. For if it had been possible to keep the whole army together, and to act with an undivided force, Troy would have been taken both earlier and at smaller cost.[1]

Such is the general sketch of the war of Troy, as given by Thucydidês. So different is it from the genuine epical narrative, that we seem hardly to be reading a description of the same event; still less should we imagine that the event was known, to him as well as to us, only through the epic poets themselves. The men, the numbers, and the duration of the siege, do indeed remain the same; but the cast and juncture of events, the determining forces, and the characteristic features, are altogether heterogeneous. But, like Herodotus, and still more than Herodotus, Thucydidês was under the pressure of two conflicting impulses. He shared the general faith in the mythical antiquity, yet at the same time he could not believe in any facts which contradicted the laws of historical credibility

[1] Thucyd. i. 9–12.

or probability. He was thus under the necessity of torturing the matter of the old mythes into conformity with the subjective exigencies of his own mind. He left out, altered, recombined, and supplied new connecting principles and supposed purposes, until the story became such as no one could have any positive reason for calling in question. Though it lost the impressive mixture of religion, romance and individual adventure, which constituted its original charm, it acquired a smoothness and plausibility, and a political *ensemble*, which the critics were satisfied to accept as historical truth. And historical truth it would doubtless have been, if any independent evidence could have been found to sustain it. Had Thucydidês been able to produce such new testimony, we should have been pleased to satisfy ourselves that the war of Troy, as he recounted it, was the real event; of which the war of Troy, as sung by the epic poets, was a misreported, exaggerated, and ornamented recital. But in this case the poets are the only real witnesses, and the narrative of Thucydidês is a mere extract and distillation from their incredibilities.

A few other instances may be mentioned to illustrate the views of Thucydidês respecting various mythical incidents. 1. He treats the residence of the Homeric Phæakians at Korkyra as an undisputed fact, and employs it partly to explain the efficiency of the Korkyrean navy in times preceding the Peloponnesian war.[1] 2. He notices with equal confidence the story of Têreus and Prokne, daughter of Pandiôn, and the murder of the child Itys by Prokne his mother and Philomêla; and he produces this ancient mythe with especial reference to the alliance between the Athenians and Têrês, king of the Odrysian Thracians, during the time of the Peloponnesian war, intimating that the Odrysian Têrês was neither of the same family nor of the same country as Têreus the husband of Prokne.[2] The conduct of Pandiôn, in giving his daughter

[1] Thucyd. i. 25.

[2] Thucyd. ii. 29. Καὶ τὸ ἔργον τὸ περὶ τὸν Ἴτυν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐν τῇ γῇ ταύτῃ ἔπραξαν· πολλοῖς δὲ καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ἀηδόνος μνήμῃ Δαυλιὰς ἡ ὄρνις ἐπωνόμασται. Εἰκὸς δὲ καὶ τὸ κῆδος Πανδίονα ξυνάψασθαι τῆς θυγατρὸς διὰ τοσούτου, ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, μᾶλλον ἢ διὰ πολλῶν ἡμερῶν ἐς Ὀδρύσας ὁδοῦ. The first of these sentences would lead us to infer, if it came from any other pen than that of Thucydidês, that the writer believed the metamorphosis of Philomêla into a nightingale: see vol. i. ch. xi.

The observation respecting the convenience of neighbourhood for the marriage is remarkable, and shows how completely Thucydidês regarded the event as historical. What would he have said respecting the marriage of Oreithyia, daughter of Erechtheus, with Boreas, and the prodigious distance which she is reported to have been carried by her husband?

Proknê in marriage to Têreus, is in his view dictated by political motives and interests. 3. He mentions the Strait of Messina as the place through which Odysseus is said to have sailed.[1] 4. The Cyclôpes and the Læstrygones (he says) were the most ancient reported inhabitants of Sicily; but he cannot tell to what race they belonged, nor whence they came.[2] 5. Italy derived its name from Italus king of the Sikels. 6. Eryx and Egesta in Sicily were founded by fugitive Trojans after the capture of Troy; also Skionê, in the Thracian peninsula of Pallênê, by Greeks from the Achæan town of Pellênê, stopping thither in their return from the siege of Troy: the Amphilochian Argos in the Gulf of Ambrakia was in like manner founded by Amphilochus son of Amphiaräus, in his return from the same enterprise. The remorse and mental derangement of the matricidal Alkmæôn, son of Amphiaräus, is also mentioned by Thucydidês,[3] as well as the settlement of his son Akarnan in the country called after him Akarnania.[4]

*Τπέρ τε πόντου πάντ', ἐπ' ἔσχατα χθονός*, &c. (Sophoklês ap. Strabo, vii. p. 295.)

From the way in which Thucydidês introduces the mention of this event, we see that he intended to correct the misapprehension of his countrymen, who having just made an alliance with the Odrysian *Têrês*, were led by that circumstance to think of the old mythical *Têreus*, and to regard him as the ancestor of *Têrês*.

[1] Thucyd. iv. 24.

[2] Thucyd. vi. 2.

[3] Thucyd. ii. 68–102; iv. 120; vi. 2. Antiochus of Syracuse, the contemporary of Thucydidês, also mentioned Italus as the eponymous king of Italy: he further named Sikelus, who came to Morges, son of Italus, after having been banished from Rome. He talks about Italus, just as Thucydidês talks about Thêseus, as a wise and powerful king, who first acquired a great dominion (Dionys. H. A. R. i. 12, 35, 73). Aristotle also mentioned Italus in the same general terms (Polit. vii. 9, 2).

[4] We may here notice some particulars respecting Isokratês. He manifests entire confidence in the authenticity of the mythical genealogies and chronology; but while he treats the mythical personages as historically real, he regards them at the same time not as human, but as half-gods, superior to humanity. About Helena, Thêseus, Sarpêdôn, Kyknus, Memnôn, Achilles, &c., see Encom. Helen. Or. x. pp. 282, 292, 295, Bek. Helena was worshipped in his time as a goddess at Therapnæ (ib. p. 295). He recites the settlements of Danaus, Kadmus and Pelops in Greece, as undoubted historical facts (p. 297). In his discourse called *Busiris*, he accuses Polykratês the sophist of a gross anachronism in having placed Busiris subsequent in point of date to Orpheus and Æolus (Or. xi. p. 301, Bek.), and he adds that the tale of Busiris having been slain by Hêraklês was chronologically impossible (p. 309). Of the long Athenian genealogy from Kekrops to Thêseus, he speaks with perfect historical confidence (Panathenaic. p. 349, Bek.); not less so of the adventures of Hêraklês and his mythical contemporaries, which he places in the mouth of Archidamus as a justification of the Spartan title to Messenia (Or. vi. *Archidamus*, p. 156, Bek.; compare Or. v. *Philippus*, pp. 114, 138), *φάσιν, οἷς περὶ*

Such are the special allusions made by this illustrious author in the course of his history to mythical events. From the tenor of his language we may see that he accounted all that could be known about them to be uncertain and unsatisfactory; but he has it much at heart to show, that even the greatest were inferior in magnitude and importance to the Peloponnesian war.[1] In this respect his opinion seems to

τῶν παλαιῶν πιστέυομεν, &c. He condemns the poets in strong language for the wicked and dissolute tales which they circulated respecting the gods: many of them (he says) had been punished for such blasphemies by blindness, poverty, exile and other misfortunes (Or. xi. p. 309, Bek.).

In general it may be said, that Isokratês applies no principles of historical criticism to the mythes; he rejects such as appear to him discreditable or unworthy, and believes the rest.

[1] Thucyd. i. 21–22.

The first two volumes of this History have been noticed in an able article of the Quarterly Review for October 1846; as well as in the Heidelberger Jahrbücher der Literatur (1846, No. 41, p. 641–655) by Professor Kortüm.

While expressing, on several points, approbation of my work, by which I feel much flattered—both my English and my German critic take partial objection to the views respecting Grecian legend. The Quarterly Reviewer contends that the mythopœic faculty of the human mind, though essentially loose and untrustworthy, is never creative, but requires some basis of fact to work upon. Kortüm thinks that I have not done justice to Thucydidês, as regards his way of dealing with legend; that I do not allow sufficient weight to the authority of an historian so circumspect and so cold-blooded (den kalt-blüthigsten und besonnensten Historiker des Alterthums, p. 653) as a satisfactory voucher for the early facts of Grecian history in his preface (Herr G. fehlt also, wenn er das anerkannt kritische Procemium als Gewährsmann verschmäht, p. 654).

No man feels more powerfully than I do the merits of Thucydidês as an historian, or the value of the example which he set in multiplying critical inquiries respecting matters recent and verifiable. But the ablest judge or advocate, in investigating specific facts, can proceed no further than he finds witnesses having the means of knowledge and willing more or less to tell truth. In reference to facts prior to 776 B.C., Thucydidês had nothing before him except the legendary poets, whose credibility is not at all enhanced by the circumstance that he accepted them as witnesses, applying himself only to cut down and modify their allegations. His credibility in regard to the specific facts of these early times depends altogether upon theirs. Now we in our day are in a better position for appreciating their credibility than he was in his, since the foundations of historical evidence are so much more fully understood, and good or bad materials for history are open to comparison in such large extent and variety. Instead of wondering that he shared the general faith in such delusive guides—we ought rather to give him credit for the reserve with which he qualified that faith, and for the sound idea of historical possibility to which he held fast as the limit of his confidence. But it is impossible to consider Thucydidês as a *satisfactory guarantee* (Gewährsmann) for matters of fact which he derives only from such sources.

have been at variance with that which was popular among his contemporaries.

To touch a little upon the later historians by whom these mythes were handled, we find that Anaximenês of Lampsacus composed a consecutive history of events, beginning from the Theogony down to the battle of Mantineia.[1] But Ephorus professed to omit all the mythical narratives which are referred to times anterior to the return of the Herakleids (such restriction would of course have banished the siege of Troy), and even reproved those who introduced mythes into historical writing; adding, that everywhere truth was the object to be aimed at.[2] Yet in practice he seems often to have departed

Professor Kortüm considers that I am inconsistent with myself in refusing to discriminate particular matters of historical fact among the legends—and yet in accepting these legends (in my chap. xx.) as giving a faithful mirror of the general state of early Grecian society (p. 653). It appears to me that this is no inconsistency, but a real and important distinction. Whether Hêraklês, Agamemnôn, Odysseus, &c., were real persons, and performed all, or a part, of the possible actions ascribed to them—I profess myself unable to determine. But even assuming both the persons and their exploits to be fictions, these very fictions will have been conceived and put together in conformity to the general social phænomena among which the describer and his hearers lived—and will thus serve as illustrations of the manners then prevalent. In fact the real value of the Preface of Thucydidês, upon which Professor Kortüm bestows such just praise, consists, not in the particular facts which he brings out by altering the legends, but in the rational general views which he sets forth respecting early Grecian society, and respecting the steps as well as the causes whereby it attained its actual position as he saw it.

Professor Kortüm also affirms that the mythes contain "real matter of fact along with mere conceptions;" which affirmation is the same as that of the Quarterly Reviewer, when he says that the mythopœic faculty is not creative. Taking the mythes in a mass, I doubt not that this is true, nor have I anywhere denied it. Taking them one by one, I neither affirm nor deny it. My position is, that whether there be matter of fact or not, we have no test whereby it can be singled out, identified and severed from the accompanying fiction. And it lies upon those, who proclaim the practicability of such severance, to exhibit some means of verification better than any which has been yet pointed out. If Thucydidês has failed in doing this, it is certain that none of the many authors who have made the same attempt after him have been more successful.

It cannot surely be denied that the mythopœic faculty is *creative*, when we have before us so many divine legends not merely in Greece, but in other countries also. To suppose that these religious legends are mere exaggerations, &c., of some basis of actual fact—that the gods of polytheism were merely divinised men with qualities distorted or feigned—would be to embrace in substance the theory of Euêmerus.

[1] Diodôr. xv. 89. He was a contemporary of Alexander the Great.

[2] Diodôr. iv. 1. Strabo, ix. p. 422, *ἐπιτιμήσας τοῖς φιλομυθοῦσιν ἐν τῇ τῆς ἱστορίας γραφῇ.*

from his own rule.[1] Theopompus, on the other hand, openly proclaimed that he could narrate fables in his history better than Herodotus, or Ktesias, or Hellanicus.[2] The fragments which remain to us exhibit some proof that this promise was performed as to quantity;[3] though as to his style of narration, the judgement of Dionysius is unfavourable. Xenophôn ennobled his favourite amusement of the chase by numerous examples chosen from the heroic world, tracing their portraits with all the simplicity of an undiminished faith. Kallisthenês, like Ephorus, professed to omit all mythes which referred to a time anterior to the return of the Herakleids; yet we know that he devoted a separate book or portion of his history to the Trojan war.[4] Philistus introduced some mythes in the earlier portions of his Sicilian history; but Timæus was distinguished above all others by the copious and indiscriminate way in which he collected and repeated such legends.[5] Some of these writers employed their ingenuity in transforming the

[1] Ephorus recounted the principal adventures of Hêraklês (Fragm. 8, 9, ed. Marx.), the tales of Kadmus and Harmonia (Fragm. 12), the banishment of Ætôlus from Elis (Fragm. 15; Strabo, viii. p. 357); he drew inferences from the chronology of the Trojan and Theban wars (Fragm. 28); he related the coming of Dædalus to the Sikan king Kokalus, and the expedition of the Amazons (Fragm. 99–103).

He was particularly copious in his information about *κτίσεις*, *ἀποικίαι* and *συγγένειαι* (Polyb. ix. 1).

[2] Strabo, i. p. 74.

[3] Dionys. Halic. de Vett. Scriptt. Judic. p. 428, Reisk.; Ælian, V. H. iii. 18, *Θεόπομπος . . . δεινὸς μυθολόγος*.

Theopompus affirmed, that the bodies of those who went into the forbidden precinct (*τὸ ἄβατον*) of Zeus in Arcadia gave no shadow (Polyb. xvi. 12). He recounted the story of Midas and Silênus (Fragm. 74, 75, 76, ed. Wichers): he said a good deal about the heroes of Troy; and he seems to have assigned the misfortunes of the *Νόστοι* to an historical cause—the rottenness of the Grecian ships from the length of the siege, while the genuine epic ascribes it to the anger of Athênê (Fragm. 112, 113, 114; Schol. Homer. Iliad. ii. 135); he narrated an alleged expulsion of Kinyras from Cyprus by Agamemnôn (Fragm. 111); he gave the genealogy of the Macedonian queen Olympias up to Achilles and Æakus (Fragm. 232).

[4] Cicero, Epist. ad Familiar. v. 12; Xenophôn de Venation. c. 1.

[5] Philistus, Fragm. 1 (Göller), Dædalus and Kokalus; about Liber and Juno (Fragm. 57); about the migration of the Sikels into Sicily eighty years after the Trojan war (ap. Dionys. Hal. i. 3).

Timæus (Fragm. 50, 51, 52, 53, Göller) related many fables respecting Jasôn, Mêdea, and the Argonauts generally. The miscarriage of the Athenian armament under Nikias before Syracuse is imputed to the anger of Hêraklês against the Athenians because they came to assist the Egestans, descendants of Troy (Plutarch, Nikias, 1),—a naked reproduction of genuine epical agencies by an historian; also about Diomêdês and the Daunians; Phaëthôn and the river Eridanus; the combats of the Gigantes in the Phlegræan plains (Fragm. 97, 99, 102).

mythical circumstances into plausible matter of history: Ephorus in particular converted the serpent Pythô, slain by Apollo, into a tyrannical king.[1]

But the author who pushed this transmutation of legend into history to the greatest length, was the Messenian Euêmerus, contemporary of Kassander of Macedôn. He melted down in this way the divine persons and legends, as well as the heroic—representing both gods and heroes as having been mere earthborn men, though superior to the ordinary level in respect of force and capacity, and deified or heroified after death as a recompense for services or striking exploits. In the course of a voyage into the Indian Sea, undertaken by command of Kassander, Euêmerus professed to have discovered a fabulous country called Panchaia, in which was a temple of the Triphylian Zeus: he there described a golden column with an inscription purporting to have been put up by Zeus himself, and detailing his exploits while on earth.[2] Some eminent men, among whom may be numbered Polybius, followed the views of Euêmerus, and the Roman poet Ennius[3] translated his Historia Sacra: but on the whole he never acquired favour, and the unblushing inventions which he put into circulation were of themselves sufficient to disgrace both the author and his opinions. The doctrine that all the gods had once existed as mere men offended the religious pagans, and drew upon Euêmerus the imputation of atheism; but, on the other hand, it came to be warmly espoused by several of the Christian assailants of paganism,—by Minucius Felix, Lactantius, and St. Augustin, who found the ground ready prepared for them in their efforts to strip Zeus and the other pagan gods of the attributes of deity. They believed not only in the main theory, but also in the copious details of Euêmerus; and the same man whom Strabo casts aside as almost a proverb for mendacity, was extolled by them as an excellent specimen of careful historical inquiry.[4]

[1] Strabo, ix. p. 422.

[2] Compare Diodôr. v. 44–46; and Lactantius, De Falsâ Relig. i. 11.

[3] Cicero, De Naturâ Deor. i. 42; Varro, De Re Rust. i. 48.

[4] Strabo, ii. p. 102. Οὐ πολὺ οὖν λείπεται ταῦτα τῶν Πύθεω καὶ Εὐημέρου καὶ Ἀντιφάνους ψευσμάτων; compare also i. p. 47, and ii. p. 104.

St. Augustin, on the contrary, tells us (Civitat. Dei, vi. 7), "Quid de ipso Jove senserunt, qui nutricem ejus in Capitolio posuerunt? Nonne attestati sunt omnes Euemero, qui non fabulosâ garrulitate, sed *historicâ diligentiâ*, homines fuisse mortalesque conscripsit?" And Minucius Felix (Octav. 20–21), "Euemerus exequitur Deorum natales: patrias, sepulcra, dinumerat, et per provincias monstrat, Dictæi Jovis, et Apollinis Delphici,

But though the pagan world repudiated that "lowering tone of explanation" which effaced the superhuman personality of Zeus and the great gods of Olympus—the mythical persons and narratives generally came to be surveyed more and more from the point of view of history, and subjected to such alterations as might make them look more like plausible matter of fact. Polybius, Strabo, Diodôrus, and Pausanias, cast the mythes into historical statements—with more or less of transformation, as the case may require, assuming always that there is a basis of truth, which may be discovered by removing poetical exaggerations and allowing for mistakes. Strabo, in particular, lays down that principle broadly and unequivocally in his remarks upon Homer. To give pure fiction, without any foundation of fact, was in his judgement utterly unworthy of so great a genius; and he comments with considerable acrimony on the geographer Eratosthenês, who maintains the opposite opinion. Again, Polybius tells us that the Homeric Æolus, the dispenser of the winds by appointment from Zeus, was in reality a man eminently skilled in navigation, and exact in predicting the weather; that the Cyclopês and Læstrygones were wild and savage real men in Sicily; and that Scylla and Charybdis were a figurative representation of dangers arising from pirates in the Strait of Messina. Strabo speaks of the amazing expeditions of Dionysus and Hêraklês, and of the long wanderings of Jasôn, Menelaus, and Odysseus, in the same category with the extended commercial range of the Phœnician merchant-ships. He explains the report of Thêseus and Peirithôus having descended to Hadês, by their dangerous earthly pilgrimages,—and the invocation of the Dioskuri as the protectors of the imperilled mariner, by the celebrity which they had acquired as real men and navigators.

et Phariæ Isidis, et Cereris Eleusiniæ." Compare Augustin, Civit. Dei, xviii. 8–14; and Clemens Alexand. Cohort. ad Gent. p. 15–18, Sylb.

Lactantius (De Falsâ Relig. c. 13, 14, 16) gives copious citations from Ennius's translation of the Historia Sacra of Euêmerus.

Εὐήμερος, ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς ἄθεος, Sextus Empiricus, adv. Physicos, ix. § 17–51. Compare Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 42; Plutarch, De Isîde et Osiride, c. 23, t. ii. p. 475, ed. Wytt.

Nitzsch assumes (Helden Sage der Griechen, sect. 7, p. 84) that the voyage of Euêmerus to Panchaia was intended only as an amusing romance, and that Strabo, Polybius, Eratosthenês and Plutarch were mistaken in construing it as a serious recital. Böttiger, in his Kunst-Mythologie der Griechen (Absch. ii. s. 6, p. 190), takes the same view. But not the least reason is given for adopting this opinion, and it seems to me far-fetched and improbable; Lobeck (Aglaopham. p. 989), though Nitzsch alludes to him as holding it, manifests no such tendency, as far as I can observe.

Diodôrus gave at considerable length versions of the current fables respecting the most illustrious names in the Grecian mythical world, compiled confusedly out of distinct and incongruous authors. Sometimes the mythe is reproduced in its primitive simplicity, but for the most part it is partially, and sometimes wholly, historicised. Amidst this jumble of dissentient authorities, we can trace little of a systematic view, except the general conviction that there was at the bottom of the mythes a real chronological sequence of persons, and real matter of fact, historical or ultra-historical. Nevertheless there are some few occasions on which Diodôrus brings us back a step nearer to the point of view of the old logographers. For, in reference to Hêraklês, he protests against the scheme of cutting down the mythes to the level of present reality. He contends that a special standard of ultra-historical credibility ought to be constituted, so as to include the mythe in its native dimensions, and do fitting honour to the grand, beneficent, and superhuman personality of Hêraklês and other heroes or demigods. To apply to such persons the common measure of humanity (he says), and to cavil at the glorious picture which grateful man has drawn of them, is at once ungracious and irrational. All nice criticism into the truth of the legendary narratives is out of place: we show our reverence to the god by acquiescing in the incredibilities of his history, and we must be content with the best guesses which we can make, amidst the inextricable confusion and numberless discrepancies which they present.[1] Yet though Diodôrus here exhibits a pre-

[1] Diodôr. iv. 1–8. *Ἔνιοι γὰρ τῶν ἀναγινωσκόντων, οὐ δικαίᾳ χρώμενοι κρίσει, τἀκριβὲς ἐπιζητοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαίαις μυθολογίαις, ἐπ' ἴσῳ τοῖς πραττομένοις ἐν τῷ καθ' ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ, καὶ τὰ δισταζόμενα τῶν ἔργων διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, ἐκ τοῦ καθ' αὑτοὺς βίου τεκμαιρόμενοι, τὴν Ἡρακλέους δύναμιν ἐκ τῆς ἀσθενείας τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων θεωροῦσιν, ὥστε διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἔργων ἀπιστεῖσθαι τὴν γραφήν. Καθόλου γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαίαις μυθολογίαις οὐκ ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου πικρῶς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐξεταστέον. Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις πεπεισμένοι μήτε Κενταύρους διφυεῖς ἐξ ἑτερογενῶν σωμάτων ὑπάρξαι, μήτε Γηρυόνην τρισώματον, ὅμως προσδεχόμεθα τὰς τοιαύτας μυθολογίας, καὶ ταῖς ἐπισημασίαις συναύξομεν τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ τιμήν. Καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον, Ἡρακλέα μὲν ἔτι κατ' ἀνθρώπους ὄντα τοῖς ἰδίοις πόνοις ἐξημερῶσαι τὴν οἰκουμένην, τοὺς δ' ἀνθρώπους, ἐπιλαθομένους τῆς κοινῆς εὐεργεσίας, συκοφαντεῖν τὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἔργοις ἔπαινον*, &c.

This is a remarkable passage: first, inasmuch as it sets forth the total inapplicability of analogies drawn from the historical past as narratives about Hêraklês; next, inasmuch as it suspends the employment of critical and scientific tests, and invokes an acquiescence interwoven and identified with the feelings, as the proper mode of evincing pious reverence for the god Hêraklês. It aims at reproducing exactly that state of mind to which the mythes were addressed, and with which alone they could ever be in thorough harmony.

ponderance of the religious sentiment over the purely historical point of view, and thus reminds us of a period earlier than Thucydidês—he in another place inserts a series of stories which seem to be derived from Euêmerus, and in which Uranus, Kronus and Zeus appear reduced to the character of human kings celebrated for their exploits and benefactions.[1] Many of the authors, whom Diodôrus copies, have so entangled together Grecian, Asiatic, Egyptian and Libyan fables, that it becomes impossible to ascertain how much of this heterogeneous mass can be considered as at all connected with the genuine Hellenic mind.

Pausanias is far more strictly Hellenic in his view of the Grecian mythes than Diodôrus: his sincere piety makes him inclined to faith generally with regard to the mythical narratives, but subject nevertheless to the frequent necessity of historicising or allegorising them. His belief in the general reality of the mythical history and chronology is complete, in spite of the many discrepancies which he finds in it, and which he is unable to reconcile.

Another author who seems to have conceived clearly, and applied consistently, the semi-historical theory of the Grecian mythes, is Palæphatus, of whose work what appears to be a short abstract has been preserved.[2] In the short preface of this treatise "concerning Incredible Tales," he remarks, that some men, from want of instruction, believe all the current narratives; while others, more searching and cautious, disbelieve them altogether. Each of these extremes he is anxious to avoid. On the one hand, he thinks that no narrative could ever have acquired credence unless it had been founded in truth; on the other, it is impossible for him to accept so much of the existing narratives as conflicts with the analogies of present natural phænomena. If such things ever had been, they would still continue to be—but they never have so occurred: and the extra-analogical features of the stories are to be ascribed to the licence of the poets. Palæphatus wishes to adopt a middle course, neither accepting all nor rejecting all: accord-

[1] Diodôr. iii. 45–60; 44–46.

[2] The work of Palæphatus, probably this original, is alluded to in the *Ciris* of Virgil (88)—

"Docta Palæphatiâ testatur voce papyrus."

The date of Palæphatus is unknown—indeed this passage of the *Ciris* seems the only ground that exists for inference respecting it. That which we now possess is probably an extract from a larger work—an extract made by an excerptor at some later time: see Vossius de Historicis Græcis, p. 478, ed. Westermann.

ingly, he had taken great pains to separate the true from the false in many of the narratives; he had visited the localities wherein they had taken place, and made careful inquiries from old men and others.[1] The results of his researches are presented in a new version of fifty legends, among the most celebrated and the most fabulous, comprising the Centaurs, Pasiphaê, Aktæôn, Kadmus and the Sparti, the Sphinx, Cycnus, Dædalus, the Trojan horse, Æolus, Scylla, Geryôn, Bellerophôn, &c.

It must be confessed that Palæphatus has performed his promise of transforming the "incredibilia" into narratives in themselves plausible and unobjectionable, and that in doing so he always follows some thread of analogy, real or verbal. The Centaurs (he tells us) were a body of young men from the village of Nephelê in Thessaly, who first trained and mounted horses for the purpose of repelling a herd of bulls belonging to Ixiôn king of the Lapithæ, which had run wild and done great damage: they pursued these wild bulls on horseback, and pierced them with their spears, thus acquiring both the name of *Prickers* (κέντορες) and the imputed attribute of joint body with the horse. Aktæôn was an Arcadian, who neglected the cultivation of his land for the pleasures of hunting, and was thus eaten up by the expense of his hounds. The dragon whom Kadmus killed at Thêbes, was in reality Drako king of Thêbes; and the dragon's teeth which he was said to have sown, and from whence sprung a crop of armed men, were in point of fact elephants' teeth, which Kadmus as a rich Phœnician had brought over with him: the sons of Drako sold these

[1] Palæphat. init. ap. Script. Mythogr. ed. Westermann, p. 268. Τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν πείθονται πᾶσι τοῖς λεγομένοις, ὡς ἀνομίλητοι σοφίας καὶ ἐπιστήμης—οἱ δὲ πυκνότεροι τὴν φύσιν καὶ πολυπράγμονες ἀπιστοῦσι τὸ παράπαν μηδὲν γενέσθαι τούτων. Ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ γενέσθαι πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα· . . . . γενόμενα δέ τινα οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ λογογράφοι παρέτρεψαν εἰς τὸ ἀπιστότερον καὶ θαυμασιώτερον τοῦ θαυμάζειν ἕνεκα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. Ἐγὼ δὲ γινώσκω, ὅτι οὐ δύναται τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι οἷα καὶ λέγεται· τοῦτο δὲ καὶ διείληφα, ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἂν ἐλέγετο.

The main assumption of the semi-historical theory is here shortly and clearly stated.

One of the early Christian writers, Minucius Felix, is astonished at the easy belief of his pagan forefathers in miracles. If ever such things had been done in former times (he affirms), they would continue to be done now; as they cannot be done now, we may be sure that they never were *really* done formerly (Minucius Felix, Octav. c. 20): "Majoribus enim nostris tam facilis in mendaciis fides fuit, ut temerè crediderint etiam alia monstruosa mira miracula, Scyllam multiplicem, Chimæram multiformem, Hydram, et Centauros. Quid illas aniles fabulas—de hominibus aves, et feras homines, et de hominibus arbores atque flores? *Quæ, si essent facta, fierent; quia fieri non possunt, ideo nec facta sunt.*"

elephants' teeth and employed the proceeds to levy troops against Kadmus. Dædalus, instead of flying across the sea on wings, had escaped from Krête in a swift sailing-boat under a violent storm: Kottus, Briareus and Gygês were not persons with one hundred hands, but inhabitants of the village of Hekatoncheiria in Upper Macedonia, who warred with the inhabitants of Mount Olympus against the Titans: Scylla, whom Odysseus so narrowly escaped, was a fast-sailing piratical vessel, as was also Pegasus, the alleged winged horse of Bellerophôn.[1]

By such ingenious conjectures, Palæphatus eliminates all the incredible circumstances, and leaves to us a string of tales perfectly credible and commonplace, which we should readily believe, provided a very moderate amount of testimony could be produced in their favour. If his treatment not only disenchants the original mythes, but even effaces their generic and essential character, we ought to remember that this is not more than what is done by Thucydidês in his sketch of the Trojan war. Palæphatus handles the mythes consistently, according to the semi-historical theory, and his results exhibit

[1] Palæphat. Narrat. 1, 3, 6, 13, 20, 21, 29. Two short treatises on the same subject as this of Palæphatus, are printed along with it both in the collection of Gale and of Westermann; the one *Heraclîti de Incredibilibus*, the other *Anonymi de Incredibilibus*. They both profess to interpret some of the extraordinary or miraculous mythes, and proceed in a track not unlike that of Palæphatus. Scylla was a beautiful courtezan, surrounded with abominable parasites: she ensnared and ruined the companions of Odysseus, though he himself was prudent enough to escape her (Heraclit. c. 2, p. 313, West). Atlas was a great astronomer; Pasiphaê fell in love with a youth named Taurus; the monster called the Chimæra was in reality a ferocious queen, who had two brothers called Leo and Drako; the ram which carried Phryxus and Hellê across the Ægean was a boatman named Krius (Heraclit. c. 2, 6, 15, 24).

A great number of similar explanations are scattered throughout the Scholia on Homer and the Commentary of Eustathius, without specification of their authors.

Theôn considers such resolution of fable into plausible history as a proof of surpassing ingenuity (Progymnasmata, cap. 6, ap. Walz. Coll. Rhett. Græc. i. p. 219). Others among the Rhetors, too, exercised their talents sometimes in vindicating, sometimes in controverting, the probability of the ancient mythes. See the Progymnasmata of Nicolaus—Κατασκευὴ ὅτι εἰκότα τὰ κατὰ Νιόβην, Ἀνασκευὴ ὅτι οὐκ εἰκότα τὰ κατὰ Νιόβην (ap. Walz. Coll. Rhetor. i. p. 284–318), where there are many specimens of this fanciful mode of handling.

Plutarch, however, in one of his treatises, accepts Minotaurs, Sphinxes, Centaurs, &c., as realities; he treats them as products of the monstrous, incestuous, and ungovernable lusts of man, which he contrasts with the simple and moderate passions of animals (Plutarch, Gryllus, p. 990).

the maximum which that theory can ever present.[1] By aid of conjecture we get out of the impossible, and arrive at matters intrinsically plausible, but totally uncertified; beyond this point we cannot penetrate, without the light of extrinsic evidence, since there is no intrinsic mark to distinguish truth from plausible fiction.

It remains that we should notice the manner in which the ancient mythes were received and dealt with by the philosophers. The earliest expression which we hear, on the part of philosophy, is the severe censure bestowed upon them on ethical grounds by Xenophanês of Kolophôn, and seemingly by some others of his contemporaries.[2] It was apparently in reply to such charges, which did not admit of being directly rebutted, that Theagenês of Rhêgium (about 520 B.C.) first started the idea of a double meaning in the Homeric and Hesiodic narratives,—an interior sense, different from that which the words in their obvious meaning bore, yet to a certain extent analogous, and discoverable by sagacious divination. Upon this principle he allegorised especially the battle of the gods in the Iliad.[3] In the succeeding

[1] The learned Mr. Jacob Bryant regards the explanations of Palæphatus as if they were founded upon real fact. He admits, for example, the city Nephelê alleged by that author in his exposition of the fable of the Centaurs. Moreover, he speaks with much commendation of Palæphatus generally: "He (Palæphatus) wrote early, and seems to have been a serious and sensible person; one who saw the absurdity of the fables upon which the theology of his country was founded." (Ancient Mythology, vol. i. p. 411-435.)

So also Sir Thomas Browne (Enquiry into Vulgar Errors, Book I. chap. vi. p. 221, ed. 1835) alludes to Palæphatus as having incontestably pointed out the real basis of the fables. "And surely the fabulous inclination of those days was greater than any since; which swarmed so with fables, and from such slender grounds took hints for fictions, poisoning the world ever after: wherein how far they succeeded, may be exemplified from Palæphatus, in his Book of Fabulous Narrations."

[2] Xenophan. ap. Sext. Empir. adv. Mathemat. ix. 193. He also disapproved of the rites, accompanied by mourning and wailing, with which the Eleatês worshipped Leukothea: he told them, *εἰ μὲν θεὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, μὴ θρηνεῖν· εἰ δὲ ἄνθρωπον, μὴ θύειν* (Aristotel. Rhet. ii. 23).

Xenophanês pronounced the battles of the Titans, Gigantes and Centaurs to be "fictions of our predecessors," *πλάσματα τῶν προτέρων* (Xenophan. Fragm. 1. p. 42, ed. Schneidewin).

See a curious comparison of the Grecian and Roman theology in Dionys. Halicarn. Ant. Rom. ii. 20.

[3] Schol. Iliad. xx. 67; Tatian. adv. Græc. c. 48. Hêrakleitus indignantly repelled the impudent atheists who found fault with the divine mythes of the Iliad, ignorant of their true allegorical meaning: *ἢ τῶν ἐπιφυομένων τῷ Ὁμήρῳ τόλμα τοὺς Ἥρας δεσμοὺς αἰτιᾶται, καὶ νομίζουσιν ὕλην τινὰ δαψιλῆ τῆς ἀθέου πρὸς Ὅμηρον ἔχειν μανίας ταῦτα—Ἢ οὐ μέμνῃ ὅτι τ' ἐκρέμω ὑψόθεν, &c. λέληθε δ' αὐτοὺς ὅτι τούτοις τοῖς ἔπεσιν ἐκτεθεολόγηται ἡ τοῦ παντὸς γένεσις, καὶ τὰ συνεχῶς ᾀδόμενα τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα ταύτων τῶν στίχων ἐστὶ τάξις* (Schol. ad. Hom. Iliad. xv. 18).

century, Anaxagoras and Metrodôrus carried out the allegorical explanation more comprehensively and systematically; the former representing the mythical personages as mere mental conceptions invested with name and gender, and illustrative of ethical precepts,—the latter connecting them with physical principles and phænomena. Metrodôrus resolved not only the persons of Zeus, Hêrê and Athênê, but also those of Agamemnôn, Achilles and Hectôr, into various elemental combinations and physical agencies, and treated the adventures ascribed to them as natural facts concealed under the veil of allegory.[1] Empedoklês, Prodikus, Antisthenês, Parmenidês, Hêrakleidês of Pontus, and in a later age, Chrysippus and the Stoic philosophers generally,[2] followed more or less the same principle of treating the popular gods as allegorical personages; while the expositors of Homer (such as Stesimbrotus, Glaukôn and others, even down to the Alexandrine age), though none of them proceeded to the same extreme length as Metrodôrus, employed allegory amongst other media of explanation for the purpose of solving difficulties, or eluding reproaches against the poet.

[1] Diogen. Laërt. ii. 11; Tatian. adv. Græc. c. 37; Hesychius, v. *Ἀγαμέμνονα*. See the ethical turn given to the stories of Circê, the Syrens and Scylla, in Xenoph. Memorab. i. 3, 7; ii. 6, 11–31. Syncellus, Chronic. p. 149. *Ἑρμηνεύουσι δὲ οἱ Ἀναξαγόρειοι τοὺς μυθώδεις θεοὺς, νοῦν μὲν τὸν Δία, τὴν δὲ Ἀθηνᾶν τέχνην*, &c.

Uschold and other modern German authors seem to have adopted in its full extent the principle of interpretation proposed by Metrodôrus—treating Odysseus and Penelopê as personifications of the Sun and Moon, &c. See Helbig, Die Sittlichen Zustände des Griechischen Helden Alters, Einleitung. p. xxix. (Leipsig, 1839).

Corrections of the Homeric text were also resorted to, in order to escape the necessity of imputing falsehood to Zeus (Aristotel. De Sophist. Elench. c. 4).

[2] Sextus Empiric. ix. 18; Diogen. viii. 76; Plutarch, De Placit. Philosoph. i. 3–6; De Poesi Homericâ, 92–126. De Stoicor. Repugn. p. 1050; Menander, De Encomiis, c. 5.

Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 14, 15, 16, 41; ii. 24–25. "Physica ratio non inelegans inclusa in impias fabulas."

In the *Bacchæ* of Euripidês, Pentheus is made to deride the tale of the motherless infant Dionysus having been sewn into the thigh of Zeus. Teiresias, while reproving him for his impiety, explains the story away in a sort of allegory: the *μηρὸς Διὸς* (he says) was a mistaken statement in place of the *αἰθὴρ χθόνα ἐγκυκλούμενος* (Bacch. 235–290).

Lucretius (iii. 995–1036) allegorises the conspicuous sufferers in Hadês,—Tantalus, Sisyphus, Tityus, and the Danaïds, as well as the ministers of penal infliction, Cerberus and the Furies. The first four are emblematic descriptions of various defective or vicious characters in human nature,—the deisidæmonic, the ambitious, the amorous, or the insatiate and querulous man; the two last represent the mental terrors of the wicked.

In the days of Plato and Xenophôn, this allegorising interpretation was one of the received methods of softening down the obnoxious mythes—though Plato himself treated it as an insufficient defence, seeing that the bulk of youthful hearers could not see through the allegory, but embraced the story literally as it was set forth.[1] Pausanias tells us, that when he first began to write his work, he treated many of the Greek legends as silly and undeserving of serious attention; but as he proceeded he gradually arrived at the full conviction, that the ancient sages had designedly spoken in enigmatical language, and that there was valuable truth wrapped up in their narratives: it was the duty of a pious man, therefore, to study and interpret, but not to reject, stories current and accredited respecting the gods.[2] And others,—arguing from the analogy of the religious mysteries, which could not be divulged without impiety to any except such as had been specially admitted and initiated,—maintained that it would be a profanation to reveal directly to the vulgar, the genuine scheme of nature and the divine administration: the ancient poets and philosophers had taken the only proper course, of talking to the many in types and parables, and reserving the naked truth for privileged and qualified intelligences.[3] The allegorical mode of explaining the

[1] Οἱ νῦν περὶ Ὁμηρον δεινοί—so Plato calls these interpreters (Kratylus, p. 407); see also Xenoph. Sympos. iii. 6; Plato, Ion, p. 530; Plutarch, De Audiend. Poet. p. 19. ὑπόνοια was the original word, afterwards succeeded by ἀλληγορία.

Ἥρας δὲ δεσμοὺς καὶ Ἡφαίστου βίψεις ὑπὸ πατρὸς, μέλλοντος τῇ μητρὶ τυπτομένῃ ἀμυνεῖν, καὶ θεομαχίας ὅσας Ὁμηρος πεποίηκεν, οὐ παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οὔτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας, οὔτ' ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν. Ὁ γὰρ νέος οὐχ' οἷός τε κρίνειν, ὅ,τι τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὃ μὴ, ἀλλ' ἃ ἂν τηλικοῦτος ὢν λάβῃ ἐν ταῖς δόξαις, δυσέκνιπτά τε καὶ ἀμετάστατα φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι (Plato, Republ. ii. 17, p. 378).

The idea of an interior sense and concealed purpose in the ancient poets occurs several times in Plato (Theætet. c. 93, p. 180): παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων, μετὰ ποιήσεως ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς πολλοὺς, &c.; also Protagor. c. 20, p. 316.

"Modo Stoicum Homerum faciunt,—modo Epicureum,—modo Peripateticum,—modo Academicum. Apparet nihil horum esse in illo, quia omnia sunt." (Seneca, Ep. 88.) Compare Plutarch, De Defectu Oracul. c. 11–12, t. ii. p. 702, Wytt., and Julian, Orat. vii. p. 216.

[2] Pausan. viii. 8, 2. To the same purpose (Strabo, x. p. 474), allegory is admitted to a certain extent in the fables by Dionys. Halic. Ant. Rom. ii. 20. The fragment of the lost treatise of Plutarch, on the Platæan festival of the Dædala, is very instructive respecting Grecian allegory (Fragm. ix. t. 5, p. 754–763, ed. Wytt.; ap. Euseb. Præpar. Evang. iii. 1).

[3] This doctrine is set forth in Macrobius (i. 2). He distinguishes between *fabula* and *fabulosa narratio:* the former is fiction pure, intended either to amuse or to instruct—the latter is founded upon truth, either respecting human or respecting divine agency. The gods did not like to be

ancient fables[1] became more and more popular in the third and fourth centuries after the Christian æra, especially among the

publicly talked of (according to his view) except under the respectful veil of a fable (the same feeling as that of Herodotus, which led him to refrain from inserting the ἱεροὶ λόγοι in his history). The supreme God, the τἀγαθὸν, the πρῶτον αἴτιον, could not be talked of in fables; but the other gods, the aërial or æthereal powers, and the soul, might be, and ought to be, talked of in that manner alone. Only superior intellects ought to be admitted to a knowledge of the secret reality. "De Diis cæteris, et de animâ, non frustra se, nec ut oblectent, ad fabulosa convertunt; sed quia sciunt *inimicam esse naturæ apertam nudamque expositionem sui*; quæ sicut vulgaribus sensibus hominum intellectum sui, vario rerum tegmine operimentoque, subtraxit; ita à prudentibus arcana sua voluit per fabulosa tractari . . . . . Adeo semper ita se et sciri et coli numina maluerunt, qualiter in vulgus antiquitas fabulata est . . . . Secundum hæc Pythagoras ipse atque Empedocles, Parmenides quoque et Heraclides, de Diis fabulati sunt: nec secus Timæus." Compare also Maximus Tyrius, dissert. x. and xxii. Arnobius exposes the allegorical interpretation as mere evasion, and holds the Pagans to literal historical fact (Adv. Gentes, v. p. 185, ed. Elm.).

Respecting the allegorical interpretation applied to the Greek fables, Böttiger (Die Kunst-Mythologie der Griechen, Abschn. ii. p. 176); Nitzsch (Heldensage der Griech. sect. 6, p. 78); Lobeck (Aglaopham. p. 133–155).

[1] According to the anonymous writer, ap. Westermann (Script. Myth. p. 328), every personal or denominated god may be construed in three different ways: either πραγματικῶς (historically, as having been a king or a man)—or ψυχικῶς, in which theory Hêrê signifies the *soul*; Athênê, *prudence*; Aphroditê, *desire*; Zeus, *mind*, &c.—or στοιχειακῶς, in which system Apollo signifies the *sun*; Poseidôn, the *sea*; Hêrê, the upper stratum of the air, or *æther*; Athênê, the lower or denser stratum; Zeus, the upper hemisphere; Kronus, the lower, &c. This writer thinks that all the three principles of construction may be resorted to, each on its proper occasion, and that neither of them excludes the others. It will be seen that the first is pure Euemerism; the two latter are modes of allegory.

The allegorical construction of the gods and of the divine mythes is copiously applied in the treatises, both of Phurnutus and Sallustius, in Gale's collection of mythological writers. Sallustius treats the mythes as of divine origin, and the chief poets as inspired (θεόληπτοι): the gods were propitious to those who recounted worthy and creditable mythes respecting them, and Sallustius prays that they will accept with favour his own remarks (cap. 3 and 4, p. 245–251, Gale). He distributes mythes into five classes: theological, physical, spiritual, material, and mixed. He defends the practice of speaking of the gods under the veil of allegory, much in the same way as Macrobius (in the preceding note): he finds, moreover, a good excuse even for those mythes which imputed to the gods theft, adultery, outrages towards a father, and other enormities: such tales (he says) were eminently suitable, since the mind *must at once see* that the facts as told are *not* to be taken as being themselves the real truth, but simply as a veil disguising some interior truth (p. 247).

Besides the life of Homer ascribed to Plutarch (see Gale, p. 325–332), Hêraclidês (*not* Hêraclidês of Pontus) carries out the process of allegorising the Homeric mythes most earnestly and most systematically. The

new Platonic philosophers; being both congenial to their orientalised turn of thought, and useful as a shield against the attacks of the Christians.

It was from the same strong necessity, of accommodating the old mythes to a new standard both of belief and of appreciation, that both the historical and the allegorical schemes of transforming them arose; the literal narrative being decomposed for the purpose of arriving at a base either of particular matter of fact, or of general physical or moral truth. Instructed men were commonly disposed to historicise only the heroic legends, and to allegorise more or less of the divine legends: the attempt of Euêmerus to historicise the latter was for the most part denounced as irreligious, while that of Metrodôrus to allegorise the former met with no success. In allegorising moreover even the divine legends, it was usual to apply the scheme of allegory only to the inferior gods, though some of the great Stoic philosophers carried it further and allegorised all the separate personal gods, leaving only an all-pervading cosmic Mind,[1] essential as a co-efficient along with Matter, yet not

application of the allegorising theory is, in his view, the only way of rescuing Homer from the charge of scandalous impiety—*πάντῃ γὰρ ἠσέβησεν, εἰ μηδὲν ἠλληγόρησεν* (Hêrac. *in init.* p. 407, Gale). He proves at length, that the destructive arrows of Apollo, in the first book of the Iliad, mean nothing at the bottom except a contagious plague, caused by the heat of the summer sun in marshy ground (p. 416–424). Athênê, who darts down from Olympus at the moment when Achilles is about to draw his sword on Agamemnôn, and seizes him by the hair, is a personification of repentant prudence (p. 435). The conspiracy against Zeus, which Homer (Iliad. i. 400) relates to have been formed by the Olympic gods, and defeated by the timely aid of Thetis and Briareus—the chains and suspension imposed upon Hêrê—the casting of Hêphæstos by Zeus out of Olympus, and his fall in Lêmnus—the destruction of the Grecian wall by Poseidôn, after the departure of the Greeks—the amorous scene between Zeus and Hêrê on Mount Gargarus—the distribution of the universe between Zeus, Poseidôn, and Hadês—all these he resolves into peculiar manifestations and conflicts of the elemental substances in nature. To the much-decried battle of the gods he gives a turn partly physical, partly ethical (p. 481). In like manner he transforms and vindicates the adventures of the gods in the Odyssey: the wanderings of Odysseus, together with the Lotophagi, the Cyclôps, Circê, the Sirens, Æolus, Scylla, &c., he resolves into a series of temptations, imposed as a trial upon a man of wisdom and virtue, and emblematic of human life (p. 496). The story of Arês, Aphroditê and Hêphæstos, in the eighth book of the Odyssey, seems to perplex him more than any other: he offers two explanations, neither of which seems satisfactory even to himself (p. 494).

[1] See Ritter, Geschichte der Philosophie, 2nd edit. part 3, book 11, chap. 4, p. 592; Varro ap. Augustin. Civitat. Dei, vi. 5, ix. 6; Cicero, Nat. Deor. ii. 24–28.

Chrysippus admitted the most important distinction between Zeus and the other gods (Plutarch, de Stoicor. Repugnant. p. 1052).

separable from Matter. But many pious pagans seem to have perceived that allegory pushed to this extent was fatal to all living religious faith,[1] inasmuch as it divested the gods of their character of Persons, sympathising with mankind and modifiable in their dispositions according to the conduct and prayers of the believer: and hence they permitted themselves to employ allegorical interpretation only to some of the obnoxious legends connected with the superior gods, leaving the personality of the latter unimpeached.

One novelty, however, introduced seemingly by the philosopher Empedoklês and afterwards expanded by others, deserves notice, inasmuch as it modified considerably the old religious creed by drawing a pointed contrast between gods and dæmons, —a distinction hardly at all manifested in Homer, but recognised in the "Works and Days" of Hesiod.[2] Empedoklês widened the gap between the two, and founded upon it important consequences. The gods were good, immortal, and powerful agents, having volition and intelligence, but without appetite, passion or infirmity; the dæmons were of a mixed nature between gods and men, ministers and interpreters from the former to the latter, but invested also with an agency and dispositions of their own. Though not immortal, they were *still long lived, and subject to the passions and propensities of* men, so that there were among them beneficent and maleficent dæmons with every shade of intermediate difference.[3] It had

[1] Plutarch. de Isid. et Osirid. c. 66, p. 377; c. 70, p. 379. Compare on this subject O. Müller, Prolegom. Mythol. p. 59 *seq.*, and Eckermann, Lehrbuch der Religions Geschichte, vol. i. sect. ii. p. 46.

[2] Hesiod, Opp. et Di. 122: to the same effect Pythagoras and Thalês (Diogen. Laërt. viii. 32; and Plutarch, Placit. Philos. i. 8).

The Hesiodic dæmons are all good: Athenagoras (Legat. Chr. p. 8) says that Thalês admitted a distinction between good and bad dæmons, which seems very doubtful.

[3] The distinction between Θεοί and Δαίμονες is especially set forth in the treatise of Plutarch, De Defectu Oraculorum, capp. 10, 12, 13, 15, &c. He seems to suppose it traceable to the doctrine of Zoroaster or the Orphic mysteries, and he represents it as relieving the philosopher from great perplexities; for it was difficult to know where to draw the line in admitting or rejecting divine Providence: errors were committed sometimes in affirming God to be the cause of everything, at other times in supposing him to be the cause of nothing. Ἐπεὶ τὸ διορίσαι πῶς χρηστέον καὶ μέχρι τινῶν τῇ προνοίᾳ, χαλεπὸν, οἱ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἁπλῶς τὸν θεὸν, οἱ δὲ ὁμοῦ τι πάντων αἴτιον ποιοῦντες, ἀστοχοῦσι τοῦ μετρίου καὶ πρέποντος. Εὖ μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ λέγοντες, ὅτι Πλάτων τὸ ταῖς γεννωμέναις ποιότησιν ὑποκείμενον στοιχεῖον ἐξευρὼν, ὃ νῦν ὕλην καὶ φύσιν καλοῦσιν, πολλῶν ἀπήλλαξε καὶ μεγάλων ἀποριῶν τοὺς φιλοσόφους· ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσι πλείονας λῦσαι καὶ μείζονας ἀπορίας οἱ τὸ τῶν δαιμόνων γένος ἐν μέσῳ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τρόπον τινὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν ἡμῶν σύναγον εἰς ταὐτὸ καὶ συναπτὸν, ἐξευρόντες

been the mistake (according to these philosophers) of the old mythes to ascribe to the gods proceedings really belonging to the dæmons, who were always the immediate communicants with mortal nature, inspiring prophetic power to the priestesses of the oracles, sending dreams and omens, and perpetually interfering either for good or for evil. The wicked and violent dæmons, having committed many enormities, had thus sometimes incurred punishment from the gods: besides which, their bad dispositions had imposed upon men the necessity of appeasing them by religious ceremonies of a kind acceptable to such beings; hence the human sacrifices, the violent, cruel, and obscene exhibitions, the wailings and fastings, the tearing and eating of raw flesh, which it had become customary to practise on various consecrated occasions, and especially in the Dionysiac solemnities. Moreover, the discreditable actions imputed to the gods,—the terrific combats, the Typhonic and Titanic convulsions, the rapes, abductions, flight, servitude, and concealment,—all these were really the doings and sufferings of bad dæmons, placed far below the sovereign agency—equable, undisturbed, and unpolluted—of the immortal gods. The action

(c. 10). Ἡ δαιμόνων φύσις ἔχουσα καὶ πάθος θνητοῦ καὶ θεοῦ δύναμιν (c. 13).

Εἰσὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἐν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ δαίμοσιν ἀρετῆς διαφοραὶ, καὶ τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ἀλόγου τοῖς μὲν ἀσθενὲς καὶ ἀμαυρὸν ἔτι λείψανον, ὥσπερ περίττωμα, τοῖς δὲ πολὺ καὶ δυσκατάσβεστον ἔνεστιν, ὧν ἴχνη καὶ σύμβολα πολλαχοῦ θυσίαι καὶ τελεταὶ καὶ μυθολογίαι σώζουσι καὶ διαφυλάττουσιν ἐνδιεσπαρμένα (ib.): compare Plutarch, de Isid. et Osir. 25, p. 360.

Καὶ μὴν ὅσας ἔν τε μύθοις καὶ ὕμνοις λέγουσι καὶ ᾄδουσι, τοῦτο μὲν ἁρπαγὰς, τοῦτο δὲ πλάνας θεῶν, κρύψεις τε καὶ φυγὰς καὶ λατρείας, οὐ θεῶν εἰσὶν ἀλλὰ δαιμόνων παθήματα, &c. (c. 15): also c. 23; also de Isid. et Osir. c. 25, p. 366.

Human sacrifices and other objectionable rites are excused, as necessary for the purpose of averting the anger of bad dæmons (c. 14–15).

Empedoklês is represented as the first author of the doctrine which imputed vicious and abominable dispositions to many of the dæmons (c. 15, 16, 17, 20), τοὺς εἰσαγομένους ὑπὸ Ἐμπεδοκλέους δαίμονας; expelled from heaven by the gods, θεήλατοι καὶ οὐρανοπετεῖς (Plutarch, De Vitand. Aër. Alien. p. 830); followed by Plato, Xenokratês and Chrysippus, c. 17: compare Plato (Apolog. Socrat. p. 27; Politic. p. 271; Symposion, c. 28. p. 203), though he seems to treat the δαίμονες as defective and mutable beings, rather than actively maleficent. Xenokratês represents some of them both as wicked and powerful in a high degree:—Ξενοκράτης καὶ τῶν ἡμερῶν τὰς ἀποφράδας, καὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν ὅσαι πληγάς τινας ἢ κοπετοὺς, ἢ νηστείας, ἢ δυσφημίας, ἢ αἰσχρολογίαν ἔχουσιν, οὔτε θεῶν τιμαῖς οὔτε δαιμόνων οἴεται προσήκειν χρηστῶν, ἀλλ' εἶναι φύσεις ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι μεγάλας μὲν καὶ ἰσχυρὰς, δυστρόπους δὲ καὶ σκυθρωπὰς, αἳ χαίρουσι τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ τυγχάνουσαι πρὸς οὐθὲν ἄλλο χεῖρον τρέπονται (Plutarch, De Isid. et Osir. c. 26, p. 361; Quæstion. Rom. p. 283): compare Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. i. p. 62.

of such dæmons upon mankind was fitful and intermittent: they sometimes perished or changed their local abode, so that oracles which had once been inspired became after a time forsaken and disfranchised.[1]

This distinction between gods and dæmons appeared to save in a great degree both the truth of the old legends and the dignity of the gods: it obviated the necessity of pronouncing either that the gods were unworthy, or the legends untrue. Yet although devised for the purpose of satisfying a more scrupulous religious sensibility, it was found inconvenient afterwards when assailants arose against paganism generally. For while it abandoned as indefensible a large portion of what had once been genuine faith, it still retained the same word *dæmons* with an entirely altered signification. The Christian writers in their controversies found ample warrant among the *earlier* pagan authors[2] for treating all the gods as dæmons—and not less ample warrant among the *later* pagans for denouncing the dæmons generally as evil beings.[3]

Such were the different modes in which the ancient mythes were treated, during the literary life of Greece, by the four classes above named—poets, logographers, historians and philosophers.

Literal acceptance, and unconscious, uninquiring faith, such as they had obtained from the original auditors to whom they were addressed, they now found only among the multitude—alike retentive of traditional feeling[4] and fearful of criticising

[1] Plutarch, De Defect. Orac. c. 15, p. 418. Chrysippus admitted, among the various conceivable causes to account for the existence of evil, the supposition of some negligent and reckless dæmons, δαιμόνια φαῦλα ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι γίνονται καὶ ἐγκληταί ἀμέλειαι (Plutarch, De Stoicor. Repugnant. p. 1051). A distinction, which I do not fully understand, between θεοὶ and δαίμονες, was also adopted among the Lokrians at Opus: δαίμων with them seems to have been equivalent to ἥρως (Plutarch, Quæstion. Græc. c. 6, p. 292): see the note above.

[2] Tatian. adv. Græcos, c. 20; Clemens Alexandrin. Admonit. ad Gentes, p. 26–29, Sylb.; Minuc. Felix. Octav. c. 26. "Isti igitur impuri spiritus, ut ostensum a Magis, a philosophis, a Platone, sub statuis et imaginibus consecrati delitescunt, et afflatu suo quasi auctoritatem præsentis numinis consequuntur," &c. This, like so many other of the aggressive arguments of the Christians against paganism, was taken from the pagan philosophers themselves.

Lactantius, De Verâ Philosophiâ, iv. 28. "Ergo iidem sunt Dæmones, quos fatentur execrandos esse: iidem Dii, quibus supplicant. Si nobis credendum esse non putant, credant Homero; qui summum illum Jovem Dæmonibus aggregavit," &c.

[3] See vol. i. chap. ii., the remarks on the Hesiodic Theogony.

[4] A destructive inundation took place at Pheneus in Arcadia, seemingly in the time of Plutarch: the subterranean outlet (βάραθρον) of the river had

the proceedings of the gods.[1] But with instructed men they became rather subjects of respectful and curious analysis—all agreeing that the Word as tendered to them was inadmissible, yet all equally convinced that it contained important meaning, though hidden yet not undiscoverable. A very large proportion of the force of Grecian intellect was engaged in searching after this unknown base, by guesses, in which sometimes the principle of semi-historical interpretation was assumed, sometimes that of allegorical, without any collateral evidence in either case, and without possibility of verification. Out of the one assumption grew a string of allegorised phænomenal truths, out of the other a long series of seeming historical events and chronological persons—both elicited from the transformed mythes and from nothing else.

The utmost which we accomplish by means of the semi-

become blocked up, and the inhabitants ascribed the stoppage to the anger of Apollo, who had been provoked by the stealing of the Pythian tripod by Hêraklês: the latter had carried the tripod to Pheneus and deposited it there. *Ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ἀτοπώτερος τούτων ὁ Ἀπόλλων, εἰ Φενεάτας ἀπόλλυσι τοὺς νῦν, ἐμφράξας τὸ βάραθρον, καὶ κατακλύσας τὴν χώραν ἅπασαν αὐτῶν, ὅτι πρὸ χιλίων ἐτῶν, ὥς φασιν, ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἀνασπάσας τὸν τρίποδα τὸν μαντικὸν εἰς Φενεὸν ἀπήνεγκε;* (Plutarch. de Serâ Numin. Vindictâ, p. 557; compare Pausan. viii. 14, 1). The expression of Plutarch that the abstraction of the tripod by Hêraklês had taken place 1000 years before, is that of the critic, who thinks it needful to historicise and chronologise the genuine legend; which, to an inhabitant of Pheneus at the time of the inundation, was doubtless as little questioned as if the theft of Hêraklês had been laid in the preceding generation.

Agathoclês of Syracuse committed depredations on the coasts of Ithaca and Korkyra: the excuse which he offered was, that Odysseus had come to Sicily and blinded Polyphêmus, and that on his return he had been kindly received by the Phæakians (Plutarch, ib.).

This is doubtless a jest, either made by Agathoclês, or more probably invented for him; but it is founded upon a popular belief.

[1] "Sanctiusque et reverentius visum, de actis Deorum credere quam scire." (Tacit. German. c. 34.)

Aristidês, however, represents the Homeric theology (whether he would have included the Hesiodic we do not know) as believed quite literally among the multitude in his time, the second century after Christianity (Aristid. Orat. iii. p. 25). *Ἀπορῶ, ὅτῳ πότε χρή με διαθέσθαι μεθ' ὑμῶν, πότερα ὡς τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ καὶ Ὁμήρῳ δὲ συνδοκεῖ, θεῶν παθήματα συμπεισθῆναι καὶ ἡμᾶς, οἷον Ἄρεος δεσμὰ καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος θητείας καὶ Ἡφαίστου ῥίψεις εἰς θάλασσαν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ Ἰνοῦς ἄχη καὶ φυγάς τινας.* Compare Lucian, *Ζεὺς Τραγῳδός*, c. 20, and De Luctu, c. 2; Dionys. Halicar. A. R. ii. p. 90, Sylb.

Kallimachus (Hymn. ad Jov. 9) distinctly denied the statement of the Kretans that they possessed in Krête the tomb of Zeus, and treated it as an instance of Kretan mendacity; while Celsus did not deny it, but explained it in some figurative manner—*αἰνιττόμενος τροπικὰς ὑπονοίας* (Origen. cont. Celsum, iii. p. 137).

historical theory even in its most successful applications, is, that after leaving out from the mythical narrative all that is miraculous or high-coloured or extravagant, we arrive at a series of credible incidents—incidents which *may, perhaps*, have really occurred, and against which no intrinsic presumption can be raised. This is exactly the character of a well-written modern novel (as, for example, several among the compositions of Defoe), the whole story of which is such as may well have occurred in real life: it is plausible fiction and nothing beyond. To raise plausible fiction up to the superior dignity of truth, some positive testimony or positive ground of inference must be shown; even the highest measure of intrinsic probability is not alone sufficient. A man who tells us that on the day of the battle of Platæa, rain fell on the spot of ground where the city of New York now stands, will neither deserve nor obtain credit, because he can have had no means of positive knowledge; though the statement is not in the slightest degree improbable. On the other hand, statements in themselves very improbable may well deserve belief, provided they be supported by sufficient positive evidence. Thus the canal dug by order of Xerxês across the promontory of Mount Athos, and the sailing of the Persian fleet through it, is a fact which I believe, because it is well-attested—notwithstanding its remarkable improbability, which so far misled Juvenal as to induce him to single out the narrative as a glaring example of Grecian mendacity.[1] Again, many critics have observed that the general tale of the Trojan war (apart from the superhuman agencies) is not more improbable than that of the crusades, which every one admits to be an historical fact. But (even if we grant this position, which is only true to a small extent), it is not sufficient to show an analogy between the two cases in respect to negative presumptions alone; the analogy ought to be shown to hold between them in respect to positive certificate also. The crusades are a curious phænomenon in history, but we accept them nevertheless as an unquestionable fact, because the antecedent improbability is surmounted by adequate contemporary testimony. When the like testimony, both in amount and kind, is produced to establish the historical reality of the Trojan war, we shall not hesitate to deal with the two events on the same footing.

In applying the semi-historical theory to Grecian mythical

[1] Juvenal, Sat. x. 174—

"Creditur olim
Velificatus Athos, et quantum Græcia mendax
audet in historia" &c

narrative, it has been often forgotten that a certain strength of testimony, or positive ground of belief, must first be tendered, before we can be called upon to discuss the antecedent probability or improbability of the incidents alleged. The belief of the Greeks themselves, without the smallest aid of special or contemporary witnesses, has been tacitly assumed as sufficient to support the case, provided only sufficient deduction be made from the mythical narratives to remove all antecedent improbabilities. It has been taken for granted that the faith of the people must have rested originally upon some particular historical event, involving the identical persons, things and places which the original mythes exhibit, or at least the most prominent among them. But when we examine the psychagogic influences predominant in the society among whom this belief originally grew up, we shall see that their belief is of little or no evidentiary value, and that the growth and diffusion of it may be satisfactorily explained without supposing any special basis of matters of fact. The popular faith, so far as it counts for anything, testifies in favour of the entire and literal mythes, which are now universally rejected as incredible.[1]

[1] Colonel Sleeman observes respecting the Hindoo historical mind—"History to this people is all a fairy tale" (Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official, vol. i. ch. ix. p. 70). And again, "The popular poem of the Ramaen describes the abduction of the heroine by the monster king of Ceylon, Rawun; and her recovery by means of the monkey general Hunnooman. Every word of this poem the people assured me was written, if not by the hand of the Deity himself, at least by his inspiration, which was the same thing—and it must consequently be true. Ninety-nine out of a hundred, among the Hindoos, implicitly believe, not only every word of the poem, but every word of every poem that has ever been written in Sanscrit. If you ask a man whether he really believes any very egregious absurdity quoted from these books, he replies, with the greatest *naïveté* in the world, Is it not written in the book, and how should it be there written, if not true? The Hindoo religion reposes upon an entire prostration of mind,—that continual and habitual surrender of the reasoning faculties, which we are accustomed to make occasionally, while engaged at the theatre, or in the perusal of works of fiction. We allow the scenes, characters, and incidents, to pass before our mind's eye, and move our feelings—without stopping a moment to ask whether they are real or true. There is only this difference—that with people of education among us, even in such short intervals of illusion or *abandon*, any extravagance in the acting, or flagrant improbability in the fiction, destroys the charm, breaks the spell by which we have been so mysteriously bound, and restores us to reason and the realities of ordinary life. With the Hindoos, on the contrary, the greater the improbability, the more monstrous and preposterous the fiction—the greater is the charm it has over their minds; and the greater their learning in the Sanscrit, the more are they under the influence of this charm. Believing all to be written by the Deity, or under his inspirations, and the men and things of former days to have been very

We have thus the very minimum of positive proof, and the maximum of negative presumption: we may diminish the latter by conjectural omissions and interpolations, but we cannot by any artifice increase the former: the narrative ceases to be incredible, but it still remains uncertified,—a mere commonplace possibility. Nor is fiction always, or essentially, extravagant and incredible. It is often not only plausible and coherent, but even more like truth (if a paradoxical phrase may be allowed) than truth itself. Nor can we, in the absence of any extrinsic test, reckon upon any intrinsic mark to discriminate the one from the other.[1]

different from men and things of the present day, and the heroes of these fables to have been demigods, or people endowed with powers far superior to those of the ordinary men of their own day—the analogies of nature are never for a moment considered; nor do questions of probability, or possibility, according to those analogies, ever obtrude to dispel the charm with which they are so pleasingly bound. They go on through life reading and talking of these monstrous fictions, which shock the taste and understanding of other nations, without ever questioning the truth of one single incident, or hearing it questioned. There was a time, and that not far distant, when it was the same in England, and in every other European nation; and there are, I am afraid, some parts of Europe where it is so still. But the Hindoo faith, so far as religious questions are concerned, is not more capacious or absurd than that of the Greeks or Romans in the days of Socrates or Cicero; the only difference is, that among the Hindoos a greater number of the questions which interest mankind are brought under the head of religion." (Sleeman, Rambles, &c., vol. i. ch. xxvi. p. 227: compare vol. ii. ch. v. p. 51; viii. p. 97).

[1] Lord Lyttelton, in commenting on the tales of the Irish bards, in his History of Henry II., has the following just remarks (book iv. vol. iii. p. 13, quarto): "One may reasonably suppose that in MSS. written since the Irish received the Roman letters from St. Patrick, *some* traditional truths recorded before by the bards in their unwritten poems may have been preserved to our times. Yet these cannot be so separated from many fabulous stories derived from the same sources, as to obtain a firm credit; it not being sufficient to establish the authority of suspected traditions, that they can be shown not to be so improbable or absurd as others with which they are mixed—*since there may be specious as well as senseless fictions.* Nor can a poet or bard, who lived in the sixth or seventh century after Christ, if his poem is still extant, be any voucher for facts supposed to have happened before the incarnation; though his evidence (allowing for poetical licence) may be received on such matters as come within his own time, or the remembrance of old men with whom he conversed. The most judicious historians pay no regard to the Welch or British traditions delivered by Geoffrey of Monmouth, though it is not impossible but that some of these may be true."

One definition of a mythe given by Plutarch coincides exactly with a *specious fiction:* Ὁ μῦθος εἶναι βούλεται λόγος ψευδὴς ἐοικὼς ἀληθινῷ (Plutarch, Bellone an pace clariores fuerunt Athenienses, p. 348).

"Der Grund-Trieb des Mythus (Creuzer justly expresses it) das Gedachte in ein Geschehenes umzusetzen." (Symbolik der Alten Welt, sect. 43, p. 99.)

In the semi-historical theory respecting Grecian mythical narrative, the critic unconsciously transports into the Homeric age those habits of classification and distinction, and that standard of acceptance or rejection, which he finds current in his own. Amongst us the distinction between historical fact and fiction is highly valued as well as familiarly understood: we have a long history of the past, deduced from a study of contemporary evidences; and we have a body of fictitious literature, stamped with its own mark and interesting in its own way. But this *historical sense*, now so deeply rooted in the modern mind that we find a difficulty in conceiving any people to be without it, is the fruit of records and inquiries, first applied to the present, and then preserved and studied by subsequent generations; while in a society which has not yet formed the habit of recording its present, the real facts of the past can never be known; the difference between attested matter of fact and plausible fiction—between truth and that which is like truth—can neither be discerned nor sought for. Yet it is precisely upon the supposition that this distinction is present to men's habitual thoughts, that the semi-historical theory of the mythes is grounded.

It is perfectly true, as has often been stated, that the Grecian epic contains what are called traditions respecting the past—the larger portion of it indeed consists of nothing else. But what are these traditions? They are the matter of those songs and stories which have acquired hold on the public mind; they are the creations of the poets and storytellers themselves, each of whom finds some pre-existing, and adds others of his own, new and previously untold, under the impulse and authority of the inspiring Muse. Homer doubtless found many songs and stories current with respect to the siege of Troy; he received and transmitted some of these traditions, re-cast and transformed others, and enlarged the whole mass by new creations of his own. To the subsequent poets, such as Arktinus and Leschês, these Homeric creations formed portions of pre-existing tradition, with which they dealt in the same manner; so that the whole mass of traditions constituting the tale of Troy became larger and larger with each successive contributor. To assume a generic difference between the older and the newer strata of tradition—to treat the former as morsels of history, and the latter as appendages of fiction—is an hypothesis gratuitous at the least, not to say inadmissible. For the farther we travel back into the past, the more do we recede from the clear day of positive history, and the deeper

do we plunge into the unsteady twilight and gorgeous clouds of fancy and feeling. It was one of the agreeable dreams of the Grecian epic, that the man who travelled far enough northward beyond the Rhipæan mountains, would in time reach the delicious country and genial climate of the virtuous Hyperboreans—the votaries and favourites of Apollo, who dwelt in the extreme north beyond the chilling blasts of Boreas. Now the hope that we may, by carrying our researches up the stream of time, exhaust the limits of fiction, and land ultimately upon some points of solid truth, appears to me no less illusory than this northward journey in quest of the Hyperborean elysium.

The general disposition to adopt the semi-historical theory as to the genesis of Grecian mythes, arises in part from reluctance in critics to impute to the mythopœic ages extreme credulity or fraud; together with the usual presumption, that where much is believed some portion of it must be true. There would be some weight in these grounds of reasoning, if the ages under discussion had been supplied with records and accustomed to critical inquiry. But amongst a people unprovided with the former and strangers to the latter, credulity is naturally at its maximum, as well in the narrator himself as in his hearers. The idea of deliberate fraud is moreover inapplicable,[1] for if the hearers are disposed to accept what is related to them as a revelation from the Muse, the *æstrus* of composition is quite sufficient to impart a similar persuasion to the poet whose mind is penetrated with it. The belief of that day can hardly be said to stand apart by itself as an act of reason. It becomes confounded with vivacious imagination and earnest emotion; and in every case where these mental excitabilities are powerfully acted upon, faith ensues

[1] In reference to the loose statements of the Highlanders, Dr. Johnson observes—"He that goes into the Highlands with a mind naturally acquiescent, and a credulity eager for wonders, may perhaps come back with an opinion very different from mine; for the inhabitants, knowing the ignorance of all strangers in their language and antiquities, are perhaps not very scrupulous adherents to truth: yet I do not say that they deliberately speak studied falsehood, or have a settled purpose to deceive. They have acquired and considered little, and do not always feel their own ignorance. They are not much accustomed to be interrogated by others, and seem never to have thought of interrogating themselves; *so that if they do not know what they tell to be true, they likewise do not distinctly perceive it to be false.* Mr. Boswell was very diligent in his inquiries, and the result of his investigations was, that the answer to the second question was commonly such as nullified the answer to the first." (Journey to the Western Islands, p. 272, 1st edit. 1775.)

unconsciously and as a matter of course. How active and prominent such tendencies were among the early Greeks, the extraordinary beauty and originality of their epic poetry may teach us.

It is, besides, a presumption far too largely and indiscriminately applied, even in our own advanced age, that where much is believed, something must necessarily be true—that accredited fiction is always traceable to some basis of historical truth.[1] The influence of imagination and feeling is not confined simply to the process of retouching, transforming, or magnifying narratives originally founded on fact; it will often create new narratives of its own, without any such preliminary basis. Where there is any general body of sentiment pervading men living in society, whether it be religious or political—love, admiration or antipathy—all incidents tending to illustrate that sentiment are eagerly welcomed, rapidly circulated and (as a general rule) easily accredited. If real incidents are not at hand, impressive fictions will be provided to satisfy the demand. The perfect harmony of such fictions with the prevalent feeling stands in the place of certifying testimony, and causes men to hear them not merely with credence, but even with delight. To call them in question and require proof, is a task which cannot be undertaken without incurring obloquy. Of such tendencies in the human mind abundant evidence is furnished by the innumerable religious legends which have acquired currency in various parts of the world, and of which no country was more fertile than Greece—legends which derived their origin, not from special facts misreported and exaggerated, but from pious feelings pervading the society, and translated into narrative by forward and imaginative minds—legends, in which not merely the incidents, but often even the personages are unreal, yet in which the generating sentiment is conspicuously discernible, providing its own matter as well as its own form. Other sentiments also, as well as the religious, provided they be fervent and widely diffused, will find expression in current narrative, and become portions of the general public belief. Every celebrated and notorious character is the source of a thousand fictions exemplifying his peculiarities. And if it be true, as I think present observation may show us, that such creative agencies are even now visible and effective, when the materials of genuine history are copious and critically studied

[1] I considered this position more at large in an article in the Westminster Review for May 1843, on Niebuhr's Greek Legends, with which article much in the present chapter will be found to coincide.

—much more are we warranted in concluding that in ages destitute of records, strangers to historical testimony, and full of belief in divine inspiration both as to the future and as to the past, narratives purely fictitious will acquire ready and uninquiring credence, provided only they be plausible and in harmony with the preconceptions of the auditors.

The allegorical interpretation of the mythes has been by several learned investigators, especially by Creuzer, connected with the hypothesis of an ancient and highly instructed body of priests, having their origin either in Egypt or in the East, and communicating to the rude and barbarous Greeks religious, physical and historical knowledge under the veil of symbols. At a time (we are told) when language was yet in its infancy, visible symbols were the most vivid means of acting upon the minds of ignorant hearers: the next step was to pass to symbolical language and expressions—for a plain and literal exposition, even if understood at all, would at least have been listened to with indifference, as not corresponding with any mental demand. In such allegorising way, then, the early priests set forth their doctrines respecting God, nature and humanity—a refined monotheism and a theological philosophy —and to this purpose the earliest mythes were turned. But another class of mythes, more popular and more captivating, grew up under the hands of the poets—mythes purely epical, and descriptive of real or supposed past events. The allegorical mythes, being taken up by the poets, insensibly became confounded in the same category with the purely narrative mythes —the matter symbolised was no longer thought of, while the symbolising words came to be construed in their own literal meaning—and the basis of the early allegory, thus lost among the general public, was only preserved as a secret among various religious fraternities, composed of members allied together by initiation in certain mystical ceremonies, and administered by hereditary families of presiding priests. In the Orphic and Bacchic sects, in the Eleusinian and Samothracian mysteries, was thus treasured up the secret doctrine of the old theological and philosophical mythes, which had once constituted the primitive legendary stock of Greece, in the hands of the original priesthood and in ages anterior to Homer. Persons who had gone through the preliminary ceremonies of initiation, were permitted at length to hear, though under strict obligation of secrecy, this ancient religious and cosmogonic doctrine, revealing the destination of man and the certainty of posthumous rewards and punishments—all disengaged from the corruptions

of poets, as well as from the symbols and allegories under which they still remained buried in the eyes of the vulgar. The mysteries of Greece were thus traced up to the earliest ages, and represented as the only faithful depositary channels of that purer theology and physics which had originally been communicated, though under the unavoidable inconvenience of a symbolical expression, by an enlightened priesthood coming from abroad to the then rude barbarians of the country.[1]

But this theory, though advocated by several learned men,

[1] For this general character of the Grecian mysteries with their concealed treasure of doctrine, see *Warburton*, Divine Legation of Moses, book ii. sect. 4.

*Payne Knight*, On the symbolical Language of ancient Art and Mythology, sect. 6, 10, 11, 40, &c.

*Saint Croix*, Recherches sur les Mystères du Paganisme, sect. 3, p. 106; sect. 4, p. 404, &c.

*Creuzer*, Symbolik und Mythologie der Alten Völker, sect. 2, 3, 23, 39, 42, &c. Meiners and Heeren adopt generally the same view, though there are many divergencies of opinion between these different authors, on a subject essentially obscure. Warburton maintained that the interior doctrine communicated in the mysteries was the existence of one Supreme Divinity, combined with the Euemeristic creed, that the pagan gods had been mere men.

See Clemens Alex. Strom. v. p. 592, Sylb.

The view taken by Hermann of the ancient Grecian mythology is in many points similar to that of Creuzer, though with some considerable difference. He thinks that it is an aggregate of doctrine—philosophical, theological, physical, and moral—expressed under a scheme of systematic personifications, each person being called by a name significant of the function personified: this doctrine was imported from the East into Greece, where the poets, retaining or translating the names, but forgetting their meaning and connexion, distorted the primitive stories, the sense of which came to be retained only in the ancient mysteries. That true sense, however (he thinks), may be recovered by a careful analysis of the significant names: and his two dissertations (De Mythologiâ Græcorum Antiquissimâ, in the Opuscula, vol. ii.) exhibit a specimen of this systematic expansion of etymology into narrative. The dissent from Creuzer is set forth in their published correspondence, especially in his concluding "Brief an Creuzer über das Wesen und die Behandlung der Mythologie," Leipzig, 1819. The following citation from his Latin dissertation sets forth his general doctrine—

Hermann, De Mythologiâ Græcorum Antiquissimâ, p. 4 (Opuscula, vol. ii. p. 171):—"Videmus rerum divinarum humanarumque scientiam ex Asiâ per Lyciam migrantem in Europam: videmus fabulosos poëtas peregrinam doctrinam, monstruoso tumore orientis sive exutam, sive nondum indutam, quasi de integro Græcâ specie procreantes; videmus poëtas illos, quorum omnium vera nomina nominibus—ab arte, quâ clarebant, petitis—obliterata sunt, diu in Thraciâ hærentes, raroque tandem etiam cum aliis Græciæ partibus commercio junctos: qualis Pamphus, non ipse Atheniensis, Atheniensibus hymnos Deorum fecit. Videmus denique retrusam paulatim in mysteriorum secretam illam sapientum doctrinam, vitiatam religionum perturbatione, corruptam insciti interpretum, obscuratam levitate amœniora

has been shown to be unsupported and erroneous. It implies a mistaken view both of the antiquity and the purport of the mysteries, which cannot be safely carried up even to the age of Hesiod, and which, though imposing and venerable as religious ceremonies, included no recondite or esoteric teaching.[1]

The doctrine supposed to have been originally symbolised and subsequently overclouded, in the Greek mythes, was in

*sectantium—adeo ut eam ne illi quidem intelligerent, qui hæreditariam a* prioribus poësin colentes, quum ingenii præstantiâ omnes præstinguerent, tantâ illos oblivione merserunt, ut ipsi sint primi auctores omnis eruditionis habiti."

Hermann thinks, however, that by pursuing the suggestions of etymology, vestiges may still be discovered, and something like a history compiled, of Grecian belief as it stood anterior to Homer and Hesiod:—"est autem in hac omni ratione judicio maxime opus, quia non testibus res agitur, sed ad interpretandi solertiam omnia revocanda sunt" (p. 172). To the same general purpose the French work of M. Emèric David, Recherches sur le Dieu Jupiter—reviewed by O. Müller: see the Kleine Schriften of the latter, vol. ii. p. 82.

Mr. Bryant has also employed a profusion of learning, and numerous etymological conjectures, to resolve the Greek mythes into mistakes, perversions, and mutilations, of the exploits and doctrines of oriental tribes long-lost and by-gone,—Amonians, Cuthites, Arkites, &c. "It was Noah (he thinks) who was represented under the different names of Thoth, Hermês, Menês, Osiris, Zeuth, Atlas, Phorôneus, Promêtheus, to which list a further number of great extents might be added: the Noûs of Anaxagoras was in reality the patriarch Noah" (Ant. Mythol. vol. ii. pp. 253, 272). "The Cuthites or Amonians, descendants of Noah, settled in Greece from the east, celebrated for their skill in building and the arts" (ib. i. p. 502; ii. p. 187). "The greatest part of the Grecian theology arose from misconception and blunders, the stories concerning their gods and heroes were founded on terms misinterpreted or abused" (ib. i. p. 452). "The number of different actions ascribed to the various Grecian gods or heroes all relate to one people or family, and are at bottom one and the same history" (ib. ii. p. 57). "The fables of Promêtheus and Tityus were taken from ancient Amonian temples, from hieroglyphics misunderstood and badly explained" (i. p. 426): see especially vol. ii. p. 160.

[1] The Anti-Symbolik of Voss, and still more the Aglaophamus of Lobeck, are full of instruction on the subject of this supposed interior doctrine, and on the ancient mysteries in general: the latter treatise especially is not less distinguished for its judicious and circumspect criticism than for its copious learning.

Mr. Halhed (Preface to the Gentoo Code of Laws, p. xiii.–xiv.) has good observations on the vanity of all attempts to allegorise the Hindu mythology: he observes, with perfect truth, "The vulgar and illiterate have always understood the mythology of their country in its literal sense: and there was a time to every nation, when the highest rank in it was equally vulgar and illiterate with the lowest. . . . A Hindu esteems the astonishing miracles attributed to a Brima, or a Kishen, as facts of the most indubitable authenticity, and the relation of them as most strictly historical."

Compare also Gibbon's remarks on the allegorising tendencies of the later Platonists (Hist. Decl. and Fall, vol. iv. p. 71).

reality first intruded into them by the unconscious fancies of later interpreters. It was one of the various roads which instructed men took to escape from the literal admission of the ancient mythes, and to arrive at some new form of belief, more consonant with their ideas of what the attributes and character of the gods ought to be. It was one of the ways of constituting, by help of the mysteries, a philosophical religion apart from the general public, and of connecting that distinction with the earliest periods of Grecian society. Such a distinction was both avowed and justified among the superior men of the later pagan world. Varro and Scævola distributed theology into three distinct departments,—the mythical or fabulous, the civil, and the physical. The first had its place in the theatre, and was left without any interference to the poets; the second belonged to the city or political community as such, —it comprised the regulation of all the public worship and religious rites, and was consigned altogether to the direction of the magistrate; the third was the privilege of philosophers, but was reserved altogether for private discussion in the schools apart from the general public.[1] As a member of the city, the philosopher sympathised with the audience in the theatre, and took a devout share in the established ceremonies, nor was he justified in trying what he heard in the one or saw in the other by his own ethical standard. But in the private assemblies of instructed or inquisitive men, he enjoyed the fullest liberty of canvassing every received tenet, and of broaching his own theories unreservedly, respecting the existence and nature of the gods. By these discussions the activity of the philosophical mind was maintained and truth elicited; but it was such truth as the body of the people ought not to hear, lest their faith in

[1] Varro, ap. Augustin. De Civ. Dei, iv. 27; vi. 5–6. "Dicis fabulosos Deos accommodatos esse ad theatrum, naturales ad mundum, civiles ad urbem." "Varro, de religionibus loquens, multa esse vera dixit, quæ non modo vulgo scire non sit utile, sed etiam tametsi falsa sint, aliter existimare populum expediat: et ideo Græcos teletas et mysteria taciturnitate parietibusque clausisse" (ibid. iv. 31). See Villoison, De Triplici Theologiâ Commentatio, p. 8; and Lactantius, De Origin. Error. ii. 3. The doctrine of the Stoic Chrysippus, ap. Etymologicon Magn. v. Τελεταί— *Χρύσιππος δέ φησι, τοὺς περὶ τῶν θείων λόγους εἰκότως καλεῖσθαι τελετὰς, χρῆναι γὰρ τούτους τελευταίους καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσι διδάσκεσθαι, τῆς ψυχῆς ἐχούσης ἕρμα καὶ κεκρατημένης, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀμυήτους σιωπᾷν δυναμένης· μέγα γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἄθλον ὑπὲρ θεῶν ἀκοῦσαί τε ὀρθὰ, καὶ ἐγκρατεῖς γενέσθαι αὐτῶν.*

The triple division of Varro is reproduced in Plutarch, *Amatorius*, p. 763. *τὰ μὲν μύθῳ, τὰ δὲ νόμῳ, τὰ δὲ λόγῳ, πίστιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔσχηκε· τῆς δ' οὖν περὶ θεῶν δόξης καὶ παντάπασιν ἡγεμόνες καὶ διδάσκαλοι γεγόνασιν ἡμῖν οἵ τε ποιηταὶ, καὶ οἱ νομόθεται, καὶ τρίτον, οἱ φιλόσοφοι.*

their own established religious worship should be overthrown. In thus distinguishing the civil theology from the fabulous, Varro was enabled to cast upon the poets all the blame of the objectionable points in the popular theology, and to avoid the necessity of pronouncing censure on the magistrates; who (he contended) had made as good a compromise with the settled prejudices of the public as the case permitted.

The same conflicting sentiments which led the philosophers to decompose the divine mythes into allegory, impelled the historians to melt down the heroic mythes into something like continuous political history, with a long series of chronology calculated upon the heroic pedigrees. The one process as well as the other was interpretative guesswork, proceeding upon unauthorised assumptions, and without any verifying test or evidence. While it frittered away the characteristic beauty of the mythe into something essentially anti-mythical, it sought to arrive both at history and philosophy by impracticable roads. That the superior men of antiquity should have striven hard to save the dignity of legends which constituted the charm of their literature as well as the substance of the popular religion, we cannot be at all surprised; but it is gratifying to find Plato discussing the subject in a more philosophical spirit. The Platonic Sokratês being asked whether he believes the current Attic fable respecting the abduction of Oreithyia (daughter of Erechtheus) by Boreas, replies, in substance,—"It would not be strange if I disbelieved it, as the clever men do; I might then show my cleverness by saying that a gust of Boreas blew her down from the rocks above while she was at play, and that having been killed in this manner she was reported to have been carried off by Boreas. Such speculations are amusing enough, but they belong to men ingenious and busy-minded over-much, and not greatly to be envied, if it be only for this reason, *that after having set right one fable, they are under the necessity of applying the same process to a host of others*—Hippocentaurs, Chimæras, Gorgons, Pegasus, and numberless other monsters and incredibilities. A man, who, disbelieving these stories, shall try to find a probable basis for each of them, will display an ill-placed acuteness and take upon himself an endless burden, for which I at least have no leisure: accordingly I forego such researches, and believe in the current version of the stories."[1]

[1] Plato, Phædr. c. 7, p. 229.

PHÆDRUS. Εἰπέμοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σὺ τοῦτο τὸ μυθολόγημα πείθει ἀληθὲς εἶναι;

SOKRATES. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἀπιστοίην, ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοί, οὐκ ἂν ἄτοπος εἴην, εἶτα σοφιζόμενος φαίην αὐτὴν πνεῦμα Βορέου κατὰ τῶν πλησίον πετρῶν σὺν

These remarks of Plato are valuable, not simply because they point out the uselessness of digging for a supposed basis of truth in the mythes, but because they at the same time suggest the true reason for mistrusting all such tentatives. The mythes form a class apart, abundant as well as peculiar. To remove any individual mythe from its own class into that of history or philosophy, by simple conjecture and without any collateral evidence, is of no advantage, unless you can perform a similar process on the remainder. If the process be trustworthy, it ought to be applied to all; and *e converso*, if it be not applicable to all, it is not trustworthy as applied to any one specially; always assuming no special evidence to be accessible. To detach any individual mythe from the class to which it belongs, is to present it in an erroneous point of view: we have no choice except to admit them as they stand, by putting ourselves approximately into the frame of mind of those for whom they were destined and to whom they appeared worthy of credit.

If Plato thus discountenances all attempts to transform the mythes by interpretation into history or philosophy, indirectly recognising the generic difference between them—we find substantially the same view pervading the elaborate precepts in his treatise on the Republic. He there regards the mythes, not as embodying either matter of fact or philosophical principle, but as portions of religious and patriotic faith, and instruments of ethical tuition. Instead of allowing the poets to frame them according to the impulses of their own genius and with a view to immediate popularity, he directs the legislator to provide types of his own for the characters of the gods and heroes, and to suppress all such divine and heroic legends as are not in harmony with these pre-established canons. In the Platonic system, the mythes are not to be matters of history, nor yet of spontaneous or casual fiction, but of prescribed faith: he supposes that the people will believe, as a thing of course, what

*Φαρμακείᾳ παίζουσαν ὥσαι, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τελευτήσασαν λεχθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ Βορέου ἀνάρπαστον γεγονέναι . . . Ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ἄλλως μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα χαρίεντα ἡγοῦμαι, λίαν δὲ δεινοῦ καὶ ἐπιπόνου καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐτυχοῦς ἀνδρὸς, κατ' ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, ὅτι δ' αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη μετὰ τοῦτο τὸ τῶν Ἱπποκενταύρων εἶδος ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, καὶ αὖθις τὸ τῆς Χιμαίρας. Καὶ ἐπιῤῥεῖ δὲ ὄχλος τοιούτων Γοργόνων καὶ Πηγάσων, καὶ ἄλλων ἀμηχάνων πλήθη τε καὶ ἀτοπίαι τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων· αἷς εἴ τις ἀπιστῶν προσβιβᾷ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἕκαστον, ἅτε ἀγροίκῳ τινὶ σοφίᾳ χρώμενος, πολλῆς αὐτῷ σχολῆς δεήσει. Ἐμοὶ δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα οὐδαμῶς ἐστὶ σχολή . . . Ὅθεν δὴ χαίρειν ἐάσας ταῦτα, πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομιζομένῳ περὶ αὐτῶν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, σκοπῶ οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἐμαυτὸν*, &c.

the poets circulate, and he therefore directs that the latter shall circulate nothing which does not tend to ennoble and improve the feelings. He conceives the mythes as stories composed to illustrate the general sentiments of the poets and the community, respecting the character and attributes of the gods and heroes, or respecting the social relations, and ethical duties as well as motives of mankind: hence the obligation upon the legislator to prescribe beforehand the types of character which shall be illustrated, and to restrain the poets from following out any opposing fancies. "Let us neither believe ourselves (he exclaims), nor permit any one to circulate, that Thêseus son of Poseidôn, and Peirithôus son of Zeus, or any other hero or son of a god, could ever have brought themselves to commit abductions or other enormities such as are now falsely ascribed to them. We must compel the poets to say, either that such persons were not the sons of gods, or that they were not the perpetrators of such misdeeds."[1]

Most of the mythes which the youth hear and repeat (according to Plato) are false, but some of them are true: the great and prominent mythes which appear in Homer and Hesiod are no less fictions than the rest. But fiction constitutes one of the indispensable instruments of mental training as well as truth; only the legislator must take care that the fictions so employed shall be beneficent and not mischievous.[2] As the mischievous fictions (he says) take their rise from wrong preconceptions respecting the character of the gods and heroes, so the way to

[1] Plato, Repub. iii. 5, p. 391. The perfect ignorance of all men respecting the gods rendered the task of fiction easy (Plato, Kritias, p. 107).

[2] Plato, Repub. ii. 16, p. 377. Λόγων δὲ διττὸν εἶδος, τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς, ψεῦδος δ' ἕτερον; Ναί. Παιδευτέον δ' ἐν ἀμφοτέροις, πρότερον δ' ἐν τοῖς ψεύδεσιν· . . . . Οὐ μανθάνεις, ὅτι πρῶτον τοῖς παιδίοις μύθους λέγομεν· τοῦτο δέ που ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν ψεῦδος, ἔνι δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆ. . . . Πρῶτον ἡμῖν ἐπιστατητέον τοῖς μυθοποιοῖς, καὶ ὃν μὲν ἂν καλὸν μῦθον ποιήσωσιν, ἐγκριτέον, ὃν δ' ἂν μὴ, ἀπυκριτέον . . . . ὧν δὲ νῦν λέγουσι, τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκβλητέοι . . . . οὓς Ἡσίοδος καὶ Ὅμηρος ἡμῖν ἐλεγέτην, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί. Οὗτοι γάρ που μύθους τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ψευδεῖς συντιθέντες ἔλεγόν τε καὶ λέγουσι. Ποίους δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ τί αὐτῶν μεμφόμενος λέγεις; Ὅπερ, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, χρὴ καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα μέμφεσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐάν τις μὴ καλῶς ψεύδηται. Τί τοῦτο; Ὅταν τις εἰκάζῃ κακῶς τῷ λόγῳ περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων, οἷοί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ γραφεὺς μηδὲν ἐοικότα γράφων οἷς ἂν ὅμοια βούληται γράψαι.

The same train of thought, and the precepts founded upon it, are followed up through chap. 17, 18, and 19; compare De Legg. xii. p. 941.

Instead of recognising the popular or dramatic theology as something distinct from the civil (as Varro did), Plato suppresses the former as a separate department and merges it in the latter.

correct them is to enforce, by authorised compositions, the adoption of a more correct standard.[1]

The comments which Plato has delivered with so much force in his Republic, and the enactments which he deduces from them, are in the main an expansion of that sentiment of condemnation, which he shared with so many other philosophers, towards a large portion of the Homeric and Hesiodic stories.[2] But the manner in which he has set forth this opinion unfolds to us more clearly the real character of the mythical narrative. They are creations of the productive minds in the community, deduced from the supposed attributes of the gods and heroes: so Plato views them, and in such character he proposes to amend them. The legislator would cause to be prepared a better and truer picture of the foretime, because he would start from truer (that is to say more creditable) conceptions of the gods and heroes. For Plato rejects the mythes respecting Zeus and Hêrê, or Thêseus and Peirithôus, not from any want of evidence, but because they are unworthy of gods and heroes: he proposes to call forth new mythes, which, though he admits them at the outset to be fiction, he knows will soon be received as true, and supply more valuable lessons of conduct.

We may consider then that Plato disapproves of the attempt to identify the old mythes either with exaggerated history or with disguised philosophy. He shares in the current faith, without any suspicion or criticism, as to Orpheus, Palamêdês, Dædalus, Amphiôn, Thêseus, Achilles, Cheirôn, and other mythical personages;[3] but what chiefly fills his mind is, the inherited sentiment of deep reverence for these superhuman characters and for the age to which they belonged,—a sentiment sufficiently strong to render him not only an unbeliever in such legends as

[1] Plato, Repub. ii. c. 21, p. 382. Τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος πότε καὶ τί χρήσιμον, ὥστε μὴ ἄξιον εἶναι μίσους; Ἆρ' οὐ πρός τε τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τῶν καλουμένων φίλων, ὅταν διὰ μανίαν ἢ τινα ἄνοιαν κακόν τι ἐπιχειρῶσι πράττειν, τότε ἀποτροπῆς ἕνεκα ὡς φάρμακον χρήσιμον γίγνεται; Καὶ ἐν αἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ταῖς μυθολογίαις, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι ἅπῃ τἀληθὲς ἔχει περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἀφομοιοῦντες τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος, ὅτι μάλιστα, οὕτω χρήσιμον ποιοῦμεν;

[2] The censure which Xenophanês pronounced upon the Homeric legends has already been noticed: Herakleitus (Diogen. Laërt. ix. 1) and Metrodôrus, the companion and follower of Epicurus, were not less profuse in their invectives, ἐν γραμμάσι τοσούτοις τῷ ποιητῇ λελοιδόρηται (Plutarch, Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, p. 1086). He even advised persons not to be ashamed to confess their utter ignorance of Homer, to the extent of not knowing whether Hectôr was a Greek or a Trojan (Plut. ib. p. 1094).

[3] Plato, Republic. iii. 4-5, p. 391; De Legg. iii. 1, p. 677.

conflict with it, but also a deliberate creator of new legends for the purpose of expanding and gratifying it. The more we examine this sentiment, both in the mind of Plato as well as in that of the Greeks generally, the more shall we be convinced that it formed essentially and inseparably a portion of Hellenic religious faith. The mythe both presupposes, and springs out of, a settled basis and a strong expansive force of religious, social, and patriotic feeling, operating upon a past which is little better than a blank as to positive knowledge. It resembles history, in so far as its form is narrative: it resembles philosophy, in so far as it is occasionally illustrative; but in its essence and substance, in the mental tendencies by which it is created as well as in those by which it is judged and upheld, it is a popularised expression of the divine and heroic faith of the people.

Grecian antiquity cannot be at all understood except in connexion with Grecian religion. It begins with gods and it ends with historical men, the former being recognised not simply as gods, but as primitive ancestors, and connected with the latter by a long mythical genealogy, partly heroic and partly human. Now the whole value of such genealogies arises from their being taken entire: the god or hero at the top is in point of fact the most important member of the whole;[1] for the length and continuity of the series arises from anxiety on the part of historical men to join themselves by a thread of descent with the being whom they worshipped in their gentile sacrifices. Without the ancestorial god, the whole pedigree would have become not only acephalous, but worthless and uninteresting. The pride of the Herakleids, Asklepiads, Æakids, Neleids, Dædalids, &c., was attached to the primitive eponymous hero and to the god from whom they sprung, not to the line of names, generally long and barren, through which the divine or heroic dignity gradually dwindled down into common manhood. Indeed the length of the genealogy (as I have before remarked) was an evidence of the humility of the historical man, which led him to place himself at a respectful distance from the gods or heroes; for Hekatæus of Milêtus, who ranked himself as the fifteenth descendant of a god, might perhaps have accounted it an overweening impiety in any living man to claim a god for his immediate father.

[1] For a description of similar tendencies in the Asiatic religions, see Mövers, Die Phönizier, ch. v. p. 153 (Bonn, 1841): he points out the same phænomena as in the Greek,—coalescence between the ideas of ancestry and worship,—confusion between gods and men in the past,—increasing tendency to Euemerise (p. 156–157).

The whole chronology of Greece, anterior to 776 B.C., consists of calculations founded upon these mythical genealogies, especially upon that of the Spartan kings and their descent from Hêraklês,—thirty years being commonly taken as the equivalent of a generation, or about three generations to a century. This process of computation was altogether illusory, as applying historical and chronological conditions to a case on which they had no bearing. Though the domain of history was seemingly enlarged, the religious element was tacitly set aside: when the heroes and gods were chronologised, they became insensibly approximated to the limits of humanity, and the process indirectly gave encouragement to the theory of Euêmerus. Personages originally legendary and poetical were erected into definite landmarks for measuring the duration of the foretime, thus gaining in respect to historical distinctness, but not without loss on the score of religious association. Both Euêmerus and the subsequent Christian writers, who denied the original and inherent divinity of the pagan gods, had a great advantage in carrying their chronological researches strictly and consistently upwards—for all chronology fails as soon as we suppose a race superior to common humanity.

Moreover it is to be remarked that the pedigree of the Spartan kings, which Apollodôrus and Eratosthenês selected as the basis of their estimate of time, is nowise superior in credibility and trustworthiness to the thousand other gentile and family pedigrees with which Greece abounded; it is rather indeed to be numbered among the most incredible of all, seeing that Hêraklês as a progenitor is placed at the head of perhaps more pedigrees than any other Grecian god or hero.[1] The descent of the Spartan king Leonidas from Hêraklês rests upon no better evidence than that of Aristotle or Hippokratês from Asklêpius,[2] —of Evagoras or Thucydidês from Æakus,—of Sokratês from

[1] According to that which Aristotle seems to recognise (Histor. Animal. vii. 6), Hêraklês was father of seventy-two sons, but of only one daughter —he was essentially *ἀρρενογόνος*, illustrating one of the physical peculiarities noticed by Aristotle. Euripidês however mentions daughters of Hêraklês in the plural number (Eurip. Heraklcid. 45).

[2] Hippokratês was twentieth in descent from Hêraklês, and nineteenth from Asklêpius (Vita Hippocr. by Soranus, ap. Westermann, Scriptor. Biographic. viii. 1); about Aristotle, see Diogen. Laërt. v. 1. Xenophôn, the physician of the emperor Claudius, was also an Asklepiad (Tacit. Ann. xii. 61).

In Rhodes, the neighbouring island to Kôs, was the gens Ἀλιάδαι, or sons of Hêlios, specially distinguished from the Ἀλίασται of mere associated worshippers of Hêlios, *τὸ κοινὸν τῶν* Ἀλιαδῶν *καὶ τῶν* Ἀλιαστῶν (see the Inscription in Boeckh's Collection, No. 2525, with Boeckh's comment).

Dædalus,—of the Spartan heraldic family from Talthybius,—of the prophetic Iamid family in Elis from Iamus,—of the root-gatherers in Pêlion from Cheirôn,—and of Hekatæus and his gens from some god in the sixteenth ascending line of the series. There is little exaggeration in saying, indeed, that no permanent combination of men in Greece, religious, social, or professional, was without a similar pedigree; all arising out of the same exigencies of the feelings and imagination, to personify as well as to sanctify the bond of union among the members. Every one of these *gentes* began with a religious and ended with an historical person. At some point or other in the upward series, entities of history were exchanged for entities of religion; but where that point is to be found we are unable to say, nor had the wisest of the ancient Greeks any means of determining. Thus much however we know, that the series, taken as a whole, though dear and precious to the believing Greek, possesses no value as chronological evidence to the historian.

When Hekatæus visited Thêbes in Egypt, he mentioned to the Egyptian priests, doubtless with a feeling of satisfaction and pride, the imposing pedigree of the gens to which he belonged, —with fifteen ancestors in ascending line, and a god as the initial progenitor. But he found himself immeasurably outdone by the priests "who genealogised against him."[1] They showed to him three hundred and forty-one wooden colossal statues, representing the succession of chief priests in the temple in uninterrupted series from father to son, through a space of 11,300 years. Prior to the commencement of this long period (they said), the gods dwelling along with men, had exercised sway in Egypt; but they repudiated altogether the idea of men begotten by gods or of heroes.[2]

Both these counter-genealogies are, in respect to trustworthiness and evidence, on the same footing. Each represents partly the religious faith, partly the retrospective imagination of the persons from whom it emanated. In each the lower members of the series (to what extent we cannot tell) are real, the upper members fabulous; but in each also the series derived all its interest and all its imposing effect from being conceived unbroken and entire. Herodotus is much perplexed by the capital discrepancy between the Grecian and Egyptian chronologies, and vainly employs his

[1] Herodot. ii. 143. *Ἑκαταίῳ δὲ γενεηλογήσαντι ἑωυτὸν, καὶ ἀναβήσαντι ἐς ἑκκαιδέκατον θεὸν, ἀντεγενεηλόγησαν ἐπὶ τῇ ἀριθμήσει, οὐ δεκόμενοι παρ' αὐτοῦ, ἀπὸ θεοῦ γενέσθαι ἄνθρωπον· ἀντεγενεηλόγησαν δὲ ὧδε*, &c.

[2] Herod. ii. 143–145. *Καὶ ταῦτα Αἰγύπτιοι ἀτρεκέως φασὶν ἐπίστασθαι, αἰεί τε λογιζόμενοι καὶ αἰεὶ ἀπογραφόμενοι τὰ ἔτεα.*

ingenuity in reconciling them. There is no standard of objective evidence by which either the one or the other of them can be tried. Each has its own subjective value, in conjunction with the faith and feelings of Egyptians and Greeks, and each presupposes in the believer certain mental prepossessions which are not to be found beyond its own local limits. Nor is the greater or less extent of duration at all important, when we once pass the limits of evidence and verifiable reality. One century of recorded time, adequately studded with authentic and orderly events, presents a greater mass and a greater difficulty of transition to the imagination than a hundred centuries of barren genealogy. Herodotus, in discussing the age of Homer and Hesiod, treats an anterior point of 400 years as if it were only yesterday; the reign of Henry VI. is separated from us by an equal interval, and the reader will not require to be reminded how long that interval now appears.

The mythical age was peopled with a mingled aggregate of gods, heroes, and men, so confounded together that it was often impossible to distinguish to which class any individual name belonged. In regard to the Thracian god Zalmoxis, the Hellespontic Greeks interpreted his character and attributes according to the scheme of Euemerism. They affirmed that he had been a man, the slave of the philosopher Pythagoras at Samos, and that he had by abilities and artifice established a religious ascendency over the minds of the Thracians, and obtained from them divine honours. Herodotus cannot bring himself to believe this story, but he frankly avows his inability to determine whether Zalmoxis was a god or a man,[1] nor can he extricate himself from a similar embarrassment in respect to Dionysus and Pan. Amidst the confusion of the Homeric fight, the goddess Athênê confers upon Diomêdês the miraculous favour of dispelling the mist from his eyes, so as to enable him to discriminate gods from men; and nothing less than a similar miracle could enable a critical reader of the mythical narratives

[1] Herod. iv. 94–96. After having related the Euemeristic version given by the Hellespontic Greeks, he concludes, with his characteristic frankness and simplicity—*Ἐγὼ δὲ, περὶ μὲν τούτου καὶ τοῦ καταγαίου οἰκήματος, οὔτε ἀπιστέω, οὔτε δὴ πιστεύω τι λίην. δοκέω δὲ πολλοῖσι ἔτεσι πρότερον τὸν Ζάλμοξιν τοῦτον γενέσθαι Πυθαγόρεω. Εἴτε δὲ ἐγένετό τις Ζάλμοξις ἄνθρωπος, εἴτ' ἐστὶ δαίμων τις Γέτῃσι οὗτος ἐπιχώριος, χαιρέτω.* So Plutarch (Numa, c. 19) will not undertake to determine whether Janus was a god or a king, *εἴτε δαίμων, εἴτε βασιλεὺς γενόμενος*, &c.

Herakleitus the philosopher said that men were *θεοὶ θνητοί*, and the gods were *ἄνθρωποι ἀθάνατοι* (Lucian, Vitar. Auctio. c. 13, vol. i. p. 303, Tauch.: compare the same author, Dialog. Mortuor. iii. vol. i. p. 182, ed. Tauchn.

to draw an ascertained boundary-line between the two.[1] But the original hearers of the mythes felt neither surprise nor displeasure from this confusion of the divine with the human individual. They looked at the past with a film of faith over their eyes—neither knowing the value, nor desiring the attainment of an unclouded vision. The intimate companionship, and the occasional mistake of identity between gods and men, were in full harmony with their reverential retrospect. And we accordingly see the poet Ovid in his Fasti, when he undertakes the task of unfolding the legendary antiquities of early Rome, re-acquiring, by the inspiration of Juno, the power of seeing gods and men in immediate vicinity and conjunct action, such as it existed before the development of the critical and historical sense.[2]

To resume, in brief, what has been laid down in this and the preceding chapters respecting the Grecian mythes—

1. They are a special product of the imagination and feelings, radically distinct both from history and philosophy: they cannot be broken down and decomposed into the one, nor allegorised into the other. There are indeed some particular and even assignable mythes, which raise intrinsic presumption of an

[1] Iliad, v. 127 —

> Ἀχλὺν δ' αὖ τοι ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἕλον, ἣ πρὶν ἐπῆεν,
> Ὄφρ' εὖ γιγνώσκῃς ἠμὲν θεὸν, ἠδὲ καὶ ἄνδρα.

Of this undistinguishable confusion between gods and men, striking illustrations are to be found both in the third book of Cicero de Naturâ Deorum (16–21), and in the long disquisition of Strabo (x. p. 467–474) respecting the Kabeiri, the Korybantes, the Daktyls of Ida; the more so as he cites the statements of Pherekydês, Akusilaus, Dêmêtrius of Skêpsis and others. Under the Roman empire the lands in Greece belonging to the immortal gods were exempted from tribute. The Roman tax-collectors refused to recognise as immortal gods any persons who had once been men; but this rule could not be clearly applied (Cicero, Nat. Deor. iii. 20). See the remarks of Pausanias (ii. 26, 7) about Asklêpius: Galen, too, is doubtful about Asklêpius and Dionysus—*Ἀσκληπιὸς γέ τοι καὶ Διόνυσος, εἴτ' ἄνθρωποι πρότερον ἦσαν, εἴτε καὶ ἀρχῆθεν θεοί* (Galen in Protreptic. 9. t. i. p. 22, ed. Kuhn). Xenophôn (De Venat. c. i.) considers Cheirôn as the brother of Zeus.

The ridicule of Lucian (Deorum Concilium, t. iii. p. 527–538, Hems.) brings out still more forcibly the confusion here indicated.

[2] Ovid, Fasti, vi. 6–20—

> "Fas mihi præcipue vultus vidisse Deorum,
> Vel quia sum vates, vel quia sacra cano . . .
> . . . Ecce Deas vidi . . .
> Horrueram, tacitoque animum pallore fatebar:
> Cum Dea, quos fecit, sustulit ipsa metus.
> Namque ait—O vates, Romani conditor anni,
> Ause per exiguos magna referre modos;
> Jus tibi fecisti numen cœleste videndi,
> Cum placuit numeris condere festa tuis."

allegorising tendency; and there are doubtless some others, though not specially assignable, which contain portions of matter of fact, or names of real persons, embodied in them. But such matter of fact cannot be verified by any intrinsic mark, nor are we entitled to presume its existence in any given case unless some collateral evidence can be produced.

2. We are not warranted in applying to the mythical world the rules either of historical credibility or chronological sequence. Its personages are gods, heroes, and men, in constant juxtaposition and reciprocal sympathy; men too, of whom we know a large proportion to be fictitious, and of whom we can never ascertain how many may have been real. No series of such personages can serve as materials for chronological calculation.

3. The mythes were originally produced in an age which had no records, no philosophy, no criticism, no canon of belief, and scarcely any tincture either of astronomy or geography—but which, on the other hand, was full of religious faith, distinguished for quick and susceptible imagination, seeing personal agents where we look only for objects and connecting laws;—an age moreover eager for new narrative, accepting with the unconscious impressibility of children (the question of truth or falsehood being never formally raised) all which ran in harmony with its pre-existing feelings, and penetrable by inspired prophets and poets in the same proportion that it was indifferent to positive evidence. To such hearers did the primitive poet or story-teller address himself. It was the glory of his productive genius to provide suitable narrative expression for the faith and emotions which he shared in common with them, and the rich stock of Grecian mythes attests how admirably he performed his task. As the gods and the heroes formed the conspicuous object of national reverence, so the mythes were partly divine, partly heroic, partly both in one.[1] The adventures of Achilles, Helen, and Diomêdês, of Œdipus and Adrastus, of Meleager and Althæa, of Jasôn and the Argô, were recounted by the same tongues and accepted with the same unsuspecting confidence, as those of Apollo and Artemis, of Arês and Aphroditê, of Poseidôn and Hêraklês.

[1] The fourth Eclogue of Virgil, under the form of a prophecy, gives a faithful picture of the heroic and divine past, to which the legends of Troy and the Argonauts belonged—

> "Ille Deûm vitam accipiet, Divisque videbit
> Permixtos heroas," &c.
> "Alter erit tum Tiphys et altera quæ vehat Argo
> Delectos heroas: erunt etiam altera bella,
> Atque iterum ad Troiam magnus mittetur Achilles."

4. The time however came when this plausibility ceased to be complete. The Grecian mind made an important advance, socially, ethically, and intellectually. Philosophy and history were constituted, prose writing and chronological records became familiar; a canon of belief more or less critical came to be tacitly recognised. Moreover superior men profited more largely by the stimulus, and contracted habits of judging different from the vulgar: the god Elenchus[1] (to use a personification of Menander) the giver and prover of truth, descended into their minds. Into the new intellectual medium, thus altered in its elements and no longer uniform in its quality, the mythes descended by inheritance; but they were found, to a certain extent, out of harmony even with the feelings of the people, and altogether dissonant with those of instructed men. Yet the most superior Greek was still a Greek, cherishing the common reverential sentiment towards the foretime of his country. Though he could neither believe nor respect the mythes as they stood, he was under an imperious mental necessity to transform them into a state worthy of his belief and respect. Whilst the literal mythe still continued to float among the poets and the people, critical men interpreted, altered, decomposed and added, until they found something which satisfied their minds as a supposed real basis. They manufactured some dogmas of supposed original philosophy, and a long series of fancied history and chronology, retaining the mythical names and generations, even when they were obliged to discard or recast the mythical events. The interpreted mythe was thus promoted into a reality, while the literal mythe was degraded into a fiction.[2]

[1] Lucian, Pseudol. c. 4. *Παρακλητέος ἡμῖν τῶν Μενάνδρου προλόγων εἶς, ὁ Ἔλεγχος, φίλος ἀληθείᾳ καὶ παῤῥησίᾳ θεὸς, οὐχ ὁ ἀσημότατος τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν σκηνὴν ἀναβαινόντων.* (See Meineke ad Menandr. p. 284.)

[2] The following passage from Dr. Ferguson's Essay on Civil Society (part ii. sect. i. p. 126) bears well on the subject before us—

"If conjectures and opinions formed at a distance have not a sufficient authority in the history of mankind, the domestic antiquities of every nation must for this very reason be received with caution. They are for the most part the mere conjectures or the fictions of subsequent ages; and even where at first they contained some resemblance of truth, they still vary with the imagination of those by whom they were transmitted, and in every generation receive a different form. They are made to bear the stamp of the times through which they have passed in the form of tradition, not of the ages to which their pretended descriptions relate. . . . . When traditionary fables are rehearsed by the vulgar, they bear the marks of a national character, and though mixed with absurdities, often raise the imagination and move the heart: when made the materials of poetry, and adorned by the skill and the eloquence of an ardent and superior mind, they instruct the understanding as well as engage the passions. It is only

The habit of distinguishing the interpreted from the literal mythe has passed from the literary men of antiquity to those of the modern world, who have for the most part construed the divine mythes as allegorised philosophy, and the heroic mythes as exaggerated, adorned, and over-coloured history. The early ages of Greece have thus been peopled with quasi-historical persons and quasi-historical events, all extracted from the mythes after making certain allowances for poetical ornament. But we must not treat this extracted product as if it were the original substance. We cannot properly understand it except by viewing it in connexion with the literal mythes out of which it was obtained, in their primitive age and appropriate medium, before the superior minds had yet outgrown the common faith in an all-personified Nature, and learned to restrict the divine free-agency by the supposition of invariable physical laws. It is in this point of view that the mythes are important for any one who would correctly appreciate the general tone of Grecian thought and feeling; for they were the universal mental stock of the Hellenic world—common to men and women, rich and poor, instructed and ignorant; they were in every one's memory and in every one's mouth,[1] while science and history were

in the management of mere antiquaries, or stript of the ornaments which the laws of history forbid them to wear, that *they become unfit even to amuse the fancy or to serve any purpose whatever.*

"It were absurd to quote the fable of the Iliad or the Odyssey, the legends of Hercules, Theseus and Œdipus, as authorities in matters of fact relating to the history of mankind; but they may, with great justice, be cited to ascertain what were the conceptions and sentiments of the age in which they were composed, or to characterise the genius of that people with whose imaginations they were blended, and by whom they were fondly rehearsed and admired. In this manner fiction may be admitted to vouch for the genius of nations, while history has nothing to offer worthy of credit."

To the same purpose M. Paulin Paris (in his Lettre à M. H. de Monmerqué, prefixed to the Roman de Berte aux Grans Piés, Paris, 1836), respecting the 'romans' of the Middle Ages:—"Pour bien connaître l'histoire du moyen âge, non pas celle des faits, mais celle des mœurs qui rendent les faits vraisemblables, il faut l'avoir étudiée dans les romans, et voilà pourquoi l'Histoire de France n'est pas encore faite." (p. xxi.)

[1] A curious evidence of the undiminished popularity of the Grecian mythes, to the exclusion even of recent history, is preserved by Vopiscus at the beginning of his Life of Aurelian.

The præfect of the city of Rome, Junius Tiberianus, took Vopiscus into his carriage on the festival-day of the Hilaria; he was connected by the ties of relationship with Aurelian, who had died about a generation before—and as the carriage passed by the splendid temple of the Sun, which Aurelian had consecrated, he asked Vopiscus, what author had written the Life of that emperor? To which Vopiscus replied, that he had read some Greek works which touched upon Aurelian, but nothing in Latin. Whereat the venerable præfect was profoundly grieved: "Dol-

confined to comparatively few. We know from Thucydidês how erroneously and carelessly the Athenian public of his day retained the history of Peisistratus, only one century past;[1] but the adventures of the gods and heroes, the numberless explanatory legends attached to visible objects and periodical ceremonies, were the theme of general talk, and any man unacquainted with them would have found himself partially excluded from the sympathy of his neighbours. The theatrical representations, exhibited to the entire city population and listened to with enthusiastic interest, both presupposed and perpetuated acquaintance with the great lines of heroic fable. Indeed in later times even the pantomimic dancers embraced in their representations the whole field of mythical incident, and their immense success proves at once how popular and how well-known such subjects were. The names and attributes of the heroes were incessantly alluded to in the way of illustration, to point out a consoling, admonitory, or repressive moral: the simple mention of any of them sufficed to call up in every one's mind the principal events of his life, and the poet or rhapsode could thus calculate on touching chords not less familiar than susceptible.[2]

orem gemitûs sui vir sanctus per hæc verba profudit:—Ergo *Thersitem, Sinonem, cæteraque illa prodigia vetustatis, et nos bene scimus, et posteri frequentabunt:* divum Aurelianum, clarissimum principem, severissimum Imperatorem, per quem totus Romano nomini orbis est restitutus, posteri nescient? Deus avertat hanc amentiam! Et tamen, si bene memini, ephemeridas illius viri scriptas habemus," &c. (Historiæ August. Scriptt. p. 209, ed. Salmas.)

This impressive remonstrance produced the Life of Aurelian by Vopiscus. The materials seem to have been ample and authentic: it is to be regretted that they did not fall into the hands of an author qualified to turn them to better account.

[1] Thucyd. vi. 56.

[2] Pausan. i. 3, 3. *Λέγεται μὲν δὴ καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ἀληθῆ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, οἷα ἱστορίας ἀνηκόοις οὖσι, καὶ ὁπόσα ἥκουον εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων ἔν τε χόροις καὶ τραγῳδίαις πιστὰ ἡγουμένοις*, &c. The treatise of Lucian, De Saltatione, is a curious proof how much these mythes were in every one's memory, and how large the range of knowledge of them was which a good dancer possessed (see particularly c. 76–79, t. ii. p. 308–310, Hemst.).

Antiphanês ap. Athenæ. vi. p. 223—

> *Μακάριόν ἐστιν ἡ τραγῳδία*
> *ποίημα κατὰ πάντ', εἴ γε πρῶτον οἱ λόγοι*
> *ὑπὸ τῶν θεατῶν εἰσιν ἐγνωρισμένοι*
> *πρίν καί τιν' εἰπεῖν· ὡς ὑπομνῆσαι μόνον*
> *δεῖ τὸν ποιητήν. Οἰδίπουν γὰρ ἄν γε φῶ,*
> *τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντ' ἴσασιν· ὁ παῖδ Λάϊος,*
> *μήτηρ Ἰοκάστη, θυγατέρας, παῖδες τίνες·*
> *τί πεῖσεθ' οὗτος, τί πεποίηκεν. Ἂν πάλιν*
> *εἴπῃ τις Ἀλκμαίωνα, καὶ τὰ παιδία*
> *πάντ' εὐθὺς εἴρηκ', ὅτι μανεὶς ἀπέκτονε*
> *τὴν μητέρ'· ἀγανακτῶν δ' Ἄδραστος εὐθέως*
> *ἥξει, πάλιν δ' ἄπεισιν*, &c.

A similar effect was produced by the multiplied religious festivals and processions, as well as by the oracles and prophecies which circulated in every city. The annual departure of the Theôric ship from Athens to the sacred island of Dêlos, kept alive in the minds of Athenians generally, the legend of Thêseus and his adventurous enterprise in Krête:[1] and in like manner

The first pages of the eleventh Oration of Dio Chrysostom contain some striking passages both as to the universal acquaintance with the mythes, and as to their extreme popularity (Or. xi. p. 307–312, Reisk.). See also the commencement of Heraklidês, De Allegoriâ Homericâ (ap. Scriptt. Myth. ed. Gale, p. 408), about the familiarity with Homer.

The Lydê of the poet Antimachus was composed for his own consolation under sorrow, by enumerating the *ἡρωϊκὰς συμφορὰς* (Plutarch, Consolat. ad Apollôn. c. 9, p. 106: compare Æschines cont. Ktesiph. c. 48). A sepulchral inscription in Thêra, on the untimely death of Admêtus, a youth of the heroic gens Ægidæ, makes a touching allusion to his ancestors Pêleus and Pherês (Boeckh, C. I. t. ii. p. 1087).

A curious passage of Aristotle is preserved by Dêmêtrius Phalereus (*Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας*, c. 144),—*Ὅσῳ γὰρ αὐτίτης καὶ μονώτης εἰμί, φιλομυθότερος γέγονα* (compare the passage in the Nikomachean Ethics, i. 9, *μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος*). Stahr refers this to a letter of Aristotle written in his old age, the mythes being the consolation of his solitude (Aristotelia, i. p. 201).

For the employment of the mythical names and incidents as topics of pleasing and familiar comparison, see Menander, *Περὶ Ἐπιδεικτικ.* § iv. capp. 9 and 11, ap. Walz. Coll. Rhett. t. ix. p. 283–294. The degree in which they passed into the ordinary songs of women is illustrated by a touching epigram contained among the Chian Inscriptions published in Boeckh's Collection (No. 2236)—

*Βιττὼ καὶ Φαινὶς, φίλη ἡμέρῃ (ῃ) αἱ συνέριθοι,*
*Αἱ πενιχραὶ, γραῖαι, τῆδ' ἐκλίθημεν δμοῦ.*
*Ἀμφότεραι Κῶαι, πρῶται γένος—ὦ γλυκὺς ὄρθρος,*
*Πρὸς λύχνον ᾧ μύθους ἤδομεν ἡμιθέων.*

These two poor women were not afraid to boast of their family descent. They probably belonged to some noble gens which traced its origin to a god or a hero. About the songs of women, see also Agathias, i. 7, p. 29, ed. Bonn.

In the family of the wealthy Athenian Demokratês was a legend, that his primitive ancestor (son of Zeus by the daughter of the Archêgetês of the dême Aixônêis, to which he belonged) had received Hêraklês at his table: this legend was so rife that the old women sung it,—*ἅπερ αἱ γραῖαι ᾄδουσι* (Plato, Lysis, p. 205). Compare also a legend of the dême *Ἀναγυροῦς*, mentioned in Suidas *ad voc.*

"Who is this maiden?" asks Orestês from Pyladês in the Iphigeneia in Tauris of Euripidês (662), respecting his sister Iphigeneia, whom he does not know as priestess of Artemis in a foreign land—

*Τίς ἐστὶν ἡ νεᾶνις; ὡς Ἑλληνικῶς*
*Ἀνήρθ' ἡμᾶς τοὺς τ' ἐν Ἰλίῳ πόνους*
*Νόστον τ' Ἀχαιῶν, τόν τιν' οἰωνοῖς σοφὸν*
*Κάλχαντ', Ἀχιλλέως τ' οὔνομ', &c.*
*. . . . ἐστὶν ἡ ξένη γένος*
*Ἐκεῖθεν. Ἀργεία τις, &c.*

[1] Plato, Phædo, c. 2.

most of the other public rites and ceremonies were of a commemorative character, deduced from some mythical person or incident familiarly known to natives, and forming to strangers a portion of the curiosities, of the place.[1] During the period of Grecian subjection under the Romans, these curiosities, together with their works of art and their legends, were especially clung to as a set-off against present degradation. The Theban citizen who found himself restrained from the liberty enjoyed by all other Greeks, of consulting Amphiaräus as a prophet, though the sanctuary and chapel of the hero stood in his own city—could not be satisfied without a knowledge of the story which explained the origin of such prohibition,[2] and which conducted him back to the originally hostile relations between Amphiaräus and Thêbes. Nor can we suppose among the citizens of Sikyôn anything less than a perfect and reverential conception of the legend of Thêbes, when we read the account given by Herodotus of the conduct of the despot Kleisthenês in regard to Adrastus and Melanippus.[3] The Trœzenian youths and maidens,[4] who universally, when on the eve of marriage, consecrated an offering of their hair at the Herôon of Hippolytus, maintained a lively recollection of the legend of that unhappy recusant whom Aphroditê had so cruelly punished. Abundant relics preserved in many Grecian cities and temples served both as mementos and attestations of other legendary events; and the tombs of the heroes counted among the most powerful stimulants of mythical reminiscence. The sceptre of Pelops and Agamemnôn, still preserved in the days of Pausanias at Chæroneia in Bœôtia, was the work of the god Hêphæstos. While many other alleged productions of the same divine hand were preserved in different cities of Greece, this is the only one

[1] The Philopseudes of Lucian (t. iii. p. 31, Hemst. cap. 2, 3, 4) shows not only the pride which the general public of Athens and Thêbes took in their old mythes (Triptolemus, Boreas and Oreithyia, the Sparti, &c.), but the way in which they treated every man who called the stories in question as a fool or as an atheist. He remarks that if the guides who showed the antiquities had been restrained to tell nothing but what was true, they would have died of hunger; for the visiting strangers would not care to hear plain truth, even if they could have got it for nothing (*μηδὲ ἀμισθὶ τῶν ξένων τἀληθὲς ἀκούειν ἐθελησάντων*).

[2] Herodot. viii. 134.

[3] Herodot. v. 67.

[4] Euripid. Hippolyt. 1424; Pausan. ii. 32, 1; Lucian, De Deâ Syriâ, c. 60, vol. iv. p. 287, Tauch.

It is curious to see in the account of Pausanias how all the petty peculiarities of the objects around became connected with explanatory details growing out of this affecting legend. Compare Pausan. i. 22, 2.

which Pausanias himself believed to be genuine: it had been carried by Elektra, daughter of Agamemnôn, to Phôkis, and received divine honours from the citizens of Chæroneia.[1] The spears of Mêrionês and Odysseus were treasured up at Engyium in Sicily, that of Achilles at Phasêlis; the sword of Memnôn adorned the temple of Asklêpius at Nicomêdia; and Pausanias, with unsuspecting confidence, adduces the two latter as proofs that the arms of the heroes were made of brass.[2] The hide of the Kalydonian boar was guarded and shown by the Tegeates as a precious possession; the shield of Euphorbus was in like manner suspended in the temple of Branchidæ near Milêtus, as well as in the temple of Hêrê in Argos. Visible relics of Epeius and Philoktêtês were not wanting; moreover Strabo raises his voice with indignation against the numerous Palladia which were shown in different cities, each pretending to be the genuine image from Troy.[3] It would be impossible to specify the number of chapels, sanctuaries, solemnities, foundations of one sort or another, said to have been first commenced by heroic or mythical personages,—by Hêraklês, Jasôn, Mêdea, Alkmæôn, Diomêdês, Odysseus, Danaus and his daughters,[4] &c. Perhaps in some of these cases particular critics might raise objections, but the great bulk of the people entertained a firm and undoubted belief in the current legend.

If we analyse the intellectual acquisitions of a common Grecian townsman, from the rude communities of Arcadia or Phôkis even up to the enlightened Athens, we shall find that, over and above the rules of art or capacities requisite for his daily wants, it consisted chiefly of the various mythes connected with his gens, his city, his religious festivals and the mysteries in which he might have chosen to initiate himself, as well as with the works of art and the more striking natural objects which he might see around him—the whole set off and decorated by some knowledge of the epic and dramatic poets. Such was the intellectual and imaginative reach of an ordinary Greek, considered apart from the instructed few: it was an aggregate of religion, of social and patriotic retrospect, and of romantic fancy, blended into one indivisible faith. And thus

[1] Pausan. ix. 40, 6.

[2] Plutarch, Marcell. c. 20; Pausan. iii. 3, 6.

[3] Pausan. viii. 46, 1; Diogen. Laër. viii. 5; Strabo, vi. p. 263; Appian, Bell. Mithridat. c. 77; Æschyl. Eumen. 380.

Wachsmuth has collected the numerous citations out of Pausanias on this subject (Hellenische Alterthumskunde, part ii. sect. 115, p. 111).

[4] Herodot. ii. 182; Plutarch, Pyrrh. c. 32; Schol. Apoll. Rhod. iv. 1217; Diodôr. iv. 56.

the subjective value of the mythes, looking at them purely as elements of Grecian thought and feeling, will appear indisputably great, however little there may be of objective reality, either historical or philosophical, discoverable under them.

We must not omit the incalculable importance of the mythes as stimulants to the imagination of the Grecian artist in sculpture, in painting, in carving, and in architecture. From the divine and heroic legends and personages were borrowed those paintings, statues, and reliefs, which rendered the temples, porticos, and public buildings, at Athens and elsewhere, objects of surpassing admiration. Such visible reproduction contributed again to fix the types of the gods and heroes familiarly and indelibly on the public mind.[1] The figures delineated on cups and vases as well as on the walls of private houses were chiefly drawn from the same source—the mythes being the great storehouse of artistic scenes and composition.

To enlarge on the characteristic excellence of Grecian art would here be out of place: I regard it only in so far as, having originally drawn its materials from the mythes, it reacted upon the mythical faith and imagination—the reaction imparting strength to the former as well as distinctness to the latter. To one who saw constantly before him representations of the battles of the Centaurs or the Amazons,[2] of the exploits performed by Perseus and Bellerophôn, of the incidents composing the Trojan war or the Kalydonian boar-hunt—the process of belief, even in the more fantastic of these conceptions, became easy in proportion as the conception was familiarised. And if any person had been slow to believe in the efficacy of the prayers of Æakus, whereby that devout hero once obtained special relief from Zeus, at a moment when Greece was perishing from long-continued sterility—his doubts would probably vanish, when, on visiting the Æakeium at Ægina, there were exhibited to him the statues of the very envoys who had come on the behalf of the distressed Greeks to solicit that Æakus would pray for them.[3] A Grecian temple[4] was not simply a place of worship, but the actual dwelling-place of a god, who

[1] Ἡμιθέων ἀρεταῖς, the subjects of the works of Polygnotus at Athens (Melanthius, ap. Plutarch. Cimôn. c. 4); compare Theocrit. xv. 138.

[2] The Centauromachia and the Amazonomachia are constantly associated together in the ancient Grecian reliefs (see the Expédition Scientifique de Morée, t. ii. p. 16, in the explanation of the temple of Apollo Epikureius at Phigaleia).

[3] Pausan. ii. 29, 6.

[4] Ernst Curtius, Die Akropolis von Athen, Berlin, 1844, p. 18. Arnobius adv. Gentes, vi. p. 207, ed. Elmenhorst.

was believed to be introduced by the solemn dedicatory ceremony, and whom the imagination of the people identified in the most intimate manner with his statue. The presence or removal of the statue was conceived as identical with that of the being represented—and while the statue was solemnly washed, dressed, and tended with all the respectful solicitude which would have been bestowed upon a real person,[1] miraculous tales were often rife respecting the manifestation of real internal feeling in the wood and the marble. At perilous or critical moments, the statue was affirmed to have sweated, to have wept, to have closed its eyes, or brandished the spear in its hands, in token of sympathy or indignation.[2] Such legends, springing up usually in times of suffering and danger, and finding few men bold enough openly to contradict them, ran in complete harmony with the general mythical faith, and tended to strengthen it in all its various ramifications. The renewed activity of the god or hero both brought to mind and accredited the pre-existing mythes connected with his name. When Boreas,

[1] See the case of the Æginetans lending the Æakids for a time to the Thebans (Herodot. v. 80), who soon however returned them: likewise sending the Æakids to the battle of Salamis (viii. 64–80). The Spartans, when they decreed that only one of their two kings should be out on military service, decreed at the same time that only one of the Tyndarids should go out with them (v. 75): they once lent the Tyndarids as aids to the envoys of Epizephyrian Locri, who prepared for them a couch on board their ship (Diodôr. Excerpt, xvi. p. 15, Dindorf). The Thebans grant their hero Melanippus to Kleisthenês of Sikyôn (v. 68). What was sent must probably have been a consecrated copy of the genuine statue.

Respecting the solemnities practised towards the statues, see Plutarch, Alkibiad. 34; Kallimach. Hymn. ad Lavacr. Palladis, init. with the note of Spanheim; K. O. Müller, Archæologie der Kunst, § 69; compare Plutarch, Quæstion. Romaic. § 61, p. 279; and Tacit. Mor. Germ. c. 40; Diodôr. xvii. 49.

The manner in which the real presence of a hero was identified with his statue (*τὸν δίκαιον δεῖ θεὸν Οἴκοι μένειν σῴζοντα τοὺς ἱδρυμένους.*—Menander, Fragm. *Ἡνίοχος*, p. 71, Meineke), consecrated ground, and oracle, is nowhere more powerfully attested than in the Heroïca of Philostratus cap. 2–20, p. 674–692; also De Vit. Apollôn. Tyan. iv. 11), respecting Prôtesilaus at Elæus, Ajax at the Aianteium, and Hectôr at Ilium: Prôtesilaus appeared exactly in the equipment of his statue,—*χλαμύδα ἐνῆπται, ξένε, τὸν Θετταλικὸν τρόπον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἄγαλμα τοῦτο* (p. 674). The presence and sympathy of the hero Lykus is essential to the satisfaction of the Athenian dikasts (Aristophan. Vesp. 389–820): the fragment of Lucilius quoted by Lactantius, De Falsâ Religione (i. 22), is curious.—*Τοῖς ἥρωσι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν ἱδρυμένοις* (Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 1).

[2] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 12; Strabo, vi. p. 264. Theophrastus treats the perspiration as a natural phænomenon in the statues made of cedar-wood (Histor. Plant. v. 10). Plutarch discusses the credibility of this sort of miracles in his Life of Coriolanus, c. 37–38.

during the invasion of Greece by Xerxês and in compliance with the fervent prayers of the Athenians, had sent forth a providential storm to the irreparable damage of the Persian armada,[1] the sceptical minority (alluded to by Plato) who doubted the mythe of Boreas and Oreithyia, and his close connexion thus acquired with Erechtheus and the Erechtheids generally, must for the time have been reduced to absolute silence.

## CHAPTER XVII

### THE GRECIAN MYTHICAL VEIN COMPARED WITH THAT OF MODERN EUROPE

I HAVE already remarked that the existence of that popular narrative talk, which the Germans express by the significant word *Sage* or *Volks-Sage*, in a greater or less degree of perfection or development, is a phænomenon common to almost all stages of society and to almost all quarters of the globe. It is the natural effusion of the unlettered, imaginative and believing man, and its maximum of influence belongs to an early state of the human mind: for the multiplication of recorded facts, the diffusion of positive science, and the formation of a critical standard of belief, tend to discredit its dignity and to repress its easy and abundant flow. It supplies to the poet both materials to recombine and adorn, and a basis as well as a stimulus for further inventions of his own; and this at a time when the poet is religious teacher, historian, and philosopher, all in one—not, as he becomes at a more advanced period, the mere purveyor of avowed, though interesting, fiction.

Such popular stories, and such historical songs (meaning by historical simply that which is accepted as history) are found in most quarters of the globe, and especially among the Teutonic

[1] Herodot. vii. 189. Compare the gratitude of the Megalopolitans to Boreas for having preserved them from the attack of the Lacedæmonian king Agis (Pausan. viii. 27, 4—viii. 36, 4). When the Ten Thousand Greeks were on their retreat through the cold mountains of Armenia, Boreas blew in their faces "parching and freezing intolerably." One of the prophets recommended that a sacrifice should be offered to him, which was done, "and the painful effect of the wind appeared to every one forthwith to cease in a marked manner" (*καὶ πᾶσι δὴ περιφανῶς ἔδοξε λῆξαι τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦ πνεύματος.*—Xenoph. Anab. iv. 5, 3).

and Celtic populations of early Europe. The old Gothic songs were cast into a continuous history by the historian Ablavius;[1] and the poems of the Germans respecting Tuisto the earth-born god, his son Mannus, and his descendants the eponyms of the various German tribes,[2] as they are briefly described by Tacitus, remind us of Hesiod, or Eumêlus, or the Homeric Hymns. Jacob Grimm, in his learned and valuable Deutsche Mythologie, has exhibited copious evidence of the great fundamental analogy, along with many special differences, between the German, Scandinavian and Grecian mythical world; and the Dissertation of Mr. Price (prefixed to his edition of Warton's History of English Poetry) sustains and illustrates Grimm's view. The same personifying imagination—the same ever-present conception of the will, sympathies, and antipathies of the gods as the producing causes of phænomena, and as distinguished from a course of nature with its invariable sequence—the same relations between gods, heroes and men, with the like difficulty of discriminating the one from the other in many individual names—a similar wholesale transfer of human attributes to the gods, with the absence of human limits and liabilities—a like belief in Nymphs, Giants, and other beings neither gods nor men—the same coalescence of the religious with the patriotic feeling and faith—these are positive features common to the early Greeks with the early Germans: and the negative conditions of the two are not less analogous—the absence of prose writing, positive records, and scientific culture. The preliminary basis and encouragements for the mythopœic faculty were thus extremely similar.

But though the prolific forces were the same in kind, the results were very different in degree, and the developing circumstances were more different still.

First, the abundance, the beauty, and the long continuance of early Grecian poetry, in the purely poetical age, is a phænomenon which has no parallel elsewhere.

Secondly, the transition of the Greek mind from its poetical to its comparatively positive state was self-operated, accomplished by its own inherent and expansive force—aided indeed, but by no means either impressed or provoked, from without.

[1] Jornandes, De Reb. Geticis, cap. 4-6.

[2] Tacit. Mor. German. c. 2. "Celebrant carminibus antiquis, quod unum apud eos memoriæ et annalium genus est, Tuistonem Deum terrâ editum, et filium Mannum, originem gentis conditoresque. Quidam licentiâ vetustatis, plures Deo ortos, pluresque gentis appellationes, Marsos, Gambrivios, Suevos, Vandaliosque affirmant: eaque vera et antiqua nomina."

From the poetry of Homer, to the history of Thucydidês and the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, was a prodigious step, but it was the native growth of the Hellenic youth into an Hellenic man; and what is of still greater moment, it was brought about without breaking the thread either of religious or patriotic tradition—without any coercive innovation or violent change in the mental feelings. The legendary world, though the ethical judgements and rational criticisms of superior men had outgrown it, still retained its hold upon their feelings as an object of affectionate and reverential retrospect.

Far different from this was the development of the early Germans. We know little about their early poetry, but we shall run no risk of error in affirming that they had nothing to compare with either Iliad or Odyssey. Whether, if left to themselves, they would have possessed sufficient progressive power to make a step similar to that of the Greeks, is a question which we cannot answer. Their condition, mental as well as political, was violently changed by a foreign action from without. The influence of the Roman empire introduced artificially among them new institutions, new opinions, habits and luxuries, and, above all, a new religion; the Romanised Germans becoming themselves successively the instruments of this revolution with regard to such of their brethren as still remained heathens. It was a revolution often brought about by penal and coercive means: the old gods Thor and Woden were formally deposed and renounced, their images were crumbled into dust, and the sacred oaks of worship and prophecy hewn down. But even where conversion was the fruit of preaching and persuasion, it did not the less break up all the associations of a German with respect to that mythical world which he called his past, and of which the ancient gods constituted both the charm and the sanctity: he had now only the alternative of treating them either as men or as dæmons.[1] That mixed religious and patriotic

[1] On the hostile influence exercised by the change of religion on the old Scandinavian poetry, see an interesting article of Jacob Grimm in the Göttingen Gelehrte Anzeigen, Feb. 1830, p. 268–273; a review of Olaf Tryggvson's Saga. The article *Helden* in his Deutsche Mythologie is also full of instruction on the same subject: see also the Einleitung to the book, p. 11, 2nd edition.

A similar observation has been made with respect to the old mythes or the pagan Russians by Eichhoff:—"L'établissement du Christianisme, ce gage du bonheur des nations, fut vivement apprécié par les Russes, qui dans leur juste reconnaissance, le personnifièrent dans un héros. Vladimir le Grand, ami des arts, protecteur de la religion qu'il protégea, et dont les fruits firent oublier les fautes, devint l'Arthus et le Charlemagne de la Russie, et ses hauts faits furent un mythe national qui domina tous ceux du

retrospect, formed by the coalescence of piety with ancestral feeling, which constituted the appropriate sentiment both of Greeks and of Germans towards their unrecorded antiquity, was among the latter banished by Christianity: and while the root of the old mythes was thus cankered, the commemorative ceremonies and customs with which they were connected, either lost their consecrated character or disappeared altogether. Moreover new influences of great importance were at the same time brought to bear. The Latin language, together with some tinge of Latin literature—the habit of writing and of recording present events—the idea of a systematic law and pacific adjudication of disputes,—all these formed a part of the general working of Roman civilisation, even after the decline of the Roman empire, upon the Teutonic and Celtic tribes. A class of specially-educated men was formed upon a Latin basis and upon Christian principles, consisting too almost entirely of priests, who were opposed, as well by motives of rivalry as by religious feeling, to the ancient bards and storytellers of the community. The "lettered men"[1] were constituted apart from "the men of story," and Latin literature contributed along with religion to sink the mythes of untaught heathenism. Charlemagne indeed, at the same time that he employed aggressive and violent proceedings to introduce Christianity among the Saxons, also took special care to commit to writing and preserve the old heathen songs. But there can be little doubt that this step was the suggestion of a large and enlightened understanding peculiar to himself. The disposition general among lettered Christians of that age is more accurately represented by his son Louis le Débonnaire, who, having learnt these songs as a boy, came to abhor them when he arrived at mature years, and could never be induced either to repeat or tolerate them.[2]

paganisme. Autour de lui se groupèrent ces guerriers aux formes athlétiques, au cœur généreux, dont la poésie aime à entourer le berceau mystérieux des peuples: et les exploits du vaillant Dobrinia, de Rogdai, d'Ilia, de Curilo, animèrent les ballades nationales, et vivent encore dans de naïfs récits." (Eichhoff, Histoire de la Langue et Littérature des Slaves, Paris, 1839, part iii. ch. 2, p. 190.)

[1] This distinction is curiously brought to view by Saxo Grammaticus, where he says of an Englishman named Lucas, that he was "literis quidem tenuiter instructus, sed historiarum scientiâ apprime eruditus" (p. 330, apud Dahlmann's Historische Forschungen, vol. i. p. 176).

[2] "Barbara et antiquissima carmina (says Eginhart in his Life of Charlemagne), quibus veterum regum actus et bella canebantur, conscripsit."

Theganus says of Louis le Débonnaire, "Poetica carmina gentilia, quæ in juventute didicerat, respuit, nec legere, nec audire, nec docere, voluit." (De Gestis Ludovici Imperatoris ap. Pithœum, p. 304, c. xix.)

According to the old heathen faith, the pedigree of the Saxon, Anglian, Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish kings,—probably also those of the German and Scandinavian kings generally,—was traced to Odin, or to some of his immediate companions or heroic sons.[1] I have already observed that the value of these genealogies consisted not so much in their length, as in the reverence attached to the name serving as primitive source. After the worship attached to Odin had been extinguished, the genealogical line was lengthened up to Japhet or Noah—and Odin, no longer accounted worthy to stand at the top, was degraded into one of the simple human members of it.[2] And we find this alteration of the original

[1] See Grimm's Deutsche Mythologie, art. *Helden*, p. 356, 2nd edit. Hengist and Horsa were fourth in descent from Odin (Venerable Bede, Hist. i. 15). Thiodolff, the Scald of Harold Haarfager king of Norway, traced the pedigree of his sovereign through thirty generations to Yngarfrey, the son of Niord companion of Odin at Upsal; the kings of Upsal were called Ynglinger, and the son of Thiodolff, Ynglingatal (Dahlmann, Histor. Forschung. i. p. 379). Eyvind, another Scald a century afterwards, deduced the pedigree of Jarl Hacon from Saming son of Yngwifrey (p. 381). Are Frode, the Icelandic historian, carried up his own genealogy through thirty-six generations to Yngwe; a genealogy which Torfæus accepts as trustworthy, opposing it to the line of kings given by Saxo Grammaticus (p. 352). Torfæus makes Harold Haarfager a descendant from Odin through twenty-seven generations; Alfred of England through twenty-three generations; Offa of Mercia through fifteen (p. 362). See also the translation by Lange of P. A. Müller's Saga Bibliothek, Introd. p. xxviii. and the genealogical tables prefixed to Snorro Sturleson's Edda.

Mr. Sharon Turner conceives the human existence of Odin to be distinctly proved, seemingly upon the same evidence as Euêmerus believed in the human existence of Zeus (History of the Anglo-Saxons, Appendix to b. ii. ch. 3, p. 219, 5th edit.).

[2] Dahlmann, Histor. Forschung. t. i. p. 390. There is a valuable article on this subject in the Zeitschrift für Geschichts Wissenschaft (Berlin, vol. i. p. 237–282) by Stuhr, "Uber einige Hauptfragen des Nördischen Alterthums," wherein the writer illustrates both the strong motive and the effective tendency, on the part of the Christian clergy who had to deal with these newly-converted Teutonic pagans, to Euemerise the old gods, and to represent a genealogy, which they were unable to efface from men's minds, as if it consisted only of mere men.

Mr. John Kemble (Uber die Stammtafel der Westsachsen, ap. Stuhr. p. 254) remarks, that "nobilitas" among that people consisted in descent from Odin and the other gods.

Colonel Sleeman also deals in the same manner with the religious legends of the Hindoos—so natural is the proceeding of Euêmerus, towards any religion in which a critic does not believe—

"They (the Hindoos) of course think that the incarnations of their three great divinities were beings infinitely superior to prophets, being in all their attributes and prerogatives equal to the divinities themselves. *But we are disposed to think that these incarnations were nothing more than great men whom their flatterers and poets have exalted into gods—this was the*

mythical genealogies to have taken place even among the Scandinavians, although the introduction of Christianity was in those parts both longer deferred, so as to leave time for a more ample development of the heathen poetical vein—and seems to have created a less decided feeling of antipathy (especially in Iceland) towards the extinct faith.[1] The poems and tales composing the Edda, though first committed to writing after the period of Christianity, do not present the ancient gods in a point of view intentionally odious or degrading.

The transposition above alluded to, of the genealogical root from Odin to Noah, is the more worthy of notice, as it illustrates the genuine character of these genealogies, and shows that they sprung, not from any erroneous historical data, but from the turn of the religious feeling; also that their true value is derived from their being taken entire, as connecting the existing race of men with a divine original. If we could imagine that Grecian paganism had been superseded by Christianity in the year 500 B.C., the great and venerated gentile genealogies of Greece would have undergone the like modification; the Herakleids, Pelopids, Æakids, Asklepiads, &c. would have been merged in some larger aggregate branching out from the archæology of the Old Testament. The old heroic legends connected with these ancestral names would either have been forgotten, or so transformed as to suit the new vein of thought; for the altered worship, ceremonies, and customs would have been altogether at variance with them, and the mythical feeling would have ceased to dwell upon those to whom prayers were no longer offered. If the oak of Dôdôna had been cut down, or the Theôric ship had ceased to be sent from Athens to Dêlos, the mythes of Theseus and of the two black doves would have lost their pertinence, and died away. As it was, the change from Homer to Thucydidês and Aristotle took place internally, gradually, and imperceptibly. Philosophy and history were superinduced in the minds of the

*way in which men made their gods in ancient Greece and Egypt.*—All that the poets have sung of the actions of these men is now received as revelation from heaven: though nothing can be more monstrous than the actions ascribed to the best incarnation, Krishna, of the best of the gods, Vishnoo." (Sleeman, Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official, vol. i. ch. viii. p. 61.)

[1] See P. E. Müller, Uber den Ursprung und Verfall der Isländischen Historiographie, p. 63.

In the Leitfaden zur Nördischen Alterthumskunde, p. 4–5 (Copenhagen, 1837), is an instructive summary of the different schemes of interpretation applied to the northern mythes: 1. the historical; 2. the geographical; 3. the astronomical; 4. the physical; 5. the allegorical.

superior few, but the feelings of the general public continued unshaken—the sacred objects remained the same both to the eye and to the heart—and the worship of the ancient gods was even adorned by new architects and sculptors who greatly strengthened its imposing effect.

While then in Greece the mythopœic stream continued in the same course, only with abated current and influence, in modern Europe its ancient bed was blocked up and it was turned into new and divided channels. The old religion,—though as an ascendent faith, unanimously and publicly manifested, it became extinct,—still continued in detached scraps and fragments, and under various alterations of name and form. The heathen gods and goddesses, deprived as they were of divinity, did not pass out of the recollection and fears of their former worshippers but were sometimes represented (on principles like those of Euêmerus) as having been eminent and glorious men—sometimes degraded into dæmons, magicians, elfs, fairies and other supernatural agents, of an inferior grade and generally mischievous cast. Christian writers such as Saxo Grammaticus and Snorro Sturleson committed to writing the ancient oral songs of the Scandinavian Scalds, and digested the events contained in them into continuous narrative —performing in this respect a task similar to that of the Grecian logographers Pherekydês and Hellanikus, in reference to Hesiod and the Cyclic poets. But while Pherekydês and Hellanikus compiled under the influence of feelings substantially the same as those of the poets on whom they bestowed their care, the Christian logographers felt it their duty to point out the Odin and Thor of the old Scalds as evil dæmons, or cunning enchanters who had fascinated the minds of men into a false belief in their divinity.[1] In some cases the heathen

[1] "Interea tamen homines Christiani in numina non credant ethnica, nec aliter fidem narrationibus hisce adstruere vel adhibere debent, quam in libri hujus proœmio monitum est de causis et occasionibus cur et quomodo genus humanum a verâ fide aberraverit." (Extract from the Prose Edda, p. 75, in the Lexicon Mythologicum ad calcem Eddæ Sæmund. vol. iii. p. 357, Copenhag. edit.)

A similar warning is to be found in another passage cited by P. E. Müller, Uber den Ursprung und Verfall der Isländischen Historiographie, p. 138, Copenhagen, 1813; compare the Prologue to the Prose Edda, p. 6, and Mallet, Introduction à l'Histoire de Dannemarc, ch. vii. p. 114–132.

Saxo Grammaticus represents Odin sometimes as a magician, sometimes as an evil dæmon, sometimes as a high-priest, or pontiff of heathenism, who imposed so powerfully upon the people around him as to receive divine honours. Thor also is treated as having been an evil dæmon. (See Lexicon Mythologic. *ut supra*, pp. 567, 915.)

recitals and ideas were modified so as to suit Christian feeling. But when preserved without such a change, they exhibited themselves palpably, and were designated by their compilers, as at variance with the religious belief of the people, and as associated either with imposture or with evil spirits.

A new vein of sentiment had arisen in Europe, unsuitable indeed to the old mythes, yet leaving still in force the demand for mythical narrative generally. And this demand was satisfied, speaking generally, by two classes of narratives,—the legends of the Catholic Saints and the Romances of Chivalry, corresponding to two types of character, both perfectly accommodated to the feelings of the time,—the saintly ideal and the chivalrous ideal.

Both these two classes of narrative correspond, in character as well as in general purpose, to the Grecian mythes,—being stories accepted as realities, from their full conformity with the predispositions and deep-seated faith of an uncritical audience, and prepared beforehand by their authors, not with any reference to the conditions of historical proof, but for the purpose of calling forth sympathy, emotion, or reverence. The type of the saintly character belongs to Christianity, being the history of Jesus Christ as described in the Gospels, and that of the prophets in the Old Testament; whilst the lives of holy men, who acquired a religious reputation from the fourth to the fourteenth century of the Christian æra, were invested with attributes, and illustrated with ample details, tending to

Respecting the function of Snorro as logographer, see Præfat. ad Eddam, *ut supra*, p. xi. He is much more faithful, and less unfriendly to the old religion, than the other logographers of the ancient Scandinavian Sagas. (Leitfaden der Nördischen Alterthümer, p. 14, by the Antiquarian Society of Copenhagen, 1837.)

By a singular transformation, dependent upon the same tone of mind, the authors of the French Chansons de Geste in the twelfth century turned Apollo into an evil dæmon, patron of the Mussulmans (see the Roman of Garin le Loherain, par M. Paulin Paris, 1833, p. 31):—"Car mieux vaut Dieux que ne fait Apollis." M. Paris observes, "Cet ancien Dieu des beaux arts est l'un des démons le plus souvent désignés dans nos poëmes, comme patron des Musulmans."

The prophet Mahomet, too, anathematised the old Persian epic anterior to his religion. "C'est à l'occasion de Naser Ibn al-Hareth, qui avait apporté de Perse l'Histoire de Rustem et d'Isfendiar, et la faisait réciter par des chanteuses dans les assemblées des Koreischites, que Mahomet prononça le vers suivant (of the Koran): Il y a des hommes qui achètent des contes frivoles, pour détourner par-là les hommes de la voie de Dieu, d'une manière insensée, et pour la livrer à la risée: mais leur punition les couvrira de honte." (Mohl, Préface au Livre des Rois de Ferdousi, p. xiii.)

assimilate them to this revered model. The numerous miracles, the cure of diseases, the expulsion of dæmons, the temptations and sufferings, the teaching and commands, with which the biography of Catholic saints abounds, grew chiefly out of this pious feeling, common to the writer and to his readers. Many of the other incidents, recounted in the same performances, take their rise from misinterpreted allegories, from ceremonies and customs of which it was pleasing to find a consecrated origin, or from the disposition to convert the etymology of a name into matter of history: many have also been suggested by local peculiarities, and by the desire of stimulating or justifying the devotional emotions of pilgrims who visited some consecrated chapel or image. The dove was connected, in the faith of the age, with the Holy Ghost, the serpent with Satan; lions, wolves, stags, unicorns, &c. were the subjects of other emblematic associations; and such modes of belief found expression for themselves in many narratives which brought the saints into conflict or conjoint action with these various animals. Legends of this kind, indefinitely multiplied and pre-eminently popular and affecting, in the middle ages, are not exaggerations of particular matters of fact, but emanations in detail of some current faith or feeling, which they served to satisfy, and by which they were in turn amply sustained and accredited.[1]

[1] The legends of the Saints have been touched upon by M. Guizot (Cours d'Histoire Moderne, leçon xvii.) and by M. Ampère (Histoire Littéraire de la France, t. ii. cap. 14, 15, 16); but a far more copious and elaborate account of them, coupled with much just criticism, is to be found in the valuable Essai sur les Légendes Pieuses du Moyen Age, par L. F. Alfred Maury, Paris, 1843.

M. Guizot scarcely adverts at all to the more or less of matter of fact contained in these biographies; he regards them altogether as they grew out of and answered to the predominant emotions and mental exigencies of the age: "Au milieu d'un déluge de fables absurdes, la morale éclate avec un grand empire" (p. 159, ed. 1829). "Les légendes ont été pour les Chrétiens de ce temps (qu'on me permette cette comparaison purement littéraire) ce que sont pour les Orientaux ces longs récits, ces histoires si brillantes et si variées, dont les Mille et une Nuits nous donnent un échantillon. C'était là que l'imagination populaire errait librement dans un monde inconnu, merveilleux, plein de mouvement et de poésie" (p. 175, ibid.).

M. Guizot takes his comparison with the tales of the Arabian Nights, as heard by an Oriental with uninquiring and unsuspicious credence. Viewed with reference to an instructed European, who reads these narratives as pleasing but recognised fiction, the comparison would not be just; for no one in that age dreamt of questioning the truth of the biographies. All the remarks of M. Guizot assume this implicit faith in them as literal histories: perhaps in estimating the feelings to which they owed their

Readers of Pausanias will recognise the great general analogy between the stories recounted to him at the temples which he visited, and these legends of the middle ages. Though the type of character which the latter illustrate is indeed materially different, yet the source as well as the circulation, the generating as well as the sustaining forces, were in both cases the same. Such legends were the natural growth of a religious faith earnest, unexamining, and interwoven with the feelings at a time when the reason does not need to be cheated. The lives of the Saints bring us even back to the simple and ever-operative theology of the Homeric age; so constantly is the hand of God exhibited even in the minutest details, for the succour of a favoured individual,—so completely is the scientific point of view, respecting the phænomena of nature, absorbed into the religious.[1] During the intellectual vigour of

extraordinary popularity, he allows too little predominance to the religious feeling, and too much influence to other mental exigencies which then went along with it; more especially as he remarks in the preceding lecture (p. 116), "Le caractère général de l'époque est la concentration du développement intellectuel dans la sphère religieuse."

How this absorbing religious sentiment operated in generating and accrediting new matter of narrative, is shown with great fulness of detail in the work of M. Maury:—"Tous les écrits du moyen âge nous apportent la preuve de cette préoccupation exclusive des esprits vers l'Histoire Sainte et les prodiges qui avaient signalé l'avènement du Christianisme. Tous nous montrent la pensée de Dieu et du Ciel, dominant les moindres œuvres de cette époque de naïve et de crédule simplicité. D'ailleurs, n'était-ce pas le moine, le clerc, qui constituaient alors les seuls écrivains? Qu'y a-t-il d'étonnant que le sujet habituel de leurs méditations, de leurs études, se reflétât sans cesse dans leurs ouvrages? Partout reparaissait à l'imagination Jésus et ses Saints: cette image, l'esprit l'accueillait avec soumission et obéissance: il n'osait pas encore envisager ces célestes pensées avec l'œil de la critique, armé de défiance et de doute; au contraire, l'intelligence les acceptait toutes indistinctement et s'en nourrissait avec avidité. Ainsi s'accréditaient tous les jours de nouvelles fables. *Une foi vive veut sans cesse de nouveaux faits qu'elle puisse croire*, comme la charité veut de nouveaux bienfaits pour s'exercer" (p. 43). The remarks on the History of St. Christopher, whose personality was allegorised by Luther and Melancthon, are curious (p. 57).

[1] "Dans les prodiges que l'on admettait avoir dû nécessairement s'opérer au tombeau du saint nouvellement canonisé, l'expression, 'Cæci visum, claudi gressum, muti loquelam, surdi auditum, paralytici debitum membrorum officium, recuperabant,' était devenue plûtot une formule d'usage que la relation littérale du fait." (Maury, Essai sur les Légendes Pieuses du Moyen Age, p. 5.)

To the same purpose M. Ampère, ch. 14, p. 361: "Il y a un certain nombre de faits que l'agiographie reproduit constamment, quelque soit son héros: ordinairement ce personnage a eu dans sa jeunesse une vision qui lui a révélé son avenir: ou bien, une prophétie lui a annoncé ce qu'il serait un jour. Plus tard, il opère un certain nombre de miracles, toujours les

Greece and Rome, a sense of the invariable course of nature and of the scientific explanation of phænomena had been created among the superior minds, and through them indirectly among the remaining community; thus limiting to a certain extent the ground open to be occupied by a religious legend. With the decline of the pagan literature and philosophy, before the sixth century of the Christian æra, this scientific conception gradually passed out of sight, and left the mind free to a religious interpretation of nature not less simple and *naïf* than that which had prevailed under the Homeric paganism.[1] The great

mêmes; il exorcise des possédés, ressuscite des morts, il est averti de sa fin par un songe. Puis sur son tombeau s'accomplissent d'autres merveilles à-peu-près semblables."

[1] A few words from M. Ampère to illustrate this: "C'est donc au sixième siècle que la légende se constitue: c'est alors qu'elle prend complètement le caractère naïf qui lui appartient: qu'elle est elle-même, qu'elle se sépare de toute influence étrangère. En même temps, l'ignorance devient de plus en plus grossière, et par suite la crédulité s'accroit: les calamités du temps sont plus lourdes, et l'on a un plus grand besoin de remède et de consolation. . . . . Les récits miraculeux se substituent aux argumens de la théologie. Les miracles sont devenus la meilleure démonstration du Christianisme: c'est la seule que puissent comprendre les esprits grossiers des barbares" (c. 15, p. 373).

Again, c. 17, p. 401: "Un des caractères de la légende est de mêler constamment le puéril au grand: il faut l'avouer, elle défigure parfois un peu ces hommes d'une trempe si forte, en mettant sur leur compte des anecdotes dont le caractère n'est pas toujours sérieux; elle en a usé ainsi pour St. Columban, dont nous verrons tout à l'heure le rôle vis-à-vis de Brunehaut et des chefs Mérovingiens. La légende auroit pu se dispenser de nous apprendre, comment un jour, il se fît rapporter par un corbeau les gants qu'il avait perdus: comment, un autre jour, il empêcha la bière de couler d'un tonneau percé, et diverses merveilles, certainement indignes de sa mémoire."

The miracle by which St. Columban employed the raven to fetch back his lost gloves is exactly in the character of the Homeric and Hesiodic age: the earnest faith, as well as the reverential sympathy, between the Homeric man and Zeus or Athênê, is indicated by the invocation of their aid for his own sufferings of detail and in his own need and danger. The criticism of M. Ampère, on the other hand, is analogous to that of the later pagans, after the conception of a course of nature had become established in men's minds, so far as that exceptional interference by the gods was understood to be, comparatively speaking, rare, and only supposable upon what were called great emergencies.

In the old Hesiodic legend (see vol. i. ch. ix.), Apollo is apprised by a raven of the infidelity of the nymph Korônis to him—*Τῷ μὲν ἄρ' ἄγγελος ἦλθε κόραξ*, &c. (the raven appears elsewhere as companion of Apollo, Plutarch, de Isid. et Os. p. 379, Herod iv. 15). Pindar in his version of the legend eliminated the raven, without specifying *how* Apollo got his knowledge of the circumstance. The Scholiasts praise Pindar much for having rejected the puerile version of the story—*ἐπαινεῖ τὸν Πίνδαρον ὁ Ἀρτέμων ὅτι παρακρουσάμενος τὴν περὶ τὸν κόρακα ἱστορίαν, αὐτὸν δι' ἑαυτοῦ ἐγνωκέναι*

religious movement of the Reformation, and the gradual formation of critical and philosophical habits in the modern mind, have caused these legends of the Saints,—once the charm and cherished creed of a numerous public,[1]—to pass altogether out

φησὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω . . . χαίρειν οὖν ἐάσας τῷ τοιούτῳ μύθῳ τελέως ὄντι ληρώδει, &c.—compare also the criticisms of the Schol. ad Soph. Œdip. Kol. 1378, on the old epic Thebaïs; and the remarks of Arrian (Exp. Al. iii. 4) on the divine interference by which Alexander and his army were enabled to find their way across the sand of the desert to the temple of Ammon.

In the eyes of M. Ampère, the recital of the biographer of St. Columban appears puerile (*οὔπω τόδον ὧδε θεοὺς ἀναφανδὰ φιλεῦντας*, Odyss. iii. 221): in the eyes of that biographer, the criticism of M. Ampère would have appeared impious. When it is once conceded that phænomena are distributable under two denominations, the natural and the miraculous, it must be left to the feelings of each individual to determine what is, and what is not, a suitable occasion of a miracle. Diodôrus and Pausanias differed in opinion (as stated in a previous chapter) about the death of Actæôn by his own hounds—the former maintaining that the case was one fit for the special intervention of the goddess Artemis; the latter that it was not so. The question is one determinable only by the religious feelings and conscience of the two dissentients: no common standard of judgement can be imposed upon them: for no reasonings derived from science or philosophy are available, inasmuch as in this case the very point in dispute is, whether the scientific point of view be admissible. Those who are disposed to adopt the supernatural belief, will find in every case the language open to them wherewith Dionysius of Halikarnassus (in recounting a miracle wrought by Vesta in the early times of Roman history for the purpose of rescuing an unjustly accused virgin) reproves the sceptics of his time: "It is well worth while (he observes) to recount the special manifestation (*ἐπιφάνειαν*) which the goddess showed to these unjustly accused virgins. For these circumstances, extraordinary as they are, have been held worthy of belief by the Romans, and historians have talked much about them. Those persons indeed who adopt the atheistical schemes of philosophy (if indeed we must call them *philosophy*), pulling in pieces as they do *all* the special manifestations (*ἀπάσας διασύροντες τὰς ἐπιφανείας τῶν θεῶν*) of the gods which have taken place among Greeks or barbarians, will of course turn *these* stories also into ridicule, ascribing them to the vain talk of men, as if none of the gods cared at all for mankind. But those who, having pushed their researches further, believe the gods not to be indifferent to human affairs, but favourable to good men and hostile to bad—will not treat *these* special manifestations as *more* incredible than others." (Dionys. Halic. ii. 68–69.) Plutarch, after noticing the great number of miraculous statements in circulation, expresses his anxiety to draw a line between the true and the false, but cannot find where: "excess both of credulity and of incredulity (he tells us) in such matters is dangerous; caution, and nothing too much, is the best course." (Camillus, c. 6.) Polybius is for granting permission to historians to recount a sufficient number of miracles to keep up a feeling of piety in the multitude, but not more; to measure out the proper quantity (he observes) is difficult, but not impossible (*δυσπαράγραφός ἐστιν ἡ ποσότης, οὐ μὴν ἀπαράγραφός γε*, xvi. 12).

[1] The great Bollandist collection of the Lives of the Saints, intended to

of credit, without even being regarded, among Protestants at least, as worthy of a formal scrutiny into the evidence—a proof of the transitory value of public belief, however sincere and fervent, as a certificate of historical truth, if it be blended with religious predispositions.

The same mythopœic vein, and the same susceptibility and facility of belief, which had created both supply and demand for the legends of the Saints, also provided the abundant stock of romantic narrative poetry, in amplification and illustration of the chivalrous ideal. What the legends of Troy, of Thêbes, of the Kalydonian boar, of Œdipus, Thêseus, &c. were to an early Greek, the tales of Arthur, of Charlemagne, of the Niebelungen, were to an Englishman, or Frenchman, or German, of the twelfth or thirteenth century. They were neither recognised fiction nor authenticated history; they were history, as it is felt and welcomed by minds unaccustomed to investigate evidence and unconscious of the necessity of doing so. That the Chronicle of Turpin, a mere compilation of poetical legends respecting Charlemagne, was accepted as genuine history, and even pronounced to be such by papal authority, is well known; and the authors of the Romances announce themselves, not less than those of the old Grecian epic, as being about to recount real matter of fact.[1] It is

comprise the whole year, did not extend beyond the nine months from January to October, which occupy fifty-three large volumes. The month of April fills three of those volumes, and exhibits the lives of 1472 saints. Had the collection run over the entire year, the total number of such biographies could hardly have been less than 25,000, and might have been even greater (see Guizot, Cours d'Histoire Moderne, leçon xvii. p. 157).

[1] See Warton's History of English Poetry, vol. i. dissert. i. p. xvii. Again, in sect. iii. p. 140: "Vincent de Beauvais, who lived under Louis IX. of France (about 1260), and who, on account of his extraordinary erudition, was appointed preceptor to that king's sons, very gravely classes Archbishop Turpin's Charlemagne among the real histories, and places it on a level with Suetonius and Cæsar. He was himself an historian, and has left a large history of the world, fraught with a variety of reading, and of high repute in the middle ages; but edifying and entertaining as this work might have been to his contemporaries, at present it serves only to record their prejudices and to characterise their credulity." About the full belief in Arthur and the Tales of the Round Table during the fourteenth century, and about the strange historical mistakes of the poet Gower in the fifteenth, see the same work, sect. 7, vol. ii. p. 33; sect. 19, vol. ii. p. 239.

"L'auteur de la Chronique de Turpin (says M. Sismondi, Littérature du Midi, vol. i. ch. 7, p. 289) n'avait point l'intention de briller aux yeux du public par une invention heureuse, ni d'amuser les oisifs par des contes merveilleux qu'ils reconnoitroient pour tels: il présentait aux Français tous ces faits étranges comme de l'histoire, et la lecture des légendes fabuleuses avait accoutumé à croire à de plus grandes merveilles encore; aussi plusieurs de ces fables furent elles reproduites dans la Chronique de St. Denis."

certain that Charlemagne is a great historical name, and it is possible, though not certain, that the name of Arthur may be historical also. But the Charlemagne of history, and the Charlemagne of romance, have little except the name in common; nor could we ever determine except by independent evidence (which in this case we happen to possess), whether Charlemagne was a real or a fictitious person.[1] That illustrious name, as well as the more problematical Arthur, is taken up by the romancers, not with a view to celebrate realities previously verified, but for the purpose of setting forth or amplifying an ideal of their own, in such manner as both to rouse the feelings and captivate the faith of their hearers.

To inquire which of the personages of the Carlovingian epic were real and which were fictitious,—to examine whether the expedition ascribed to Charlemagne against Jerusalem had ever taken place or not,—to separate truth from exaggeration in the exploits of the Knights of the Round Table,—these were problems which an audience of that day had neither disposition to undertake nor means to resolve. They accepted the narrative as they heard it, without suspicion or reserve: the

Again, ib. p. 290: "Souvent les anciens romanciers, lorsqu'ils entreprennent un récit de la cour de Charlemagne, prennent un ton plus élevé: ce ne sont point des fables qu'ils vont conter, c'est de l'histoire nationale,—c'est la gloire de leurs ancêtres qu'ils veulent célébrer, et ils ont droit alors à demander qu'on les écoute avec respect."

The Chronicle of Turpin was inserted, even so late as the year 1566, in the collection printed by Scardius at Frankfort of early German historians (Ginguené, Histoire Littéraire d'Italie, vol. iv. part ii. ch. 3, p. 157).

To the same point—that these romances were listened to as real stories—see Sir Walter Scott's Preface to Sir Tristram, p. lxvii. The authors of the Legends of the Saints are not less explicit in their assertions that everything which they recount is true and well attested (Ampère, c. 14, p. 358).

[1] The series of articles by M. Fauriel, published in the Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. xiii., are full of instruction respecting the origin, tenor, and influence of the Romances of Chivalry. Though the name of Charlemagne appears, the romancers are really unable to distinguish him from Charles Martel or from Charles the Bald (p. 537-539). They ascribe to him an expedition to the Holy Land, in which he conquered Jerusalem from the Saracens, obtained possession of the relics of the passion of Christ, the crown of thorns, &c. These precious relics he carried to Rome, from whence they were taken to Spain by a Saracen emir named Balan at the head of an army. The expedition of Charlemagne against the Saracens in Spain was undertaken for the purpose of recovering the relics:—"Ces divers romans peuvent être regardés comme la suite, comme le développement, de la fiction de la conquête de Jérusalem par Charlemagne."

Respecting the Romance of Rinaldo of Montauban (describing the struggles of a feudal lord against the emperor) M. Fauriel observes, "Il n'y a, je crois, aucun fondement historique: c'est, selon toute apparence, la pure expression poétique du fait général," &c. (p. 542).

incidents related, as well as the connecting links between them, were in full harmony with their feelings, and gratifying as well to their sympathies as to their curiosity: nor was anything further wanting to induce them to believe it, though the historical basis might be ever so slight or even non-existent.[1]

[1] Among the 'formules consacrées' (observes M. Fauriel) of the romancers of the Carlovingian epic, are asseverations of their own veracity, and of the accuracy of what they are about to relate—specification of witnesses whom they have consulted—appeals to pretended chronicles:—"Que ces citations, ces indications, soient parfois sérieuses et sincères, cela peut être; mais c'est une exception et une exception rare. De telles allégations de la part des romanciers, sont en général un pur et simple mensonge, mais non toutefois un mensonge gratuit. C'est un mensonge qui a sa raison et sa convenance: il tient au désir et au besoin de satisfaire une opinion accoutumée à supposer et à chercher du vrai dans les fictions du genre de celles où l'on allègue ces prétendues autorités. La manière dont les auteurs de ces fictions les qualifient souvent eux-mêmes, est une conséquence naturelle de leur prétention d'y avoir suivi des documens vénérables. Ils les qualifient de chansons de *vieille histoire*, de *haute histoire*, de *bonne geste*, de *grande baronnie*: et ce n'est pas pour se vanter qu'ils parlent ainsi: la vanité d'auteur n'est rien chez eux, en comparaison du besoin qu'ils ont d'être crus, de passer pour de simples traducteurs, de simples répétiteurs de légendes ou d'histoire consacrée. Ces protestations de véracité, qui, plus ou moins expresses, sont de rigueur dans les romans Carlovingiens, y sont aussi fréquemment accompagnées de protestations accessoires contre les romanciers, qui, ayant déjà traité un sujet donné, sont accusés d'y avoir faussé la vérité." (Fauriel, Orig. de l'Epopée Chevaleresque, in the Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. xiii. p. 554.)

About the Cycle of the Round Table, see the same series of articles (Rev. D.M. t. xiv. p. 170-184). The Chevaliers of the Saint Graal were a sort of *idéal* of the Knights Templars: "Une race de princes héroïques, originaires de l'Asie, fut prédestinée par le ciel même à la garde du Saint Graal. Perille fut le premier de cette race, qui s'étant converti au Christianisme, passa en Europe sous l'Empereur Vespasien," &c.; then follows a string of fabulous incidents: the epical agency is similar to that of Homer—Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή.

M. Paulin Paris, in his Prefaces to the Romans des Douze Pairs de France, has controverted many of the positions of M. Fauriel, and with success, so far as regards the Provençal origin of the Chansons de Geste, asserted by the latter. In regard to the Romances of the Round Table, he agrees substantially with M. Fauriel; but he tries to assign a greater historical value to the poems of the Carlovingian epic—very unsuccessfully in my opinion. But his own analysis of the old poem of Garin le Loherain bears out the very opinion which he is confuting: "Nous sommes au règne de Charles Martel, et nous reconnaissons sous d'autres noms les détails exacts de la fameuse défaite d'Attila dans les champs Catalauniques. Saint Loup et Saint Nicaise, glorieux prélats du quatrième siècle, reviennent figurer autour du père de Pépin le Bref: enfin pour compléter la confusion, Charles Martel meurt sur le champ de bataille, à la place du roi des Visigoths, Théodoric .... *Toutes les parties de la narration sont vraies:* seulement *toutes s'y trouvent déplacées.* En général, les peuples n'entendent rien à la chronologie: les évènemens restent: les individus, les lieux et les époques, ne laissent aucune trace: c'est, pour ainsi dire, une décora-

The romances of chivalry represented, to those who heard them, real deeds of the foretime—"glories of the foregone men," to use the Hesiodic expression[1]—at the same time that they embodied and filled up the details of an heroic ideal, such as that age could conceive and admire—a fervent piety, combined with strength, bravery, and the love of adventurous aggression directed sometimes against infidels, sometimes against enchanters or monsters, sometimes in defence of the fair sex. Such characteristics were naturally popular, in a century of feudal struggles and universal insecurity, when the grand subjects of common respect and interest were the church and the crusades, and when the latter especially were embraced with an enthusiasm truly astonishing.

The long German poem of the Niebelungen Lied, as well as the Volsunga Saga and a portion of the songs of the Edda, relate to a common fund of mythical, superhuman personages, and of fabulous adventure, identified with the earliest antiquity of the Teutonic and Scandinavian race, and representing their primitive sentiment towards ancestors of divine origin. Sigurd, Brynhilde, Gudrun, and Atle, are mythical characters celebrated as well by the Scandinavian Scalds as by the German epic poets, but with many varieties and separate additions to distinguish the one from the other. The German epic, later and more elaborated, includes various persons not known to the songs in the Edda, in particular the prominent name of Dieterich of Bern—presenting moreover the principal char-

tion scénique que l'on applique indifféremment à des récits souvent contraires." (Preface to the Roman de Garin le Loherain, p. xvi.-xx.: Paris, 1833.) Compare also his Lettre à M. Monmerqué, prefixed to the Roman de Berthe aux Grans Piés, Paris, 1836.

To say that *all* the parts of the narrative are true, is contrary to M. Paris's own showing: *some* parts may be true, separately taken, but these fragments of truth are melted down with a large mass of fiction, and cannot be discriminated unless we possess some independent test. The poet who picks out one incident from the fourth century, another from the fifth, and a few more from the eighth, and then blends them all into a continuous tale, along with many additions of his own, shows that he takes the items of fact because they suit the purposes of his narrative, not because they happen to be attested by historical evidence. His hearers are not critical: they desire to have their imaginations and feelings affected, and they are content to accept without question whatever accomplishes this end.

[1] Hesiod, Theogon. 100—κλέεα προτέρων ἀνθρώπων. Puttenham talks of the remnant of bards existing in his time (1589): "Blind Harpers, or such like Taverne Minstrels, whose matters are for the most part *stories of old time*, as the Tale of Sir Topaze, the Reportes of Bevis of Southampton, Adam Bell, Clymme of the Clough, and such other old Romances or *Historical Rhymes*." (Arte of English Poesie, book ii. cap. 9.)

acters and circumstances as Christian, while in the Edda there is no trace of anything but heathenism. There is indeed, in this the old and heathen version, a remarkable analogy with many points of Grecian mythical narrative. As in the case of the short life of Achilles, and of the miserable Labdakids of Thêbes—so in the family of the Volsungs, though sprung from and protected by the gods—a curse of destiny hangs upon them and brings on their ruin, in spite of pre-eminent personal qualities.[1] The more thoroughly this old Teutonic story has been traced and compared, in its various transformations and

[1] Respecting the Volsunga Saga and the Niebelungen Lied, the work of Lange—Untersuchungen über die Geschichte und das Verhältniss der Nördischen und Deutschen Heldensage—is a valuable translation from the Danish Saga-Bibliothek of P. E. Müller.

P. E. Müller maintains indeed the historical basis of the tales respecting the Volsungs (see p. 102–107)—upon arguments very unsatisfactory; though the genuine Scandinavian origin of the tale is perfectly made out. The chapter added by Lange himself at the close (see p. 432, &c.) contains juster views as to the character of the primitive mythology, though he too advances some positions respecting a something "reinsymbolisches" in the background, which I find it difficult to follow (see p. 477, &c.).—There are very ancient epical ballads still sung by the people in the Faro islands, many of them relating to Sigurd and his adventures (p. 412).

Jacob Grimm, in his Deutsche Mythologie, maintains the purely mythical character, as opposed to the historical, of Siegfried and Dieterich (Art. *Helden*, p. 344–346).

So, too, in the great Persian epic of Ferdousi, the principal characters are religious and mythical. M. Mohl observes,—"Les caractères des personnages principaux de l'ancienne histoire de Perse se retrouvent dans le livre des Rois (de Ferdousi) tels que les indiquent les parties des livres de Zoroaster que nous possédons encore. Kaioumors, Djemschid, Feridoun, Gushtasp, Isfendiar, &c., jouent dans le poème épique le même rôle que dans les Livres sacrés: à cela près, que dans les derniers ils nous apparaissent à travers une atmosphère mythologique qui grandit tous leurs traits: mais cette différence est précisément celle qu'on devait s'attendre à trouver entre la tradition religieuse et la tradition épique." Mohl, Livre des Rois par Ferdousi, Préface, p. 1.

The Persian historians subsequent to Ferdousi have all taken his poem as the basis of their histories, and have even copied him faithfully and literally (Mohl, p. 53). Many of his heroes became the subjects of long epical biographies, written and recited without any art or grace, often by writers whose names are unknown (ib. p. 54–70). Mr. Morier tells us that "the Shah Nameh is still believed by the present Persians to contain their ancient history" (Adventures of Hadgi Baba, c. 32). As the Christian romancers transformed Apollo into the patron of Mussulmans, so Ferdousi makes Alexander the Great a Christian: "La critique historique (observes M. Mohl) était du temps de Ferdousi chose presqu' inconnu" (ib. p. xlviii.). About the absence not only of all historiography, but also of all idea of it or taste for it, among the early Indians, Persians, Arabians, &c., see the learned book of Nork, *Die Götter Syriens*, Preface, p. viii. *seqq.* (Stuttgart, 1842).

accompaniments, the less can any well-established connexion be made out for it with authentic historical names or events. We must acquiesce in its personages as distinct in original conception from common humanity, and as belonging to the subjective mythical world of the race by whom they were sung.

Such were the compositions which not only interested the emotions, but also satisfied the undistinguishing historical curiosity, of the ordinary public in the middle ages. The exploits of many of these romantic heroes resemble in several points those of the Grecian: the adventures of Perseus, Achilles, Odysseus, Atalanta, Bellerophôn, Jasôn, and the Trojan war or Argonautic expedition generally, would have fitted in perfectly to the Carlovingian or other epics of the period.[1] That of the middle ages, like the Grecian, was eminently expansive in its nature. New stories were successively attached to the names and companions of Charlemagne and Arthur, just as the legend of Troy was enlarged by Arktinus, Leschês, and Stesichorus—that of Thêbes by fresh miseries entailed on the fated head of Œdipus,—and that of the Kalydonian boar by the addition of Atalanta. Altogether, the state of mind of the hearers seems in both cases to have been much the same—eager for emotion and sympathy, and receiving any narrative attuned to their feelings, not merely with hearty welcome, but also with unsuspecting belief.

Nevertheless there were distinctions deserving of notice,

[1] Several of the heroes of the ancient world were indeed themselves popular subjects with the romancers of the middle ages, Thêseus, Jasôn, &c.; Alexander the Great more so than any of them.

Dr. Warton observes respecting the Argonautic expedition, "Few stories of antiquity have more the cast of one of the old romances than this of Jasôn. An expedition of a new kind is made into a strange and distant country, attended with infinite dangers and difficulties. The king's daughter of the new country is an enchantress; she falls in love with the young prince, who is the chief adventurer. The prize which he seeks is guarded by brazen-footed bulls, who breathe fire, and by a hideous dragon who never sleeps. The princess lends him the assistance of her charms and incantations to conquer these obstacles; she gives him possession of the prize, leaves her father's court, and follows him into his native country." (Warton, Observations on Spenser, vol. i. p. 178.)

To the same purpose M. Ginguené: "Le premier modèle des Fées n'est-il pas dans Circé, dans Calypso, dans Médée? Celui des géans, dans Polyphème, dans Cacus, et dans les géans, ou les Titans, cette race ennemie de Jupiter? Les serpens et les dragons des romans ne sont-ils pas des successeurs du dragon des Hespérides et de celui de la Toison d'or? Les Magiciens! la Thessalie en étoit pleine. Les armes enchantées et impénétrables! elles sont de la même trempe, et l'on peut les croire forgées au même fourneau que celles d'Achille et d'Enée." (Ginguené, Histoire Littéraire d'Italie, vol. iv. part ii. ch. 3, p. 151.)

which render the foregoing proposition more absolutely exact with regard to Greece than with regard to the middle ages. The tales of the epic, and the mythes in their most popular and extended signification, were the only intellectual nourishment with which the Grecian public was supplied, until the sixth century before the Christian æra: there was no prose writing, no history, no philosophy. But such was not exactly the case at the time when the epic of the middle ages appeared. At that time, a portion of society possessed the Latin language, the habit of writing, and some tinge both of history and philosophy: there were a series of chronicles, scanty indeed and imperfect, but referring to contemporary events and preventing the real history of the past from passing into oblivion: there were even individual scholars, in the twelfth century, whose acquaintance with Latin literature was sufficiently considerable to enlarge their minds and to improve their judgements. Moreover the epic of the middle ages, though deeply imbued with religious ideas, was not directly amalgamated with the religion of the people, and did not always find favour with the clergy; while the heroes of the Grecian epic were not only linked in a thousand ways with existing worship, practices, and sacred localities, but Homer and Hesiod pass with Herodotus for the constructors of Grecian theology. We thus see that the ancient epic was both exempt from certain distracting influences by which that of the middle ages was surrounded, and more closely identified with the veins of thought and feeling prevalent in the Grecian public. Yet these counteracting influences did not prevent Pope Calixtus II. from declaring the Chronicle of Turpin to be a genuine history.

If we take the history of our own country as it was conceived and written from the twelfth to the seventeenth century by Hardyng, Fabyan, Grafton, Hollinshed, and others, we shall find that it was supposed to begin with Brute the Trojan, and was carried down from thence, for many ages and through a long succession of kings, to the times of Julius Cæsar. A similar belief of descent from Troy, arising seemingly from a reverential imitation of the Romans and of their Trojan origin, was cherished in the fancy of other European nations. With regard to the English, the chief circulator of it was Geoffrey of Monmouth. It passed with little resistance or dispute into the national faith—the kings from Brute downward being enrolled in regular chronological series with their respective dates annexed. In a dispute which took place during the reign of Edward I. (A.D. 1301) between England and Scotland, the

descent of the kings of England from Brute the Trojan was solemnly embodied in a document put forth to sustain the rights of the crown of England, as an argument bearing on the case then in discussion: and it passed without attack from the opposing party,[1]—an incident which reminds us of the appeal made by Æschinês, in the contention between the Athenians and Philip of Macedôn respecting Amphipolis, to the primitive dotal rights of Akamas son of Thêseus—and also of the defence urged by the Athenians to sustain their conquest of Sigeium, against the reclamations of the Mityleneans, wherein the former alleged that they had as much right to the place as any of the other Greeks who had formed part of the victorious armament of Agamemnôn.[2]

The tenacity with which this early series of British kings was defended, is no less remarkable than the facility with which it was admitted. The chroniclers at the beginning of the seventeenth century warmly protested against the intrusive scepticism which would cashier so many venerable sovereigns and efface so many noble deeds. They appealed to the patriotic feelings of their hearers, represented the enormity of thus setting up a presumptuous criticism against the belief of ages, and insisted on the danger of the precedent as regarded history generally.[3]

[1] See Warton's History of English Poetry, sect. iii. p. 131, note. "No man before the sixteenth century presumed to doubt that the Francs derived their origin from Francus son of Hector; that the Spaniards were descended from Japhet, the Britons from Brutus, and the Scotch from Fergus." (Ibid. p. 140.)

According to the Prologue of the prose Edda, Odin was the supreme king of Troy in Asia, "in eâ terrâ quam nos Turciam appellamus . . . . Hinc omnes Borealis plagæ magnates vel primores genealogias suas referunt, atque principes illius urbis inter numina locant: sed in primis ipsum Priamum pro Odeno ponunt," &c. They also identified *Tros* with *Thor*. (See Lexicon Mythologicum ad calcem Eddæ Sæmund. p. 552, vol. iii.)

[2] See vol. i. ch. xv.; also Æschinês, De Falsâ Legatione, c. 14; Herodot. v. 94. The Herakleids pretended a right to the territory in Sicily near Mount Eryx, in consequence of the victory gained by their progenitor Hêraklês over Eryx, the eponymous hero of the place. (Herodot. v. 43.)

[3] The remarks in Speed's Chronicle (book v. c. 3, sect. 11–12), and the preface to Howes's Continuation of Stow's Chronicle, published in 1631, are curious as illustrating this earnest feeling. The Chancellor Fortescue, in impressing upon his royal pupil, the son of Henry VI., the limited character of English monarchy, deduces it from Brute the Trojan:—"Concerning the different powers which kings claim over their subjects, I am firmly of opinion that it arises solely from the different nature of their original institution. So the kingdom of England had its original from Brute and the Trojans, who attended him from Italy and Greece, and became a mixt kind of government, compounded of the regal and the political." (Hallam, Hist. Mid. Ages, ch. viii. P. 3, page 220.)

How this controversy stood, at the time and in the view of the illustrious author of Paradise Lost, I shall give in his own words as they appear in the second page of his History of England. After having briefly touched upon the stories of Samothes son of Japhet, Albion son of Neptune, &c., he proceeds—

"But now of Brutus and his line, with the whole progeny of kings to the entrance of Julius Cæsar, we cannot so easily be discharged: descents of ancestry long continued, laws and exploits not plainly seeming to be borrowed or devised, which on the common belief have wrought no small impression: *defended by many, denied utterly by few.* For what though Brutus and the whole Trojan pretence were yielded up, seeing they, who first devised to bring us some noble ancestor, were content at first with Brutus the Consul, till better invention, though not willing to forego the name, taught them to remove it higher into a more fabulous age, and by the same remove lighting on the Trojan tales, in affectation to make the Briton of one original with the Roman, pitched there: *Yet those old and inborn kings, never any to have been real persons, or done in their lives at least some part of what so long hath been remembered, cannot be thought without too strict incredulity.* For these, and those causes above mentioned, that which hath received approbation from so many, I have chosen not to omit. Certain or uncertain, be that upon the credit of those whom I must follow: *so far as keeps aloof from impossible or absurd*, attested by ancient writers from books more ancient, I refuse not as the due and proper subject of story."[1]

Yet in spite of the general belief of so many centuries—in spite of the concurrent persuasion of historians and poets—in spite of the declaration of Milton, extorted from his feelings rather than from his reason, that this long line of quasi-historical kings and exploits could not be *all* unworthy of belief—in spite of so large a body of authority and precedent, the historians of the nineteenth century begin the history of England with Julius Cæsar. They do not attempt either to settle the date of king Bladud's accession, or to determine what may be the basis of truth in the affecting narrative of Lear.[2] The

[1] "Antiquitas enim recepit fabulas fictas etiam nonnunquam incondite: hæc ætas autem jam exculta, præsertim eludens omne quod fieri non potest, respuit," &c. (Cicero, De Republicâ, ii. 10, p. 147, ed. Maii.)

[2] Dr. Zachary Grey has the following observations in his Notes on Shakespeare (London, 1754, vol. i. p. 112). In commenting on the passage in King Lear, *Nero is an angler in the lake of darkness*, he says, "This is one of Shakespeare's most remarkable *anachronisms*. King Lear succeeded his father Bladud anno mundi 3105; and Nero, anno mundi 4017, was

standard of historical credibility, especially with regard to modern events, has indeed been greatly and sensibly raised within the last hundred years.

But in regard to ancient Grecian history, the rules of evidence still continue relaxed. The dictum of Milton, regarding the ante-Cæsarian history of England, still represents pretty exactly the feeling now prevalent respecting the mythical history of Greece:—"Yet those old and inborn kings (Agamemnôn, Achilles, Odysseus, Jasôn, Adrastus, Amphiaräus, Meleager, &c.), never any to have been real persons, or done in their lives at least some part of what so long has been remembered, cannot be thought without too strict incredulity." Amidst much fiction (we are still told), there must be some truth: but how is such truth to be singled out? Milton does not even attempt to make the severance: he contents himself with "keeping aloof from the impossible and the absurd," and ends in a narrative which has indeed the merit of being sober-coloured, but which he never for a moment thinks of recommending to his readers as true. So in regard to the legends of Greece,—Troy, Thêbes, the Argonauts, the Boar of Kalydôn, Hêraklês, Thêseus, Œdipus,—the conviction still holds in men's minds, that there must be something true at the bottom; and many readers of this work may be displeased, I fear, not to see conjured up before them the Eidôlon of an authentic history, even though the vital spark of evidence be altogether wanting.[1]

sixteen years old, when he married Octavia, Cæsar's daughter. See Funccii Chronologia, p. 94."

Such a supposed chronological discrepancy would hardly be pointed out in any commentary now written.

The introduction prefixed by Mr. Giles to his recent translation of Geoffrey of Monmouth (1842) gives a just view both of the use which our old poets made of his tales, and of the general credence so long and so unsuspectingly accorded to them. The list of old British kings given by Mr. Giles also deserves attention, as a parallel to the Grecian genealogies anterior to the Olympiads.

[1] The following passage from the Preface of Mr. Price to Warton's History of English Poetry is alike just and forcibly characterised; the whole Preface is indeed full of philosophical reflection on popular fables generally. Mr. Price observes (p. 79)—

"The great evil with which this long-contested question appears to be threatened at the present day, is an extreme equally dangerous with the incredulity of Mr. Ritson,—a disposition to receive as authentic history, under a slightly fabulous colouring, every incident recorded in the British Chronicle. An allegorical interpretation is now inflicted upon all the marvellous circumstances; a forced construction imposed upon the less glaring deviations from probability; and the usual subterfuge of baffled research,—erroneous readings and etymological sophistry,—is made to

I presume to think that our great poet has proceeded upon mistaken views with respect to the old British fables, not less in that which he leaves out than in that which he retains. To omit the miraculous and the fantastic (it is that which he really means by "the impossible and the absurd,") is to suck the life-blood out of these once popular narratives—to divest them at once both of their genuine distinguishing mark, and of the charm by which they acted on the feelings of believers. Still

reduce every stubborn and intractable text to something like the consistency required. It might have been expected that the notorious failures of Dionysius and Plutarch in Roman history would have prevented the repetition of an error, which neither learning nor ingenuity can render palatable; and that the havoc and deadly ruin effected by these ancient writers (in other respects so valuable) in one of the most beautiful and interesting monuments of traditional story, would have acted as sufficient corrective on all future aspirants. The favourers of this system might at least have been instructed by the philosophic example of Livy,—if it be lawful to ascribe to philosophy a line of conduct which perhaps was prompted by a powerful sense of poetic beauty,—that traditional record can only gain in the hands of the future historian by one attractive aid,—the grandeur and lofty graces of that incomparable style in which the first decade is written; and that the best duty towards antiquity, and the most agreeable one towards posterity, is to transmit the narrative received as an unsophisticated tradition, in all the plenitude of its marvels and the awful dignity of its supernatural agency. For however largely we may concede that real events have supplied the substance of any traditive story, yet the amount of absolute facts, and the manner of those facts, the period of their occurrence, the names of the agents, and the locality given to the scene, are all combined upon principles so wholly beyond our knowledge, that it becomes impossible to fix with certainty upon any single point better authenticated than its fellow. Probability in such decisions will often prove the most fallacious guide we can follow; for, independently of the acknowledged historical axiom, that 'le vrai n'est pas toujours le vraisemblable,' innumerable instances might be adduced, where tradition has had recourse to this very probability to confer a plausible sanction upon her most fictitious and romantic incidents. It will be a much more useful labour, wherever it can be effected, to trace the progress of this traditional story in the country where it has become located, by a reference to those natural or artificial monuments which are the unvarying sources of fictitious events; and, by a strict comparison of its details with the analogous memorials of other nations, to separate those elements which are obviously of a native growth, from the occurrences bearing the impress of a foreign origin. *We shall gain little, perhaps, by such a course for the history of human events;* but it will be an important accession to our stock of knowledge on the *history of the human mind.* It will infallibly display, as in the analysis of every similar record, the operations of that refining principle which is ever obliterating the monotonous deeds of violence, that fill the chronicle of a nation's early career, and exhibit the brightest attribute in the catalogue of man's intellectual endowments,—a glowing and vigorous imagination,—bestowing upon all the impulses of the mind a splendour and virtuous dignity, which, however fallacious historically considered, are never without a powerfully redeeming good, the ethical tendency of all their lessons."

less ought we to consent to break up and disenchant in a similar manner the mythes of ancient Greece—partly because they possess the mythical beauties and characteristics in far higher perfection, partly because they sank deeper into the mind of a Greek, and pervaded both the public and private sentiment of the country to a much greater degree than the British fables in England.

Two courses, and two only, are open; either to pass over the mythes altogether, which is the way in which modern historians treat the old British fables—or else to give an account of them as mythes; to recognise and respect their specific nature, and to abstain from confounding them with ordinary and certifiable history. There are good reasons for pursuing this second method in reference to the Grecian mythes; and when so considered, they constitute an important chapter in the history of the Grecian mind, and indeed in that of the human race generally. The historical faith of the Greeks, as well as that of other people, in reference to early and unrecorded times, is as much subjective and peculiar to themselves as their religious faith: among the Greeks, especially, the two are confounded with an intimacy which nothing less than great violence can disjoin. Gods, heroes and men—religion and patriotism—matters divine, heroic and human—were all woven together by the Greeks into one indivisible web, in which the threads of truth and reality, whatever they might originally have been, were neither intended to be, nor were actually, distinguishable. Composed of such materials, and animated by the electric spark of genius, the mythical antiquities of Greece formed a whole at once trustworthy and captivating to the faith and feelings of the people; but neither trustworthy nor captivating, when we sever it from these subjective conditions, and expose its naked elements to the scrutiny of an objective criticism. Moreover the separate portions of Grecian mythical foretime ought to be considered with reference to that aggregate of which they form a part: to detach the divine from the heroic legends, or some one of the heroic legends from the remainder, as if there were an essential and generic difference between them, is to present the whole under an erroneous point of view. The mythes of Troy and Thêbes are no more to be handled objectively, with a view to detect an historical base, than those of Zeus in Krête, of Apollo and Artemis in Dêlos, of Hermês, or of Promêtheus. To single out the siege of Troy from the other mythes, as if it were entitled to pre-eminence as an ascertained historical and chronological event, is a proceeding which

destroys the true character and coherence of the mythical world: we only transfer the story (as has been remarked in the preceding chapter) from a class with which it is connected by every tie both of common origin and fraternal affinity, to another with which it has no relationship, except such as violent and gratuitous criticism may enforce.

By drawing this marked distinction between the mythical and the historical world,—between matter appropriate only for subjective history, and matter in which objective evidence is attainable,—we shall only carry out to its proper length the just and well-known position long ago laid down by Varro. That learned man recognised three distinguishable periods in the time preceding his own age: "First, the time from the beginning of mankind down to the first deluge; a time wholly unknown. Secondly, the period from the first deluge down to the first Olympiad, which is called *the mythical period*, because many fabulous things are recounted in it. Thirdly, the time from the first Olympiad down to ourselves, which is called *the historical period*, because the things done in it are comprised in true histories."[1]

Taking the commencement of true or objective history at the point indicated by Varro, I still consider the mythical and historical periods to be separated by a wider gap than he would have admitted. To select any one year as an absolute point of commencement, is of course not to be understood literally: but in point of fact, this is of very little importance in reference to the present question, seeing that the great mythical events—the sieges of Thêbes and Troy, the Argonautic expedition, the Kalydonian boar-hunt, the return of the Herakleids, &c.—are all placed long anterior to the first Olympiad, by those who have applied chronological boundaries to the mythical narratives. The period immediately preceding the first Olympiad is one exceedingly barren of events; the received chronology recognises 400 years, and Herodotus admitted 500 years, from that date back to the Trojan war.

[1] Varro ap. Censorin. de Die Natali; Varronis Fragm. p. 219, ed. Scaliger, 1623. "Varro tria discrimina temporum esse tradit. Primum ab hominum principio usque ad cataclysmum priorem, quod propter ignorantiam vocatur ἄδηλον. Secundum, a cataclysmo priore ad Olympiadem primam, quod, quia in eo multa fabulosa referuntur, *Mythicon* nominatur. Tertium a primâ Olympiade ad nos; quod dicitur *Historicon*, quia res in eo gestæ veris historiis continentur."

To the same purpose Africanus, ap. Eusebium, Præp. Ev. xx. p. 487: Μέχρι μὲν Ὀλυμπιάδων, οὐδὲν ἀκριβὲς ἱστόρηται τοῖς Ἕλλησι, πάντων συγκεχυμένων, καὶ κατὰ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς τῶν πρὸ τοῦ συμφωνούντων, &c.

## CHAPTER XVIII

CLOSING EVENTS OF LEGENDARY GREECE—PERIOD OF INTERMEDIATE DARKNESS, BEFORE THE DAWN OF HISTORICAL GREECE

### Section I.—Return of the Herakleids into Peloponnesus

In one of the preceding chapters, we have traced the descending series of the two most distinguished mythical families in Peloponnêsus—the Perseids and the Pelopids. We have followed the former down to Hêraklês and his son Hyllus, and the latter down to Orestês son of Agamemnôn, who is left in the possession of that ascendency in the peninsula which had procured for his father the chief command in the Trojan war. The Herakleids or sons of Hêraklês, on the other hand, are expelled fugitives, dependent upon foreign aid or protection: Hyllus had perished in single combat with Echemus of Tegea, (connected with the Pelopids by marriage with Timandra sister of Klytæmnêstra,[1]) and a solemn compact had been made, as the preliminary condition of this duel, that no similar attempt at an invasion of the peninsula should be undertaken by his family for the space of 100 years. At the end of the stipulated period the attempt was renewed, and with complete success; but its success was owing not so much to the valour of the invaders as to a powerful body of new allies. The Herakleids re-appear as leaders and companions of the Dorians,—a northerly section of the Greek name, who now first come into importance,—poor indeed in mythical renown, since they are never noticed in the Iliad, and only once casually mentioned in the Odyssey, as a fraction among the many-tongued inhabitants of Krête—but destined to form one of the grand and predominant elements throughout all the career of historical Hellas.

The son of Hyllus—Kleodæus—as well as his grandson Aristomachus, were now dead, and the lineage of Hêraklês was represented by the three sons of the latter—Têmenus, Kresphontês, and Aristodêmus. Under their conduct the Dorians penetrated into the peninsula. The mythical account traced back this intimate union between the Herakleids and the Dorians to a prior war, in which Hêraklês himself had rendered

[1] Hesiod, Eoiai, Fragm. 58, p. 42, ed. Düntzer.

inestimable aid to the Dorian king Ægimius, when the latter was hard pressed in a contest with the Lapithæ. Hêraklês defeated the Lapithæ, and slew their king Korônus; in return for which Ægimius assigned to his deliverer one-third part of his whole territory, and adopted Hyllus as his son. Hêraklês desired that the territory thus made over might be held in reserve until a time should come when his descendants might stand in need of it; and that time did come, after the death of Hyllus (see Chap. V.). Some of the Herakleids then found shelter at Trikorythus in Attica, but the remainder, turning their steps towards Ægimius, solicited from him the allotment of land which had been promised to their valiant progenitor. Ægimius received them according to his engagement and assigned to them the stipulated third portion of his territory.[1] From this moment the Herakleids and Dorians became intimately united together into one social communion. Pamphylus and Dymas, sons of Ægimius, accompanied Têmenus and his two brothers in their invasion of Peloponnêsus.

Such is the mythical incident which professes to explain the origin of those three tribes into which all the Dorian communities were usually divided—the Hyllêis, the Pamphyli, and the Dymanes—the first of the three including certain particular families, such as that of the kings of Sparta, who bore the special name of Herakleids. Hyllus, Pamphylus, and Dymas are the eponymous heroes of the three Dorian tribes.

Têmenus and his two brothers resolved to attack Peloponnêsus, not by a land-march along the Isthmus, such as that in which Hyllus had been previously slain, but by sea across the narrow inlet between the promontories of Rhium and Antirrhium with which the Gulf of Corinth commences

[1] Diodôr. iv. 37–60; Apollodôr. ii. 7, 7; Ephorus ap. Steph. Byz. Δυμᾶν, Fragm. 10, ed. Marx.

The Doric institutions are called by Pindar *τεθμοὶ Αἰγιμίου Δωριεῖς* (Pyth. i. 124).

There existed an ancient epic poem, now lost, but cited on some few occasions by authors still preserved, under the title *Αἰγίμιος*; the authorship being sometimes ascribed to Hesiod, sometimes to Kerkops (Athenæ. xi. p. 503). The few fragments which remain do not enable us to make out the scheme of it, inasmuch as they embrace different mythical incidents lying very wide of each other,—Iô, the Argonauts, Pêleus and Thetis, &c. But the name which it bears seems to imply that the war of Ægimius against the Lapithæ, and the aid given to him by Hêraklês, was one of its chief topics. Both O. Müller (History of the Dorians, vol. i. b. 1. c. 8) and Welcker (Der Epische Kyklus, p. 263) appear to me to go beyond the very scanty evidence which we possess in their determination of this lost poem; compare Marktscheffel, Præfat. Hesiod. Fragm. cap. 5, p. 159.

According to one story indeed—which however does not seem to have been known to Herodotus—they are said to have selected this line of march by the express direction of the Delphian god, who vouchsafed to expound to them an oracle which had been delivered to Hyllus in the ordinary equivocal phraseology. Both the Ozolian Lokrians, and the Ætôlians, inhabitants of the northern coast of the Gulf of Corinth, were favourable to the enterprise, and the former granted to them a port for building their ships, from which memorable circumstance the port ever afterwards bore the name of Naupaktus. Aristodêmus was here struck with lightning and died, leaving twin sons, Eurysthenês and Proklês; but his remaining brothers continued to press the expedition with alacrity.

At this juncture, an Akarnanian prophet named Karnus, presented himself in the camp[1] under the inspiration of Apollo, and uttered various predictions: he was however so much suspected of treacherous collusion with the Peloponnesians, that Hippotês, great grandson of Hêraklês through Phylas and Antiochus, slew him. His death drew upon the army the wrath of Apollo, who destroyed their vessels and punished them with famine. Têmenus in his distress, again applying to the Delphian god for succour and counsel, was made acquainted with the cause of so much suffering, and was directed to banish Hippotês for ten years, to offer expiatory sacrifice for the death of Karnus, and to seek as the guide of the army a man with three eyes.[2] On coming back to Naupaktus, he met the Ætôlian Oxylus son of Andræmôn returning to his country, after a temporary exile in Elis incurred for homicide: Oxylus had lost one eye, but as he was seated on a horse, the man and the horse together made up the three eyes required, and he was adopted as the guide prescribed by the oracle.[3] Conducted by

[1] Respecting this prophet, compare Œnomaus ap. Eusebium, Præparat. Evangel. v. p. 211. According to that statement, both Kleodæus (here called *Aridæus*), son of Hyllus, and Aristomachus son of Kleodæus, had made separate and successive attempts at the head of the Herakleids to penetrate into Peloponnêsus through the Isthmus: both had failed and perished, having misunderstood the admonition of the Delphian oracle. Œnomaus could have known nothing of the pledge given by Hyllus, as the condition of the single combat between Hyllus and Echemus (according to Herodotus), that the Herakleids should make no fresh trial for 100 years; if it had been understood that they had given and then violated such a pledge, such violation would probably have been adduced to account for their failure.

[2] Apollodôr. ii. 8, 3; Pausan. iii. 13, 3.

[3] Apollodôr. ii 8, 3. According to the account of Pausanias, the beast upon which Oxylus rode was a mule and had lost one eye (Paus. v. 3. 5).

him, they refitted their ships, landed on the opposite coast of Achaia, and marched to attack Tisamenus son of Orestês, then the great potentate of the peninsula. A decisive battle was fought, in which the latter was vanquished and slain, and in which Pamphylus and Dymas also perished. This battle made the Dorians so completely masters of the Peloponnêsus, that they proceeded to distribute the territory among themselves. The fertile land of Elis had been by previous stipulation reserved for Oxylus, as a recompense for his services as conductor: and it was agreed that the three Herakleids—Têmenus, Kresphontês, and the infant sons of Aristodêmus—should draw lots for Argos, Sparta, and Messênê. Argos fell to Têmenus, Sparta to the sons of Aristodêmus, and Messênê to Kresphontês; the latter having secured for himself this prize, the most fertile territory of the three, by the fraud of putting into the vessel out of which the lots were drawn, a lump of clay instead of a stone, whereby the lots of his brothers were drawn out while his own remained inside. Solemn sacrifices were offered by each upon this partition; but as they proceeded to the ceremony, a miraculous sign was seen upon the altar of each of the brothers—a toad corresponding to Argos, a serpent to Sparta, and a fox to Messênê. The prophets, on being consulted, delivered the import of these mysterious indications: the toad, as an animal slow and stationary, was an evidence that the possessor of Argos would not succeed in enterprises beyond the limits of his own city; the serpent denoted the aggressive and formidable future reserved to Sparta; the fox prognosticated a career of wile and deceit to the Messenian.

Such is the brief account given by Apollodôrus of the Return of the Herakleids, at which point we pass, as if touched by the wand of a magician, from mythical to historical Greece. The story bears on the face of it the stamp, not of history, but of legend—abridged from one or more of the genealogical poets,[1] and presenting such an account as they thought satisfactory, of the first formation of the great Dorian establishments in Peloponnêsus, as well as of the semi-Ætôlian Elis. Its incidents are so conceived as to have an explanatory bearing on Dorian institutions—upon the triple division of tribes, characteristic of

[1] Herodotus observes, in reference to the Lacedæmonian account of their first two kings in Peloponnêsus (Eurysthenês and Proklês, the twin sons of Aristodêmus), that the Lacedæmonians gave a *story not in harmony with any of the poets*,—Λακεδαιμόνιοι γὰρ, ὁμολογέοντες οὐδενὶ ποιητῇ, λέγουσιν αὐτὸν Ἀριστόδημον . . . βασιλεύοντα ἀγαγεῖν σφέας ἐς ταύτην τὴν χώρην τὴν νῦν ἐκτέαται, ἀλλ' οὐ τοὺς Ἀριστοδήμου παῖδας (Herodot. vi. 52).

the Dorians—upon the origin of the great festival of the Karneia at Sparta and other Dorian cities, alleged to be celebrated in expiation of the murder of Karnus—upon the different temper and character of the Dorian states among themselves—upon the early alliance of the Dorians with Elis, which contributed to give ascendency and vogue to the Olympic games—upon the reverential dependence of Dorians towards the Delphian oracle—and lastly upon the etymology of the name Naupaktus. If we possessed the narrative more in detail, we should probably find many more examples of colouring of the legendary past suitable to the circumstances of the historical present.

Above all, this legend makes out in favour of the Dorians and their kings a mythical title to their Peloponnesian establishments; Argos, Sparta, and Messênê are presented as rightfully belonging, and restored by just retribution, to the children of Hêraklês. It was to them that Zeus had specially given the territory of Sparta; the Dorians came in as their subjects and auxiliaries.[1] Plato gives a very different version of the legend, but we find that he too turns the story in such a manner as to embody a claim of right on the part of the conquerors. According to him, the Achæans who returned from the capture of Troy, found among their fellow-citizens at home—the race which had grown up during their absence—an aversion to readmit them: after a fruitless endeavour to make good their rights, they were at last expelled, but not without much contest and bloodshed. A leader named Dorieus collected all these exiles into one body, and from him they received the name of Dorians instead of Achæans; then marching back under the conduct of the Herakleids into Peloponnêsus, they recovered by force the possessions from which they had been shut out, and constituted the three Dorian establishments under the separate Herakleid brothers, at Argos, Sparta, and Messênê. These three fraternal dynasties were founded upon a scheme of

[1] Tyrtæus, Fragm.—

> Αὐτὸς γὰρ Κρονίων, καλλιστεφάνου πόσις Ἥρας,
> Ζεὺς Ἡρακλείδαις τῇδε δέδωκε πόλιν·
> Οἷσιν ἅμα, προλιπόντες Ἐρινεὸν ἠνεμόεντα,
> Εὐρείαν Πέλοπος νῆσον ἀφικόμεθα.

In a similar manner Pindar says that Apollo had planted the sons of Hêraklês, jointly with those of Ægimius, at Sparta, Argos and Pylus (Pyth. v. 93).

Isokratês (Or. vi. *Archidamus*, p. 120) makes out a good title by a different line of mythical reasoning. There seem to have been also stories, containing mythical reasons why the Herakleids did *not* acquire possession of Arcadia (Polyæn. i. 7).

intimate union and sworn alliance one with the other, for the purpose of resisting any attack which might be made upon them from Asia,[1] either by the remaining Trojans or by their allies. Such is the story as Plato believed it; materially different in the incidents related, yet analogous in mythical feeling, and embodying alike the idea of a rightful reconquest. Moreover the two accounts agree in representing both the entire conquest and the triple division of Dorian Peloponnêsus as begun and completed in one and the same enterprise,—so as to constitute one single event, which Plato would probably have called the Return of the Achæans, but which was commonly known as the Return of the Herakleids. Though this is both inadmissible and inconsistent with other statements which approach close to the historical times, yet it bears every mark of being the primitive view originally presented by the genealogical poets. The broad way in which the incidents are grouped together, was at once easy for the imagination to follow and impressive to the feelings.

The existence of one legendary account must never be understood as excluding the probability of other accounts, current at the same time, but inconsistent with it; and many such there were as to the first establishment of the Peloponnesian Dorians. In the narrative which I have given from Apollodôrus, conceived apparently under the influence of Dorian feelings, Tisamenus is stated to have been slain in the invasion. But according to another narrative, which seems to have found favour with the historical Achæans on the north coast of Peloponnêsus, Tisamenus, though expelled by the invaders from his kingdom of Sparta or Argos, was not slain: he was allowed to retire under agreement, together with a certain portion of his subjects, and he directed his steps towards the coast of Peloponnêsus south of the Corinthian Gulf, then occupied by the Ionians. As there were relations, not only of friendship, but of kindred origin, between Ionians and Achæans (the eponymous heroes Iôn and Achæus pass for brothers, both sons of Xuthus), Tisamenus solicited from the Ionians admission for himself and his fellow-fugitives into their territory. The leading Ionians declining this request, under the apprehension that Tisamenus might be chosen as sovereign over the whole, the latter accomplished his object by force. After a vehement struggle, the Ionians were vanquished and put to flight, and Tisamenus thus acquired possession of Helikê, as well as of the northern coast of the peninsula, westward from

[1] Plato, *Leges*. iii. 6-7, p. 682-686.

Sikyôn; which coast continued to be occupied by the Achæans, and received its name from them, throughout all the historical times. The Ionians retired to Attica, many of them taking part in what is called the Ionic emigration to the coast of Asia Minor, which followed shortly after. Pausanias indeed tells us that Tisamenus, having gained a decisive victory over the Ionians, fell in the engagement,[1] and did not himself live to occupy the country of which his troops remained masters. But this story of the death of Tisamenus seems to arise from a desire on the part of Pausanias to blend together into one narrative two discrepant legends; at least the historical Achæans in later times continued to regard Tisamenus himself as having lived and reigned in their territory, and as having left a regal dynasty which lasted down to Ogygês,[2] after whom it was exchanged for a popular government.[3]

The conquest of Têmenus, the eldest of the three Herakleids, originally comprehended only Argos and its neighbourhood: it was from thence that Trœzen, Epidaurus, Ægina, Sikyôn, and Phlius were successively occupied by Dorians, the sons and son-in-law of Têmenus—Dêiphontês, Phalkês, and Keisus—being the leaders under whom this was accomplished.[4] At Sparta the success of the Dorians was furthered by the treason of a man named Philonomus, who received as recompense the neighbouring town and territory of Amyklæ.[5] Messênia is said to have submitted without resistance to the dominion of the Herakleid Kresphontês, who established his residence at Stenyklarus: the Pylian Melanthus, then ruler of the country and representative of the great mythical lineage of Nêleus and Nestôr, withdrew with his household gods and with a portion of his subjects to Attica.[6]

The only Dorian establishment in the peninsula not directly connected with the triple partition is Corinth, which is said to

[1] Pausan. vii. 1–3.

[2] Polyb. ii. 45; iv. 1. Strabo, viii. p. 383–384. This Tisamenus derives his name from the memorable act of revenge ascribed to his father Orestês. So in the legend of the Siege of Thêbes, Thersander, as one of the Epigoni, avenged his father Polynikês: the son of Thersander was also called *Tisamenus* (Herodot. iv. 149). Compare O. Müller, Dorians, i. p. 69, note 9, Eng. Trans.

[3] Diodôr. iv. 1. The historian Ephorus embodied in his work a narrative in considerable detail of this grand event of Grecian legend,—the Return of the Herakleids,—with which he professed to commence his consecutive history: from what sources he borrowed we do not know.

[4] Strabo, viii. p. 389. Pausan. ii. 6, 2; 12, 1.

[5] Conôn. Narr. 36; Strabo, viii. p. 365.

[6] Strabo, viii. p. 359; Conôn, Narr. 39.

have been Dorised somewhat later and under another leader, though still a Herakleid. Hippotês—descendant of Hêraklês in the fourth generation, but not through Hyllus—had been guilty (as already mentioned) of the murder of Karnus the prophet at the camp of Naupaktus, for which he had been banished and remained in exile for ten years; his son deriving the name of Alêtês from the long wanderings endured by the father. At the head of a body of Dorians, Alêtês attacked Corinth: he pitched his camp on the Solygeian eminence near the city, and harassed the inhabitants with constant warfare until he compelled them to surrender. Even in the time of the Peloponnesian war, the Corinthians professed to identify the hill on which the camp of these assailants had been placed. The great mythical dynasty of the Sisyphids was expelled, and Alêtês became ruler and Œkist of the Dorian city; many of the inhabitants however, Æolic or Ionic, departed.[1]

The settlement of Oxylus and his Ætôlians in Elis is said by some to have been accomplished with very little opposition; the leader professing himself to be descended from Ætolus, who had been in a previous age banished from Elis into Ætôlia, and the two people, Epeians and Ætôlians, acknowledging a kindred origin one with the other.[2] At first indeed, according to Ephorus, the Epeians appeared in arms, determined to repel the intruders, but at length it was agreed on both sides to abide the issue of a single combat. Degmenus, the champion of the Epeians, confided in the long shot of his bow and arrow; but the Ætôlian Pyræchmês came provided with his sling,—a weapon then unknown and recently invented by the Ætôlians,—the range of which was yet longer than that of the bow of his enemy: he thus killed Degmenus, and secured the victory to Oxylus and his followers. According to one statement the Epeians were expelled; according to another they fraternised amicably with the new-comers. Whatever may be the truth as to this matter, it is certain that their name is from this moment lost, and that they never reappear among the historical elements of Greece:[3] we hear from this time forward only of Eleians, said to be of Ætôlian descent.[4]

[1] Thucyd. iv. 42. Schol. Pindar. Olymp. xiii. 17; and Nem. vii. 155. Conôn, Narrat. 26. Ephor. ap. Strab. viii. p. 389.
Thucydidês calls the ante-Dorian inhabitants of Corinth Æolians; Conôn calls them Ionians.

[2] Ephorus ap. Strabo, x. p. 463.

[3] Strabo, viii. p. 358; Pausan. v. 4, 1. One of the six towns in Triphylia mentioned by Herodotus is called Ἔπειον (Herodot. iv. 149).

[4] Herodot. viii. 73; Pausan. v. 1, 2. Hekatæus affirmed that the Epeians

One most important privilege was connected with the possession of the Eleian territory by Oxylus, coupled with his claim on the gratitude of the Dorian kings. The Eleians acquired the administration of the temple at Olympia, which the Achæans are said to have possessed before them; and in consideration of this sacred function, which subsequently ripened into the celebration of the great Olympic games, their territory was solemnly pronounced to be inviolable. Such was the statement of Ephorus:[1] we find, in this case as in so many others, that the return of the Herakleids is made to supply a legendary basis for the historical state of things in Peloponnêsus.

It was the practice of the great Attic tragedians, with rare exceptions, to select the subjects of their composition from the heroic or legendary world. Euripidês had composed three dramas, now lost, on the adventures of Têmenus with his daughter Hyrnethô and his son-in-law Dêiphontês—on the family misfortunes of Kresphontês and Meropê—and on the successful valour of Archelaus the son of Têmenus in Macedonia, where he was alleged to have first begun the dynasty of the Temenid kings. Of these subjects the first and second were eminently tragical, and the third, relating to Archelaus, appears to have been undertaken by Euripidês in compliment to his contemporary sovereign and patron, Archelaus king of Macedonia: we are even told that those exploits which the usual version of the legend ascribed to Têmenus, were reported in the drama of Euripidês to have been performed by Archelaus his son.[2] Of all the heroes, touched upon by the three Attic tragedians, these Dorian Herakleids stand lowest in the descending genealogical series—one mark amongst others that we are approaching the ground of genuine history.

Though the name Achæans, as denoting a people, is henceforward confined to the North-Peloponnesian territory specially called Achaia, and to the inhabitants of Achæa Phthiôtis, north

were completely alien to the Eleians; Strabo does not seem to have been able to satisfy himself either of the affirmative or negative (Hekatæus, Fr. 348, ed. Didot; Strabo, viii. p. 341).

[1] Ephorus ap. Strab. viii. p. 358. The tale of the inhabitants of Pisa, the territory more immediately bordering upon Olympia, was very different from this.

[2] Agatharchides ap. Photium, Sect. 250, p. 1332. Οὐδ' Εὐριπίδου κατηγορῶ, τῷ Ἀρχελάῳ περιτεθεικότος τὰς Τημένου πράξεις.

Compare the Fragments of the Τημένιδαι, Ἀρχέλαος, and Κρεσφόντης, in Dindorf's edition of Euripidês, with the illustrative remarks of Welcker, Griechische Tragödien, pp. 697, 708, 828.

The Prologue of the Archelaus seems to have gone through the whole series of the Herakleidan lineage, from Æsyptus and Danaus downwards.

of Mount Œta—and though the great Peloponnesian states always seem to have prided themselves on the title of Dorians—yet we find the kings of Sparta, even in the historical age, taking pains to appropriate to themselves the mythical glories of the Achæans, and to set themselves forth as the representatives of Agamemnôn and Orestês. The Spartan king Kleomenês even went so far as to disavow formally any Dorian parentage; for when the priestess at Athens refused to permit him to sacrifice in the temple of Athênê, on the plea that it was peremptorily closed to all Dorians, he replied—"I am no Dorian, but an Achæan."[1] Not only did the Spartan envoy, before Gelôn of Syracuse, connect the indefeasible title of his country to the supreme command of the Grecian military force, with the ancient name and lofty prerogatives of Agamemnôn[2]—but in further pursuance of the same feeling, the Spartans are said to have carried to Sparta both the bones of Orestês from Tegea, and those of Tisamenus from Helikê,[3] at the injunction of the Delphian oracle. There is also a story that Oxylus in Elis was directed by the same oracle to invite into his country an Achæan, as Œkist, conjointly with himself; and that he called in Agorius, the great-grandson of Orestês, from Helikê, with a small number of Achæans who joined him.[4] The Dorians themselves, being singularly poor in native legends, endeavoured, not unnaturally, to decorate themselves with those legendary ornaments which the Achæans possessed in abundance.

As a consequence of the Dorian establishments in Peloponnêsus, several migrations of the pre-existing inhabitants are represented as taking place. 1. The Epeians of Elis are either expelled, or merged in the new-comers under Oxylus, and lose their separate name. 2. The Pylians, together with the great heroic family of Nêleus and his son Nestôr, who preside over them, give place to the Dorian establishment of Messênia, and retire to Athens, where their leader Melanthus becomes king: a large portion of them take part in the subsequent Ionic emigration. 3. A portion of the Achæans, under Penthilus, and other descendants of Orestês, leave Peloponnêsus, and form what is called the Æolic Emigration, to Lesbos, the Trôad, and the Gulf of Adramyttium: the name *Æôlians*, unknown to Homer and seemingly never applied to any separate tribe at all, being introduced to designate a large section of the Hellenic name, partly in Greece Proper and partly in Asia.

[1] Herodot. v. 72.
[2] Herodot. vii. 159.
[3] Herodot. i. 68; Pausan. vii. 1, 3.
[4] Pausan. v. 4, 2.

4. Another portion of Achæans expel the Ionians from Achaia properly so called, in the north of Peloponnêsus; the Ionians retiring to Attica.

The Homeric poems describe Achæans, Pylians, and Epeians, in Peloponnêsus, but take no notice of Ionians in the northern district of Achaia: on the contrary, the Catalogue in the Iliad distinctly includes this territory under the dominions of Agamemnôn. Though the Catalogue of Homer is not to be regarded as an historical document, fit to be called as evidence for the actual state of Peloponnêsus at any prior time, it certainly seems a better authority than the statements advanced by Herodotus and others respecting the occupation of northern Peloponnêsus by the Ionians, and their expulsion from it by Tisamenus. In so far as the Catalogue is to be trusted, it negatives the idea of Ionians at Helikê, and countenances what seems in itself a more natural supposition—that the historical Achæans in the north part of Peloponnêsus are a small undisturbed remnant of the powerful Achæan population once distributed throughout the peninsula, until it was broken up and partially expelled by the Dorians.

The Homeric legends, unquestionably the oldest which we possess, are adapted to a population of Achæans, Danaans, and Argeians, seemingly without any special and recognised names, either aggregate or divisional, other than the name of each separate tribe or kingdom. The Post-Homeric legends are adapted to a population classified quite differently—Hellens, distributed into Dorians, Ionians, and Æôlians. If we knew more of the time and circumstances in which these different legends grew up, we should probably be able to explain their discrepancy; but in our present ignorance we can only note the fact.

Whatever difficulty modern criticism may find in regard to the event called "The Return of the Herakleids," no doubt is expressed about it even by the best historians of antiquity. Thucydidês accepts it as a single and literal event, having its assignable date, and carrying at one blow the acquisition of Peloponnêsus. The date of it he fixes as eighty years after the capture of Troy. Whether he was the original determiner of this epoch, or copied it from some previous author, we do not know. It must have been fixed according to some computation of generations, for there were no other means accessible—probably by means of the lineage of the Herakleids, which, as belonging to the kings of Sparta, constituted the most public and conspicuous thread of connexion between the Grecian real and mythical world, and measured the interval between the

Siege of Troy itself and the first recorded Olympiad. Hêraklês himself represents the generation before the siege, and his son Tlepolemus fights in the besieging army. If we suppose the first generation after Hêraklês to commence with the beginning of the siege, the fourth generation after him will coincide with the ninetieth year after the same epoch; and therefore, deducting ten years for the duration of the struggle, it will coincide with the eightieth year after the capture of the city;[1] thirty years being reckoned for a generation. The date assigned by Thucydidês will thus agree with the distance in which Têmenus, Kresphontês, and Aristodêmus stand removed from Hêraklês. The interval of eighty years, between the capture of Troy and the Return of the Herakleids, appears to have been admitted by Apollodôrus and Eratosthenês, and some other professed chronologists of antiquity: but there were different reckonings which also found more or less of support.

## Section II.—Migration of Thessalians and Bœotians

In the same passage in which Thucydidês speaks of the Return of the Herakleids, he also marks out the date of another event a little antecedent, which is alleged to have powerfully affected the condition of Northern Greece. "Sixty years after the capture of Troy (he tells us) the Bœôtians were driven by the Thessalians from Arnê, and migrated into the land then called Kadmêïs, but now Bœôtia, wherein there had previously dwelt a section of their race, who had contributed the contingent to the Trojan war."

The expulsion here mentioned, of the Bœôtians from Arnê "by the Thessalians," has been construed, with probability, to allude to the immigration of the Thessalians, properly so called, from the Thesprôtid in Epirus into Thessaly. That the Thessalians had migrated into Thessaly from the Thesprôtid territory, is stated by Herodotus,[2] though he says nothing about time or circumstances. Antiphus and Pheidippus appear in the Homeric Catalogue as commanders of the Grecian contingent from the islands of Kôs and Karpathus, on the south-east coast of Asia Minor: they are sons of Thessalus, who is himself the son of Hêraklês. A legend ran, that these two chiefs, in the dispersion which ensued after the victory, had been driven by storms into the Ionian Gulf, and cast upon the coast of Epirus, where they landed and settled at Ephyrê in the

[1] The date of Thucydidês is calculated, *μετὰ Ἴλιον ἅλωσιν* (i. 13).
[2] Herod. vii. 176.

Thesprôtid.[1] It was Thessalus, grandson of Pheidippus, who was reported to have conducted the Thesprotians across the passes of Pindus into Thessaly, to have conquered the fertile central plain of that country, and to have imposed upon it his own name instead of its previous denomination Æolis.[2]

Whatever we may think of this legend as it stands, the state of Thessaly during the historical ages renders it highly probable that the Thessalians, properly so called, were a body of immigrant conquerors. They appear always as a rude, warlike, violent, and uncivilised race, distinct from their neighbours the Achæans, the Magnetes, and the Perrhæbians, and holding all the three in tributary dependence. These three tribes stand to them in a relation analogous to that of the Lacedæmonian Periœki towards Sparta, while the Penestæ, who cultivated their lands, are almost an exact parallel of the Helots. Moreover, the low level of taste and intelligence among the Thessalians, as well as certain points of their costume, assimilates them more to Macedonians or Epirots than to Hellens.[3] Their position in Thessaly is in many respects analogous to that of the Spartan Dorians in Peloponnêsus, and there seems good reason for concluding that the former, as well as the latter, were originally victorious invaders, though we cannot pretend to determine the time at which the invasion took place. The great family of the Aleuads,[4] and probably other Thessalian families besides, were descendants of Hêraklês, like the kings of Sparta.

There are no similar historical grounds, in the case of the alleged migration of the Bœôtians from Thessaly to Bœôtia, to justify a belief in the main fact of the legend, nor were the different legendary stories in harmony one with the other. While the Homeric epic recognises the Bœôtians in Bœôtia, but not in Thessaly, Thucydidês records a statement which he had found of their migration from the latter into the former. But in order to escape the necessity of flatly contradicting

[1] See the epigram ascribed to Aristotle (Anthолog. Græc. t. i. p. 181, ed. Reisk; Velleius Patercul. i. 1).

The Scholia on Lycophrôn (912) give a story somewhat different. Ephyrê is given as the old legendary name of the city of Krannon in Thessaly (Kineas, ap. Schol. Pindar. Pyth. x. 85), which creates the confusion with the Thesprotian Ephyrê.

[2] Herodot. vii. 176; Velleius Patercul. i. 2–3; Charax, ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Δώριον; Polyæn. viii. 44.

There were several different statements, however, about the parentage of Thessalus as well as about the name of the country (Strabo, ix. p. 443; Stephan. Byz. v. Αἰμονία).

[3] See K. O. Müller, History of the Dorians, Introduction, sect. 4.

[4] Pindar, Pyth. x. 2.

Homer, he inserts the parenthesis that there had been previously an outlying fraction of Bœôtians in Bœôtia at the time of the Trojan war,[1] from whom the troops who served with Agamemnôn were drawn. Nevertheless, the discrepancy with the Iliad, though less strikingly obvious, is not removed, inasmuch as the Catalogue is unusually copious in enumerating the contingents from Thessaly, without once mentioning Bœôtians. Homer distinguishes Orchomenus from Bœôtia, and he does not specially notice Thêbes in the Catalogue: in other respects his enumeration of the towns coincides pretty well with the ground historically known afterwards under the name of Bœôtia.

Pausanias gives us a short sketch of the events which he supposes to have intervened in this section of Greece between the Siege of Troy and the Return of the Herakleids. Peneleôs, the leader of the Bœôtians at the siege, having been slain by Eurypylus the son of Telephus, Tisamenus, son of Thersander and grandson of Polynikês, acted as their commander both during the remainder of the siege and after their return. Autesiôn, his son and successor, became subject to the wrath of the avenging Erinnyes of Laius and Œdipus: the oracle directed him to expatriate, and he joined the Dorians. In his place Damasichthôn, son of Opheltas and grandson of Peneleôs, became king of the Bœôtians: he was succeeded by Ptolemæus, who was himself followed by Xanthus. A war having broken out at that time between the Athenians and Bœôtians, Xanthus engaged in single combat with Melanthus son of Andropompus, the champion of Attica, and perished by the cunning of his opponent. After the death of Xanthus, the Bœôtians passed from kingship to popular government.[2] As Melanthus was of the lineage of the Neleids, and had migrated from Pylus to Athens in consequence of the successful establishment of the Dorians in Messênia, the duel with Xanthus must have been of course subsequent to the Return of the Herakleids.

Here then we have a summary of alleged Bœôtian history between the Siege of Troy and the Return of the Herakleids, in which no mention is made of the immigration of the mass of Bœôtians from Thessaly, and seemingly no possibility left of fitting in so great and capital an incident. The legends followed by Pausanias are at variance with those adopted by Thucydidês, but they harmonise much better with Homer.

So deservedly high is the authority of Thucydidês, that the

[1] Thucyd. i. 12. ἦν δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ἀποδασμὸς πρότερον ἐν τῇ γῇ ταύτῃ ἀφ' ὧν καὶ ἐς Ἴλιον ἐστράτευσαν.

[2] Pausan. ix. 5, 8.

migration here distinctly announced by him is commonly set down as an ascertained datum, historically as well as chronologically. But on this occasion it can be shown that he only followed one amongst a variety of discrepant legends, none of which there were any means of verifying.

Pausanias recognised a migration of the Bœôtians from Thessaly, in early times anterior to the Trojan war;[1] and the account of Ephorus, as given by Strabo, professed to record a series of changes in the occupants of the country:—first, the non-Hellenic Aones and Temmikes, Leleges and Hyantes; next, the Kadmeians, who, after the second siege of Thêbes by the Epigoni, were expelled by the Thracians and Pelasgians, and retired into Thessaly, where they joined in communion with the inhabitants of Arnê,—the whole aggregate being called Bœôtians. After the Trojan war, and about the time of the Æolic emigration, these Bœôtians returned from Thessaly and reconquered Bœôtia, driving out the Thracians and Pelasgians, —the former retiring to Parnassus, the latter to Attica. It was on this occasion (he says) that the Minyæ of Orchomenus were subdued, and forcibly incorporated with the Bœôtians. Ephorus seems to have followed in the main the same narrative as Thucydidês, about the movement of the Bœôtians out of Thessaly; coupling it however with several details current as explanatory of proverbs and customs.[2]

The only fact which we make out, independent of these legends, is, that there existed certain homonymies and certain affinities of religious worship, between parts of Bœôtia and parts of Thessaly, which appear to indicate a kindred race. A town named Arnê,[3] similar in name to the Thessalian, was enumerated in the Bœôtian Catalogue of Homer, and antiquaries identified it sometimes with the historical town Chæroneia,[4] sometimes with Akræphium. Moreover there was near

[1] Pausan. x. 8, 3.

[2] Ephor. Fragm. 30, ed. Marx.; Strabo, ix. p. 401–402. The story of the Bœôtians at Arnê in Polyænus (i. 12) probably comes from Ephorus.

Diodôrus (xix. 53) gives a summary of the legendary history of Thêbes from Deukaliôn downwards: he tells us that the Bœôtians were expelled from their country, and obliged to retire into Thessaly during the Trojan war, in consequence of the absence of so many of their brave warriors at Troy; they did not find their way back into Bœôtia until the fourth generation.

[3] Stephan. Byz. v. Ἄρνη, makes the Thessalian Arnê an ἄποικος of the Bœôtian.

[4] Homer, Iliad, ii.; Strabo, ix. p. 413; Pausan. ix. 40, 3. Some of the families at Chæroneia, even during the time of the Roman dominion in Greece, traced their origin to Peripoltas the prophet, who was said to have

the Bœôtian Koròneia a river named Kuarius or Koralius, and a venerable temple dedicated to the Itonian Athênè, in the sacred ground of which the Pamboeotia, or public council of the Bœôtian name, was held; there was also a temple and a river of similar denomination in Thessaly, near to a town called Iton or Itônus.[1] We may from these circumstances presume a certain ancient kindred between the population of these regions, and such a circumstance is sufficient to explain the generation of legends describing migrations backward and forward, whether true or not in point of fact.

What is most important to remark is, that the stories of Thucydidês and Ephorus bring us out of the mythical into the historical Bœôtia. Orchomenus is Bœotised, and we hear no more of the once-powerful Minyæ: there are no more Kadmeians at Thêbes, nor Bœôtians in Thessaly. The Minyæ and the Kadmeians disappear in the Ionic emigration, which will be presently adverted to. Historical Bœôtia is now constituted, apparently in its federative league under the presidency of Thêbes, just as we find it in the time of the Persian and Peloponnesian wars.

## Section III.—Emigrations from Greece to Asia and the Islands of the Ægean

### 1. Æolic.—2. Ionic.—3. Doric

To complete the transition of Greece from its mythical to its historical condition, the secession of the races belonging to the former must follow upon the introduction of those belonging to

accompanied Opheltas in his invading march out of Thessaly (Plutarch, Kimon, c. 1).

[1] Strabo, ix. 411–435; Homer, Iliad, ii. 696; Hekatæus, Fr. 338, Didot.

The Fragment from Alkæus (cited by Strabo, but briefly and with a mutilated text) serves only to identify the river and the town.

Itônus was said to be son of Amphiktyôn, and Bœôtus son of Itônus (Pausan. ix. 1, 1. 34, 1: compare Steph. Byz. v. Βοιωτία) by Melanippê. By another legendary genealogy (probably arising after the name *Æolic* had obtained footing as the class-name for a large section of Greeks, but as old as the poet Asius, Olympiad 30) the eponymous hero Bœôtus was fastened on to the great lineage of Æolus, through the paternity of the god Poseidôn either with Melanippê or with Arnê, daughter of Æolus (Asius, Fr. 8, ed. Düntzer; Strabo, vi. p. 265; Diodôr. v. 67; Hellanikus ap. Schol. Iliad. ii. 494). Two lost plays of Euripidês were founded on the misfortunes of Melanippê, and her twin children by Poseidôn—Bœôtus and Æolus (Hygin. Fab. 186; see the Fragments of Μελανίππη Σοφὴ and Μελανίππη Δεσμῶτις in Dindorf's edition, and the instructive comments of Welcker, Griech. Tragöd. vol. ii. p. 840–860).

the latter. This is accomplished by means of the Æolic and Ionic migrations.

The presiding chiefs of the Æolic emigration are the representatives of the heroic lineage of the Pelopids: those of the Ionic emigration belong to the Neleids; and even in what is called the Doric emigration to Thêra, the Œkist Thêras is not a Dorian but a Kadmeian, the legitimate descendant of Œdipus and Kadmus.

The Æolic, Ionic, and Doric colonies were planted along the western coast of Asia Minor, from the coasts of the Propontis southward down to Lykia (I shall in a future chapter speak more exactly of their boundaries); the Æolic occupying the northern portion together with the islands of Lesbos and Tenedos; the Doric occupying the southernmost, together with the neighbouring islands of Rhodes and Kôs; and the Ionic being planted between them, comprehending Chios, Samos, and the Cycladês islands.

### 1. Æolic Emigration

The Æolic emigration was conducted by the Pelopids: the original story seems to have been that Orestês himself was at the head of the first batch of colonists, and this version of the event is still preserved by Pindar and by Hellanikus.[1] But the more current narratives represented the descendants of Orestês as chiefs of the expeditions to Æolis,—his illegitimate son Penthilus, by Erigonê daughter of Ægisthus,[2] together with Echelatus and Gras, the son and grandson of Penthilus—also Kleuês and Malaus, descendants of Agamemnôn through another lineage. According to the account given by Strabo, Orestês began the emigration, but died on his route in Arcadia; his son Penthilus, taking the guidance of the emigrants, conducted them by the long land-journey through Bœôtia and Thessaly to Thrace;[3] from whence Archelaus, son of Penthilus, led them across the Hellespont, and settled at Daskylium on the Propontis. Gras, son of Archelaus, crossed over to Lesbos and possessed himself of the island. Kleuês and

[1] Pindar, Nem. xi. 43; Hellanic. Fragm. 114, ed. Didot. Comp. Stephan. Byz. v. Πέρινθος.

[2] Kinæthon ap. Pausan. ii. 18, 5. Penthilids existed in Lesbos during the historical times (Aristot. Polit. v. 10, 2).

[3] It has sometimes been supposed that the country called Thrace here means the residence of the Thracians near Parnassus; but the length of the journey, and the number of years which it took up, are so specially marked, that I think Thrace in its usual and obvious sense must be intended.

Malaus, conducting another body of Achæans, were longer on their journey, and lingered a considerable time near Mount Phrikium in the territory of Lokris; ultimately however they passed over by sea to Asia and took possession of Kymê, south of the Gulf of Adramyttium, the most considerable of all the Æolic cities on the continent.[1] From Lesbos and Kymê, the other less considerable Æolic towns, spreading over the region of Ida as well as the Trôad, and comprehending the island of Tenedos, are said to have derived their origin.

Though there are many differences in the details, the accounts agree in representing these Æolic settlements as formed by the Achæans expatriated from Lacônia under the guidance of the dispossessed Pelopids.[2] We are told that in their journey through Bœôtia they received considerable reinforcements, and Strabo adds that the emigrants started from Aulis, the port from whence Agamemnôn departed in the expedition against Troy.[3] He also informs us that they missed their course and experienced many losses from nautical ignorance, but we do not know to what particular incidents he alludes.[4]

### 2. Ionic Emigration

The Ionic emigration is described as emanating from and directed by the Athenians, and connects itself with the previous legendary history of Athens, which must therefore be here briefly recapitulated.

The great mythical hero Thêseus, of whose military prowess and errant exploits we have spoken in a previous chapter, was still more memorable in the eyes of the Athenians as an internal political reformer. He was supposed to have performed for them the inestimable service of transforming Attica out of many states into one. Each dême, or at least a great many out of the whole number, had before his time enjoyed political independence under its own magistrates and assemblies, acknowledging only a federal union with the rest under the

[1] Strabo, xiii. p. 582. Hellanikus seems to have treated of this delay near Mount Phrikium (see Steph. Byz. v. Φρίκιον). In another account (xiii. p. 621), probably copied from the Kymæan Ephorus, Strabo connects the establishments of this colony with the sequel of the Trojan war: the Pelasgians, the occupants of the territory, who had been the allies of Priam, were weakened by the defeat which they had sustained, and unable to resist the immigrants.

[2] Velleius Paterc. i. 4; compare Antikleidês ap. Athenæ. xi. c. 3; Pausanias, iii. 2, 1.

[3] Strabo, ix. p. 401.

[4] Strabo, i. p. 10.

presidency of Athens. By a mixture of conciliation and force, Thêseus succeeded in putting down all these separate governments and bringing them to unite in one political system centralised at Athens. He is said to have established a constitutional government, retaining for himself a defined power as king or president, and distributing the people into three classes: Eupatridæ, a sort of sacerdotal noblesse; Geômori and Demiurgi, husbandmen and artisans.[1] Having brought these important changes into efficient working, he commemorated them for his posterity by introducing solemn and appropriate festivals. In confirmation of the dominion of Athens over the Megarid territory, he is said further to have erected a pillar at the extremity of the latter towards the Isthmus, marking the boundary between Peloponnêsus and Iônia.

But a revolution so extensive was not consummated without creating much discontent. Menestheus, the rival of Thêseus, —the first specimen, as we are told, of an artful demagogue,— took advantage of this feeling to assail and undermine him. Thêseus had quitted Attica to accompany and assist his friend Peirithöus in his journey down to the under-world, in order to carry off the goddess Persephonê,—or (as those who were critical in legendary story preferred recounting) in a journey to the residence of Aidôneus, king of the Molossians in Epirus, to carry off his daughter. In this enterprise Peirithöus perished, while Thêseus was cast into prison, from whence he was only liberated by the intercession of Hêraklês. It was during his temporary absence that the Tyndarids Castôr and Pollux invaded Attica for the purpose of recovering their sister Helen, whom Thêseus had at a former period taken away from Sparta and deposited at Aphidnæ; and the partisans of Menestheus took advantage both of the absence of Thêseus and of the calamity which his licentiousness had brought upon the country, to ruin his popularity with the people. When he returned he found them no longer disposed to endure his dominion, or to continue to him the honours which their previous feelings of gratitude had conferred. Having therefore placed his sons under the protection of Elephenôr in Eubœa, he sought an asylum with Lykomêdês prince of Scyros, from whom however he received nothing but an insidious welcome and a traitorous death.[2]

Menestheus, succeeding to the honours of the expatriated hero, commanded the Athenian troops at the siege of Troy.

[1] Plutarch, Thêseus, c. 24, 25, 26. [2] Plutarch, Thêseus, c. 34–35.

But though he survived the capture, he never returned to Athens—different stories being related of the place where he and his companions settled. During this interval the feelings of the Athenians having changed, they restored the sons of Thêseus, who had served at Troy under Elephenôr and had returned unhurt, to the station and functions of their father. The Theseids Demophoôn, Oxyntas, Apheidas, and Thymœtês, had successively filled this post for the space of about sixty years,[1] when the Dorian invaders of Peloponnésus (as has been before related) compelled Melanthus and the Neleid family to abandon their kingdom of Pylus. The refugees found shelter at Athens, where a fortunate adventure soon raised Melanthus to the throne. A war breaking out between the Athenians and Bœôtians respecting the boundary tract of Œnoê, the Bœôtian king Xanthus challenged Thymœtês to single combat: the latter declining to accept it, Melanthus not only stood forward in his place, but practised a cunning stratagem with such success as to kill his adversary. He was forthwith chosen king, Thymœtês being constrained to resign.[2]

Melanthus and his son Kodrus reigned for nearly sixty years, during which time large bodies of fugitives, escaping from the recent invaders throughout Greece, were harboured by the Athenians: so that Attica became populous enough to excite the alarm and jealousy of the Peloponnesian Dorians. A powerful Dorian force, under the command of Alêtês from Corinth and Althæmenês from Argos, were accordingly despatched to invade the Athenian territory, in which the Delphian oracle promised them success, provided they abstained from injuring the person of Kodrus. Strict orders were given to the Dorian army that Kodrus should be preserved unhurt; but the oracle had become known among the Athenians,[3] and the

[1] Eusebius, Chronic. Can. p. 228–229, ed. Scaliger; Pausan. ii. 18, 7.

[2] Ephorus ap. Harpocration v. Ἀπατούρια:—Ἔφορος ἐν δευτέρῳ, ὡς διὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὁρίων ἀπάτην γενομένην, ὅτι πολεμούντων Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Βοιωτοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Μελαινῶν χώρας, Μέλανθος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βασιλεὺς Ξάνθον τὸν Θηβαῖον μονομαχῶν ἀπέκτεινεν. Compare Strabo, ix. p. 393.

Ephorus derives the term Ἀπατούρια from the words signifying a trick with reference to the boundaries, and assumes the name of this great Ionic festival to have been derived from the stratagem of Melanthus, described in Conôn (Narrat. 39) and Polyænus (i. 19). The whole derivation is fanciful and erroneous, and the story is a curious specimen of legend growing out of etymology.

[3] The orator Lykurgus, in his eulogium on Kodrus, mentions a Delphian citizen named Kleomantis who secretly communicated the oracle to the Athenians, and was rewarded by them for doing so with σίτησις ἐν Πρυτανείῳ (Lycurg. cont. Leocrat. c. 20).

generous prince determined to bring death upon himself as a means of salvation to his country. Assuming the disguise of a peasant, he intentionally provoked a quarrel with some of the Dorian troops, who slew him without suspecting his real character. No sooner was this event known, than the Dorian leaders, despairing of success, abandoned their enterprise and evacuated the country.[1] In retiring, however, they retained possession of Megara, where they established permanent settlers, and which became from this moment Dorian,—seemingly at first a dependency of Corinth, though it afterwards acquired its freedom and became an autonomous community.[2] This memorable act of devoted patriotism, analogous to that of the daughters of Erechtheus at Athens, and of Menœkeus at Thêbes, entitled Kodrus to be ranked among the most splendid characters in Grecian legend.

Kodrus is numbered as the last king of Athens: his descendants were styled Archons, but they held that dignity for life—a practice which prevailed during a long course of years afterwards. Medon and Neileus, his two sons, having quarrelled about the succession, the Delphian oracle decided in favour of the former; upon which the latter, affronted at the preference, resolved upon seeking a new home.[3] There were at this moment many dispossessed sections of Greeks, and an adventitious population accumulated in Attica, who were anxious for settlements beyond sea. The expeditions which now set forth to cross the Ægean, chiefly under the conduct of members of the Kodrid family, composed collectively the memorable Ionic Emigration, of which the Ionians, recently expelled from Peloponnêsus, formed a part, but, as it would seem, only a small part; for we hear of many quite distinct races, some renowned in legend, who withdraw from Greece amidst this assemblage of colonists. The Kadmeians, the Minyæ of Orchomenus, the Abantês of Eubœa, the Dryopes; the Molossi, the Phokians, the Bœôtians, the Arcadian Pelasgians, and even the Dorians of Epidaurus—are represented as furnishing each a proportion of the crews of these emigrant vessels.[4]

[1] Pherekydês, Fragm. 110, ed. Didot; Vell. Paterc. i. 2; Conôn, Nar. 26; Polyæn. i. c. 18.

Hellanikus traced the genealogy of Kodrus, through ten generations, up to Deukaliôn (Fragment 10, ed. Didot).

[2] Strabo, xiv. p. 653.

[3] Pausan. vii. 2, 1.

[4] Herodot. i. 146; Pausan. vii. 2, 3, 4. Isokratês extols his Athenian ancestors for having provided, by means of this emigration, settlements for so large a number of distressed and poor Greeks at the expense of Barbarians (Or. xii. Panathenaic. p. 241).

Nor were the results unworthy of so mighty a confluence of different races. Not only the Cycladês islands in the Ægean, but the great islands of Samos and Chios near the Asiatic coast, and ten different cities on the coast of Asia Minor, from Milêtus on the south to Phokæa in the north, were founded, and all adopted the Ionic name. Athens was the metropolis or mother city of all of them: Androklus and Neileus, the Œkists of Ephesus and Milêtus, and probably other Œkists also, started from the Prytaneium at Athens,[1] with those solemnities, religious and political, which usually marked the departure of a swarm of Grecian colonists.

Other mythical families, besides the heroic lineage of Nêleus and Nestôr, as represented by the sons of Kodrus, took a leading part in the expedition. Herodotus mentions Lykian chiefs, descendants from Glaukus son of Hippolochus, and Pausanias tells us of Philôtas descendant of Peneleôs, who went at the head of a body of Thebans: both Glaukus and Peneleôs are commemorated in the Iliad.[2] And it is a remarkable fact mentioned by Pausanias (though we do not know on what authority), that the inhabitants of Phokæa—which was the northernmost city of Iônia on the borders of Æolis, and one of the last founded—consisting mostly of Phokian colonists under the conduct of the Athenians Philogenês and Dæmôn, were not admitted into the Pan-Ionic Amphiktyony until they consented to choose for themselves chiefs of the Kodrid family.[3] Proklês, the chief who conducted the Ionic emigrants from Epidaurus to Samos, was said to be of the lineage of Iôn son of Xuthus.[4]

Of the twelve Ionic states constituting the Pan-Ionic Amphiktyony—some of them among the greatest cities in Hellas—I shall say no more at present, as I have to treat of them again when I come upon historical ground.

### 3. Doric Emigrations

The Æolic and Ionic emigrations are thus both presented to us as direct consequences of the event called the Return of the Herakleids: and in like manner the formation of the Dorian Hexapolis in the south-western corner of Asia Minor: Kôs, Knidus, Halicarnassus and Rhodes, with its three separate cities, as well as the Dorian establishments in Krête, Melos,

[1] Herodot. i. 146; vii. 95; viii. 46. Vellei. Paterc. i. 4. Pherekydês, Frag. 111, ed. Didot.
[2] Herodot. i. 147; Pausan. vii. 2, 7.
[3] Pausan. vii. 2, 2; vii. 3, 4.
[4] Pausan. vii. 4, 3.

and Thêra, are all traced more or less directly to the same great revolution.

Thêra, more especially, has its root in the legendary world. Its Œkist was Thêras, a descendant of the heroic lineage of Œdipus and Kadmus, and maternal uncle of the young kings of Sparta, Eurysthenês and Proklês, during whose minority he had exercised the regency. On their coming of age his functions were at an end; but being unable to endure a private station, he determined to put himself at the head of a body of emigrants. Many came forward to join him, and the expedition was further reinforced by a body of interlopers, belonging to the Minyæ, of whom the Lacedæmonians were anxious to get rid. These Minyæ had arrived in Lacônia, not long before, from the island of Lemnos, out of which they had been expelled by the Pelasgian fugitives from Attica. They landed without asking permission, took up their abode and began to "light their fires" on Mount Taygetus. When the Lacedæmonians sent to ask who they were and wherefore they had come, the Minyæ replied that they were sons of the Argonauts who had landed at Lemnos, and that being expelled from their own homes, they thought themselves entitled to solicit an asylum in the territory of their fathers: they asked, withal, to be admitted to share both the lands and the honours of the state. The Lacedæmonians granted the request, chiefly on the ground of a common ancestry—their own great heroes, the Tyndarids, having been enrolled in the crew of the Argô: the Minyæ were then introduced as citizens into the tribes, received lots of land, and began to intermarry with the pre-existing families. It was not long, however, before they became insolent: they demanded a share in the kingdom (which was the venerated privilege of the Herakleids), and so grossly misconducted themselves in other ways, that the Lacedæmonians resolved to put them to death, and began by casting them into prison. While the Minyæ were thus confined, their wives, Spartans by birth and many of them daughters of the principal men, solicited permission to go in and see them: leave being granted, they made use of the interview to change clothes with their husbands, who thus escaped and fled again to Mount Taygetus. The greater number of them quitted Lacônia, and marched to Triphylia in the western regions of Peloponnêsus, from whence they expelled the Paroreatæ and the Kaukones, and founded six towns of their own, of which Lepreum was the chief. A certain proportion, however, by permission of the Lacedæmonians, joined Thêras and departed with him to the

island of Kallistê, then possessed by Phœnician inhabitants who were descended from the kinsmen and companions of Kadmus, and who had been left there by that prince, when he came forth in search of Eurôpa, eight generations preceding. Arriving thus among men of kindred lineage with himself, Thêras met with a fraternal reception, and the island derived from him the name, under which it is historically known, of Thêra.[1]

Such is the foundation-legend of Thêra, believed both by the Lacedæmonians and by the Theræans, and interesting as it brings before us, characteristically as well as vividly, the persons and feelings of the mythical world—the Argonauts, with the Tyndarids as their companions and Minyæ as their children. In Lepreum, as in the other towns of Triphylia, the descent from the Minyæ of old seems to have been believed in the historical times, and the mention of the river Minyëius in those regions by Homer tended to confirm it.[2] But people were not unanimous as to the legend by which that descent should be made out; while some adopted the story just cited from Herodotus, others imagined that Chlôris, who had come from the Minyeian town of Orchomenus as the wife of Nêleus to Pylus, had brought with her a body of her countrymen.[3]

These Minyæ from Lemnos and Imbros appear again as portions of another narrative respecting the settlement of the colony of Mêlos. It has already been mentioned, that when the Herakleids and the Dorians invaded Lacônia, Philonomus, an Achæan, treacherously betrayed to them the country, for which he received as his recompense the territory of Amyklæ. He is said to have peopled this territory by introducing detachments of Minyæ from Lemnos and Imbros, who in the third

[1] Herodot. iv. 145–149; Valer. Maxim. iv. c. 6; Polyæn. vii. 49, who however gives the narrative differently by mentioning "Tyrrhenians from Lemnos aiding Sparta during the Helotic war:" another narrative in his collection (viii. 71), though imperfectly preserved, seems to approach more closely to Herodotus.

[2] Homer, Iliad, xi. 721.

[3] Strabo, viii. p. 347. M. Raoul Rochette, who treats the legends for the most part as if they were so much authentic history, is much displeased with Strabo for admitting this diversity of stories (Histoire des Colonies Grecques, t. iii. ch. 7, p. 54—"Après des détails si clairs et si positifs, comment est-il possible que ce même Strabon, bouleversant toute la chronologie, fasse arriver les Minyens dans la Triphylie sous la conduite de Chloris, mère de Nestor?"

The story which M. Raoul Rochette thus puts aside is quite equal in point of credibility to that which he accepts: in fact, no measure of credibility can be applied.

generation after the return of the Herakleids, became so discontented and mutinous, that the Lacedæmonians resolved to send them out of the country as emigrants, under their chiefs Polis and Delphus. Taking the direction of Krête, they stopped in their way to land a portion of their colonists on the island of Mêlos, which remained throughout the historical times a faithful and attached colony of Lacedæmôn.[1] On arriving in Krête, they are said to have settled at the town of Gortyn. We find, moreover, that other Dorian establishments, either from Lacedæmôn or Argos, were formed in Krête, and Lyktos in particular is noticed, not only as a colony of Sparta, but as distinguished for the analogy of its laws and customs.[2] It is even said that Krête, immediately after the Trojan war, had been visited by the wrath of the gods, and depopulated by famine and pestilence, and that in the third generation afterwards, so great was the influx of immigrants, that the entire population of the island was renewed with the exception of the Eteokrêtes at Polichnæ and Præsus.[3]

There were Dorians in Krête in the time of the Odyssey: Homer mentions different languages and different races of men, Eteokrêtes, Kydônes, Dorians, Achæans, and Pelasgians, as all co-existing in the island, which he describes to be populous, and to contain ninety cities. A legend given by Andrôn, based seemingly upon the statement of Herodotus, that Dôrus the son of Hellen had settled in Histiæôtis, ascribed the first introduction of the three last races to Tektaphus son of Dôrus —who had led forth from that country a colony of Dorians, Achæans, and Pelasgians, and had landed in Krête during the reign of the indigenous king Krês.[4] This story of Andrôn so

[1] Conôn, Narrat. 36. Compare Plutarch, Quæstion. Græc. c. 21, where Tyrrhenians from Lemnos are mentioned, as in the passage of Polyænus referred to in a preceding note.

[2] Strabo, x. p. 481; Aristot. Polit. ii. 10.

[3] Herodot. vii. 171 (see vol. i. ch. xii.). Diodôrus (v. 80), as well as Herodotus, mentions generally large immigrations into Krête from Lacedæmôn and Argos; but even the laborious research of M. Raoul Rochette (Histoire des Colonies Grecques, t. iii. c. 9, p. 60–68) fails in collecting any distinct particulars of them.

[4] Steph. Byz. v. Δῶριον.—Περὶ δὲν ἱστορεῖ Ἀνδρων, Κρητὸς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ βασιλεύοντος, Τέκταφον τὸν Δώρου τοῦ Ἕλληνος, ὁρμήσαντα ἐκ τῆς ἐν Θετταλίᾳ τότε μὲν Δωρίδος, νῦν δὲ Ἱστιαιώτιδος καλουμένης, ἀφικέσθαι εἰς Κρήτην μετὰ Δωριέων τε καὶ Ἀχαιῶν καὶ Πελασγῶν, τῶν οὐκ ἀπαράντων εἰς Τυρρηνίαν. Compare Strabo, x. p. 475–476, from which it is plain that the story was adduced by Andrôn with a special explanatory reference to the passage in the Odyssey (xv. 175).

The age of Andrôn, one of the authors of Atthidês, is not precisely ascertainable, but he can hardly be put earlier than 300 B.C.; see the

exactly fits on to the Homeric Catalogue of Kretan inhabitants, that we may reasonably presume it to have been designedly arranged with reference to that Catalogue, so as to afford some plausible account, consistently with the received legendary chronology, how there came to be Dorians in Krête before the Trojan war—the Dorian colonies after the return of the Herakleids being of course long posterior in supposed order of time. To find a leader sufficiently early for his hypothesis, Andrôn ascends to the primitive Eponymus Dôrus, to whose son Tektaphus he ascribes the introduction of a mixed colony of Dorians, Achæans, and Pelasgians into Krête. These are the exact three races enumerated in the Odyssey, and the king Krês, whom Andrôn affirms to have been then reigning in the island, represents the Eteokrêtes and Kydônes in the list of Homer. The story seems to have found favour among native Kretan historians, as it doubtless serves to obviate what would otherwise be a contradiction in the legendary chronology.[1]

Another Dorian emigration from Peloponnêsus to Krête, which extended also to Rhodes and Kôs, is further said to have been conducted by Althæmenês, who had been one of the chiefs in the expedition against Attica in which Kodrus perished. This prince, a Herakleid and third in descent from Têmenus, was induced to expatriate by a family quarrel, and conducted a body of Dorian colonists from Argos first to Krête, where some of them remained; but the greater number accompanied him to Rhodes, in which island, after expelling the Karian possessors, he founded the three cities of Lindus, Ialysus, and Kameirus.[2]

It is proper here to add, that the legend of the Rhodian archæologists respecting their Œkist Althæmenês, who was worshipped in the island with heroic honours, was something totally different from the preceding. Althæmenês was a Krêtan, son of the king Katreus, and grandson of Minos. An oracle predicted to him that he would one day kill his father: eager to escape so terrible a destiny, he quitted Krête, and conducted

preliminary Dissertation of C. Müller to the Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum, ed. Didot, p. lxxxii.; and the Prolusio de Atthidum Scriptoribus, prefixed to Lenz's edition of the Fragments of Phanodêmus and Dêmôn, p. xxviii. Lips. 1812.

[1] See Diodôr. iv. 60; v. 80 From Strabo (*l. c.*) however we see that others rejected the story of Andrôn.

O. Müller (History of the Dorians, b. i. c. 1. § 9) accepts the story as substantially true, putting aside the name Dôrus, and even regards it as certain that Minos of Knôssus was a Dorian: but the evidence with which he supports this conclusion appears to me loose and fanciful.

[2] Conôn, Narrat. 47; Ephorus, Frag. 62, ed. Marx.

a colony to Rhodes, where the famous temple of the Atabyrian Zeus, on the lofty summit of Mount Atabyrum, was ascribed to his foundation, built so as to command a view of Krête. He had been settled on the island for some time, when his father Katreus, anxious again to embrace his only son, followed him from Krête: he landed in Rhodes during the night without being known, and a casual collision took place between his attendants and the islanders. Althæmenês hastened to the shore to assist in repelling the supposed enemies, and in the fray had the misfortune to kill his aged father.[1]

Either the emigrants who accompanied Althæmenês, or some other Dorian colonists afterwards, are reported to have settled at Kôs, Knidus, Karpathus, and Halikarnassus. To the last-mentioned city, however, Anthês of Trœzên is assigned as the œkist: the emigrants who accompanied him were said to have belonged to the Dymanian tribe, one of the three tribes always found in a Doric state: and the city seems to have been characterised as a colony sometimes of Trœzên, sometimes of Argos.[2]

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We thus have the Æolic, the Ionic, and the Doric colonial establishments in Asia, all springing out of the legendary age, and all set forth as consequences, direct or indirect, of what is called the Return of the Herakleids, or the Dorian conquest of Peloponnêsus. According to the received chronology, they are succeeded by a period, supposed to comprise nearly three centuries, which is almost an entire blank, before we reach authentic chronology and the first recorded Olympiad—and they thus form the concluding events of the mythical world, out of which we now pass into historical Greece, such as it stands at the last-mentioned epoch. It is by these migrations that the parts of the Hellenic aggregate are distributed into the places which they occupy at the dawn of historical daylight

[1] Diodôr. v. 59; Apollodôr. iii. 2, 2. In the chapter next but one preceding this, Diodôrus had made express reference to native Rhodian mythologists,—to one in particular, named Zeno (c. 57).

Wesseling supposes two different settlers in Rhodes, both named Althæmenês; this is certainly necessary, if we are to treat the two narratives as historical.

[2] Strabo, xiv. p. 653; Pausan. ii. 39, 3; Kallimachus apud Stephan. Byz. v. Ἁλικαρνασσός.

Herodotus (vii. 99) calls Halikarnassus a colony of Trœzên; Pomponius Mela (i. 16), of Argos. Vitruvius names both Argos and Trœzên (ii. 8, 12); but the two œkists whom he mentions, Melas and Arevanius, were not so well known as Anthês; the inhabitants of Halikarnassus being called *Antheadæ* (see Stephan. Byz. v. Ἀθῆναι; and a curious inscription in Boeckh's Corpus Inscriptionum, No. 2655).

—Dorians, Arcadians, Ætolo-Eleians, and Achæans, sharing Peloponnêsus unequally among them—Æolians, Ionians, and Dorians, settled both in the islands of the Ægean and the coast of Asia-Minor. The Return of the Herakleids, as well as the three emigrations, Æolic, Ionic, and Doric, present the legendary explanation, suitable to the feelings and belief of the people, showing how Greece passed from the heroic races who besieged Troy and Thêbes, piloted the adventurous Argô, and slew the monstrous boar of Kalydôn—to the historical races, differently named and classified, who furnished victors to the Olympic and Pythian games.

A patient and learned French writer, M. Raoul Rochette—who construes all the events of the heroic age, generally speaking, as so much real history, only making allowance for the mistakes and exaggerations of poets,—is greatly perplexed by the blank and interruption which this supposed continuous series of history presents, from the Return of the Herakleids down to the beginning of the Olympiads. He cannot explain to himself so long a period of absolute quiescence, after the important incidents and striking adventures of the heroic age. If there happened nothing worthy of record during this long period—as he presumes from the fact that nothing has been transmitted—he concludes that this must have arisen from the state of suffering and exhaustion in which previous wars and revolution had left the Greeks; a long interval of complete inaction being required to heal such wounds.[1]

[1] "La période qui me semble la plus obscure et la plus remplie de difficultés, n'est pas celle que je viens de parcourir: c'est celle qui sépare l'époque des Héraclides de l'institution des Olympiades. La perte des ouvrages d'Ephore et de Théopompe est sans doute la cause en grande partie du vide immense que nous offre dans cet intervalle l'histoire de la Grèce. Mais si l'on en excepte l'établissement des colonies Éoliennes, Doriennes, et Ioniennes, de l'Asie Mineure, et quelques évènemens, très rapprochés de la première de ces époques, l'espace de plus de quatre siècles qui les sépare est couvert d'une obscurité presque impénétrable, et l'on aura toujours lieu de s'étonner que les ouvrages des anciens n'offrent aucun secours pour remplir une lacune aussi considérable. Une pareille absence doit aussi nous faire soupçonner qu'il se passa dans la Grèce peu de ces grands évènemens qui se gravent fortement dans la mémoire des hommes: puisque, si les traces ne s'en étaient point conservées dans les écrits des contemporains, au moins le souvenir s'en seroit il perpétué par des monumens: or les monumens et l'histoire se taisent également. Il faut donc croire que la Grèce, agitée depuis si long temps par des révolutions de toute espèce, épuisée par ses dernières émigrations, se tourna toute entière vers des occupations paisibles, et ne chercha, pendant ce long intervalle, qu'à guérir, au sein du repos et de l'abondance qui en est la suite, les plaies profondes que sa population avait souffertes." (Raoul Rochette, Histoire des Colonies Grecques, t. ii. c. 16, p. 455.)

Assuming M. Rochette's view of the heroic ages to be correct, and reasoning upon the supposition that the adventures ascribed to the Grecian heroes are matters of historical reality, transmitted by tradition from a period of time four centuries before the recorded Olympiads, and only embellished by describing poets —the blank which he here dwells upon is, to say the least of it, embarrassing and unaccountable. It is strange that the stream of tradition, if it had once begun to flow, should (like several of the rivers in Greece) be submerged for two or three centuries and then re-appear. But when we make what appears to me the proper distinction between legend and history, it will be seen that a period of blank time between the two is perfectly conformable to the conditions under which the former is generated. It is not the immediate past, but a supposed remote past, which forms the suitable atmosphere of mythical narrative,—a past originally quite undetermined in respect to distance from the present, as we see in the Iliad and Odyssey. And even when we come down to the genealogical poets, who affect to give a certain measure of bygone time, and a succession of persons as well as of events, still the names whom they most delight to honour and upon whose exploits they chiefly expatiate, are those of the ancestral gods and heroes of the tribe and their supposed contemporaries; ancestors separated by a long lineage from the present hearer. The gods and heroes were conceived as removed from him by several generations, and the legendary matter which was grouped around them appeared only the more imposing when exhibited at a respectful distance, beyond the days of father and grandfather and of all known predecessors. The Odes of Pindar strikingly illustrate this tendency. We thus see how it happened that between the times assigned to heroic adventure and those of historical record, there existed an intermediate blank, filled with inglorious names; and how amongst the same society, which cared not to remember proceedings of fathers and grandfathers, there circulated much popular and accredited narrative respecting real or supposed ancestors long past and gone. The obscure and barren centuries which immediately precede the first recorded Olympiad, form the natural separation between the legendary return of the Herakleids and the historical wars of Sparta against Messênê;—between the province of legend wherein matter of fact (if any there be) is so

To the same purpose Gillies (History of Greece, ch. iii. p. 67, quarto): "The obscure transactions of Greece, during the four following centuries, ill correspond with the splendour of the Trojan, or even of the Argonautic expedition," &c.

intimately combined with its accompaniments of fiction, as to be undistinguishable without the aid of extrinsic evidence—and that of history, where some matters of fact can be ascertained, and where a sagacious criticism may be usefully employed in trying to add to their number.

## CHAPTER XIX

### APPLICATION OF CHRONOLOGY TO GRECIAN LEGEND

I NEED not repeat, what has already been sufficiently set forth in the preceding pages, that the mass of Grecian incident anterior to 776 B.C. appears to me not reducible either to history or to chronology, and that any chronological system which may be applied to it must be essentially uncertified and illusory. It was however chronologised in ancient times, and has continued to be so in modern; and the various schemes employed for this purpose may be found stated and compared in the first volume (the last published) of Mr. Fynes Clinton's Fasti Hellenici. There were among the Greeks, and there still are among modern scholars, important differences as to the dates of the principal events: Eratosthenês dissented both from Herodotus and from Phanias and Kallimachus, while Larcher and Raoul Rochette (who follow Herodotus) stand opposed to O. Müller and to Mr. Clinton.[1] That the reader may have a

[1] Larcher and Raoul Rochette, adopting the chronological date of Herodotus, fix the taking of Troy at 1270 B.C., and the Return of the Herakleids at 1190 B.C. According to the scheme of Eratosthenês, these two events stand at 1184 and 1104 B.C.

O. Müller, in his Chronological Tables (Appendix vi. to History of Dorians, vol. ii. p. 441, Engl. transl.), gives no dates or computation of years anterior to the Capture of Troy and the Return of the Herakleids, which he places with Eratosthenês in 1184 and 1104 B.C.

C. Müller thinks (in his Annotatio ad Marmor Parium, appended to the Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum, ed. Didot, pp. 556, 568, 572; compare his Prefatory Notice of the Fragments of Hellanikus, p. xxviii. of the same volume) that the ancient chronologists in their arrangement of the mythical events as antecedent and consequent, were guided by certain numerical attachments, especially by a reverence for the cycle of 63 years, product of the sacred numbers $7 \times 9 = 63$. I cannot think that he makes out his hypothesis satisfactorily, as to the particular cycle followed, though it is not improbable that some preconceived numerical theories *did* guide these early calculators. He calls attention to the fact that the Alexandrine computation of dates was only one among a number of others discrepant,

general conception of the order in which these legendary events were disposed, I transcribe from the Fasti Hellenici a double chronological table, contained in p. 159, in which the dates are placed in series, from Phorôneus to the Olympiad of Corœbus in B.C. 776—in the first column according to the system of Eratosthenês, in the second according to that of Kallimachus.

"The following table (says Mr. Clinton) offers a summary view of the leading periods from Phorôneus to the Olympiad of Corœbus, and exhibits a double series of dates; the one proceeding from the date of Eratosthenês, the other from a date founded on the reduced calculations of Phanias and Kallimachus, which strike out fifty-six years from the amount of Eratosthenês. Phanias, as we have seen, omitted fifty-five years between the Return and the registered Olympiads; for so we may understand the account: Kallimachus, fifty-six years between the Olympiad of Iphitus and the Olympiad in which Corœbus won.[1] The first column of this table exhibits the *current* years before and after the fall of Troy: in the second column of dates the *complete* intervals are expressed."

Wherever chronology is possible, researches such as those of Mr. Clinton, which have conduced so much to the better understanding of the later times of Greece, deserve respectful attention. But the ablest chronologist can accomplish nothing, unless he is supplied with a certain basis of matters of fact, pure and distinguishable from fiction, and authenticated by witnesses, both knowing the truth and willing to declare it. Possessing this preliminary stock, he may reason from it to refute distinct falsehoods and to correct partial mistakes: but if all the original statements submitted to him contain truth (at least wherever there *is* truth), in a sort of chemical combination with fiction, which he has no means of decomposing,—he is in the condition of one who tries to solve a problem without data: he is first obliged to construct his own data, and from them to extract his conclusions. The statements of the epic poets, our only original witnesses in this case, correspond to the description here given. Whether the proportion of

and that modern inquirers are too apt to treat it as if it stood alone, or carried some superior authority (p. 568–572; compare Clemen. Alex. Stromat. i. p. 145, Sylb.). For example, O. Müller observes (Appendix to Hist. of Dorians, p. 442) that "Larcher's criticism and rejection of the Alexandrine chronologists may perhaps be found as groundless as they are presumptuous,"—an observation which, to say the least of it, ascribes to Eratosthenês a far higher authority than he is entitled to.

[1] The date of Kallimachus for *Iphitus* is approved by Clavier (Prem. Temps, t. ii. p. 203), who considers it as not far from the truth.

| Years before the Fall of Troy. | | Years intervening between the different events. | B.C. Eratosth. | B.C. Kallimach. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (570)[1] | *Phoroneus*, p. 19 . . . . . | 287 | (1753) | (1697) |
| (283) | *Danaus*, p. 73 . . . . . | 33 | (1466) | (1410) |
| | *Pelasgus V.* p. 13, 88 . . . . | | | |
| (250) | *Deukalion*, p. 42 . . . . . | 50 | (1433) | (1377) |
| (200) | *Erechtheus* . . . . . | 50 | (1383) | (1327) |
| | *Dardanus*, p. 88 . . . . . | | | |
| (150) | *Azan, Aphidas, Elatus* . . . . | 20 | (1333) | (1277) |
| 130 | *Kadmus*, p. 85 . . . . . | 30 | 1313 | 1257 |
| (100) | *Pelops* . . . . . | 22 | (1283) | (1227) |
| 78 | Birth of *Hercules* . . . . . | 36 | 1261 | 1205 |
| (42) | Argonauts . . . . . | 12 | (1225) | (1169) |
| 30 | First Theban war, p. 51, h. . . | 4 | 1213 | 1157 |
| 26 | Death of *Hercules* . . . . . | 2 | 1209 | 1153 |
| 24 | Death of *Eurystheus*, p. 106, x. . | 4 | 1207 | 1151 |
| 20 | Death of *Hyllus* . . . . . | 2y 9m | 1203 | 1147 |
| 18 | Accession of *Agamemnon* . . . | 2 | 1200 | 1144 |
| 16 | Second Theban war, p. 87, 1 . . | 6 | 1198 | 1142 |
| 10 | Trojan expedition (9y 1m) . . . | 9 | 1192 | 1136 |
| **Years after the Fall of Troy.** | | | | |
| | Troy taken . . . . . | 7 | 1183 | 1127 |
| 8 | *Orestes* reigns at Argos in the 8th year . . . . . | 52 | 1176 | 1120 |
| 60 | The *Thessali* occupy Thessaly . . | 20 | 1124 | 1068 |
| | The *Bœoti* return to Bœotia in the 60th year . . . . . | | | |
| | Æolic migration under *Penthilus* . | | | |
| 80 | Return of the *Heraclidæ* in the 80th year . . . . . | 29 | 1104 | 1048 |
| 109 | *Aletes* reigns at Corinth, p. 130, m. | 1 | 1075 | 1019 |
| 110 | Migration of *Theras* . . . . . | 29 | 1074 | 1018 |
| 131 | Lesbos occupied 130 years after the æra . . . . . | 8 | 1053 | 997 |
| 139 | Death of *Codrus* . . . . . | 1 | 1045 | 989 |
| 140 | Ionic migration 60 years after the Return . . . . . | 11 | 1044 | 988 |
| 151 | Cymê founded 150 years after the æra . . . . . | 18 | 1033 | 977 |
| 169 | Smyrna, 168 years after the æra, p. 105, t. . . . . | 131 | 1015 | 959 |
| | | 229 | | |
| 300 | Olympiad of *Iphitus* . . . . . | 108<br>52 | 884 | 828 |
| 408<br>352 | Olympiad of *Coræbus* . . . . . | — | 776 | 776 |

[1] These dates, distinguished from the rest by brackets, are proposed as mere conjectures, founded upon the probable length of generations.

truth contained in them be smaller or greater, it is at all events unassignable,—and the constant and intimate admixture of fiction is both indisputable in itself, and indeed essential to the purpose and profession of those from whom the tales proceed. Of such a character are all the deposing witnesses, even where their tales agree; and it is out of a heap of such tales, not agreeing, but discrepant in a thousand ways, and without a morsel of pure authenticated truth,—that the critic is called upon to draw out a methodical series of historical events adorned with chronological dates.

If we could imagine a modern critical scholar transported into Greece at the time of the Persian war—endued with his present habits of appreciating historical evidence, without sharing in the religious or patriotic feelings of the country—and invited to prepare, out of the great body of Grecian epic which then existed, a History and Chronology of Greece anterior to 776 B.C., assigning reasons as well for what he admitted as for what he rejected—I feel persuaded that he would have judged the undertaking to be little better than a process of guess-work. But the modern critic finds that not only Pherekydês and Hellanikus, but also Herodotus and Thucydidês, have either attempted the task or sanctioned the belief that it was practicable,—a matter not at all surprising, when we consider both their narrow experience of historical evidence and the powerful ascendency of religion and patriotism in predisposing them to antiquarian belief,—and he therefore accepts the problem as they have bequeathed it, adding his own efforts to bring it to a satisfactory solution. Nevertheless, he not only follows them with some degree of reserve and uneasiness, but even admits important distinctions quite foreign to their habits of thought. Thucydidês talks of the deeds of Hellên and his sons with as much confidence as we now speak of William the Conqueror: Mr. Clinton recognises Hellên with his sons Dôrus, Æolus and Xuthus as fictitious persons. Herodotus recites the great heroic genealogies down from Kadmus and Danaus with a belief not less complete in the higher members of the series than in the lower: but Mr. Clinton admits a radical distinction in the evidence of events before and after the first recorded Olympiad, or 776 B.C.—"the first date in Grecian chronology (he remarks, p. 123) which can be fixed upon *authentic evidence*"—the highest point to which Grecian chronology, *reckoning upward*, can be carried. Of this important epoch in Grecian development,—the commencement of authentic chronological life,—Herodotus and

Thucydidês had no knowledge or took no account: the later chronologists, from Timæus downwards, noted it, and made it serve as the basis of their chronological comparisons, so far as it went: but neither Eratosthenês nor Apollodôrus seem to have recognised (though Varro and Africanus did recognise) a marked difference in respect of certainty or authenticity between the period before and the period after.

In further illustration of Mr. Clinton's opinion that the first recorded Olympiad is the earliest date which can be fixed upon authentic evidence, we have in p. 138 the following just remarks in reference to the dissentient views of Eratosthenês, Phanias and Kallimachus, about the date of the Trojan war:—"The chronology of Eratosthenês (he says), founded on a careful comparison of circumstances, and approved by those to whom the same stores of information were open, is entitled to our respect. But we must remember that a conjectural date can never rise to the authority of evidence; that what is accepted as a substitute for testimony, is not an equivalent: witnesses only can prove a date, and in the want of these, the knowledge of it is plainly beyond our reach. If, in the absence of a better light, we seek for what is probable, we are not to forget the distinction between conjecture and proof; between what is probable and what is certain. The computation then of Eratosthenês for the war of Troy is open to inquiry; and if we find it adverse to the opinions of many preceding writers, who fixed a lower date, and adverse to the acknowledged length of generation in the most authentic dynasties, we are allowed to follow other guides, who give us a lower epoch."

Here Mr. Clinton again plainly acknowledges the want of evidence and the irremediable uncertainty of Grecian chronology before the Olympiads. Now the reasonable conclusion from his argument is, not simply that "the computation of Eratosthenês was open to inquiry" (which few would be found to deny), but that both Eratosthenês and Phanias had delivered positive opinions upon a point on which no sufficient evidence was accessible, and therefore that neither the one nor the other was a guide to be followed.[1] Mr. Clinton does indeed speak of authentic dynasties prior to the first recorded

[1] Karl Müller observes (in the Dissertation above referred to, appended to the Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum, p. 568)—"Quod attinet æram Trojanam, tot obruimur et tam diversis veterum scriptorum computationibus, ut singulas enumerare negotium sit tædii plenum, eas vel probare vel improbare res vana nec vacua ab arrogantiâ. Nam nemo hodie nescit quænam fides his habenda sit omnibus."

Olympiad; but if there be any such, reaching up from that period to a supposed point coeval with or anterior to the war of Troy—I see no good reason for the marked distinction which he draws between chronology before and chronology after the Olympiad of Corœbus, or for the necessity which he feels of suspending his upward reckoning at the last-mentioned epoch, and beginning a different process, called "a downward reckoning," from the higher epoch (supposed to be somehow ascertained without any upward reckoning) of the first patriarch from whom such authentic dynasty emanates.[1] Herodotus and Thucydidês might well, upon this supposition, ask of Mr. Clinton, why he called upon them to alter their

[1] The distinction which Mr. Clinton draws between an upward and a downward chronology is one to which I cannot assent. His doctrine is, that upward chronology is trustworthy and practicable up to the first recorded Olympiad; downward chronology is trustworthy and practicable from Phorôneus down to the Ionic migration: what is uncertain is the length of the intermediate line which joins the Ionic migration to the first recorded Olympiad,—the downward and the upward terminus. (See Fasti Hellenici, vol. i. Introduct. p. ix. second edit. and p. 123, ch. vi.)

All chronology must begin by reckoning upwards; when by this process we have arrived at a certain determined æra in earlier time, we may from that date reckon downwards, if we please. We must be able to reckon upwards from the present time to the Christian æra, before we can employ that event as a fixed point for chronological determinations generally. But if Eratosthenês could perform correctly the upward reckoning from his own time to the fall of Troy, so he could also perform the upward reckoning up to the nearer point of the Ionic migration. It is true that Eratosthenês gives all his statements of time from an older point to a newer (so far at least as we can judge from Clemens Alex. Strom. 1, p. 336); he says, "From the capture of Troy to the return of the Herakleids is 80 years; from thence to the Ionic migration, 60 years; then further on, to the guardianship of Lykurgus, 159 years; then to the first year of the first Olympiad, 108 years; from which Olympiad to the invasion of Xerxês, 297 years; from whence to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, 48 years," &c. But here is no difference between upward reckoning as high as the first Olympiad, and then downward reckoning for the intervals of time above it. Eratosthenês first found or made some upward reckoning to the Trojan capture, either from his own time or from some time at a known distance from his own: he then assumes the capture of Troy as an æra, and gives statements of intervals going downwards to the Peloponnesian war: amongst other statements, he assigns clearly that interval which Mr. Clinton pronounces to be undiscoverable, viz. the space of time between the Ionic emigration and the first Olympiad, interposing one epoch between them. I reject the computation of Eratosthenês, or any other computation, to determine the supposed date of the Trojan war; but if I admitted it, I could have no hesitation in admitting also the space which he defines between the Ionic migration and the first Olympiad. Eusebius (Præp. Ev. x. 9, p. 485) reckons upwards from the birth of Christ, making various halts but never breaking off, to the initial phænomena of Grecian antiquity—the deluge of Deukaliôn and the conflagration of Phaëtôn.

method of proceeding at the year 776 B.C., and why they might not be allowed to pursue their "upward chronological reckoning" without interruption from Leonidas up to Danaus, or from Peisistratus up to Hellên and Deukalión, without any alteration in the point of view. Authentic dynasties from the Olympiads, up to an epoch above the Trojan war, would enable us to obtain chronological proof of the latter date, instead of being reduced (as Mr. Clinton affirms that we are) to "conjecture" instead of proof.

The whole question, as to the value of the reckoning from the Olympiads up to Phorôneus, does in truth turn upon this one point:—Are those genealogies which profess to cover the space between the two, authentic and trustworthy or not? Mr. Clinton appears to feel that they are not so, when he admits the essential difference in the character of the evidence, and the necessity of altering the method of computation before and after the first recorded Olympiad: yet in his Preface he labours to prove that they possess historical worth and are in the main correctly set forth: moreover, that the fictitious persons, wherever any such are intermingled, may be detected and eliminated. The evidences upon which he relies, are—1. Inscriptions; 2. The early poets.

1. An inscription, being nothing but a piece of writing on marble, carries evidentiary value under the same conditions as a published writing on paper. If the inscriber reports a contemporary fact which he had the means of knowing, and if there be no reason to suspect misrepresentation, we believe this assertion: if, on the other hand, he records facts belonging to a long period before his own time, his authority counts for little, except in so far as we can verify and appreciate his means of knowledge.

In estimating therefore the probative force of any inscription, the first and most indispensable point is to assure ourselves of its date. Amongst all the public registers and inscriptions alluded to by Mr. Clinton, there is not one which can be positively referred to a date anterior to 776 B.C. The quoit of Iphitus—the public registers at Sparta, Corinth, and Elis—the list of the priestesses of Juno at Argos—are all of a date completely uncertified. O. Müller does indeed agree with Mr. Clinton (though in my opinion without any sufficient proof) in assigning the quoit of Iphitus to the age ascribed to that prince: and if we even grant thus much, we shall have an inscription as old (adopting Mr. Clinton's determination of the age of Iphitus) as 828 B.C. But when Mr. Clinton quotes

O. Müller as admitting the registers of Sparta, Corinth, and Elis, it is right to add that the latter does not profess to guarantee the authenticity of these documents, or the age at which such registers began to be kept. It is not to be doubted that there were registers of the kings of Sparta carrying them up to Hêraklês, and of the kings of Elis from Oxylus to Iphitus: but the question is, at what time did these lists begin to be kept continuously? This is a point which we have no means of deciding, nor can we accept Mr. Clinton's unsupported conjecture, when he tells us—"*Perhaps* these were begun to be written as early as B.C. 1048, the probable time of the Dorian conquest." Again he tells us—"At Argos a register was preserved of the priestesses of Juno, which *might be* more ancient than the catalogues of the kings of Sparta or Corinth. That register, from which Hellanikus composed his work, contained the priestesses from the earliest times down to the age of Hellanikus himself. . . . But this catalogue *might have* been commenced as early as the Trojan war itself, and even at a still earlier date." (pp. x., xi.) Again, respecting the inscriptions quoted by Herodotus from the temple of the Ismenian Apollo at Thêbes, in which Amphitryo and Laodamas are named, Mr. Clinton says—"They were ancient in the time of Herodotus, which *may* perhaps carry them back 400 years before his time: and in that case they *might* approach within 300 years of Laodamas and within 400 years of the probable time of Kadmus himself."—"It is granted (he adds in a note) that these inscriptions were *not genuine*, that is, not of the date to which they were assigned by Herodotus himself. But that they were ancient cannot be doubted," &c.

The time when Herodotus saw the temple of the Ismenian Apollo at Thêbes can hardly have been earlier than 450 B.C.: reckoning upwards from hence to 776 B.C., we have an interval of 326 years: the inscriptions which Herodotus saw may well therefore have been *ancient*, without being earlier than the first recorded Olympiad. Mr. Clinton does indeed tell us that *ancient* "may perhaps" be construed as 400 years earlier than Herodotus. But no careful reader can permit himself to convert such bare possibility into a ground of inference, and to make it available, in conjunction with other similar possibilities before enumerated, for the purpose of showing that there really existed inscriptions in Greece of a date anterior to 776 B.C. Unless Mr. Clinton can make out this, he can derive no benefit from inscriptions, in his attempt to substantiate the reality of the mythical persons or of the mythical events.

The truth is that the Herakleid pedigree of the Spartan kings (as has been observed in a former chapter) is only one out of the numerous divine and heroic genealogies with which the Hellenic world abounded,[1]—a class of documents which

[1] See the string of fabulous names placed at the head of the Halicarnassian Inscription, professing to enumerate the series of priests of Poseidôn *from the foundation of the city* (Inscript. No. 2655, Boeckh), with the commentary of the learned editor: compare also what he pronounces to be an inscription of a genealogy partially fabulous at Hierapytna in Krête (No. 2563).

The memorable Parian marble is itself an inscription, in which legend and history,—gods, heroes, and men—are blended together in the various successive epochs without any consciousness of transition in the mind of the inscriber.

That the Catalogue of priestesses of Hêrê at Argos went back to the extreme of fabulous times, we may discern by the Fragments of Hellanikus (Frag. 45–53). So also did the registers at Sikyôn: they professed to record Amphion, son of Zeus and Antiopê, as the inventor of harp-music (Plutarch, De Musicâ, c. 3, p. 1132).

I remarked in a preceding page that Mr. Clinton erroneously cites K. O. Müller as a believer in the chronological *authenticity* of the lists of the early Spartan kings: he says (vol. iii. App. vi. p. 330), "Mr. Müller is of opinion that an *authentic* account of the years of each Lacedæmonian reign from the return of the Heraclidæ to the Olympiad of Korœbus had been preserved to the time of Eratosthenês and Apollodôrus." But this is a mistake: for Müller expressly disavows any belief in the *authenticity* of the lists (Dorians, i. p. 146): he says, "I do not contend that the chronological accounts in the Spartan lists form *an authentic document*, more than those in the catalogue of the priestesses of Hêrê and in the list of Halicarnassian priests. The chronological statements in the Spartan lists may have been formed from imperfect memorials: but the Alexandrine chronologists must have found such tables in existence," &c.

The discrepancies noticed in Herodotus (vi. 52) are alone sufficient to prove that continuous registers of the names of the Lacedæmonian kings did not begin to be kept until very long after the date here assigned by Mr. Clinton.

Xenophôn (Agesilaus, viii. 7) agrees with what Herodotus mentions to have been the native Lacedæmonian story—that Aristodêmus (and not his sons) was the king who conducted the Dorian invaders to Sparta. What is further remarkable is that Xenophôn calls him—'Αριστόδημος ὁ Ἡρακλέους. The reasonable inference here is, that Xenophôn believed Aristodêmus to be the *son* of Hêraklês, and that this was one of the various genealogical stories current. But here the critics interpose: "ὁ Ἡρακλέους (observes Schneider), non παῖς, sed ἀπόγονος, ut ex Herodoto viii. 131 admonuit Weiske." Surely if Xenophôn had meant this, he would have said ὁ ἀφ' Ἡρακλέους.

Perhaps particular exceptional cases might be quoted, wherein the very common phrase of ὁ followed by a genitive means *descendant*, and not *son*. But if any doubt be allowed upon this point, chronological computations, founded on genealogies, will be exposed to a serious additional suspicion. Why are we to assume that Xenophôn *must* give the same story as Herodotus, unless his words naturally tell us so?

M. John Brandis, in an instructive Dissertation (De Temporum Græcorum

become historical evidence only so high in the ascending series as the names composing them are authenticated by contemporary, or nearly contemporary, enrolment. At what period this practice of enrolment began, we have no information. Two remarks however may be made, in reference to any approximate guess as to the time when actual registration commenced:—First, that the number of names in the pedigree, or the length of past time which it professes to embrace, affords no presumption of any superior antiquity in the time of registration:—Secondly, that looking to the acknowledged paucity and rudeness of Grecian writing even down to the 60th Olympiad (540 B.C.), and to the absence of the habit of writing, as well as the low estimate of its value, which such a state of things argues, the presumption is, that written enrolment of family genealogies did not commence until a long time after 776 B.C., and the obligation of proof falls upon him who maintains that it commenced earlier. And this second remark is further borne out when we observe, that there is no registered list, except that of the Olympic victors, which goes up even so high as 776 B.C. The next list which O. Müller and Mr. Clinton produce, is that of the Karneonikæ or victors at the Karneian festival, which reaches only up to 676 B.C.

If Mr. Clinton then makes little out of inscriptions to sustain his view of Grecian history and chronology anterior to the recorded Olympiads, let us examine the inferences which he draws from his other source of evidence—the early poets. And here it will be found, First, that in order to maintain the credibility of these witnesses, he lays down positions respecting historical evidence both indefensible in themselves, and especially inapplicable to the early times of Greece: Secondly, that his reasoning is at the same time inconsistent—inasmuch as it includes admissions, which if properly understood and followed out, exhibit these very witnesses, as habitually, indiscriminately, and unconsciously, mingling truth and fiction, and therefore little fit to be believed upon their solitary and unsupported testimony.

To take the second point first, he says, Introduction, p. ii.–iii. —"The authority even of the genealogies has been called in

Antiquissimorum Rationibus, Bonn. 1857) insists forcibly on the point that Herodotus knew nothing of these registers of Spartan kings, and that they did not exist at Sparta when his history was composed (p. 6). M. Brandis conceives Hellanikus to be the first arranger and methodiser of these early genealogies (p. 8–37).

question by many able and learned persons, who reject Danaus, Kadmus, Hercules, Thêseus, and many others, as fictitious persons. It is evident that any fact would come from the hands of the poets embellished with many fabulous additions: and fictitious genealogies were undoubtedly composed. Because, however, some genealogies were fictitious, we are not justified in concluding that all were fabulous. . . . . In estimating then the historical value of the genealogies transmitted by the early poets, we may take a middle course; not rejecting them as wholly false, nor yet implicitly receiving all as true. The genealogies *contain many real persons*, but these are *incorporated with many fictitious names*. The fictions however will have a basis of truth: the genealogical expression may be false, but the connexion which it describes is real. Even to those who reject the whole as fabulous, the exhibition of the early times which is presented in this volume may still be not unacceptable: because it is necessary to the right understanding of antiquity that the opinions of the Greeks concerning their own origin should be set before us, even if these are erroneous opinions, and that their story should be told as they have told it themselves. The names preserved by the ancient genealogies may be considered of three kinds; either they were the name of a race or clan converted into the name of an individual, or they were altogether fictitious, or lastly, they were real historical names. An attempt is made in the four genealogical tables inserted below to distinguish these three classes of names. . . . . Of those who are left in the third class (*i. e.* the real) all are not entitled to remain there. But I have only placed in the third class those names concerning which there seemed to be little doubt. The rest are left to the judgement of the reader."

Pursuant to this principle of division, Mr. Clinton furnishes four genealogical tables,[1] in which the names of persons representing races are printed in capital letters, and those of purely fictitious persons in italics. And these tables exhibit a curious sample of the intimate commixture of fiction with that which he calls truth: real son and mythical father, real husband and mythical wife, or *vice versâ*.

Upon Mr. Clinton's tables we may remark—

1. The names singled out as fictitious are distinguished by no common character, nor any mark either assignable or defensible, from those which are left as real. To take an example (p. 40), why is Itônus the 1st printed out as a fiction,

[1] See Mr. Clinton's work, pp. 32, 40, 100.

while Itônus the 2nd, together with Physcus, Cynus, Salmôneus, Ormenus, &c., in the same page, are preserved as real, all of them being eponyms of towns just as much as Itônus?

2. If we are to discard Hellên, Dôrus, Æolus, Iôn, &c., as not being real individual persons, but expressions for personified races, why are we to retain Kadmus, Danaus, Hyllus, and several others, who are just as much eponyms of races and tribes as the four above mentioned? Hyllus, Pamphylus and Dymas are the eponyms of the three Dorian tribes,[1] just as Hoplês and the other three sons of Iôn were of the four Attic tribes: Kadmus and Danaus stand in the same relation to the Kadmeians and Danaans, as Argus and Achæus to the Argeians and Achæans. Besides, there are many other names really eponymous, which we cannot now recognise to be so, in consequence of our imperfect acquaintance with the subdivisions of the Hellenic population, each of which, speaking generally, had its god or hero, to whom the original of the name was referred. If, then, eponymous names are to be excluded from the category of reality, we shall find that the ranks of the real men will be thinned to a far greater extent than is indicated by Mr. Clinton's tables.

3. Though Mr. Clinton does not carry out consistently either of his disfranchising qualifications among the names and persons of the old mythes, he nevertheless presses them far enough to strike out a sensible proportion of the whole. By conceding thus much to modern scepticism, he has departed from the point of view of Hellanikus and Herodotus, and the ancient historians generally; and it is singular that the names, which he has been the most forward to sacrifice, are exactly those to which they were most attached and which it would have been most painful to their faith to part with—I mean the eponymous heroes. Neither Herodotus, nor Hellanikus, nor Eratosthenês, nor any one of the chronological reckoners of antiquity, would have admitted the distinction which Mr. Clinton draws between persons real and persons fictitious in the old mythical world, though they might perhaps occasionally, on special grounds, call in question the existence of some individual characters amongst the mythical ancestry of Greece; but they never dreamt of that general severance into real and fictitious persons which forms the principle of Mr. Clinton's "middle course." Their chronological computations for Grecian antiquity assumed that the mythical

[1] "From these three" (Hyllus, Pamphylus and Dymas), says Mr. Clinton, vol. i. ch. 5, p. 109, "the three Dorian tribes derived their names."

characters in their full and entire sequence were all real persons. Setting up the entire list as real, they calculated so many generations to a century, and thus determined the number of centuries which separated themselves from the gods, the heroes, and the autochthonous men, who formed in their view the historical starting-point. But as soon as it is admitted that the personages in the mythical world are divisible into two classes, partly real and partly fictitious, the integrity of the series is broken up, and it can be no longer employed as a basis for chronological calculation. In the estimate of the ancient chronologers, three succeeding persons of the same lineage—grandfather, father and son—counted for a century; and this may pass in a rough way, so long as you are thoroughly satisfied that they are all real persons: but if in the succession of persons A, B, C, you strike out B as a fiction, the continuity of data necessary for chronological computation disappears. Now Mr. Clinton is inconsistent with himself in this—that while he abandons the unsuspecting historical faith of the Grecian chronologers, he nevertheless continues his chronological computations upon the data of that ancient faith,—upon the assumed reality of all the persons constituting his ante-historical generations. What becomes, for example, of the Herakleid genealogy of the Spartan kings, when it is admitted that eponymous persons are to be cancelled as fictions; seeing that Hyllus, through whom those kings traced their origin to Hêraklês, comes in the most distinct manner under that category, as much so as Hoplês the son of Iôn? It will be found that when we once cease to believe in the mythical world as an uninterrupted and unalloyed succession of real individuals, it becomes unfit to serve as a basis for chronological computations, and that Mr. Clinton, when he mutilated the data of the ancient chronologists, ought at the same time to have abandoned their problems as insoluble. Genealogies of real persons, such as Herodotus and Eratosthenês believed in, afford a tolerable basis for calculations of time, within certain limits of error: "genealogies containing many real persons, but incorporated with many fictitious names," (to use the language just cited from Mr. Clinton,) are essentially unavailable for such a purpose.

It is right here to add, that I agree in Mr. Clinton's view of these eponymous persons: I admit with him that "the genealogical expression may often be false, when the connexion which it describes is real." Thus, for example, the adoption of Hyllus by Ægimius, the father of Pamphylus and Dymas,

to the privileges of a son and to a third fraction of his territories, may reasonably be construed as a mythical expression of the fraternal union of the three Dorian tribes, Hyllêis, Pamphyli, and Dymanes: so about the relationship of Iôn and Achæus, of Dôrus and Æolus. But if we put this construction on the name of Hyllus, or Iôn, or Achæus, we cannot at the same time employ either of these persons as units in chronological reckoning; nor is it consistent to recognise them in the lump as members of a distinct class, and yet to enlist them as real individuals in measuring the duration of past time.

4. Mr. Clinton, while professing a wish to tell the story of the Greeks as they have told it themselves, seems unconscious how capitally his point of view differs from theirs. The distinction which he draws between real and fictitious persons would have appeared unreasonable, not to say offensive, to Herodotus or Eratosthenês. It is undoubtedly right that the early history (if so it is to be called) of the Greeks should be told as they have told it themselves, and with that view I have endeavoured in the previous narrative, as far as I could, to present the primitive legends in their original colour and character—pointing out at the same time the manner in which they were transformed and distilled into history by passing through the retort of later annalists. It is the legend as thus transformed which Mr. Clinton seems to understand as the story told by the Greeks themselves—which cannot be admitted to be true, unless the meaning of the expression be specially explained. In his general distinction, however, between the real and fictitious persons of the mythical world, he departs essentially from the point of view even of the later Greeks. And if he had consistently followed out that distinction in his particular criticisms, he would have found the ground slipping under his feet in his upward march even to Troy—not to mention the series of eighteen generations further up to Phorôneus; but he does *not* consistently follow it out, and therefore in practice he deviates little from the footsteps of the ancients.

Enough has been said to show that the witnesses upon whom Mr. Clinton relies blend truth and fiction habitually, indiscriminately and unconsciously, even upon his own admission. Let us now consider the positions which he lays down respecting historical evidence. He says (Introduct. p. vi., vii.)—

"We may acknowledge as real persons all those whom there

is no reason for rejecting. The presumption is in favour of the early tradition, if no argument can be brought to overthrow it. The persons may be considered real, when the description of them is consonant with the state of the country at that time: when no national prejudice or vanity could be concerned in inventing them: when the tradition is consistent and general: when rival or hostile tribes concur in the leading facts: when the acts ascribed to the person (divested of their poetical ornament) enter into the political system of the age, or form the basis of other transactions which fall within known historical times. Kadmus and Danaus appear to be real persons: for it is conformable to the state of mankind, and perfectly credible, that Phœnician and Egyptian adventurers, in the ages to which these persons are ascribed, should have found their way to the coasts of Greece: and the Greeks (as already observed) had no motive from any national vanity to feign these settlements. Hercules was a real person. His acts were recorded by those who were not friendly to the Dorians; by Achæans and Æolians and Ionians, who had no vanity to gratify in celebrating the hero of a hostile and rival people. His descendants in many branches remained in many states down to the historical times. His son Tlepolemus and his grandson and great-grandson Cleodæus and Aristomachus are acknowledged (*i. e.* by O. Müller) to be real persons: and there is no reason that can be assigned for receiving these, which will not be equally valid for establishing the reality both of Hercules and Hyllus. Above all, Hercules is authenticated by the testimonies both of the Iliad and Odyssey."

These positions appear to me inconsistent with sound views of the conditions of historical testimony. According to what is here laid down, we are bound to accept as real all the persons mentioned by Homer, Arktinus, Leschês, the Hesiodic poets, Eumêlus, Asius, &c., unless we can adduce some positive ground in each particular case to prove the contrary. If this position be a true one, the greater part of the history of England, from Brute the Trojan down to Julius Cæsar, ought at once to be admitted as valid and worthy of credence. What Mr. Clinton here calls the *early tradition*, is in point of fact the narrative of these early poets. The word *tradition* is an equivocal word, and begs the whole question; for while in its obvious and literal meaning it implies only something handed down, whether truth or fiction—it is tacitly understood to imply a tale descriptive of some real matter of fact, taking its rise at the time when that fact happened, and originally accurate, but

corrupted by subsequent oral transmission. Understanding therefore by Mr. Clinton's words *early tradition*, the tales of the old poets, we shall find his position totally inadmissible —that we are bound to admit the persons or statements of Homer and Hesiod as real, unless where we can produce reasons to the contrary. To allow this, would be to put them upon a par with good contemporary witnesses; for no greater privilege can be claimed in favour even of Thucydidês, than the title of his testimony to be believed unless where it can be contradicted on special grounds. The presumption in favour of an asserting witness is either strong, or weak, or positively nothing, according to the compound ratio of his means of knowledge, his moral and intellectual habits, and his motive to speak the truth. Thus, for instance, when Hesiod tells us that his father quitted the Æolic Kymê and came to Askra in Bœôtia, we may fully believe him; but when he describes to us the battles between the Olympic gods and the Titans, or between Hêraklês and Kyknus—or when Homer depicts the efforts of Hectôr, aided by Apollo, for the defence of Troy, and the struggles of Achilles and Odysseus, with the assistance of Hêrê and Poseidôn, for the destruction of that city, events professedly long past and gone—we cannot presume either of them to be in any way worthy of belief. It cannot be shown that they possessed any means of knowledge, while it is certain that they could have no motive to consider historical truth: their object was to satisfy an uncritical appetite for narrative, and to interest the emotions of their hearers. Mr. Clinton says, that "the persons may be considered real when the description of them is consistent with the state of the country at that time." But he has forgotten, first, that we know nothing of the state of the country except what these very poets tell us; next, that fictitious persons may be just as consonant to the state of the country as real persons. While therefore, on the one hand, we have no independent evidence either to affirm or to deny that Achilles or Agamemnôn are consistent with the state of Greece or Asia Minor at a certain supposed date 1183 B.C.,—so, on the other hand, even assuming such consistency to be made out, this of itself would not prove them to be real persons.

Mr. Clinton's reasoning altogether overlooks the existence of *plausible fiction*—fictitious stories which harmonise perfectly well with the general course of facts, and which are distinguished from matters of fact not by any internal character, but by the circumstance that matter of fact has some competent and well-informed witness to authenticate it, either directly or through

legitimate inference. Fiction may be, and often is, extravagant and incredible; but it may also be plausible and specious, and in that case there is nothing but the want of an attesting certificate to distinguish it from truth. Now all the tests, which Mr. Clinton proposes as guarantees of the reality of the Homeric persons, will be just as well satisfied by plausible fiction as by actual matter of fact; the plausibility of the fiction consists in its satisfying those and other similar conditions. In most cases, the tales of the poets *did* fall in with the existing current of feelings in their audience: "prejudice and vanity" are not the only feelings, but doubtless prejudice and vanity were often appealed to, and it was from such harmony of sentiment that they acquired their hold on men's belief. Without any doubt the Iliad appealed most powerfully to the reverence for ancestral gods and heroes among the Asiatic colonists who first heard it: the temptation of putting forth an interesting tale is quite a sufficient stimulus to the invention of the poet, and the plausibility of the tale a sufficient passport to the belief of the hearers. Mr. Clinton talks of "consistent and general tradition." But that the tale of a poet, when once told with effect and beauty, acquired general belief—is no proof that it was founded on fact: otherwise, what are we to say to the divine legends, and to the large portion of the Homeric narrative which Mr. Clinton himself sets aside as untrue under the designation of "poetical ornament?" When a mythical incident is recorded as "forming the basis" of some known historical fact or institution—as for instance the successful stratagem by which Melanthus killed Xanthus in the battle on the boundary, as recounted in my last chapter,—we may adopt one of two views: we may either treat the incident as real, and as having actually given occasion to what is described as its effect—or we may treat the incident as a legend imagined in order to assign some plausible origin of the reality,—"Aut ex re nomen, aut ex vocabulo fabula."[1] In cases where the legendary incident is referred to a time long anterior to any records—as it commonly is—the second mode of proceeding appears to me far more consonant to reason and probability than the first. It is to be recollected that all the persons and facts, here defended as matter of real history by Mr. Clinton, are referred to an age long preceding the first beginning of records.

I have already remarked that Mr. Clinton shrinks from his own rule in treating Kadmus and Danaus as real persons, since

[1] Pomponius Mela, iii. 7.

they are as much eponyms of tribes or races as Dôrus and Hellên. And if he can admit Hêraklês to be a real man, I do not see upon what reason he can consistently disallow any one of the mythical personages, for there is not one whose exploits are more strikingly at variance with the standard of historical probability. Mr. Clinton reasons upon the supposition that "Hercules was a *Dorian* hero:" but he was Achæan and Kadmeian as well as Dorian, though the legends respecting him are different in all the three characters. Whether his son Tlepolemus and his grandson Kleodæus belong to the category of historical men, I will not take upon me to say, though O. Müller (in my opinion without any warranty) appears to admit it; but Hyllus certainly is not a real man, if the canon of Mr. Clinton himself respecting the eponyms is to be trusted. "The descendants of Herculês (observes Mr. Clinton) remained in many states down to the historical times." So did those of Zeus and Apollo, and of that god whom the historian Hekatæus recognised as his progenitor in the sixteenth generation: the titular kings of Ephesus, in the historical times, as well as Peisistratus, the despot of Athens, traced their origin up to Æolus and Hellên, yet Mr. Clinton does not hesitate to reject Æolus and Hellên as fictitious persons. I dispute the propriety of quoting the Iliad and Odyssey (as Mr. Clinton does) in evidence of the historic personality of Herculês. For even with regard to the ordinary men who figure in those poems, we have no means of discriminating the real from the fictitious; while the Homeric Hêraklês is unquestionably more than an ordinary man,—he is the favourite son of Zeus, from his birth predestined to a life of labour and servitude, as preparation for a glorious immortality. Without doubt the poet himself believed in the reality of Herculês, but it was a reality clothed with superhuman attributes.

Mr. Clinton observes (Introd. p. ii.), that "because some genealogies were fictitious, we are not justified in concluding that all were fabulous." It is no way necessary that we should maintain so extensive a position: it is sufficient that all are fabulous so far as concerns gods and heroes,—*some* fabulous throughout—and none ascertainably true, for the period anterior to the recorded Olympiads. How much, or what particular portions, may be true, no one can pronounce. The gods and heroes are, from our point of view, essentially fictitious; but from the Grecian point of view they were the most real (if the expression may be permitted, *i. e.* clung to with the strongest faith) of all the members of the series. They not

only formed parts of the genealogy as originally conceived, but were in themselves the grand reason why it was conceived,—as a golden chain to connect the living man with a divine ancestor. The genealogy therefore taken as a whole (and its value consists in its being taken as a whole) was from the beginning a fiction; but the names of the father and grandfather of the living man, in whose day it first came forth, were doubtless those of real men. Wherever therefore we can verify the date of a genealogy, as applied to some living person, we may reasonably presume the two lowest members of it to be also those of real persons: but this has no application to the time anterior to the Olympiads—still less to the pretended times of the Trojan war, the Kalydonian boar-hunt, or the deluge of Deukalion. To reason (as Mr. Clinton does, Introd. p. vi.),—"Because Aristomachus was a real man, therefore his father Cleodæus, his grandfather Hyllus, and so farther upwards, &c. must have been real men,"—is an inadmissible conclusion. The historian Hekatæus was a real man, and doubtless his father Hegesander also—but it would be unsafe to march up his genealogical ladder fifteen steps to the presence of the ancestorial god of whom he boasted: the upper steps of the ladder will be found broken and unreal. Not to mention that the inference, from real son to real father, is inconsistent with the admissions in Mr. Clinton's own genealogical tables; for he there inserts the names of several mythical fathers as having begotten real historical sons.

The general authority of Mr. Clinton's book, and the sincere respect which I entertain for his elucidations of the later chronology, have imposed upon me the duty of assigning those grounds on which I dissent from his conclusions prior to the first recorded Olympiad. The reader who desires to see the numerous and contradictory guesses (they deserve no better name) of the Greeks themselves in the attempt to chronologise their mythical narratives, will find them in the copious notes annexed to the first half of his first volume. As I consider all such researches not merely as fruitless in regard to any trustworthy result, but as serving to divert attention from the genuine form and really illustrative character of Grecian legend, I have not thought it right to go over the same ground in the present work. Differing as I do, however, from Mr. Clinton's views on this subject, I concur with him in deprecating the application of etymology (Introd. p. xi.-xii.) as a general scheme of explanation to the characters and events of Greek legend. Amongst the many causes which operated as

suggestives and stimulants to Greek fancy in the creation of these interesting tales, doubtless etymology has had its share; but it cannot be applied (as Hermann, above all others, has sought to apply it) for the purpose of imparting supposed sense and system to the general body of mythical narrative. I have already remarked on this topic in a former chapter.

It would be curious to ascertain at what time, or by whom, the earliest continuous genealogies, connecting existing persons with the supposed antecedent age of legend, were formed and preserved. Neither Homer nor Hesiod mentioned any verifiable *present* persons or circumstances: had they done so, the age of one or other of them could have been determined upon good evidence, which we may fairly presume to have been impossible, from the endless controversies upon this topic among ancient writers. In the Hesiodic "Works and Days," the heroes of Troy and Thêbes are even presented as an extinct race,[1] radically different from the poet's own contemporaries, who are a new race, far too depraved to be conceived as sprung from the loins of the heroes; so that we can hardly suppose Hesiod (though his father was a native of the Æolic Kymê) to have admitted the pedigree of the Æolic chiefs, as reputed descendants of Agamemnôn. Certain it is that the earliest poets did not attempt to measure or bridge over the supposed interval, between their own age and the war of Troy, by any definite series of fathers and sons: whether Eumêlus or Asius made any such attempt, we cannot tell, but the earliest continuous backward genealogies which we find mentioned are those of Pherekydês, Hellanikus, and Herodotus. It is well known that Herodotus, in his manner of computing the upward genealogy of the Spartan kings, assigns the date of the Trojan war to a period 800 years earlier than himself, equivalent about to B.C. 1270–1250; while the subsequent Alexandrine chronologists, Eratosthenês and Apollodôrus, place that event in 1184 and 1183 B.C.; and the Parian marble refers it to an intermediate date, different from either—1209 B.C. Ephorus, Phanias, Timæus, Kleitarchus, and Duris, had each his own conjectural date; but the computation of the Alexandrine chronologists was the most generally followed by those who succeeded them, and seems to have passed to modern times as the received date of this great legendary event—though some distinguished inquirers have adopted the epoch of Herodotus, which Larcher has attempted to vindicate

[1] See vol. i., chap. ii.

in an elaborate, but feeble, dissertation.[1] It is unnecessary to state that in my view the inquiry has no other value except to illustrate the ideas which guided the Greek mind, and to exhibit its progress from the days of Homer to those of Herodotus. For it argues a considerable mental progress when men begin to methodise the past, even though they do so on fictitious principles, being as yet unprovided with those records which alone could put them on a better course. The Homeric man was satisfied with feeling, imagining, and believing, particular incidents of a supposed past, without any attempt to

[1] Larcher, Chronologie d'Hérodote, chap. xiv. p. 352–401.

From the capture of Troy down to the passage of Alexander with his invading army into Asia, the latter a known date of 334 B.C., the following different reckonings were made—

| | |
|---|---|
| Phanias | gave 715 years. |
| Ephorus | „ 735 „ |
| Eratosthenês | „ 774 „ |
| Timæus, Kleitarchus | „ 820 „ |
| Duris | „ 1000 „ |

(Clemens. Alexand. Strom. i. p. 337.)

Democritus estimated a space of 730 years between his composition of the *Μικρὸς Διάκοσμος* and the capture of Troy (Diogen. Laërt. ix. 41). Isokratês believed the Lacedæmonians to have been established in Peloponnêsus 700 years, and he repeats this in three different passages (Archidam. p. 118; Panathen. p. 275; De Pace, p. 178). The dates of these three orations themselves differ by twenty-four years, the Archidamus being older than the Panathenäic by that interval; yet he employs the same number of years for each in calculating backwards to the Trojan war (see Clinton, vol. i. Introd. p. v). In round numbers, his calculation coincides pretty nearly with the 800 years given by Herodotus in the preceding century.

The remarks of Boeckh on the Parian marble generally, in his Corpus Inscriptionum Græc. t. ii. p. 322–336, are extremely valuable, but especially his criticism on the epoch of the Trojan war, which stands the twenty-fourth in the Marble. The ancient chronologists, from Damastês and Hellanikus downwards, professed to fix not only the exact year, but the exact month, day and hour in which this celebrated capture took place. [Mr. Clinton pretends to no more than the possibility of determining the event within fifty years, Introduct. p. vi.] Boeckh illustrates the manner of their argumentation.

O. Müller observes (History of the Dorians, t. ii. p. 442, Eng. Tr.), "In reckoning from the migration of the Heraklidæ downward, we follow the Alexandrine chronology, of which it should be observed, that our materials only enable us to restore it to its original state, *not to examine its correctness.*"

But I do not see upon what evidence even so much as this can be done. Mr. Clinton, admitting that Eratosthenês fixed his date by conjecture, supposes him to have chosen "a middle point between the longer and shorter computations of his predecessors." Boeckh thinks this explanation unsatisfactory (*l. c.* p. 328).

graduate the line of connexion between them and himself: to introduce fictitious hypotheses and media of connexion is the business of a succeeding age, when the stimulus of rational curiosity is first felt, without any authentic materials to supply it. We have then the form of history operating upon the matter of legend—the transition-state between legend and history; less interesting indeed than either separately, yet necessary as a step between the two.

## CHAPTER XX

### STATE OF SOCIETY AND MANNERS AS EXHIBITED IN GRECIAN LEGEND

THOUGH the particular persons and events chronicled in the legendary poems of Greece, are not to be regarded as belonging to the province of real history, those poems are nevertheless full of instruction as pictures of life and manners; and the very same circumstances which divest their composers of all credibility as historians, render them so much the more valuable as unconscious expositors of their own contemporary society. While professedly describing an uncertified past, their combinations are involuntarily borrowed from the surrounding present. For among communities, such as those of the primitive Greeks, without books, without means of extended travel, without acquaintance with foreign languages and habits, the imagination even of highly gifted men was naturally enslaved by the circumstances around them to a far greater degree than in the later days of Solôn or Herodotus; insomuch that the characters which they conceived and the scenes which they described would for that reason bear a stronger generic resemblance to the realities of their own time and locality. Nor was the poetry of that age addressed to lettered and critical authors, watchful to detect plagiarism, sated with simple imagery, and requiring something of novelty or peculiarity in every fresh production. To captivate their emotions, it was sufficient to depict with genius and fervour the more obvious manifestations of human adventure or suffering, and to idealise that type of society, both private and public, with which the hearers around were familiar. Even in describing the gods, where a great degree of latitude and

deviation might have been expected,[1] we see that Homer introduces into Olympus the passions, the caprices, the love of power and patronage, the alternation of dignity and weakness, which animated the bosom of an ordinary Grecian chief; and this tendency, to reproduce in substance the social relations to which he had been accustomed, would operate still more powerfully when he had to describe simply human characters —the chief and his people, the warrior and his comrades, the husband, wife, father, and son—or the imperfect rudiments of judicial and administrative proceeding. That his narrative on all these points, even with fictitious characters and events, presents a close approximation to general reality, there can be no reason to doubt.[2] The necessity under which he lay of drawing from a store, then happily unexhausted, of personal experience and observation, is one of the causes of that freshness and vivacity of description for which he stands unrivalled, and which constituted the imperishable charm of the Iliad and Odyssey from the beginning to the end of Grecian literature.

While therefore we renounce the idea of chronologising or historicising the events of Grecian legend, we may turn them to profit as valuable memorials of that state of society, feeling and intelligence, which must be to us the starting-point of the history of the people. Of course the legendary age, like all those which succeeded it, had its antecedent causes and determining conditions; but of these we know nothing, and we are compelled to assume it as a primary fact for the purpose of following out its subsequent changes. To conceive absolute beginning or origin (as Niebuhr has justly remarked) is beyond the reach of our faculties: we can neither apprehend nor verify anything beyond progress, or development, or decay[3]—change

[1] Καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες φασι βασιλεύεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοί, οἱ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον, ἐβασιλεύοντο. Ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἑαυτοῖς ἀφομοιοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν (Aristot. Politic. i. 1, 7).

[2] In the pictures of the Homeric Heroes, there is no material difference of character recognised between one race of Greeks and another—or even between Greeks and Trojans. See Helbig, Die Sittlichen Zustände des Griechischen Heldenalters, part ii. p. 53.

[3] Niebuhr, Römische Geschichte, vol. i. p. 55, 2nd edit. "Erkennt man aber dass aller Ursprung jenseits unserer nur Entwickelung und Fortgang fassenden Begriffe liegt; und beschränkt sich von Stufe auf Stufe im Umfang der Geschichte zurückzugehen, so wird man Völker eines Stammes (das heisst, durch eigenthümliche Art und Sprache identisch) vielfach eben an sich entgegenliegenden Küstenländern antreffen . . . ohne dass irgend etwas die Voraussetzung erheischte, eine von diesen getrennten Landschaften sei die ursprüngliche Heimath gewesen von wo ein Theil nach der andern

from one set of circumstances to another, operated by some definite combination of physical or moral laws. In the case of the Greeks, the legendary age, as the earliest in any way known to us, must be taken as the initial state from which this series of changes commences. We must depict its prominent characteristics as well as we can, and show—partly how it serves to prepare, partly how it forms a contrast to set off—the subsequent ages of Solôn, of Periklês, and of Demosthenês.

1. The political condition, which Grecian legend everywhere presents to us, is in its principal features strikingly different from that which had become universally prevalent among the Greeks in the time of the Peloponnesian war. Historical oligarchy, as well as democracy, agreed in requiring a certain established system of government, comprising these three elements—specialised functions, temporary functionaries, and ultimate responsibility (under some forms or other) to the mass of qualified citizens—either a Senate or an Ecclesia, or both. There were of course many and capital distinctions between one government and another, in respect to the qualification of the citizen, the attributes and efficiency of the general assembly, the admissibility to power, &c.; and men might often be dissatisfied with the way in which these questions were determined in their own city. But in the mind of every man, some determining rule or system—something like what in modern times is called a *constitution*—was indispensable to any government entitled to be called legitimate, or capable of creating in the mind of a Greek a feeling of moral obligation to obey it. The functionaries who exercised authority under it might be more or less competent or popular; but his personal feelings towards them were commonly lost in his attachment or aversion to the general system. If any energetic man could by audacity or craft break down the constitution and render himself permanent ruler according to his own will and pleasure—

gewandert wäre . . . Dies ist der Geographie der Thiergeschlechter und der Vegetation analog: deren grosse Bezirke durch Gebürge geschieden werden, und beschränkte Meere einschliessen."

"When we once recognise, however, that *all absolute beginning lies out of the reach of our mental conceptions, which comprehend nothing beyond development and progress*, and when we attempt nothing more than to go back from the later to the earlier stages in the compass of history, we shall often find, on opposite coasts of the same sea, people of one stock (that is of the same peculiar customs and language), without being warranted in supposing that either of these separate coasts was the primitive home from whence emigrants crossed over to the other. This is analogous to the geography of animals and plants, whose wide districts are severed by mountains and enclose intern l seas."

even though he might govern well, he could never inspire the people with any sentiment of duty towards him. His sceptre was illegitimate from the beginning, and even the taking of his life, far from being interdicted by that moral feeling which condemned the shedding of blood in other cases, was considered meritorious. Nor could he be mentioned in the language except by a name[1] (*τύραννος*, *despot*) which branded him as an object of mingled fear and dislike.

If we carry our eyes back from historical to legendary Greece, we find a picture the reverse of what has been here sketched. We discern a government in which there is little or no scheme or system,—still less any idea of responsibility to the governed,—but in which the main-spring of obedience on the part of the people consists in their personal feeling and reverence towards the chief. We remark, first and foremost, the king; next, a limited number of subordinate kings or chiefs; afterwards, the mass of armed freemen, husbandmen, artisans, freebooters, &c.; lowest of all, the free labourers for hire and the bought slaves. The king is not distinguished by any broad or impassable boundary from the other chiefs, to each of whom the title *Basileus* is applicable as well as to himself: his supremacy has been inherited from his ancestors, and passes by descent, as a general rule, to his eldest son, having been conferred upon the family as a privilege by the favour of Zeus.[2] In war, he is the

[1] The Greek name *τύραννος* cannot be properly rendered *tyrant*; for many of the *τύραννοι* by no means deserved to be so called, nor is it consistent with the use of language to speak of a mild and well-intentioned tyrant. The word *despot* is the nearest approach which we can make to it, since it is understood to imply that a man has got more power than he ought to have, while it does not exclude a beneficent use of such power by some individuals. It is however very inadequate to express the full strength of Grecian feeling which the original word called forth.

[2] The Phæakian king Alkinous (Odyss. vii. 55–65): there are twelve other Phæakian *Βασιλῆες*, he is himself the thirteenth (viii. 391).

The chief men in the Iliad, and the suitors of Penelopê in the Odyssey, are called usually and indiscriminately both *Βασιλῆες* and *Ἄνακτες*; the latter word however designates them as men of property and masters of slaves (analogous to the subsequent word *δεσπότης*, which word does not occur in Homer, though *δέσποινα* is found in the Odyssey), while the former word marks them as persons of conspicuous station in the tribe (see Odyss. i. 393–401; xiv. 63). A chief could only be *Βασιλεὺς* of freemen; but he might be *Ἄναξ* either of freemen or of slaves.

Agamemnôn and Menelaus belong to the *most kingly* race (*γένος βασιλεύτερον*: compare Tyrtæus, Fragm. ix. v. 8, p. 9, ed. Schneidewin) of the Pelopids, to whom the sceptre originally made for Zeus has been given by Hermês (Iliad, ii. 101; ix. 160; x. 239); compare Odyss. xv. 539. The race of Dardanus are the favourite offspring of Zeus, *βασιλεύτατον* among the Trojans (Iliad, xx. 304). These races are the parallels of the kingly

leader, foremost in personal prowess, and directing all military movements; in peace, he is the general protector of the injured and oppressed; he further offers up those public prayers and sacrifices which are intended to obtain for the whole people the favour of the gods. An ample domain is assigned to him as an appurtenance of his lofty position, while the produce of his fields and his cattle is consecrated in part to an abundant, though rude, hospitality. Moreover, he receives frequent presents, to avert his enmity, to conciliate his favour,[1] or to buy off his exactions; and when plunder is taken from the

*prosapiæ* called Amali, Asdingi, Gungingi and Lithingi, among the Goths, Vandals, and Lombards (Jornandes, De Rebus Geticis, c. 14–22; Paul Warnefrid, Gest. Langob. c. 14–21); and the ἀρχικὸν γένος among the Chaonian Epirots (Thucyd. ii. 80).

[1] Odyss. i. 392; xi. 184; xiii. 14; xix. 109—

> Οὐ μὲν γάρ τι κακὸν βασιλινέμεν· αἶψά τέ οἱ δῶ
> Ἀφνειὸν πέλεται, καὶ τιμηέστερος αὐτός.

Iliad, ix. 154–297 (when Agamemnôn is promising seven townships to Achilles, as a means of appeasing his wrath)—

> Ἐν δ' ἄνδρες ναίουσι πολύρρηνες, πολυβοῦται,
> Οἵ κέ σε δωτίνῃσι, θεὸν ὣς, τιμήσουσι,
> Καί σοι ὑπὸ σκήπτρῳ λιπαρὰς τελέουσι θέμιστας.

See Iliad, xii. 312; and the reproaches of Thersitês (ii. 226)—Βασιλῆας δωροφάγους (Hesiod, Opp. Di. 38–264).

The Roman kings had a large τέμενος assigned to them,—"agri, arva, et arbusta et pascui læti atque uberes" (Cicero, De Republ. v. 2): the German kings received presents: "Mos est civitatibus (observes Tacitus respecting the Germans whom he describes, M. G. 15) ultro ac viritim conferre principibus, vel armentorum vel frugum, quod pro honore acceptum etiam necessitatibus subvenit."

The revenue of the Persian kings before Darius consisted only of what were called δῶρα or presents (Herod. iii. 89): Darius first introduced both the name of tribute and the determinate assessment. King Polydektês in Seriphos invites his friends to a festival, the condition of which is that each guest shall contribute to an ἔρανος for his benefit (Pherekydês, Fragm. 26, ed. Didot); a case to which the Thracian banquet prepared by Seuthês affords an exact parallel (Xenophôn, Anab. vii. 3, 16–32: compare Thucyd. ii. 97, and Welcker, Æschyl. Trilogie, p. 381). Such Aids or Benevolences, even if originally voluntary, became in the end compulsory. In the European monarchies of the middle ages, what were called free gifts were more ancient than public taxes: "The feudal Aids (observes Mr. Hallam) are the beginning of taxation, of which they for a long time answered the purpose" (Middle Ages, ch. ii. part i. p. 189). So about the Aides in the old French Monarchy, "La Cour des Aides avoit été instituée, et sa juridiction s'étoit formée, lorsque le domaine des Rois suffisoit à toutes les dépenses de l'Etat, les droits d'Aides étoient alors des supplémens peu considérables et toujours temporaires. Depuis, le domaine des Rois avoit été anéanti: les Aides, au contraire, étoient devenues permanentes et formoient presque la totalité des ressources du trésor." (Histoire de la Fronde, par M. de St. Aulaire, ch. iii. p. 124.)

enemy, a large previous share, comprising probably the most alluring female captive, is reserved for him apart from the general distribution.[1]

Such is the position of the king in the heroic times of Greece,—the only person (if we except the heralds and priests, each both special and subordinate) who is then presented to us as clothed with any individual authority,—the person by whom all the executive functions, then few in number, which the society requires, are either performed or directed. His personal ascendency—derived from divine countenance bestowed both upon himself individually and upon his race, and probably from accredited divine descent—is the salient feature in the picture. The people hearken to his voice, embrace his propositions, and obey his orders: not merely resistance, but even criticism upon his acts, is generally exhibited in an odious point of view, and is indeed never heard of except from some one or more of the subordinate princes. To keep alive and justify such feelings in the public mind, however, the king must himself possess various accomplishments, bodily and mental, and that too in a superior degree.[2] He must be brave in the field, wise in the council, and eloquent in the agora; he must be endued with bodily strength and activity above other men, and must be an adept, not only in the use of his arms, but also in those athletic exercises which the crowd delight to witness. Even the more homely varieties of manual acquirements are an addition to his character,—such as the craft of the carpenter or shipwright, the straight furrowing of the ploughman, or the indefatigable persistence of the mower without repose or

[1] Ἐπὶ *βητοῖς γέρασι πατρικαὶ βασιλεῖαι*, is the description which Thucydidês gives of these heroic governments (i. 13).

The language of Aristotle (Polit. iii. 10, 1) is much the same: Ἡ *βασιλεία —ἡ περὶ τοὺς ἡρωικοὺς χρόνους—αὐτὴ δ' ἦν ἐκόντων μὲν, ἐπί τισι δ' ὡρισμένοις· στρατηγὸς δ' ἦν καὶ δικαστὴς ὁ βασιλεύς, καὶ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς κύριος.*

It can hardly be said correctly, however, that the king's authority was *defined*: nothing can well be more indefinite.

Agamemnôn enjoyed or assumed the power of putting to death a disobedient soldier (Aristot. Polit. iii. 9, 2). The words which Aristotle read in the speech of Agamemnôn in the Iliad—Πὰρ *γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος*—are not in our present copies: the Alexandrine critics effaced many traces of the old manners.

[2] Striking phrases on this head are put into the mouth of Sarpêdôn (Iliad, xii. 310–322).

Kings are named and commissioned by Zeus,—Ἐκ *δὲ Διὸς βασιλῆες* (Hesiod, Theogon. 96; Callimach. Hymn. ad Jov. 79: *κρατερὼ θεράποντε Διός* is a sort of paraphrase for the kingly dignity in the case of Pelias and Nêlcus (Odyss. xi. 255; compare Iliad, ii. 204).

refreshment throughout the longest day.[1] The conditions of voluntary obedience, during the Grecian heroic times, are family descent with personal force and superiority, mental as well as bodily, in the chief, coupled with the favour of the gods: an old chief, such as Péleus and Laërtes, cannot retain his position.[2] But, on the other hand, where these elements of force are present, a good deal of violence, caprice and rapacity is tolerated: the ethical judgement is not exact in scrutinising the conduct of individuals so pre-eminently endowed. As in the case of the gods, the general epithets of *good*, *just*, &c. are applied to them as euphemisms arising from submission and fear, being not only not suggested, but often pointedly belied, by their particular acts. These words signify[3] the man of birth, wealth, influence and daring, whose arm is strong to destroy or to protect, whatever may be the turn of his moral sentiments; while the opposite epithet, *bad*, designates the poor, lowly and weak, from whose dispositions, be they ever so virtuous, society has little either to hope or to fear.

Aristotle, in his general theory of government, lays down

[1] Odysseus builds his own bed and bedchamber and his own raft (Odyss. xxiii. 188; v. 246–255): he boasts of being an excellent mower and ploughman (xviii. 365–375): for his astonishing proficiency in the athletic contests, see viii. 180–230. Paris took a share in building his own house (Iliad, vi. 314).

[2] Odyss. xi. 496; xxiv. 136–248.

[3] See this prominent meaning of the words *ἀγαθὸς*, *ἐσθλὸς*, *κακὸς*, &c., copiously illustrated in Welcker's excellent Prolegomena to Theognis, sect. 9–16. Camerarius, in his notes on that poet (v. 19), had already conceived clearly the sense in which these words are used. Odyss. xv. 323. Οἵ τε τοῖς *ἀγαθοῖσι παραδρώωσι χέρηες*. Compare Hesiod, Opp. Di. 216, and the line in Athenæus, v. p. 178, *Αὐτόματοι δ' ἀγαθοὶ δειλῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἵασιν*.

"*Moralis* illarum vocum vis, et *civilis*—quarum hæc a lexicographis et commentatoribus plurimis fere neglecta est—probe discernendæ erunt. Quod quo facilius fieret, nescio an ubi posterior intellectus valet, majusculâ scribendum fuisset *Ἀγαθοὶ* et *Κακοί*."

If this advice of Welcker could have been followed, much misconception would have been obviated. The reference of these words to power and not to worth, is their primitive import in the Greek language, descending from the Iliad downward, and determining the habitual designation of parties during the period of active political dispute. The ethical meaning of the word hardly appears until the discussions raised by Sokratês, and prosecuted by his disciples, but the primitive import still continued to maintain concurrent footing.

I shall have occasion to touch more largely on this subject, when I come to expound the Grecian political parties. At present it is enough to remark that the epithets of *good men*, *best men* (the *better classes*, according to a phrase common even now), habitually applied afterwards to the aristocratical parties, descend from the rudest period of Grecian society.

the position,[1] that the earliest sources of obedience and authority among mankind are personal, exhibiting themselves most perfectly in the type of paternal supremacy; and that therefore the kingly government, as most conformable to this stage of social sentiment, became probably the first established everywhere. And in fact it still continued in his time to be generally prevalent among the non-Hellenic nations immediately around; though the Phœnician cities and Carthage, the most civilised of all non-Hellenic states, were republics. Nevertheless, so completely were the feelings about kingship reversed among his contemporary Greeks, that he finds it difficult to enter into the voluntary obedience paid by his ancestors to their early heroic chiefs. He cannot explain to his own satisfaction how any one man should have been so much superior to the companions around him as to maintain such immense personal ascendency: he suspects that in such small communities great merit was very rare, so that the chief had few competitors.[2] Such remarks illustrate strongly the revolution which the Greek mind had undergone during the preceding centuries, in regard to the internal grounds of political submission. But the connecting link between the Homeric and the republican schemes of government is to be found in two adjuncts of the Homeric royalty, which are now to be mentioned—the Boulê, or council of chiefs, and the agora, or general assembly of freemen.

These two meetings, more or less frequently convoked, and interwoven with the earliest habits of the primitive Grecian communities, are exhibited in the monuments of the legendary age as opportunities for advising the king, and media for promulgating his intentions to the people, rather than as restraints upon his authority. Unquestionably they must

[1] Aristot. Polit. i. 1, 7.

[2] Καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἴσως ἐβασιλεύοντο πρότερον, ὅτι σπάνιον ἦν εὑρεῖν ἄνδρας διαφέροντας κατ' ἀρετήν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τότε μικρὰς οἰκοῦντας πόλεις (Polit. iii. 10, 7); also the same treatise, v. 8, 5, and v. 8, 22. Οὐ γίνονται δ' ἔτι βασιλεῖαι νῦν, &c.

Aristotle handles monarchy far less copiously than either oligarchy or democracy: the tenth and eleventh chapters of his third book, in which he discusses it, are nevertheless very interesting to peruse.

In the conception of Plato also, the kingly government, if it is to work well, implies a breed superior to humanity to hold the sceptre (Legg. iv. 6, p. 713).

The Athenian dramatic poets (especially Euripidês) often put into the mouths of their heroic characters popular sentiments adapted to the democratical atmosphere of Athens—very different from what we find in Homer

have conduced in practice to the latter result as well as to the former; but this is not the light in which the Homeric poems describe them. The chiefs, kings, princes, or Gerontes —for the same word in Greek designates both an old man and a man of conspicuous rank and position—compose the council,[1] in which, according to the representations in the Iliad, the resolutions of Agamemnôn on the one side and of Hectôr on the other appear uniformly to prevail. The harshness and even contempt with which Hectôr treats respectful opposition from his ancient companion Polydamas—the desponding tone and conscious inferiority of the latter, and the unanimous assent which the former obtains, even when quite in the wrong—all this is clearly set forth in the poem:[2] while in the Grecian camp we see Nestôr tendering his advice in the most submissive and delicate manner to Agamemnôn, to be adopted or rejected as "the king of men" might determine.[3] The council is a purely consultative body, assembled not with any power of peremptorily arresting mischievous resolves of the king, but solely for his information and guidance. He himself is the presiding (Boulephorus or) member[4] of council; the rest, collectively as well as individually, are his subordinates.

We proceed from the council to the agora. According to what seems the received custom, the king, after having talked over his intentions with the former, proceeds to announce them to the people. The heralds make the crowd sit down in order,[5] and enforce silence: any one of the chiefs or councillors—

[1] Βουλὴν δὲ πρῶτον μεγαθύμων Ἴζε γερόντων (Iliad, ii. 53): compare x. 195–415. Ἴλου, παλαιοῦ δημογέροντος (xi. 371). So also the modern words *Seigneur*, *Signore*, from *Senior*; and the Arabic word *Shaik*.

[2] Iliad, xviii. 313—

Ἕκτορι μὲν γὰρ ἐπήνησαν κακὰ μητιόωντι,
Πουλυδάμαντι δ' ἄρ' οὔ τις, ὃς ἐσθλὴν φράζετο βουλήν.

Also xii. 213, where Polydamas says to Hectôr—

. . . . . ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδὲ ἔοικε
Δῆμον ἐόντα παρὲξ ἀγορευέμεν, οὔτ' ἐνὶ βουλῇ,
Οὔτε ποτ' ἐν πολέμῳ, σὸν δὲ κράτος αἰὲν ἀέξειν.

[3] Iliad, ix. 95–101.

[4] Iliad, vii. 126, Πήλευς—Ἐσθλὸς Μυρμιδόνων βουληφόρος ἠδ' ἀγορητής.

[5] Considerable stress seems to be laid on the necessity that the people in the agora should *sit down* (Iliad, ii. 96): a *standing* agora is a symptom of tumult or terror (Iliad, xviii. 246); an evening agora, to which men come elevated by wine, is also the forerunner of mischief (Odyss. iii. 138).

Such evidences of regular formalities observed in the agora are not without interest.

but as it seems, no one else[1]—is allowed to address them: the king first promulgates his intentions, which are then open to be commented upon by others. But in the Homeric agora no division of affirmative or negative voices ever takes place, nor is any formal resolution ever adopted. The nullity of positive function strikes us even more in the agora than in the council. It is an assembly for talk, communication and discussion to a certain extent by the chiefs, in presence of the people as listeners and sympathisers—often for eloquence, and sometimes for quarrel—but here its ostensible purposes end.

The agora in Ithaka, in the second book of the Odyssey, is convened by the youthful Telemachus, at the instigation of Athênê, not for the purpose of submitting any proposition, but in order to give formal and public notice to the suitors to desist from their iniquitous intrusion and pillage of his substance, and to absolve himself further, before gods and men, from all obligations towards them, if they refuse to comply. For the slaughter of the suitors, in all the security of the festive hall and banquet (which forms the catastrophe of the Odyssey), was a proceeding involving much that was shocking to Grecian feeling,[2] and therefore required to be preceded by such ample formalities, as would leave both the delinquents themselves without the shadow of excuse, and their surviving relatives without any claim to the customary satisfaction. For this special purpose Telemachus directs the heralds to summon an agora: but what seems most of all surprising is, that none had ever been summoned or held since the departure of Odysseus himself, an interval of twenty years. "No agora or session has taken place amongst us (says the grey-headed Ægyptius who opens the proceedings) since Odysseus went on shipboard: and now, who is he that has called us together? what man, young or old, has felt such a strong necessity? Has he received intelligence from our absent warriors, or has he other public news to communicate? He is our good friend for doing this: whatever his projects

[1] Iliad, ii. 100—

. . . . . αἶψα δ' ἀὐτῆς
Ἀχοίας, ἀκούσειαν δὲ διοτρεφέων βασιλήων.

Nitzsch (ad Odyss. ii. 14) controverts this restriction of individual manifestation to the chiefs: the view of O. Müller (Hist. Dorians, b. iii. c. 3) appears to me more correct: such was also the opinion of Aristotle—φησὶ τοίνυν Ἀριστοτέλης ὅτι ὁ μὲν δῆμος μόνου τοῦ ἀκοῦσαι κύριος ἦν, οἱ δὲ ἡγεμόνες καὶ τοῦ πρᾶξαι (Schol. Iliad. ix. 17): compare the same statement in his Nikomachean Ethics, iii. 5.

[2] See Iliad, ix. 635; Odyss. xi. 419.

may be, I pray Zeus to grant him success."[1] Telemachus, answering the appeal forthwith, proceeds to tell the assembled Ithakans that he has no public news to communicate, but that he has convoked them upon his own private necessities. Next he sets forth pathetically the wickedness of the suitors, calls upon them personally to desist and upon the people to restrain them, and concludes by solemnly warning them, that, being henceforward free from all obligation towards them, he will invoke the avenging aid of Zeus, so "that they may be slain in the interior of his own house, without bringing upon him any subsequent penalty."[2]

We are not of course to construe the Homeric description as anything more than an *idéal*, approximating to actual reality. But allowing all that can be required for such a limitation, it exhibits the agora more as a special medium of publicity and intercommunication,[3] from the king to the body of the people, than as including any idea of responsibility on the part of the former or restraining force on the part of the latter, however such consequences may indirectly grow out of it. The primitive Grecian government is essentially monarchical, reposing on personal feeling and divine right: the memorable dictum in the Iliad is borne out by all that we hear of the actual practice,—"The rule of many is not a good thing:

[1] Odyss. ii. 25–40.

[2] Odyss. ii. 43, 77, 145—

Νήποινοί κεν ἔπειτα δόμων ἔντοσθεν ὀλοισθε.

[3] A similar character is given of the public assemblies of the early Franks and Lombards (Pfeffel, Histoire du Droit Public en Allemagne, t. i. p. 18; Sismondi, Histoires des Républiques Italiennes, t. i. c. 2, p. 71).

Dionysius of Halicarnassus (ii. 12) pays rather too high a compliment to the moderation of the Grecian heroic kings.

The kings at Rome, like the Grecian heroic kings, began with an *ἀρχὴ ἀνυπεύθυνος*: the words of Pomponius (De Origine Juris, i. 2) would be perhaps more exactly applicable to the latter than to the former: "Initio civitatis nostræ Populus sine certâ lege, sine jure certo, primum agere instituit: omniaque manu a Regibus gubernabantur." Tacitus says (Ann. iii. 26), "Nobis Romulus, ut libitum, imperitaverat: dein Numa religionibus et divino jure populum devinxit, repertaque quædam a Tullo et Anco: sed præcipuus Servius Tullius sanctor legum fuit, quis etiam Reges obtemperarent." The appointment of a Dictator under the Republic was a reproduction, for a short and definite interval, of this old unbounded authority (Cicero, De Repub. ii. 32; Zonaras, Ann. vii. 13; Dionys. Hal. v. 75).

See Rubino, Untersuchungen über Römische Verfassung und Geschichte, Cassel, 1839, buch i. abschnitt 2, p. 112–132; and Wachsmuth, Hellenische Alterthumskunde, i. sect. 18, p. 81–91.

let us have one ruler only—one king,—him to whom Zeus has given the sceptre and the tutelary sanctions." [1]

The second book of the Iliad, full as it is of beauty and vivacity, not only confirms our idea of the passive, recipient, and listening character of the agora, but even presents a repulsive picture of the degradation of the mass of the people before the chiefs. Agamemnôn convokes the agora for the purpose of immediately arming the Grecian host, under a full impression that the gods have at last determined forthwith to crown his arms with complete victory. Such impression has been created by a special visit of Oneirus (the Dream-god), sent by Zeus during his sleep—being indeed an intentional fraud on the part of Zeus, though Agamemnôn does not suspect its deceitful character. At this precise moment, when he may be conceived to be more than usually anxious to get his army into the field and snatch the prize, an unaccountable fancy seizes him, that instead of inviting the troops to do what he really wishes, and encouraging their spirits for this one last effort, he will adopt a course directly contrary; he will try their courage by professing to believe that the siege had become desperate, and that there was no choice except to go on shipboard and flee. Announcing to Nestôr and Odysseus, in preliminary council, his intention to hold this strange language, he at the same time tells them that he relies upon them to oppose it and counterwork its effect upon the multitude.[2] The agora is presently assembled, and the king of men pours forth a speech full of dismay and despair, concluding by a distinct exhortation to all present to go aboard and return home at once. Immediately the whole army, chiefs as well as people, break up and proceed to execute his orders: every one rushes off to get his ship afloat, except Odysseus, who looks on in mournful silence and astonishment. The army would have been quickly on its voyage home, had not the goddesses Hêrê and Athênê stimulated Odysseus to an instantaneous interference. He hastens among the dispersing crowd and diverts them from their purpose of retreat: to the chiefs he addresses

[1] Iliad, ii. 204. Agamemnôn promises to make over to Achilles seven well-peopled cities, with a body of wealthy inhabitants (Iliad, ix. 153); and Menelaus, if he could have induced Odysseus to quit Ithaka and settle near him in Argos, would have depopulated one of his neighbouring towns in order to make room for him (Odyss. iv. 176).

Manso (Sparta i. 1, p. 34) and Nitzsch (ad Odyss. iv. 171) are inclined to exclude these passages as spurious,—a proceeding, in my opinion, inadmissible, without more direct grounds than they are able to produce.

[2] Iliad, ii. 74. *Πρῶτα δ' ἐγὼν ἔπεσιν πειρήσομαι*, &c.

flattering words, trying to shame them by gentle expostulation: but the people he visits with harsh reprimand and blows from his sceptre,[1] thus driving them back to their seats in the agora.

Amidst the dissatisfied crowd thus unwillingly brought back, the voice of Thersitês is heard the longest and the loudest,—a man ugly, deformed, and unwarlike, but fluent in speech, and especially severe and unsparing in his censure of the chiefs, Agamemnôn, Achilles, and Odysseus. Upon this occasion, he addresses to the people a speech denouncing Agamemnôn for selfish and greedy exaction generally, but particularly for his recent ill-treatment of Achilles—and he endeavours moreover to induce them to persist in their scheme of departure. In reply, Odysseus not only rebukes Thersitês sharply for his impudence in abusing the commander in chief, but threatens that if ever such behaviour is repeated, he will strip him naked, and thrash him out of the assembly with disgraceful blows; as an earnest of which he administers to him at once a smart stroke with the studded sceptre, imprinting its painful mark in a bloody weal across his back. Thersitês, terrified and subdued, sits down weeping, while the surrounding crowd deride him, and express the warmest approbation of Odysseus for having thus by force put the reviler to silence.[2]

Both Odysseus and Nestôr then address the agora, sympathising with Agamemnôn for the shame which the retreat of the Greeks is about to inflict upon him, and urging emphatically upon every one present the obligation of persevering until the siege shall be successfully consummated. Neither of them animadverts at all upon Agamemnôn, either for his conduct towards Achilles, or for his childish freak of trying the temper of the army.[3]

There cannot be a clearer indication than this description—so graphic in the original poem—of the true character of the Homeric agora. The multitude who compose it are listening

[1] Iliad, ii. 188–196—

> Ὄντινα μὲν βασιλῆα καὶ ἔξοχον ἄνδρα κιχείη,
> Τόνδ' ἀγανοῖς ἐπέεσσιν ἐρητύσασκε παραστάς . . .
> Ὃν δ' αὖ δήμου τ' ἄνδρα ἴδοι, βοόωντά τ' ἐφεύροι,
> Τὸν σκήπτρῳ ἐλάσασκεν, ὁμοκλήσασκέ τε μύθῳ, &c.

[2] Iliad, ii. 213–277.

[3] Iliad, ii. 284–340. Nor does Thersitês, in his criminatory speech against Agamemnôn, touch in any way upon this anomalous point, though in the circumstances under which his speech is made, it would seem to be of all others the most natural—and the sharpest thrust against the commander-in-chief.

and acquiescent, not often hesitating, and never refractory[1] to the chief. The fate which awaits a presumptuous critic, even where his virulent reproaches are substantially well-founded, is plainly set forth in the treatment of Thersités; while the unpopularity of such a character is attested even more by the excessive pains which Homer takes to heap upon him repulsive personal deformities, than by the chastisement of Odysseus —he is lame, bald, crook-backed, of misshapen head and squinting vision.

But we cease to wonder at the submissive character of the agora, when we read the proceedings of Odysseus towards the people themselves,—his fine words and flattery addressed to the chiefs, and his contemptuous reproof and manual violence towards the common men, at a moment when both were doing exactly the same thing,—fulfilling the express bidding of Agamemnôn, upon whom Odysseus does not offer a single comment. This scene, which excited a sentiment of strong displeasure among the democrats of historical Athens,[2] affords a proof that the feeling of personal dignity, of which philosophic observers in Greece—Herodotus, Xenophôn, Hippokratês, and Aristotle—boasted, as distinguishing the free Greek citizen from the slavish Asiatic, was yet undeveloped in the time of Homer.[3] The ancient epic is commonly so filled with the personal adventures of the chiefs, and the people are so constantly depicted as simple appendages attached to them, that we rarely obtain a glimpse of the treatment of the one apart from the other, such as this memorable Homeric agora affords.

There remains one other point of view in which we are to regard the agora of primitive Greece—as the scene in which justice was administered. The king is spoken of as constituted by Zeus the great judge of society. He has received from Zeus the sceptre and along with it the powers of command and sanction: the people obey these commands and enforce these sanctions, under him, enriching him at the same time with lucrative presents and payments.[4] Sometimes the king sepa-

[1] See this illustrated in the language of Thêseus, Eurip. Supplic. 349-352—

Δόξαι δὲ χρῄζω καὶ πόλει πάσῃ τάδε·
Δόξαι δ', ἐμοῦ θέλοντος· ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου
Προσδοὺς, ἔχοιμ' ἂν δῆμον εὐμενέστερον.

[2] Xenophôn, Memorab. i. 2, 9.

[3] Aristot. Polit. vii. 6, 1; Hippocrat. De Aëre, Loc. et Aq. v. 85-86; Herodot. vii. 134.

[4] The *σκῆπτρον*, *θέμιστες* or *θέμις*, and *ἀγορή* go together, under the presiding superintendence of the gods. The goddess Themis both convokes and dismisses the agora (see Iliad, xi. 806; Odyss. ii. 67; Iliad, xx. 4).

rately, sometimes the kings or chiefs or Gerontes in the plural number, are named as deciding disputes and awarding satisfaction to complainants; always however in public, in the midst of the assembled agora.[1] In one of the compartments of the shield of Achilles, the details of a judicial scene are described. While the agora is full of an eager and excited crowd, two men are disputing about the fine of satisfaction for the death of a murdered man—one averring, the other denying, that the fine had already been paid, and both demanding an inquest. The Gerontes are ranged on stone seats,[2] in the holy circle, with two talents of gold lying before them, to be awarded to such of the litigants as shall make out his case to their satisfaction. The heralds with their sceptres, repressing the warm sympathies of the crowd in favour of one or other of the parties, secure an alternate hearing to both.[3] This interesting picture completely harmonises with the brief allusion of Hesiod to the judicial trial—doubtless a real trial—between himself and his brother Persês. The two brothers disputed about their paternal inheritance, and the cause was carried to be tried by the chiefs in agora; but Persês bribed them, and obtained an unjust verdict for the whole.[4] So at least Hesiod affirms, in the bitterness of his heart; earnestly exhorting his brother not to waste a precious time, required for necessary labours, in the unprofitable occupa-

The θέμιστες, commandments, and sanctions, belong properly to Zeus (Odyss. xvi. 403); from him they are given in charge to earthly kings along with the sceptre (Iliad, i. 238; ii. 206).

The commentators on Homer recognised θέμις, rather too strictly, as ἀγορᾶς καὶ βουλῆς λέξιν) see Eustath. ad Odyss. xvi. 403).

The presents and the λιπαραὶ θέμιστες (Iliad, ix. 156).

[1] Hesiod, Theogon. 85; the single person judging seems to be mentioned (Odyss. xii. 439).

It deserves to be noticed that in Sparta the senate decided accusations of homicide (Aristot. Polit. iii. 1, 7): in historical Athens the senate of Areiopagus originally did the same, and retained, even when its powers were much abridged, the trial of accusations of intentional homicide and wounding.

Respecting the judicial functions of the early Roman kings, Dionys. Hal. A. R. x. 1. Τὸ μὲν ἀρχαῖον οἱ βασιλεῖς ἐφ' αὑτῶν ἕκαστον τοῖς δεομένοις τὰς δίκας, καὶ τὸ δικαιωθὲν ὑπ' ἐκείνων, τοῦτο νόμος ἦν (compare iv. 25; and Cicero, Republic. v. 2; Rubino, Untersuchungen, i. 2, p. 122).

[2] Iliad, xviii. 504—

Οἱ δὲ γέροντες
Εἵατ' ἐπὶ ξεστοῖσι λίθοις, ἱερῷ ἐνὶ κύκλῳ.

Several of the old northern Sagas represent the old men assembled for the purpose of judging as sitting on great stones in a circle called the Urtheilsring or Gerichtsring (Leitfaden der Nördischen Alterthümer, p. 31, Copenhag. 1837).

[3] Homer, Iliad, xviii. 497–510.

[4] Hesiod, Opp. Di. 37.

tion of witnessing and abetting litigants in the agora—for which (he adds) no man has proper leisure, unless his subsistence for the year beforehand be safely treasured up in his garners.[1] He repeats more than once his complaints of the crooked and corrupt judgements of which the kings were habitually guilty; dwelling upon abuse of justice as the crying evil of his day, and predicting as well as invoking the vengeance of Zeus to repress it. And Homer ascribes the tremendous violence of the autumnal storms to the wrath of Zeus against those judges who disgrace the agora with their wicked verdicts.[2]

Though it is certain that in every state of society, the feelings of men when assembled in multitude will command a certain measure of attention, yet we thus find the agora, in judicial matters still more than in political, serving merely the purpose of publicity. It is the king who is the grand personal mover of Grecian heroic society.[3] He is on earth the equivalent of Zeus in the agora of the gods: the supreme god of Olympus is in the habit of carrying on his government with frequent publicity, of hearing some dissentient opinions, and of allowing himself occasionally to be wheedled by Aphroditê or worried into compliance by Hêrê; but his determination is at last conclusive, subject only to the overruling interference of the Mœræ or Fates.[4] Both the society of gods, and the various societies of men, are, according to the conceptions of Grecian legend, carried on by the personal rule of a legitimate sovereign, who does not derive his title from the special appointment of his subjects, though he governs with their full consent. In fact, Grecian legend presents to us hardly anything else, except these great individual personalities. The race, or nation, is as it were absorbed into the prince: eponymous persons, especially, are not merely princes, but fathers and representative unities, each the equivalent of that greater or less aggregate to which he gives name.

But though in the primitive Grecian government, the king is the legitimate as well as the real sovereign, he is always conceived as acting through the council and agora. Both the one and the other are established and essential media through which his ascendency is brought to bear upon the society: the absence of such assemblies is the test and mark of savage men,

[1] Hesiod, Opp. Di. 27–33.

[2] Hesiod, Opp. Di. 250–263; Homer, Iliad, xvi. 387.

[3] Tittmann (Darstellung der Griechischen Staatsverfassungen, book ii. p. 63) gives too lofty an idea, in my judgement, of the condition and functions of the Homeric agora.

[4] Iliad, i. 520–527; iv. 14–56; especially the agora of the gods (xx. 16).

as in the case of the Cyclôpes.[1] Accordingly he must possess qualities fit to act with effect upon these two assemblies: wise reason for the council, unctuous eloquence for the agora.[2] Such is the *idéal* of the heroic government: a king not merely full of valour and resource as a soldier, but also sufficiently superior to those around him to ensure both the deliberate concurrence of the chiefs, and the hearty adhesion of the masses.[3] That this picture is not, in all individual cases, realised, is unquestionable; but the endowments so often predicated of good kings show it to have been the type present to the mind of the describer.[4] Xenophôn, in his Cyropædia, depicts Cyrus as an improved edition of the Homeric Agamemnôn,—"a good king and a powerful soldier," thus idealising the perfection of personal government.

It is important to point out these fundamental conceptions of government, discernible even before the dawn of Grecian history, and identified with the social life of the people. It shows us that the Greeks, in their subsequent revolutions and in the political experiments which their countless autonomous communities presented, worked upon pre-existing materials—developing and exalting elements which had been at first subordinate, and suppressing or remodelling on a totally new

[1] Odyss. ix. 114—

> Τοῖσιν δ' (the Cyclôpes) οὔτ' ἀγοραὶ βουληφόροι, οὔτε θέμιστες,
> Ἀλλ' οἵγ' ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων ναίουσι κάρηνα
> Ἐν σπέσσι γλαφυροῖσι· θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος
> Παίδων ἠδ' ἀλόχων· οὐδ' ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσι.

These lines illustrate the meaning of *θέμις*.

[2] See this point set forth in the prolix discourse of Aristeides, Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς (Or. xlv. vol. ii. p. 99): Ἡσίοδος . . . . ταὐτὰ ἄντικρυς Ὁμήρῳ λέγων . . . . ὅτι τε ἡ ῥητορικὴ σύνεδρος τῆς βασιλικῆς, &c.

[3] *Pêleus*, king of the Myrmidons, is called (Iliad, vii. 126) Ἐσθλὸς Μυρμιδόνων βουληφόρος ἠδ' ἀγορητής—*Diomedes*, ἀγορῇ δέ τ' ἀμείνων (iv. 400)—*Nestôr*, λιγὺς Πυλίων ἀγορητὴς—*Sarpêdôn*, Λυκίων βουληφόρε (v. 633); and *Idomeneus*, Κρητῶν βουληφόρε (xiii. 219).

Hesiod (Theogon. 80–96) illustrates still more amply the *idéal* of the king governing by persuasion and inspired by the Muses.

[4] See the striking picture in Thucydidês (ii. 65). Xenophôn, in the Cyropædia, puts into the mouth of his hero the Homeric comparison between the good king and the good shepherd, implying as it does immense superiority of organisation, morality, and intelligence (Cyropæd. viii. p. 450, Hutchinson).

Volney observes respecting the emirs of the Druses in Syria—"Everything depends on circumstances: if the governor be a man of ability, he is absolute;—if weak, he is a cipher. This proceeds from the want of fixed laws; a want common to all Asia." (Travels in Egypt and Syria, vol. ii. p. 66.) Such was pretty much the condition of the king in primitive Greece.

principle, that which had been originally predominant. When we approach historical Greece, we find that (with the exception of Sparta) the primitive, hereditary, unresponsible monarch, uniting in himself all the functions of government, has ceased to reign—while the feeling of legitimacy, which originally induced his people to obey him willingly, has been exchanged for one of aversion towards the character and title generally. The multifarious functions which he once exercised have been parcelled out among temporary nominees. On the other hand, the council or senate, and the agora, originally simple media through which the king acted, are elevated into standing and independent sources of authority, controlling and holding in responsibility the various special officers to whom executive duties of one kind or another are confided. The general principle here indicated is common both to the oligarchies and the democracies which grew up in historical Greece. Much as these two governments differed from each other, and many as were the varieties even between one oligarchy or democracy and another, they all stood in equal contrast with the principle of the heroic government. Even in Sparta, where the hereditary kingship lasted, it was preserved with lustre and influence exceedingly diminished,[1] and such timely diminution of its power seems to have been one of the essential conditions of its preservation.[2] Though the Spartan kings had the hereditary command of the military forces, yet even in all foreign expeditions they habitually acted in obedience to orders from home; while in affairs of the interior, the superior power of the Ephors sensibly overshadowed them. So that unless possessed of more than ordinary force of character, they seem to have exercised their chief influence as presiding members of the senate.

There is yet another point of view in which it behoves us to take notice of the council and the agora as integral portions of the legendary government of the Grecian communities. We

[1] Nevertheless the question put by Leotychides to the deposed Spartan king Demaratus—*δικοῖόν τι εἴη τὸ ἄρχειν μετὰ τὸ βασιλεύειν* (Herodot. vi. 67), and the poignant insult which those words conveyed, afford one among many other evidences of the lofty estimate current in Sparta respecting the regal dignity, of which Aristotle in the Politica seems hardly to take sufficient account.

[2] O. Müller (Hist. Dorians, book iii. i. 3) affirms that the fundamental features of the heroic royalty were maintained in the Dorian states, and obliterated only in the Ionian and democratical. In this point he has been followed by various other authors (see Helbig, Die Sittlich. Zustände des Heldenalters, p. 73), but his position appears to me not correct, even as regards Sparta; and decidedly incorrect, in regard to the other Dorian states.

are thus enabled to trace the employment of public speaking, as the standing engine of government, and the proximate cause of obedience, to the social infancy of the nation. The power of speech in the direction of public affairs becomes more and more obvious, developed and irresistible, as we advance towards the culminating period of Grecian history, the century preceding the battle of Chæroneia. That its development was greatest among the most enlightened sections of the Grecian name, and smallest among the more obtuse and stationary, is matter of notorious fact; and it is not less true, that the prevalence of this habit was one of the chief causes of the intellectual eminence of the nation generally. At a time when all the countries around were plunged comparatively in mental torpor, there was no motive sufficiently present and powerful to multiply so wonderfully the productive minds of Greece, except such as arose from the rewards of public speaking. The susceptibility of the multitude to this sort of guidance, their habit of requiring and enjoying the stimulus which it supplied, and the open discussion, combining regular forms with free opposition, of practical matters political as well as judicial—are the creative causes which formed such conspicuous adepts in the art of persuasion. Nor was it only professed orators who were thus produced; didactic aptitude was formed in the background, and the speculative tendencies were supplied with interesting phænomena for observation and combination, at a time when the truths of physical science were almost inaccessible. If the primary effect was to quicken the powers of expression, the secondary, but not less certain result, was to develope the habits of scientific thought. Not only the oratory of Demosthenês and Periklês, and the colloquial magic of Socratês, but also the philosophical speculations of Plato, and the systematic politics, rhetoric and logic of Aristotle, are traceable to the same general tendencies in the minds of the Grecian people. We find the germ of these expansive forces in the senate and agora of their legendary government. The poets, first epic and then lyric, were the precursors of the orators in their power of moving the feelings of an assembled crowd; whilst the Homeric poems—the general training-book of educated Greeks—constituted a treasury of direct and animated expression, full of concrete forms and rare in the use of abstractions, and thence better suited to the workings of oratory. The subsequent critics had no difficulty in selecting from the Iliad and Odyssey samples of eloquence in all its phases and varieties.

On the whole, then, the society depicted in the old Greek

poems is loose and unsettled, presenting very little of legal restraint, and still less of legal protection—but concentrating such political power as does exist in the hands of a legitimate hereditary king, whose ascendency over the other chiefs is more or less complete according to his personal force and character. Whether that ascendency be greater or less however, the mass of the people is in either case politically passive, and of little account. Though the Grecian freeman of the heroic age is above the degraded level of the Gallic *plebs* as described by Cæsar,[1] he is far from rivalling the fierce independence and sense of dignity combined with individual force, which characterise the Germanic tribes before their establishment in the Roman empire. Still less does his condition, or the society in which he moves, correspond to those pleasing dreams of spontaneous rectitude and innocence, in which Tacitus and Sencca indulge with regard to primitive man.[2]

2. The state of moral and social feeling, prevalent in legendary Greece, exhibits a scene in harmony with the rudimentary political fabrics just described. Throughout the long stream of legendary narrative on which the Greeks looked back as their past history, the larger social motives hardly ever come into play: either individual valour and cruelty, or the personal attachments and quarrels of relatives and war-companions, or the feuds of private enemies, are ever before us. There is no sense of obligation then existing, between man and man as such—and very little between each man and the entire community of which he is a member; such sentiments are neither operative in the real world, nor present to the imaginations of the poets. Personal feelings, either towards the gods, the king, or some near and known individual, fill the whole of a man's bosom: out of them arise all the motives to beneficence, and all the internal restraints upon violence, antipathy, or rapacity: and special communion, as well as special solemnities, are essential to their existence. The ceremony of an oath, so imposing, so paramount, and so indispensable in those days,

[1] Cæsar, Bell. Gallic. vi. 12.

[2] Seneca, Epist. xc.; Tacitus, Annal. iii. 26. "Vetustissimi mortalium (says the latter), nullâ adhuc malâ libidine, sine probro, scelere, eoque sine pœnâ aut coërcitione, agebant: neque præmiis opus erat, cum honesta suopte ingenio peterentur; et ubi nihil contra morem cuperent, nihil per metum vetabantur. At postquam exui æqualitas, et pro modestiâ et pudore ambitio et vis incedebat, provenêre dominationes, multosque apud populos æternum mansere," &c. Compare Strabo, vii. p. 301.

These are the same fancies so eloquently set forth by Rousseau in the last century. A far more sagacious criticism pervades the preface of Thucydidês.

illustrates strikingly this principle. And even in the case of the stranger suppliant—in which an apparently spontaneous sympathy manifests itself—the succour and kindness shown to him arise mainly from his having gone through the consecrated formalities of supplication, such as that of sitting down in the ashes by the sacred hearth, thus obtaining a sort of privilege of sanctuary.[1] That ceremony exalts him into something more

[1] Seuthês, in the Anabasis of Xenophôn (vii. 2, 33), describes how, when an orphan youth, he formally supplicated Mêdokos the Thracian king to grant him a troop of followers, in order that he might recover his lost dominions—*ἐκαθεζόμην ἐνδίφριος αὐτῷ ἱκέτης δοῦναί μοι ἄνδρας.*

Thucydidês gives an interesting description of the arrival of the exile Themistoklês, then warmly pursued by the Greeks on suspicion of treason, at the house of Admêtus, king of the Epirotic Molossians. The wife of Admêtus herself instructed the fugitive how to supplicate her husband in form: the child of Admêtus was placed in his arms, and he was directed to sit down in this guise close by the consecrated hearth, which was of the nature of an altar. While so seated, he addressed his urgent entreaties to Admêtus for protection: the latter raised him up from the ground and promised what was asked. "That (says the historian) was the most powerful form of supplication." Admêtus—*ἀκούσας ἀνίστησί τε αὐτὸν μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ υἱέος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔχων αὐτὸν ἐκαθέζετο, καὶ μέγιστον ἱκέτευμα ἦν τοῦτο* (Thuc. i. 136). So Têlephus, in the lost drama of Æschylus called *Μυσοί*, takes up the child Orestês. See Bothe's Fragm. 44: Schol. Aristoph. Ach. 305.

In the Odyssey, both Nausikaa and the goddess Athênê instruct Odysseus in the proper form of supplicating Alkinous: he first throws himself down at the feet of queen Arêtê, embracing her knees and addressing to her his prayer, and then without waiting for a reply, sits down among the ashes on the hearth—*ὣς εἰπὼν, κατ' ἄρ' ἕζετ' ἐπ' ἐσχάρῃ ἐν κονίῃσι*—Alkinous is dining with a large company: for some time both he and the guests are silent: at length the ancient Echenêus remonstrates with him on his tardiness in raising the stranger up from the ashes. At his exhortation, the Phæakian king takes Odysseus by the hand, and raising him up, places him on a chair beside him: he then directs the heralds to mix a bowl of wine, and to serve it to every one round, in order that all may make libations to Zeus Hiketêsios. This ceremony clothes the stranger with the full rights and character of a suppliant (Odyss. vi. 310; vii. 75, 141, 166): *κατὰ νόμους ἀφικτόρων*, Æschyl. Supplic. 242.

That the form counted for a great deal, we see evidently marked: but of course supplication is often addressed, and successfully addressed, in circumstances where this form cannot be gone through.

It is difficult to accept the doctrine of Eustathius (ad Odyss. xvi. 424), that *ἱκέτης* is a *vox media* (like *ξεῖνος*), applied as well to the *ἱκεταδόκος* as to the *ἱκέτης* properly so called: but the word *ἀλλήλοισιν*, in the passage just cited, does seem to justify his observation: yet there is no direct authority for such use of the word in Homer.

The address of Theoclymenos on first preferring his supplication to Telemachus is characteristic of the practice (Odyss. xv. 260); compare also Iliad, xvi. 574, and Hesiod. Scut. Hercul. 12-85.

The idea of the *ξεῖνος* and the *ἱκέτης* run very much together. I can hardly persuade myself that the reading *ἱκέτευσε* (Odyss. xi. 520) is

than a mere suffering man—it places him in express fellowship with the master of the house, under the tutelary sanctions of Zeus Hiketêsios. There is great difference between one form of supplication and another: the suppliant however in any form becomes more or less the object of a particular sympathy.

The sense of obligation towards the gods manifests itself separately in habitual acts of worship, sacrifice, and libations, or by votive presents, such as that of the hair of Achilles, which he has pledged to the river-god Spercheius,[1] and such as the constant dedicated offerings, which men who stand in urgent need of the divine aid first promise and afterwards fulfil. But the feeling towards the gods also appears, and that not less frequently, as mingling itself with and enforcing obligations towards some particular human person. The tie which binds a man to his father, his kinsman, his guest, or any special promise towards whom he has taken the engagement of an oath, is conceived in conjunction with the idea of Zeus, as witness and guarantee; and the intimacy of the association is attested by some surname or special appellation of the god.[2] Such personal feelings composed all the moral influences of which a Greek of that day was susceptible,—a state of mind which we can best appreciate by contrasting it with that of the subsequent citizen of historical Athens. In the view of the latter, the great impersonal authority called "The Laws" stood out separately both as guide and sanction, distinct from religious duty or private sympathies: but of this discriminated conception of positive law and positive morality,[3] the germ only can be detected in the Homeric poems. The appropriate Greek word

truly Homeric: implying as it does the idea of a pitiable sufferer, it is altogether out of place when predicated of the proud and impetuous Neoptolemus: we should rather have expected *ἐκέλευσε*. (See Odyss. x. 15.)

The constraining efficacy of special formalities of supplication, among the Scythians, is powerfully set forth in the Toxaris of Lucian: the suppliant sits upon an ox-hide, with his hands confined behind him (Lucian, Toxaris, c. 48, vol. iii. p. 69, Tauch.)—the *μεγίστη ἱκετηρία* among that people.

[1] Iliad, xxiii. 142.

[2] Odyss. xiv. 389—

> Οὐ γὰρ τοῦνεκ' ἐγώ σ' αἰδέσσομαι, οὐδὲ φελήσω,
> Ἀλλὰ Δία ξένιον δείσας, αὐτὸν δ' ἐλεαίρων·

[3] Nägelsbach (Homerische Theologie, Abschn. v. s. 23) gives a just and well-sustained view of the Homeric ethics: "Es ist der charakteristische Standpunkt der Homerischen Ethik, dass die Sphären des Rechts, der Sittlichkeit, und Religiosität, bey dem Dichter, durchaus noch nicht auseinander fallen, so dass der Mensch z. B. *δίκαιος* seyn konnte ohne *θεοσεβής* zu seyn—sondern in unentwickelter Einheit beysammen sind."

for human laws never occurs. Amidst a very wavering phraseology,[1] we can detect a gradual transition from the primitive idea of a personal goddess Themis, attached to Zeus, first to his sentences or orders called Themistes, and next by a still further remove to various established customs, which those sentences were believed to sanctify—the authority of religion and that of custom coalescing into one indivisible obligation.

The family relations, as we might expect, are set forth in our pictures of the legendary world as the grand sources of lasting union and devoted attachment. The paternal authority is highly reverenced: the son who lives to years of maturity, repays by affection to his parents the charge of his maintenance in infancy, which the language notes by a special word; whilst, on the other hand, the Erinnys, whose avenging hand is put in

[1] Νόμοι, *laws*, is not an Homeric word; *νόμος*, *law*, in the singular occurs twice in the Hesiodic Works and Days (276, 388).

The employment of the words *δίκη*, *δίκαι*, *θέμις*, *θέμιστες*, in Homer, is curious as illustrating the early moral associations, but would require far more space than can be given to it in a note; we see that the sense of each of these words was essentially fluctuating. *Themis*, in Homer, is sometimes decidedly a *person*, who exercises the important function of opening and closing the agora, both of gods and men (Iliad, xx. 4; Odyss. ii. 68), and who, besides that, acts and speaks (Iliad, xiv. 87–93); always the associate and companion of Zeus the highest god. In Hesiod (Theog. 901) she is the wife of Zeus: in Æschylus (Prometh. 209) she is the same as Γαῖα: even in Plato (Legg. xi. p. 936) witnesses swear (to want of knowledge of matters under inquest) by Zeus, Apollo, and Themis. Themis *as a person* is probably the oldest sense of the word: then we have the plural *θέμιστες* (connected with the verb *τίθημι*, like *θεσμός* and *τεθμός*), which are (not persons, but) special appurtenances or emanations of the Supreme God, or of a king acting under him, analogous to and joined with the sceptre. The sceptre, and the *θέμιστες* or the *δίκαι* constantly go together (Iliad, ii. 209; ix. 99): Zeus or the king is a judge, not a law-maker; he issues decrees or special orders to settle particular disputes, or to restrain particular men; and agreeable to the concrete forms of ancient language, the decrees are treated as if they were a collection of ready-made substantive things, actually in his possession, like the sceptre, and prepared for being delivered out when the proper occasion arose:—*δικασπόλοι, οἵτε θέμιστας Πρὸς Διὸς εἰρύαται* (Il. i. 238), compared with the two passages last cited:—*Ἄφρονα τοῦτον ἀνέντες, ὃς οὔτινα οἶδε θέμιστα* (Il. v. 761),—*Ἄγριον, οὔτε δίκας εὖ εἰδότα οὔτε θέμιστας* (Odyss. ix. 215). The plural number *δίκαι* is more commonly used in Homer than the singular: *δίκη* is rarely used to denote Justice as an abstract conception; it more often denotes a special claim of right on the part of some given man (Il. xviii. 508). It sometimes also denotes, simply, established custom or the known lot—*δμώων δίκη, γερόντων, θείων βασιλήων, θεῶν* (see Damm's Lexicon *ad voc.*); *θέμις* is used in the same manner.

See upon this matter, Platner, De Notione Juris ap. Homerum, p. 81; and O. Müller, Prolegg. Mythol. p. 121.

motion by the curse of a father or mother, is an object of deep dread.[1]

In regard to marriage, we find the wife occupying a station of great dignity and influence, though it was the practice for the husband to purchase her by valuable presents to her parents,—a practice extensively prevalent among early communities, and treated by Aristotle as an evidence of barbarism. She even seems to live less secluded and to enjoy a wider sphere of action than was allotted to her in historical Greece.[2] Concubines are frequent with the chiefs, and occasionally the jealousy of the wife breaks out in reckless excess against her husband, as may be seen in the tragical history of Phœnix. The continence of Laërtês, from fear of displeasing his wife Antikleia, is especially noticed.[3] A large portion of the romantic interest which Grecian legend inspires is derived from the women: Penelopê, Andromachê, Helen, Klytæmnêstra, Eriphylê, Iokasta, Hekabê, &c., all stand in the fore-

[1] Οὐδὲ *τοκεῦσι θρέπτρα φίλοις ἀπέδωκε* (Il. iv. 477): *θρέπτρα* or *θρεπτήρια* (compare Il. ix. 454; Odyss. ii. 134; Hesiod, Opp. Di. 186).

[2] Aristot. Polit. ii. 5, 11. The ἕδνα, or present given by the suitor to the father as an inducement to grant his daughter in marriage, are spoken of as very valuable,—*ἀπερείσια ἕδνα* (Il. xi. 244; xvi. 178; xxii. 472): to grant a daughter without ἕδνα was high compliment to the intended son-in-law (Il. ix. 141; compare xiii. 366). Among the ancient Germans of Tacitus, the husband gave presents, not to his wife's father, but to herself (Tacit. Germ. c. 18): the customs of the early Jews were in this respect completely Homeric; see the case of Shechem and Dinah (Genesis xxxiv. 12) and others, &c.; also Mr. Catlin's Letters on the North American Indians, vol. i. Lett. 26, p. 213.

The Greek ἕδνα correspond exactly to the *mundium* of the Lombard and Alemannic laws, which is thus explained by Mr. Price (Notes on the Laws of King Ethelbert, in the Ancient Laws and Institutes of England, translated and published by Mr. Thorpe, vol. i. p. 20): "The Longobardic law is the most copious of all the barbaric codes in its provisions respecting marriage, and particularly so on the subject of the Mund. From that law it appears that the Mundium was a sum paid over to the family of the bride, for transferring the tutelage which they possessed over her to the family of the husband,—'Si quis pro muliere liberâ aut puellâ mundium dederit et ei tradita fuerit ad uxorem,' &c. (ed. Rotharis, c. 183). In the same sense in which the term occurs in these dooms, it is also to be met with in the Alemannic law: it was also common in Denmark and in Sweden, where the bride was called a mund-bought or mund-given woman."

According to the 77th Law of King Ethelbert (p. 23), this *mund* was often paid in cattle: the Saxon daughters were *παρθένοι ἀλφεσίβοιαι* (Iliad, xviii. 593).

[3] Odyss. i. 430; Iliad, ix. 450; see also Terpstra, Antiquitas Homerica, capp. 17 and 18.

Polygamy appears to be ascribed to Priam, but to no one else (Iliad. xxi. 88).

ground of the picture, either from their virtues, their beauty, their crimes, or their sufferings.

Not only brothers, but also cousins, and the more distant blood-relations and clansmen, appear connected together by a strong feeling of attachment, sharing among them universally the obligation of mutual self-defence and revenge, in the event of injury to any individual of the race. The legitimate brothers divide between them by lot the paternal inheritance,—a bastard brother receiving only a small share; he is however commonly very well treated,[1] though the murder of Phokus by Telamon and Pêleus constitutes a flagrant exception. The furtive pregnancy of young women, often by a god, is one of the most frequently recurring incidents in the legendary narratives; and the severity with which such a fact, when discovered, is visited by the father, is generally extreme. As an extension of the family connexion, we read of larger unions called the phratry and the tribe, which are respectfully, but not frequently mentioned.[2]

The generous readiness with which hospitality is afforded to the stranger who asks for it,[3] the facility with which he is allowed to contract the peculiar connexion of guest with his host, and the permanence with which that connexion, when created by partaking of the same food and exchanging presents, is maintained even through a long period of separation, and even transmitted from father to son—these are among the most captivating features of the heroic society. The Homeric chief welcomes the stranger who comes to ask shelter in his

[1] Odyss. xiv. 202–215; compare Iliad, xi. 102. The primitive German law of succession divided the paternal inheritance among the sons of a deceased father, under the implied obligation to maintain and portion out their sisters (Eichhorn, *Deutsches Privat-Recht.* sect. 330).

[2] Iliad, ii. 362—

> Ἀφρήτωρ, ἀθέμιστος, ἀνεστιός ἐστιν ἐκεῖνος,
> Ὃς πολέμου ἔραται, &c. (Il. ix. 63.)

These three epithets include the three different classes of personal sympathy and obligation:—1. The Phratry, in which a man is connected with father, mother, brothers, cousins, brothers-in-law, clansmen, &c.; 2. the *θέμιστες*, whereby he is connected with his fellow-men who visit the same agora; 3. his Hestia or Hearth, whereby he becomes accessible to the *ξεῖνος* and the *ἱκέτης*—

> Τῷ δ' Ὀδυσεὺς ξίφος ὀξὺ καὶ ἄλκιμον ἔγχος ἔδωκεν,
> Ἀρχὴν ξεινοσύνης προσκηδέος· οὐδὲ τραπέζῃ
> Γνώτην ἀλλήλοιν. (Odyss xxi. 34)

[3] It must be mentioned, however, that when a chief received a stranger and made presents to him, he reimbursed to himself the value of the presents by collections among the people (Odyss. xiii. 14; xix. 197): *ἀργαλέον γὰρ ἕνα προικὸς χαρίσασθαι*, says Alkinous.

house, first gives him refreshment, and then inquires his name and the purpose of his voyage.[1] Though not inclined to invite strangers to his house, he cannot repel them when they spontaneously enter it craving a lodging.[2] The suppliant is also commonly a stranger, but a stranger under peculiar circumstances; who proclaims his own calamitous and abject condition, and seeks to place himself in a relation to the chief whom he solicits something like that in which men stand to the gods. Onerous as such special tie may become to him, the chief cannot decline it, if solicited in the proper form: the ceremony of supplication has a binding effect, and the Erinnyes punish the hardhearted person who disallows it. A conquered enemy may sometimes throw himself at the feet of his conqueror, and solicit mercy, but he cannot by doing so acquire the character and claims of a suppliant properly so called: the conqueror has free discretion either to kill him, or to spare him and accept a ransom.[3]

There are in the legendary narratives abundant examples of individuals who transgress in particular acts even the holiest of these personal ties, but the savage Cyclops is the only person described as professedly indifferent to them, and careless of that sanction of the gods which in Grecian belief accompanied them all.[4] In fact, the tragical horror which pervades the lineage of Athamas or Kadmus, and which attaches to many of the acts of Hêraklês, of Pêleus, and Telamon, of Jasôn and Mêdea, of Atreus and Thyestês, &c., is founded upon a deep feeling and sympathy with those special obligations, which

[1] Odyss. i. 123; iii. 70, &c.

[2] Odyss. xvii. 383—

Τίς γὰρ δὴ ξεῖνον καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν
Ἄλλον γ' εἰ μὴ τῶνδ', οἳ δημιοεργοί εἰσιν, &c.;

which breathes the plain-spoken shrewdness of the Hesiodic Works and Days, v. 355.

[3] See the illustrative case of Lykaon in vain craving mercy from Achilles (Iliad, xxi. 64–97. Ἀντί τοι εἰμ' ἱκέταο, &c.).

Menelaus is about to spare the life of the Trojan Adrastus, who clasps his knees and craves mercy, offering a large ransom—when Agamemnôn repels the idea of quarter, and kills Adrastus with his own hand: his speech to Menelaus displays the extreme of violent enmity, yet the poet says—

Ὡς εἰπών, παρέπεισεν ἀδελφειοῦ φρένας ἥρως,
Αἴσιμα παρειπών, &c.

Adrastus is not called an ἱκέτης, nor is the expression used in respect to Dolon (Il. x. 456), nor in the equally striking case of Odysseus (Odyss. xiv. 279) when begging for his life.

[4] Odyss. ix. 112–275.

conspicuous individuals, under the temporary stimulus of the maddening Atê, are driven to violate. In such conflict of sentiments, between the obligation generally reverenced and the exceptional deviation in an individual otherwise admired, consists the pathos of the story.

These feelings—of mutual devotion between kinsmen and companions in arms—of generous hospitality to the stranger, and of helping protection to the suppliant—constitute the bright spots in a dark age. We find them very generally prevalent amongst communities essentially rude and barbarous—amongst the ancient Germans as described by Tacitus, the Druses in Lebanon,[1] the Arabian tribes in the desert, and even the North American Indians.

[1] Tacit. German. c. 21. "Quemcunque mortalium arcere tecto, nefas habetur: pro fortunâ quisque apparatis epulis excipit: cum defecêre qui modo hospes fuerat, monstrator hospitii et comes, proximam domum non invitati adeunt: nec interest—pari humanitate accipiuntur. Notum ignotumque, quantum ad jus hospitii, nemo discernit." Compare Cæsar, B. G. vi. 22.

See about the Druses and Arabians, Volney, Travels in Egypt and Syria, vol. ii. p. 76, Engl. Transl.; Niebuhr, Beschreibung von Arabien, Copenh. 1772, p. 46–49.

Pomponius Mela describes the ancient Germans in language not inapplicable to the Homeric Greeks: "Jus in viribus habent, adeo ut ne latrocinii quidem pudeat: *tantum* hospitibus boni, mitesque supplicibus" (iii. 3).

"The hospitality of the Indians is well known. It extends even to strangers who take refuge among them. They count it a most sacred duty, from which no one is exempted. Whoever refuses relief to any one commits a grievous offence, and not only makes himself detested and abhorred by all, but liable to revenge from the offended person. In their conduct towards their enemies they are cruel and inexorable, and when enraged, bent upon nothing but murder and bloodshed. They are however remarkable for concealing their passions, and waiting for a convenient opportunity of gratifying them. But then their fury knows no bounds. If they cannot satisfy their resentment, they will even call upon their friends and posterity to do it. The longest space of time cannot cool their wrath, nor the most distant place of refuge afford security to their enemy" (Loskiel, History of the Mission of the United Brethren among the North American Indians, Part I. ch. 2. p. 15).

"Charlevoix observes (says Dr. Ferguson, Essay on Civil Society, Part II. § 2. p. 145), that the nations among whom he travelled in North America never mentioned acts of generosity or kindness under the notion of duty. They acted from affection, as they acted from appetite, without regard to its consequences. When they had done a kindness, they had gratified a desire; the business was finished and it passed from the memory. The spirit with which they give or receive presents is the same as that which Tacitus remarks among the ancient Germans:—'Gaudent muneribus, sed nec data imputant, nec acceptis obligantur.' Such gifts are of little consequence, except when employed as the seal of a bargain or a treaty."

Respecting the Morlacchi (Illyrian Sclavonians) the Abbé Fortis says (Travels in Dalmatia, p. 55–58)—

They are the instinctive manifestations of human sociality, standing at first alone, and for that reason appearing to possess

"The hospitality of the Morlachs is equally conspicuous among the poor as among the opulent. The rich prepares a roasted lamb or sheep, and the poor, with equal cordiality, gives his turkey, milk, honey—whatever he has. Nor is their generosity confined to strangers, but generally extends to all who are in want. . . . Friendship is lasting among the Morlacchi. They have even made it a kind of religious point, and tie the sacred bond at the foot of the altar. The Sclavonian ritual contains a particular benediction, for the solemn union of two male or two female friends, in presence of the whole congregation. The male friends thus united are called Pobratimi, and the females Posestreme, which means half-brothers and half-sisters. The duties of the Pobratimi are, to assist each other in every case of need and danger, to revenge mutual wrongs, &c.: their enthusiasm is often carried so far as to risk, and even lose their life. . . . But as the friendships of the Morlacchi are strong and sacred, so their quarrels are commonly unextinguishable. They pass from father to son, and the mothers fail not to put their children in mind of their duty to revenge their father if he has had the misfortune to be killed, and to show them often the bloody shirt of the deceased. . . . A Morlach is implacable if injured or insulted. With him revenge and justice have exactly the same meaning, and truly it is the primitive idea, and I have been told that in Albania the effects of revenge are still more atrocious and more lasting. There, a man of the mildest character is capable of the most barbarous revenge, believing it to be his positive duty. . . . A Morlach who has killed another of a powerful family is commonly obliged to save himself by flight, and keep out of the way for several years. If during that time he has been fortunate enough to escape the search of his pursuers, and has got a small sum of money, he endeavours to obtain pardon and peace. . . . It is the custom in some places for the offended party to threaten the criminal, holding all sorts of arms to his throat, and at last to consent to accept his ransom."

Concerning the influence of these two distinct tendencies—devoted personal friendship and implacable animosities—among the Illyrico-Sclavonian population, see Cyprien Robert, Les Slaves de la Turquie, ch. vii. p. 42–46, and Dr. Joseph Müller, Albanien, Rumelien, und die Œsterreichisch-Montenegrenische Gränze, Prag. 1844, p. 24–25.

"It is for the virtue of hospitality (observes Goguet, Origin of Laws, &c., vol. i. book vi. ch. iv.) that the primitive times are chiefly famed. But, in my opinion, hospitality was then exercised not so much from generosity and greatness of soul, as from necessity. Common interest probably gave rise to that custom. In remote antiquity, there were few or no public inns: they entertained strangers, in order that they might render them the same service, if they happened to travel into their country. Hospitality was reciprocal. When they received strangers into their houses, they acquired a right of being received into theirs again. This right was regarded by the ancients as sacred and inviolable, and extended not only to those who had acquired it, but to their children and posterity. Besides, hospitality in these times could not be attended with much expense: men travelled but little. In a word, the modern Arabians prove that hospitality may consist with the greatest vices, and that this species of generosity is no decisive evidence of goodness of heart, or rectitude of manners."

a greater tutelary force than really belongs to them—beneficent, indeed, in a high degree, with reference to their own appropriate period, but serving as a very imperfect compensation for the impotence of the magistrate, and for the absence of any all-pervading sympathy or sense of obligation between man and man. We best appreciate their importance when we compare the Homeric society with that of barbarians like the Thracians, who tattooed their bodies, as the mark of a generous lineage—sold their children for export as slaves—considered robbery, not merely as one admissible occupation among others, but as the only honourable mode of life; agriculture being held contemptible—and above all, delighted in the shedding of blood as a luxury. Such were the Thracians in the days of Herodotus and Thucydidês: and the Homeric society forms a mean term between that which these two historians yet saw in Thrace, and that which they witnessed among their own civilised countrymen.[1]

When however among the Homeric men we pass beyond the influence of the private ties above enumerated, we find scarcely any other moralising forces in operation. The acts and adventures commemorated imply a community wherein neither the protection nor the restraints of law are practically felt, and wherein ferocity, rapine, and the aggressive propensities generally, seem restrained by no internal counterbalancing scruples. Homicide, especially, is of frequent occurrence, sometimes by open violence, sometimes by fraud: expatriation for homicide is among the most constantly recurring acts of the Homeric poems: and savage brutalities are often ascribed, even to admired heroes, with apparent indifference. Achilles sacrifices twelve Trojan prisoners on the tomb of Patroklus, while his son Neoptolemus not only slaughters the aged Priam, but also

The book of Genesis, amidst many other features of resemblance to the Homeric manners, presents that of ready and exuberant hospitality to the stranger.

[1] Respecting the Thracians, compare Herodot. v. 11; Thucydid. vii. 29–30. The expression of the latter historian is remarkable,—*τὸ δὲ γένος τῶν Θρᾳκῶν, ὁμοῖα τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ βαρβαρικοῦ, ἐν ᾧ ἂν θαρσήσῃ, φονικώτατόν ἐστι.*

Compare Herodot. viii. 116; the cruelty of the Thracian king of the Bisaltæ towards his own sons.

The story of Odysseus to Eumæus in the Odyssey (xiv. 210–226) furnishes a valuable comparison for this predatory disposition among the Thracians. Odysseus there treats the love of living by war and plunder as his own peculiar taste: he did not happen to like regular labour, but the latter is not treated as in any way mean or unbecoming a free-man—

*ἔργον δέ μοι οὐ φίλον ἦεν*
*Οὐδ' οἰκωφελίη, ἥ τε τρέφει ἀγλαὰ τέκνα, &c.*

seizes by the leg the child Astyanax (son of the slain Hector) and hurls him from one of the lofty towers of Troy.[1] Moreover, the celebrity of Autolykus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, in the career of wholesale robbery and perjury, and the wealth which it enabled him to acquire, are described with the same unaffected admiration as the wisdom of Nestôr or the strength of Ajax.[2] Achilles, Menelaus, Odysseus, pillage in person whenever they can find an opportunity, employing both force and stratagem to surmount resistance.[3] The vocation of a pirate is recognised as honourable, so that a host, when he asks his guest what is the purpose of his voyage, enumerates enrichment by indiscriminate maritime plunder as among those projects which may naturally enter into his contemplation.[4] Abduction of cattle, and expeditions for unprovoked ravage as

[1] Ilias Minor, Fragm. 7, p. 18, ed. Düntzer; Iliad, xxiii. 175. Odysseus is mentioned once as obtaining poison for his arrows (Odyss. i. 160), but no poisoned arrows are ever employed in either of the two poems.

The anecdotes recounted by the Scythian Toxaris in Lucian's work so entitled (vol. ii. c. 36, p. 544 *segg.* ed. Hemst.) afford a vivid picture of this combination of intense and devoted friendship between individuals, with the most revolting cruelty of manners. "You Greeks live in peace and tranquillity," observes the Scythian—*παρ' ἡμῖν δὲ συνεχεῖς οἱ πόλεμοι, καὶ ἢ ἐπελαύνομεν ἄλλοις, ἢ ὑποχωροῦμεν ἐπιόντας, ἢ συμπεσόντες ὑπὲρ νομῆς ἢ λείας μαχόμεθα· ἔνθα μάλιστα δεῖ φίλων ἀγαθῶν*, &c.

[2] Odyss. xxi. 397; Pherekydês, Fragm. 63, ed. Didot; Autolykus, *πλεῖστα κλέπτων ἐθησαύριζεν.* The Homeric Hymn to Hermês (the great patron-god of Autolykus) is a further specimen of the admiration which might be made to attach to clever thieving.

The *ἠμερόκοιτος ἀνήρ*, likely to rob the farm, is one great enemy against whom Hesiod advises precaution to be taken,—a sharp-toothed dog well-fed to serve as guard (Opp. Di. 604).

[3] Iliad, xi. 624; xx. 189. Odyss. iv. 81–90; ix. 40; xiv. 230: and the indirect revelation (Odyss. xix. 284), coupled with a compliment to the dexterity of Odysseus.

[4] Even in the century prior to Thucydidês, undistinguishing plunder at sea, committed by Greek ships against ships not Greek, seems not to have been held discreditable. The Phokæan Dionysius, after the ill-success of the Ionic revolt, goes with his three ships of war to Sicily, and from thence plunders Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians (Herod. vi. 17).—*λῃστὴς κατεστήκεε, Ἑλλήνων μὲν οὐδενός, Καρχηδονίων δὲ καὶ Τυρσηνῶν.* Compare the conduct of the Phokæan settlers at Alalia in Corsica, after the conquest of Ionia by Harpagus (Herodot. i. 166).

In the treaty between the Romans and Carthaginians, made at some period subsequent to 509 B.C., it is stipulated—*Τοῦ Καλοῦ Ἀκρωτηρίου, Μασσίας, Ταρσηίου, μὴ λῃΐζεσθαι ἐπέκεινα Ῥωμαίους, μηδ' ἐμπορεύεσθαι, μηδὲ πόλιν κτίζειν* (Polyb. iii. 24, 4). Plunder, commerce and colonisation, are here assumed as the three objects which the Roman ships would pursue, unless they were under special obligation to abstain, in reference to foreigners. This morality approaches nearer to that of the Homeric age than to the state of sentiment which Thucydidês indicates as current in his day among the Greeks.

well as for retaliation, between neighbouring tribes, appear ordinary phænomena:[1] and the established inviolability of heralds seems the only evidence of any settled feeling of obligation between one community and another. While the house and property of Odysseus, during his long absence, enjoys no public protection,[2] those unprincipled chiefs, who consume his substance, find sympathy rather than disapprobation among the people of Ithaka. As a general rule, he who cannot protect himself finds no protection from society: his own kinsmen and immediate companions are the only parties to whom he can look with confidence for support. And in this respect, the representation given by Hesiod makes the picture even worse. In his emphatic denunciation of the fifth age, that poet deplores not only the absence of all social justice and sense of obligation among his contemporaries, but also the relaxation of the ties of family and hospitality.[3] There are marks of querulous exaggeration in the poem of the "Works and Days"; yet the author professes to describe the real state of things around him, and the features of his picture, soften them as we may, will still appear dark and calamitous. It is however to be remarked, that he contemplates a state of peace—thus forming a contrast with the Homeric poems. His copious catalogue of social evils scarcely mentions liability to plunder by a foreign enemy, nor does he compute the chances of predatory aggression as a source of profit.

There are two special veins of estimable sentiment, on which it may be interesting to contrast heroic and historical Greece, and which exhibit the latter as an improvement on the former not less in the affections than in the intellect.

The law of Athens was peculiarly watchful and provident with respect both to the persons and the property of orphan minors; but the description given in the Iliad of the utter and hopeless destitution of the orphan boy, despoiled of his paternal inheritance and abandoned by all the friends of his father, whom he urgently supplicates, and who all harshly cast him off, is one

[1] See the interesting boastfulness of Nestôr, Iliad, xi. 670–700; also Odyss. xxi. 18; Odyss. iii. 71; Thucyd. i. 5.

[2] Odyss. iv. 165, among many other passages. Telemachus laments the misfortune of his race, in respect that himself, Odysseus, and Laërtês were all only sons of their fathers: there were no brothers to serve as mutual auxiliaries (Odyss. xvi. 118).

[3] Opp. Di. 182–199—

Οὐδὲ πατὴρ παίδεσσιν ὁμοίιος, οὐδέ τι παῖδες,
Οὐδὲ ξεῖνος ξεινοδόκῳ, καὶ ἑταῖρος ἑταίρῳ,
Οὐδὲ κασίγνητος φίλος ἔσσεται, ὡς τὸ πάρος περ,
Αἶψα δὲ γηράσκοντας ἀτιμήσουσι τοκῆας, &c.

of the most pathetic morsels in the whole poem.[1] In reference again to the treatment of the dead body of an enemy, we find all the Greek chiefs who come near (not to mention the conduct of Achilles himself) piercing with their spears the corpse of the slain Hectôr, while some of them even pass disgusting taunts upon it. We may add, from the lost epics, the mutilation of the dead bodies of Paris and Deiphobus by the hand of Menelaus.[2] But at the time of the Persian invasion, it was regarded as unworthy of a right-minded Greek to maltreat in any way the dead body of an enemy, even where such a deed might seem to be justified on the plea of retaliation. After the battle of Platæa, a proposition was made to the Spartan king Pausanias to retaliate upon the dead body of Mardonius the insults which Xerxês had heaped upon that of Leonidas at Thermopylæ. He indignantly spurned the suggestion, not without a severe rebuke, or rather a half-suppressed menace, towards the proposer: and the feeling of Herodotus himself goes heartily along with him.[3]

The different manner of dealing with homicide presents a third test, perhaps more striking yet, of the change in Grecian feelings and manners during the three centuries preceding the Persian invasion. That which the murderer in the Homeric times had to dread, was, not public prosecution and punishment, but the personal vengeance of the kinsmen and friends of the deceased, who were stimulated by the keenest impulses of honour and obligation to avenge the deed, and were considered by the public as specially privileged to do so.[4] To

[1] Iliad, xxii. 487–500. Hesiod dwells upon injury to orphan children, however, as a heinous offence (Opp. Di. 330).

[2] Iliad, xxii. 371. *οὐδ' ἄρα οἵ τις ἀνουτητί γε παρέστη.* Argument of Iliad Minor, ap. Düntzer, Epp. Fragm. p. 17; Virgil, Æneid, vi. 520.

Both Agamemnôn and the Oiliad Ajax cut off the heads of slain warriors and send them rolling like a ball or like a mortar among the crowd of warriors (Iliad, xi. 147; xiii. 102).

The ethical maxim preached by Odysseus in the Odyssey, not to utter boastful shouts over a slain enemy (*Οὐχ ὁσίη, κταμένοισιν ἐπ' ἀνδράσιν εὐχετάασθαι*, xxii. 412), is abundantly violated in the Iliad.

[3] Herodot. ix. 78–79. Contrast this strong expression from Pausanias with the conduct of the Carthaginians towards the end of the Peloponnesian war, after their capture of Selinus in Sicily, where, after having put to death 16,000 persons, they mutilated the dead bodies—*κατὰ τὸ πάτριον ἔθος* (Diodôr. xiii. 57–86).

[4] The Mosaic law recognises this habit and duty on the part of the relatives of the murdered man, and provides cities of refuge for the purpose of sheltering the offender in certain cases (Deuteron. xxxv. 13–14; Bauer, Handbuch der Hebraïschen Alterthümer, sect. 51–52).

The relative who inherited the property of a murdered man was specially obliged to avenge his death (H. Leo, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte des Jüdischen Staats.—Vorl. iii. p. 35).

escape from this danger, he is obliged to flee the country, unless he can prevail upon the incensed kinsmen to accept of a valuable payment (we must not speak of coined money in the days of Homer) as satisfaction for their slain comrade. They may, if they please, decline the offer, and persist in their right of revenge; but if they accept, they are bound to leave the offender unmolested, and he accordingly remains at home without further consequences. The chiefs in agora do not seem to interfere, except to ensure payment of the stipulated sum.

Here we recognise once more the characteristic attribute of the Grecian heroic age—the omnipotence of private force tempered and guided by family sympathies, and the practical nullity of that collective sovereign afterwards called *The City*—who in historical Greece becomes the central and paramount source of obligation, but who appears yet only in the back-ground, as a germ of promise for the future. And the manner in which, in the case of homicide, that germ was developed into a powerful reality, presents an interesting field of comparison with other nations.

For the practice, here designated, of leaving the party guilty of homicide to compromise by valuable payment with the relatives of the deceased, and also of allowing to the latter a free choice whether they would accept such compromise or enforce their right of personal revenge—has been remarked in many rude communities, and is particularly memorable among the early German tribes.[1] Among the many separate Teutonic

[1] "Suscipere tam inimicitias, seu patris, seu propinqui, quam amicitias, necesse est. Nec implacabiles durant: luitur enim etiam homicidium certo pecorum armentorumque numero, recipitque satisfactionem universa domus." (Tacit. German. 21.) Niebuhr, Beschreibung von Arabien, p. 32.

"An Indian feast (says Loskiel, Mission of the United Brethren in North America) is seldom concluded without bloodshed. For the murder of a man 100 yards of wampum, and for that of a woman 200 yards, must be paid by the murderer. If he is too poor, which is commonly the case, and his friends cannot or will not assist him, he must fly from the resentment of the relations."

Rogge (Gerichtswesen der Germanen, capp. 1, 2, 3) Grimm (Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer, book v. cap. 1–2), and Eichhorn (Deutsches Privat-Recht. sect. 48) have expounded this idea and the consequences deduced from it among the ancient Germans. The practice of blood-feud, here alluded to, is still prevalent in British India; not only among the ruder Western tribes, coolies and others, but also among the more civilised and polished Rajpoots.

Aristotle alludes, as an illustration of the extreme silliness of ancient Greek practices (*εὐήθη πάμπαν*), to a custom which he states to have still

establishments which rose upon the ruins of the Western empire of Rome, the right as well as duty of private revenge, for personal injury or insult offered to any member of a family—and the endeavour to avert its effects by means of a pecuniary composition levied upon the offender, chiefly as satisfaction to the party injured, but partly also as perquisite to the king—was adopted as the basis of their legislation. This fundamental idea was worked out in elaborate detail as to the valuation of the injury inflicted, wherein one main circumstance was the rank, condition and power of the sufferer. The object of the legislator was to preserve the society from standing feuds, but at the same time to accord such full satisfaction as would induce the injured person to waive his acknowledged right of personal revenge—the full luxury of which as it presented itself to the mind of an Homeric Greek, may be read in more than one passage of the Iliad.[1] The German codes begin by trying to

continued at the Æolic Kymê, in cases of murder. If the accuser produced in support of his charge a certain number of witnesses from his own kindred, the person was held peremptorily guilty—*οἷον ἐν Κύμῃ περὶ τὰ φονικὰ νόμος ἔστιν, ἂν πλῆθός τι παράσχηται μαρτύρων ὁ διώκων τὸν φόνον τῶν αὐτοῦ συγγενῶν, ἔνοχον εἶναι τῷ φόνῳ τὸν φεύγοντα* (Polit. ii. 5, 12). This presents a curious parallel with the Old German institution of the Eideshelfern or conjurators, who, though most frequently required and produced in support of the party accused, were yet also brought by the party accusing. See Rogge, sect. 36, p. 186; Grimm, p. 862.

[1] The word *ποινή* indicates this *satisfaction by valuable payment* for wrong done, especially for homicide: that the Latin word *pœna* originally meant the same thing may be inferred from the old phrases *dare pœnas*, *pendere pœnas*. The most illustrative passage in the Iliad is that in which Ajax, in the embassy undertaken to conciliate Achilles, censures by comparison the inexorable obstinacy of the latter in setting at naught the proffered presents of Agamemnôn (Il. ix. 627)—

> *Νηλήϊ· καὶ μὲν τίς τε κασιγνήτοιο φόνοιο*
> *Ποινήν, ἢ οὗ παιδὸς ἑδέξατο τεθνειώτος·*
> *Καὶ ῥ' ὁ μὲν ἐν δήμῳ μένει αὐτοῦ, πόλλ' ἀποτίσας*
> *Τοῦ δέ τ' ἐρητύεται κραδίη καὶ θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ,*
> *Ποινὴν δεξαμένου . . . . . .*

The *ποινή* is in its primitive sense a genuine payment in valuable commodities serving as compensation (Iliad, iii. 290; v. 266; xiii. 659): but it comes by a natural metaphor to signify the death of one or more Trojans, as a satisfaction for that of a Greek warrior who had just fallen (or *vice versâ*, Iliad, xiv. 483; xvi. 398); sometimes even the notion of compensation generally (xvii. 207). In the representation on the shield of Achilles, the genuine proceeding about *ποινή* clearly appears: the question there tried is, whether the payment stipulated as satisfaction for a person slain, has really been made or not—*δύο δ' ἄνδρες ἐνείκεον εἵνεκα ποινῆς Ἀνδρὸς ἀποφθιμένου*, &c. (xviii. 498).

The danger of an act of homicide is proportioned to the number and power of the surviving relatives of the slain; but even a small number is sufficient to necessitate flight (Odyss. xxiii. 120): on the other hand, a

bring about the acceptance of a fixed pecuniary composition as a constant voluntary custom, and proceed ultimately to enforce it as a peremptory necessity: the idea of society is at first altogether subordinate, and its influence passes only by slow degrees from amicable arbitration into imperative control.

The Homeric society, in regard to this capital point in human progression, is on a level with that of the German tribes as described by Tacitus. But the subsequent course of Grecian legislation takes a direction completely different from that of the German codes. The primitive and acknowledged right of private revenge (unless where bought off by pecuniary payment), instead of being developed into practical working, is superseded by more comprehensive views of a public wrong requiring public intervention, or by religious fears respecting the posthumous wrath of the murdered person. In historical Athens, the right of private revenge was discountenanced and put out of sight, even so early as the Drakonian legislation, and at last restricted to a few extreme and special cases;[1] while the murderer came to be considered, first as having sinned against the gods, next as having deeply injured the society, and thus at once as requiring absolution and deserving punishment. On the first of these two grounds, he is interdicted from the agora and

large body of relatives was the grand source of encouragement to an insolent criminal (Odyss. xviii. 141).

An old law of Tralles in Lydia, enjoining a nominal ποινή of a medimnus of beans to the relatives of a murdered person belonging to a contemptible class of citizens, is noticed by Plutarch, Quæst. Græc. c. 46, p. 302. Even in the century preceding Herodotus, too, the Delphians gave a ποινή as satisfaction for the murder of the fabulist Æsop; which ποινή was claimed and received by the grandson of Æsop's master (Herodot. ii. 134. Plutarch, Ser. Num. Vind. p. 556).

[1] See Lysias, De Cæde Eratosthen. Orat. i. p. 94: Plutarch, Solon, c. 23; Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 632–637.

Plato (De Legg. ix. p. 871–874), in his copious penal suggestions to deal with homicide, both intentional and accidental, concurs in general with the old Attic law (see Matthiæ, Miscellanea Philologica, vol. i. p. 151): and as he states with sufficient distinctness the grounds of his propositions, we see how completely the idea of a right to private or family revenge is absent from his mind. In one particular case he confers upon kinsmen the privilege of avenging their murdered relative (p. 871); but generally, he rather seeks to enforce upon them strictly the duty of bringing the suspected murderer to trial before the court. By the Attic law, it was only the kinsmen of the deceased who had the right of prosecuting for murder—or the master, if the deceased was an οἰκέτης (Demosthen. cont. Euerg. et Mnesibul. c. 18); they might by forgiveness shorten the term of banishment for the unintentional murderer (Demosth. cont. Makart. p. 1069). They seem to have been regarded, generally speaking, as religiously obliged, but not legally compellable, to undertake this duty; compare Plato, Euthyphro, cap. 4 & 5.

from all holy places, as well as from public functions, even while yet untried and simply a suspected person; for if this were not done, the wrath of the gods would manifest itself in bad crops and other national calamities. On the second ground, he is tried before the council of Areiopagus, and if found guilty, is condemned to death, or perhaps to disfranchisement and banishment.[1] The idea of a propitiatory payment to the relatives of the deceased has ceased altogether to be admitted: it is the protection of society which dictates, and the force of society which inflicts, a measure of punishment calculated to deter for the future.

3. The society of legendary Greece includes, besides the chiefs, the general mass of freemen (λαοί), among whom stand out by special names certain professional men, such as the carpenter, the smith, the leather-dresser, the leech, the prophet, the bard, and the fisherman.[2] We have no means of appre-

[1] Lysias, cont. Agorat. Or. xiii. p. 137. Antiphon. Tetralog. i. 1. p. 629. Ἀσύμφορον δ' ὑμῖν ἐστι τόνδε, μιαρὸν καὶ ἄναγνον ὄντα, εἰς τὰ τεμένη τῶν θεῶν εἰσιόντα μιαίνειν τὴν ἁγνείαν αὐτῶν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς αὐτὰς τραπέζας ἰόντα συγκαταπιμπλάναι τοὺς ἀναιτίους· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων αἵ τε ἀφορίαι γίνονται, δυστυχεῖς θ' αἱ πράξεις καθίστανται.

The three Tetralogies of Antipho are all very instructive respecting the legal procedure in cases of alleged homicide: as also the Oration De Cæde Herodis (see capp. 1 and 2)—τοῦ νόμου κειμένου, τὸν αποκτείναντα ἀνταποθανεῖν, &c.

The case of the Spartan Drakontius (one of the Ten Thousand Greeks who served with Cyrus the younger, and permanently exiled from his country in consequence of an involuntary murder committed during his boyhood) presents a pretty exact parallel to the fatal quarrel of Patroklus at dice, when a boy, with the son of Amphidamas, in consequence of which he was forced to seek shelter under the roof of Pêleus (compare Iliad, xxiii. 85, with Xenoph. Anabas. iv. 8, 25).

[2] Odyss. xvii. 384; xix. 135. Iliad, iv. 187; vii. 221. I know nothing which better illustrates the idea of the Homeric δημιοεργοί—the herald, the prophet, the carpenter, the leech, the bard, &c.,—than the following description of the structure of an East Indian village (Mill's History of British India, b. ii. c. 5, p. 266): "A village politically considered resembles a corporation or township. Its proper establishment of *officers and servants* consists of the following descriptions:—The potail, or head inhabitant, who settles disputes and collects the revenue, &c.; the curnum, who keeps the accounts of cultivation, &c.; the tallier; the boundaryman; the superintendent of tanks and water-courses; the Brahman, who performs the village worship; the schoolmaster; the calendar Brahman, or astrologer, who proclaims the lucky or unpropitious periods for sowing or thrashing; the smith and carpenter; the potter; the washerman; the barber; the cowkeeper; the doctor; the dancing-girl, who attends at rejoicings; the musician and the poet."

Each of these officers and servants (δημιοεργοί) is remunerated by a definite perquisite—so much landed produce—out of the general crop of the village (p. 264).

ciating their condition. Though lots of arable land were assigned in special property to individuals, with boundaries both carefully marked and jealously watched,[1] yet the larger proportion of surface was devoted to pasture. Cattle formed both the chief item in the substance of a wealthy man, the chief means of making payments, and the common ground of quarrels—bread and meat, in large quantities, being the constant food of every one.[2] The estates of the owners were tilled, and their cattle tended, mostly by bought slaves, but to a certain degree also by poor freemen called Thêtes, working for hire and for stated periods. The principal slaves, who were entrusted with the care of large herds of oxen, swine, or goats, were of necessity men worthy of confidence, their duties placing them away from their master's immediate eye.[3] They had other slaves subordinate to them, and appear to have been well treated: the deep and unshaken attachment of Eumæus the swineherd and Philœtius the neatherd, to the family and affairs of the absent Odysseus, is among the most interesting points in the ancient epic. Slavery was a calamity which in that period of insecurity might befall any one. The chief who conducted a freebooting expedition, if he succeeded, brought back with him a numerous troop of slaves, as many as he could seize[4]—if he failed, became very likely a slave himself: so that the slave was often by birth of equal dignity with his master—Eumæus was himself the son of a chief, conveyed away when a child by his nurse, and sold by Phœnician kidnappers to Laërtês. A slave of this character, if he conducted himself well, might often expect to be enfranchised by his master, and placed in an independent holding.[5]

[1] Iliad, xii. 421; xxi. 405.

[2] Iliad, i. 155; ix. 154; xiv. 122.

[3] Odysseus and other chiefs of Ithaka had oxen, sheep, mules, &c., on the continent and in Peloponnêsus, under the care of herdsmen (Odyss. iv. 636; xiv. 100).

Leukanor, king of Bosporus, asks the Scythian Arsakomas—*Πόσα δὲ βοσκήματα, ἢ πόσας ἀμάξας ἔχεις, ταῦτα γὰρ ὑμεῖς πλουτεῖτε;* (Lucian, Toxaris, c. 45). The enumeration of the property of Odysseus would have placed the *βοσκήματα* in the front line.

[4] *Ἀμφὶ δ' ἃς Ἀχιλεὺς λῃΐσσατο* (Iliad, xviii. 28: compare also Odyss. i. 397; xxiii. 357; particularly xvii. 441).

[5] Odyss. xiv. 64; xv. 412; see also xix. 78: Eurykleia was also of dignified birth (i. 429). The questions put by Odysseus to Eumæus, to which the speech above referred to is an answer, indicate the proximate causes of slavery: "Was the city of your father sacked? or were you seized by pirates when alone with your sheep and oxen?" (Odyss. xv. 385).

Eumæus had purchased a slave for himself (Odyss. xiv. 448).

On the whole, the slavery of legendary Greece does not present itself as existing under a peculiarly harsh form, especially if we consider that all the classes of society were then very much upon a level in point of taste, sentiment, and instruction.[1] In the absence of legal security or an effective social sanction, it is probable that the condition of a slave under an average master may have been as good as that of the free Thête. The class of slaves whose lot appears to have been the most pitiable were the females—more numerous than the males, and performing the principal work in the interior of the house. Not only do they seem to have been more harshly treated than the males, but they were charged with the hardest and most exhausting labour which the establishment of a Greek chief required—they brought in water from the spring, and turned by hand the house-mills, which ground the large quantity of flour consumed in his family.[2] This oppressive task was performed generally by female slaves, in historical as well as in legendary Greece.[3] Spinning and weaving was the constant occupation of women, whether free or slave, of every rank and station: all the garments worn both by men and women were fashioned at home,

[1] Tacitus, Mor. Germ. 21. "Dominum ac servum nullis educationis deliciis dignoscas: inter eadem pecora, in eâdem humo, degunt," &c. (Juvenal, Sat. xiv. 167).

[2] Odyss. vii. 104; xx. 116. Iliad, vi. 457; compare the Book of Genesis, ch. xi. 5. The expression of Telemachus, when he is proceeding to hang up the female slaves who had misbehaved, is bitterly contemptuous—

Μη μὲν δὴ καθαρῷ θανάτῳ ἀπὸ θυμὸν ἑλοίμην
Τάων, &c. (Odyss. xxii. 464.)

The humble establishment of Hesiod's farmer does not possess a mill; he has nothing better than a wooden pestle and mortar for grinding or bruising the corn; both are constructed, and the wood cut from the trees by his own hand (Opp. Di. 423), though it seems that a professional carpenter ("the servant of Athênê") is required to put together the plough (v. 430). The Virgilian poem *Moretum* (v. 24) assigns a hand-mill even to the humblest rural establishment. The instructive article "Corn Mills" in Beckmann's Hist. of Inventions (vol. i. p. 227, Engl. transl.) collects all the information available about this subject.

[3] See Lysias, Or. 1, p. 93 (De Cæde Eratosthenis). Plutarch (Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 21, p. 1101)—Παχυσκελὴς ἀλετρὶς πρὸς μύλην κινουμένη—and Kallimachus (Hymn. ad Delum, 242)—μηδ' ὅθι δειλαὶ Δυστοκέες μογέουσιν ἀλετρίδες—notice the overworked condition of these women.

The "grinding slaves" (ἀλετρίδες) are expressly named in one of the Laws of Ethelbert king of Kent, and constitute the second class in point of value among the female slaves (Law xl. Thorpe's Ancient Laws and Institutes of England, vol. i. p. 7).

and Helen as well as Penelopê is expert and assiduous at the occupation.[1] The daughters of Keleos at Eleusis go to the well with their basins for water, and Nausikaa daughter of Alkinous[2] joins her female slaves in the business of washing her garments in the river. If we are obliged to point out the fierceness and insecurity of an early society, we may at the same time note with pleasure its characteristic simplicity of manners: Rebecca, Rachel, and the daughters of Jethro in the early Mosaic narrative, as well as the wife of the native Macedonian chief (with whom the Temenid Perdiccas, ancestor of Philip and Alexander, first took service on retiring from Argos) baking her own cakes on the hearth,[3] exhibit a parallel in this respect to the Homeric pictures.

We obtain no particulars respecting either the common freemen generally, or the particular class of them called Thêtes. These latter, engaged for special jobs, or at the harvest and other busy seasons of field labour, seem to have given their labour in exchange for board and clothing: they are mentioned in the same line with the slaves,[4] and were (as has been just observed) probably on the whole little better off. The condition of a poor freeman in those days, without a lot of land of his own, going about from one temporary job to another, and having no powerful family and no social authority to look up to for protection, must have been sufficiently miserable. When Eumæus indulged his expectation of being manumitted by his masters, he thought at the same time that they would give him a wife, a house, and a lot of land, near to themselves;[5] without which collateral advantages, simple manumission might perhaps have been no improvement in his condition. To be Thête in the service of a very poor farmer is selected by Achilles as the maximum of human hardship: such a person could not give to his Thête the same ample food, and good shoes and clothing, as the wealthy chief Eurymachus, while he would exact more severe labour.[6] It was probably among such smaller occupants, who could not advance the price necessary to purchase slaves, and were glad to save the cost of keep when they did not need service, that the Thêtes found employ-

[1] Odyss. iv. 131; xix. 235.
[2] Odyss. vi. 96; Hymn. ad Dêmêtr. 105.
[3] Herodot. viii. 137. [4] Odyss. iv. 643. [5] Odyss. xiv. 64.
[6] Compare Odyss. xi. 490, with xviii. 358. Klytæmnêstra, in the *Agamemnôn* of Æschylus, preaches a something similar doctrine to Kassandra,—how much kinder the ἀρχαιόπλουτοι δεσπόται were towards their slaves, than masters who had risen by unexpected prosperity (Agamemn. 1042).

ment: though we may conclude that the brave and strong amongst these poor freemen found it preferable to accompany some freebooting chief, and to live by the plunder acquired.[1] The exact Hesiod advises his farmer, whose work is chiefly performed by slaves, to employ and maintain the Thête during summer-time, but to dismiss him as soon as the harvest is completely got in, and then to take into his house for the winter, a woman "without any child;" who would of course be more useful that the Thête for the indoor occupations of that season.[2]

In a state of society such as that which we have been describing, Grecian commerce was necessarily trifling and restricted. The Homeric poems mark either total ignorance or great vagueness of apprehension respecting all that lies beyond the coasts of Greece and Asia Minor and the islands between or adjoining them. Libya and Egypt are supposed so distant as to be known only by name and hearsay: indeed when the city of Kyrene was founded, a century and a half after the first Olympiad, it was difficult to find anywhere a Greek navigator who had ever visited the coast of Libya, or was fit to serve as guide to the colonists.[3] The mention of the Sikels in the Odyssey[4] leads us to conclude that Korkyra,

[1] Thucyd. i. 5. ἐτράποντο πρὸς λῃστείαν, ἡγουμένων ἀνδρῶν οὐ τῶν ἀδυνατωτάτων, κέρδους τοῦ σφετέρου αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενέσι τροφῆς.

[2] Hesiod, Opp. Di. 459—ἐφορμηθῆναι, ὁμῶς δμῶές τε καὶ αὐτός—and 603—

. . . . . Λὐτὰρ ἐπὴν δὴ
Πάντα βίον καταθῆαι ἐπάρμενον ἔνδοθι οἴκου,
Θῆτά τ' ἄοικον ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ ἄτεκνον ἔριθον
Δίζεσθαι κέλομαι· χαλεπὴ δ' ὑπόπορτις ἔριθος.

The two words ἄοικον ποιεῖσθαι seem here to be taken together in the sense of "dismiss the Thête," or "make him houseless;" for when put out of his employer's house, he had no residence of his own. Göttling (*ad loc.*), Nitzsch (ad Odyss. iv. 643), and Lehrs (Quæst. Epic. p. 205) all construe ἄοικον with θῆτα, and represent Hesiod as advising that the houseless Thête should be at that moment *taken on*, just at the time when the summer's work was finished. Lehrs (and seemingly Göttling also), sensible that this can never have been the real meaning of the poet, would throw out the two lines as spurious. I may remark further that the translation of θῆς given by Göttling—*villicus*—is inappropriate: it includes the idea of superintendence over other labourers, which does not seem to have belonged to the Thête in any case.

There were a class of poor free-women who made their living by taking in wool to spin and perhaps to weave: the exactness of their dealing as well as the poor profit which they made, are attested by a touching Homeric simile (Iliad, xiii. 434). See Iliad, vi. 289; xxiii. 742. Odyss. xv. 414.

[3] Herodot. iv. 151. Compare Ukert, Geographie der Griechen und Römer, part i. p. 16–19.

[4] Odyss. xx. 383—xxiv. 210. The identity of the Homeric Scheria with

Italy and Sicily were not wholly unknown to the poet. Among seafaring Greeks, the knowledge of the latter implied the knowledge of the two former—since the habitual track, even of a well-equipped Athenian trireme during the Peloponnesian war, from Peloponnêsus to Sicily, was by Korkyra and the Gulf of Tarentum. The Phokæans, long afterwards, were the first Greeks who explored either the Adriatic or Tyrrhenian sea.[1] Of the Euxine sea no knowledge is manifested in Homer, who, as a general rule, presents to us the names of distant regions only in connexion with romantic or monstrous accompaniments. The Kretans, and still more the Taphians (who are supposed to have occupied the western islands off the coast of Akarnania), are mentioned as skilful mariners, and the Taphian Mentês professes to be conveying iron to Temesa to be there exchanged for copper;[2] but both Taphians and Kretans are more corsairs than traders.[3] The strong sense of the dangers of the sea, expressed by the poet Hesiod, and the imperfect structure of the early Grecian ship, attested by Thucydidês (who points out the more recent date of that improved shipbuilding which prevailed in his time), concur to demonstrate the then narrow range of nautical enterprise.[4]

Such was the state of the Greeks as traders, at a time when Babylon combined a crowded and industrious population with extensive commerce, and when the Phœnician merchant-ships visited in one direction the southern coast of Arabia, perhaps even the island of Ceylon—in another direction, the British islands.

The Phœnician, the kinsman of the ancient Jew, exhibits the type of character belonging to the latter—with greater enterprise and ingenuity, and less of religious exclusiveness, yet still different from, and even antipathetic to, the character of the Greeks. In the Homeric poems, he appears somewhat like the Jew of the middle ages, a crafty trader turning to profit the violence and rapacity of others—bringing them ornaments, decorations, the finest and brightest products of the loom, gold, silver,

Korkyra, and that of the Homeric Thrinakia with Sicily, appear to me not at all made out. Both Welcker and Klausen treat the Phæakians as purely mythical persons (see W. C. Müller, De Corcyræorum Republicâ, Götting. 1835, p. 9).

[1] Heredot. i. 163.

[2] Nitzsch. ad Odyss. i. 181; Strabo, i. p. 6. The situation of Temesa, whether it is to be placed in Italy or in Cyprus, has been a disputed point among critics both ancient and modern.

[3] Odyss. xv. 426. Τάφιοι, λῃστορες ἄνδρες; and xvi. 426. Hymn to Dêmêtêr, v. 123.

[4] Hesiod, Opp. Di. 615-684; Thucyd. i. 13.

electrum, ivory, tin, &c., in exchange for which he received landed produce, skins, wool, and slaves, the only commodities which even a wealthy Greek chief of those early times had to offer—prepared at the same time for dishonest gain, in any manner which chance might throw in his way.[1] He is however really a trader, not undertaking expeditions with the deliberate purpose of surprise and plunder, and standing distinguished in this respect from the Tyrrhenian, Kretan, or Taphian pirate. Tin, ivory, and electrum, all of which are acknowledged in the Homeric poems, were the fruit of Phœnician trade with the West as well as with the East.[2]

[1] Odyss. xiv. 290: xv. 46—

Φοίνιξ ἦλθεν ἀνήρ, ἀπατήλια εἰδώς,
Τρώκτης, ὃς δὴ πολλὰ κακὰ ἀνθρώποισιν ἐώργει.

The interesting narrative given by Eumæus, of the manner in which he fell into slavery, is a vivid picture of Phœnician dealing (compare Heredot. i. 2–4. Iliad, vi. 290; xxiii. 743). Paris is reported to have visited Sidon, and brought from thence women eminent for skill at the loom. The Cyprian Verses (see the Argument ap. Düntzer, p. 17) affirmed that Paris had landed at Sidon, and attacked and captured the city. Taphian corsairs kidnapped slaves at Sidon (Odyss. xv. 424).

The ornaments or trinkets (ἀθύρματα) which the Phœnician merchant carries with him, seem to be the same as the δαίδαλα πολλά, Πόρπας τε γναμπτάς θ' ἕλικας, &c., which Hêphæstus was employed in fabricating (Iliad, xviii. 400) under the protection of Thetis.

"Fallacissimum esse genus Phœnicum omnia monumenta vetustatis atque omnes historiæ nobis prodiderunt." (Cicero, Orat. Trium. partes ineditæ, ed. Maii, 1815, p. 13.)

[2] Ivory is frequently mentioned in Homer, who uses the word ἐλέφας exclusively to mean that substance, not to signify the animal.

The art of dyeing, especially with the various shades of purple, was in after ages one of the special excellences of the Phœnicians: yet Homer, where he alludes in a simile to dyeing or staining, introduces a Mæonian or Karian woman as the performer of the process, not a Phœnician (Iliad, iv. 141).

What the *electrum* named in the Homeric poems really is cannot be positively determined. The word in antiquity meant two different things: 1. amber; 2. an impure gold, containing as much as one-fifth or more of silver (Pliny, H. N. xxxiii. 4). The passages in which we read the word in the Odyssey do not positively exclude either of these meanings; but they present to us electrum so much in juxtaposition with gold and silver each separately, that perhaps the second meaning is more probable than the first. Herodotus understands it to mean *amber* (iii. 115): Sophoklês, on the contrary, employs it to designate a metal akin to gold (Antigone, 1033).

See the dissertation of Buttmann, appended to his collection of essays called *Mythologus*, vol. ii. p. 337; also Beckmann, History of Inventions, vol. iv. p. 12, Engl. Transl. "The ancients (observes the latter) used as a peculiar metal a mixture of gold and silver, because they were not acquainted with the art of separating them, and gave it the name of *electrum*." Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. of Greece, vol. i. p. 241) thinks that the

Thucydidês tells us that the Phœnicians and Karians, in very early periods, occupied many of the islands of the Ægean, and we know, from the striking remnant of their mining works which Herodotus himself saw in Thasus, off the coast of Thrace, that they had once extracted gold from the mountains of that island —at a period indeed very far back, since their occupation must have been abandoned prior to the settlement of the poet Archilochus.[1] Yet few of the islands in the Ægean were rich in such valuable products, nor was it in the usual course of Phœnician proceeding to occupy islands, except where there was an adjoining mainland with which trade could be carried on. The traffic of these active mariners required no permanent settlement. But as occasional visitors they were convenient, in enabling a Greek chief to turn his captives to account,—to get rid of slaves, or friendless Thêtes who were troublesome—and to supply himself with the metals, precious as well as useful.[2] The halls of Alkinous and Menelaus glitter with gold, copper, and electrum. Large stocks of yet unemployed metal—gold, copper and iron—are stored up in the treasure-chamber of Odysseus and other chiefs.[3] Coined money is unknown to the Homeric age—the trade carried on being one of barter. In reference also to the metals, it deserves to be remarked that the Homeric descriptions universally suppose copper, and not iron, to be employed for arms, both offensive and defensive. By what process the copper was tempered and hardened, so as to serve the purposes of the warrior, we do not know;[4] but the

Homeric *electrum* is amber; on the contrary, Hüllmann thinks that it was a metallic substance (Handels, Geschichte der Griechen, p. 63–81).

Beckmann doubts whether the oldest *κασσίτερος* of the Greeks was really *tin*: he rather thinks that it was "the *stannum* of the Romans, the *werk* of our smelting-houses,—that is, a mixture of lead, silver, and other accidental metals" (ibid p. 20). The Greeks of Massalia procured tin from Britain, through Gaul, by the Seine, the Saone, and the Rhone (Diodôr. v. 22).

[1] Heredot. ii. 44; vi. 47. Archiloch. Fragm. 21–22, ed. Gaisf. Œnomaus, ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. vi. 7. Thucyd. i. 12.

The Greeks connected this Phœnician settlement in Thasus with the legend of Kadmus and his sister Eurôpa: Thasus, the eponymus of the island, was brother of Kadmus. (Herod. ib.)

[2] The angry Laomedôn threatens, when Poseidôn and Apollo ask from him (at the expiration of their term of servitude) the stipulated wages of their labour, to cut off their ears and send them off to some distant islands (Iliad, xxi. 454). Compare xxiv. 752. Odyss. xx. 383; xviii. 83.

[3] Odyss. iv. 73; vii. 85; xxi. 61. Iliad, ii. 226; vi. 47.

[4] See Millin, Minéralogie Homérique, p. 74. That there are, however, modes of tempering copper, so as to impart to it the hardness of steel, has been proved by the experiments of the Comte de Caylus.

use of iron for these objects belongs to a later age, though the "Works and Days" of Hesiod suppose this change to have been already introduced.[1]

The mode of fighting among the Homeric heroes is not less different from the historical times, than the material of which their arms were composed. In historical Greece, the Hoplites, or heavy-armed infantry, maintained a close order and well-dressed line, charging the enemy with their spears protended at even distance, and coming thus to close conflict without breaking their rank: there were special troops, bowmen, slingers, &c. armed with missiles, but the hoplite had no weapon to employ in this manner. The heroes of the Iliad and Odyssey, on the contrary, habitually employ the spear as a missile, which they launch with tremendous force: each of them is mounted in his war-chariot drawn by two horses and calculated to contain the warrior and his charioteer; in which latter capacity a friend or comrade will sometimes consent to serve. Advancing in his chariot at full speed, in front of his own soldiers, he hurls his spear against the enemy: sometimes indeed he will fight on foot and hand to hand, but the chariot is usually near to receive him if he chooses, or to ensure his retreat. The mass of the Greeks and Trojans coming forward to the charge, without any

The Massagetæ employed only copper—no iron—for their weapons (Herodot. i. 215).

[1] Hesiod, Opp. Di. 150-420. The examination of the various matters of antiquity discoverable throughout the north of Europe, as published by the Antiquarian Society of Copenhagen, recognises a distinction of three successive ages:—1. Implements and arms of stone, bone, wood, &c.; little or no use of metals at all; clothing made of skins. 2. Implements and arms of copper and gold, or rather bronze and gold; little or no silver or iron. Articles of gold and electrum are found belonging to this age, but none of silver, nor any evidences of writing. 3. The age which follows this has belonging to it arms of iron, articles of silver, and some Runic inscriptions: it is the last age of northern paganism, immediately preceding the introduction of Christianity (Leitfaden zur Nördischen Alterthumskunde, pp. 31, 57, 63, Copenhagen, 1837).

The Homeric age coincides with the second of these two periods. Silver is comparatively little mentioned in Homer, while both bronze and gold are familiar metals. Iron also is rare, and seems employed only for agricultural purposes—Χρυσόν τε, χαλκόν τε ἅλις, ἐσθῆτα δ' ὑφαντήν (Iliad, vi. 48; Odyss. ii. 338; xiii. 136). The χρυσοχόος and the χαλκεύς are both mentioned in Homer, but workers in silver and iron are not known by any special name (Odyss. iii. 425-436).

"The hatchet, wimble, plane, and level, are the tools mentioned by Homer, who appears to have been unacquainted with the saw, the square, and the compass." (Gillies, Hist. of Greece, chap. ii. p. 61.)

The Gauls known to Polybius, seemingly the Cisalpine Gauls only, possessed all their property in cattle and gold—θρέμματα καὶ χρυσός,—on account of the easy transportability of both (Polyb. ii. 17).

regular step or evenly-maintained line, make their attack in the same way by hurling their spears. Each chief wears habitually a long sword and a short dagger, besides his two spears to be launched forward—the spear being also used, if occasion serves, as a weapon for thrust. Every man is protected by shield, helmet, breastplate and greaves: but the armour of the chiefs is greatly superior to that of the common men, while they themselves are both stronger and more expert in the use of their weapons. There are a few bowmen, as rare exceptions, but the general equipment and proceeding is as here described.

Such loose array, immortalised as it is in the Iliad, is familiar to every one; and the contrast which it presents, with those inflexible ranks and that irresistible simultaneous charge which bore down the Persian throng at Platæa and Kunaxa,[1] is such as to illustrate forcibly the general difference between heroic and historical Greece. While in the former, a few splendid figures stand forward in prominent relief, the remainder being a mere unorganised and ineffective mass—in the latter, these units have been combined into a system, in which every man, officer and soldier, has his assigned place and duty, and the victory, when gained, is the joint work of all. Pre-eminent individual prowess is indeed materially abridged, if not wholly excluded—no man can do more than maintain his station in the line.[2] But on the other hand, the grand purposes, aggressive or defensive, for which alone arms are taken up, become more assured and easy; while long-sighted combinations of the general are rendered for the first time practicable, when he has a disciplined body of men to obey him. In tracing the picture of civil society, we have to remark a similar transition—we pass from Hêraklês, Thêseus, Jasôn, Achilles, to Solôn, Pythagoras and Periklês—from "the shepherd of his people," (to use the phrase in which Homer depicts the good side of the Heroic king,) to the legislator who introduces, and the statesman who

[1] Tyrtæus, in his military expressions, seems to conceive the Homeric mode of hurling the spear as still prevalent—δόρυ δ' εὐτόλμως βάλλοντες (Fragm. ix. Gaisford). Either he had his mind prepossessed with the Homeric array, or else the close order and conjunct spears of the hoplites had not yet been introduced during the second Messenian war.

Thiersch and Schneidewin would substitute πάλλοντες in place of βάλλοντες. Euripidês (Androm. 695) has a similar expression, yet it does not apply well to hoplites; for one of the virtues of the hoplite consisted in carrying his spear steadily: δοράτων κίνησις betokens a disorderly march and the want of steady courage and self-possession. See the remarks of Brasidas upon the ranks of the Athenians under Kleon at Amphipolis (Thucyd. v. 6).

[2] Eurlpid. Andromach. 696.

maintains, a preconcerted system by which willing citizens consent to bind themselves. If commanding individual talent is not always to be found, the whole community is so trained as to be able to maintain its course under inferior leaders; the rights as well as the duties of each citizen being predetermined in the social order, according to principles more or less wisely laid down. The contrast is similar, and the transition equally remarkable, in the civil as in the military picture. In fact, the military organisation of the Grecian republics is an element of the greatest importance in respect to the conspicuous part which they have played in human affairs—their superiority over other contemporary nations in this respect being hardly less striking than it is in many others, as we shall have occasion to see in a subsequent stage of this history.

Even at the most advanced point of their tactics, the Greeks could effect little against a walled city. Still less effective were the heroic weapons and array for such an undertaking as a siege. Fortifications are a feature of the age deserving considerable notice. There was a time, we are told, in which the primitive Greek towns or villages derived a precarious security, not from their walls, but merely from sites lofty and difficult of access. They were not built immediately upon the shore, or close upon any convenient landing-place, but at some distance inland, on a rock or elevation which could not be approached without notice or scaled without difficulty. It was thought sufficient at that time to guard against piratical or marauding surprise: but as the state of society became assured—as the chance of sudden assault comparatively diminished and industry increased—these uninviting abodes were exchanged for more convenient sites on the plain or declivity beneath; or a portion of the latter was enclosed within larger boundaries and joined on to the original foundation, which thus became the Acropolis of the new town. Thêbes, Athens, Argos, &c. belonged to the latter class of cities; but there were in many parts of Greece deserted sites on hill-tops, still retaining even in historical times the traces of former habitation, and some of them still bearing the name of the old towns. Among the mountainous parts of Krête, in Ægina and Rhodes, in portions of Mount Ida and Parnassus, similar remnants might be perceived.[1]

[1] Ἡ παλαιὰ πόλις in Ægina (Herodot. vi. 88); Ἀστυπάλαια in Samus (Polyæn. i. 23, 2; Etymol. Mag. v. Ἀστυπάλαια: it became seemingly the acropolis of the subsequent city.

About the deserted sites in the lofty regions of Krête, see Theophrastus, de Ventis, v. 12, ed. Schneider, p. 762.

Probably in such primitive hill villages, a continuous circle of wall would hardly be required as an additional means of defence, and would often be rendered very difficult by the rugged nature of the ground. But Thucydidês represents the earliest Greeks—those whom he conceives anterior to the Trojan war—as living thus universally in unfortified villages chiefly on account of their poverty, rudeness, and thorough carelessness for the morrow. Oppressed and held apart from each other by perpetual fear, they had not yet contracted the sentiment of fixed abodes—they were unwilling even to plant fruit-trees because of the uncertainty of gathering the produce—and were always ready to dislodge, because there was nothing to gain by staying, and a bare subsistence might be had any where. He compares them to the mountaineers of Ætolia and of the Ozolian Lokris in his own time, who dwelt in their unfortified hill villages with little or no inter-communication, always armed and fighting, and subsisting on the produce of their cattle and their woods[1]—clothed in undrest hides, and eating raw meat.

The picture given by Thucydidês, of these very early and

The site of Παλαίσκηψις in Mount Ida,—*ἐπάνω Κέβρηνος κατὰ τὸ μετεωρότατον τῆς Ἴδης* (Strabo, xiii. p. 607); *ὕστερον δὲ κατωτέρω σταδίοις ἑξήκοντα εἰς τὴν νῦν Σκῆψιν μετῳκίσθησαν*. Paphos in Cyprus was the same distance below the ancient Palæ-Paphos (Strabo, xiv. p. 683).

Near Mantineia in Arcadia was situated *ὄρος ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ, τὰ ἐρείπια ἔτι Μαντινείας ἔχον τῆς ἀρχαίας· καλεῖται δὲ τὸ χωρίον ἐφ' ἡμῶν Πτόλις* (Pausan. viii. 12, 4). See a similar statement about the lofty sites of the ancient town of Orchomenus (in Arcadia) (Paus. viii. 13, 2), of Nonakris (viii. 17, 5), of Lusi (viii. 18, 3), Lykoreia on Parnassus (Paus. x. 6, 2; Strabo, ix. p. 418).

Compare also Plato, Legg. iii. 2, p. 678–679), who traces these lofty and craggy dwellings, general among the earliest Grecian townships, to the commencement of human society after an extensive deluge, which had covered all the lower grounds and left only a few survivors.

[1] Thucyd. i. 2. *Φαίνεται γὰρ ἡ νῦν Ἑλλὰς καλουμένη, οὐ πάλαι βεβαίως οἰκουμένη, ἀλλὰ μεταναστάσεις τε οὖσαι τὰ πρότερα, καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἕκαστοι τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀπολείποντες, βιαζόμενοι ὑπό τινων ἀεὶ πλειόνων· τῆς γὰρ ἐμπορίας οὐκ οὔσης, οὐδ' ἐπιμιγνύντες ἀδεῶς ἀλλήλοις, οὔτε κατὰ γῆν οὔτε διὰ θαλάσσης, νεμόμενοι δὲ τὰ αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι ὅσον ἀποζῆν, καὶ περιουσίαν χρημάτων οὐκ ἔχοντες οὐδὲ γῆν φυτεύοντες, ἄδηλον ὂν ὁπότε τις ἐπελθών, καὶ ἀπρόσκλειστον ἅμα ὄντων, ἄλλος ἀφαιρήσεται, τῆς τε καθ' ἡμέραν ἀναγκαίου τροφῆς πανταχοῦ ἂν ἡγούμενοι ἐπικρατεῖν, οὐ χαλεπῶς ἀπανίσταντο, καὶ δι' αὐτὸ οὔτε μεγέθει πόλεων ἴσχυον, οὔτε τῇ ἄλλῃ παρασκευῇ.*

About the distant and unfortified villages and rude habits of the Ætolians and Lokrians, see Thucyd. iii. 94; Pausan. x. 38, 3: also of the Cisalpine Gauls, Polyb. ii. 17.

Both Thucydidês and Aristotle seem to have conceived the Homeric period as mainly analogous to the *βάρβαροι* of their own day—*Λύει δ' Ἀριστοτέλης λέγων, ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἀεὶ ποιεῖ Ὅμηρος οἷα ἦν τότε· ἦν δὲ τοιαῦτα τὰ παλαιὰ οἱάπερ καὶ νῦν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις* (Schol. Iliad. x. 151).

unrecorded times, can only be taken as conjectural—the conjectures indeed of a statesman and a philosopher,—generalised too, in part, from the many particular instances of contention and expulsion of chiefs which he found in the old legendary poems. The Homeric poems, however, present to us a different picture. They recognise walled towns; fixed abodes, strong local attachments, hereditary individual property in land, vineyards planted and carefully cultivated, established temples of the gods, and splendid palaces of the chiefs.[1] The description of Thucydidês belongs to a lower form of society, and bears more analogy to that which the poet himself conceives as antiquated and barbarous—to the savage Cyclopes who dwell on the tops of mountains, in hollow caves, without the plough, without vine or fruit culture, without arts or instruments—or to the primitive settlement of Dardanus son of Zeus, on the higher ground of Ida, while it was reserved for his descendants and successors to found the holy Ilium on the plain.[2] Ilium or Troy represents the perfection of Homeric society. It is a consecrated spot, containing temples of the gods as well as the palace of Priam, and surrounded by walls which are the fabric of the gods; while the antecedent form of ruder society, which the poet briefly glances at, is the parallel of that which the theory of Thucydidês ascribes to his own early semi-barbarous ancestors.

Walled towns serve thus as one of the evidences, that a large part of the population of Greece had, even in the Homeric times, reached a level higher than that of the Ætolians and Lokrians of the days of Thucydidês. The remains of Mykênæ and Tiryns demonstrate the massy and Cyclopian style of architecture employed in those early days: but we may remark, that while modern observers seem inclined to treat the remains of the former as very imposing, and significant of a great princely family, Thucydidês, on the contrary, speaks of it as a small place, and labours to elude the inference, which might be deduced from its insignificant size, in disproof of the grandeur of Agamemnôn.[3] Such fortifications supplied a means

[1] Odyss. vi. 10; respecting Nausithous, past king of the Phæakians—

Ἀμφὶ δὲ τεῖχος ἔλασσε πόλει, καὶ ἐδείματο οἴκους,
Καὶ νηοὺς ποίησε θεῶν, καὶ ἐδάσσατ' ἀρούρας.

The vineyard, olive-ground and garden of Laërtes, is a model of careful cultivation (Odyss. xxiv. 245); see also the shield of Achilles (Iliad, xviii. 541–580), and the Kalydonian plain (Iliad, ix. 575).

[2] Odyss. x. 106–115; Iliad, xx. 216.

[3] Thucyd. i. 10. Καὶ ὅτι μὲν Μυκῆναι μικρὸν ἦν, ἢ εἴ τι τῶν τότε πόλισμα μὴ ἀξιόχρεων δοκεῖ εἶναι, &c.

of defence incomparably superior to those of attack. Indeed, even in historical Greece, and after the invention of battering engines, no city could be taken except by surprise or blockade, or by ruining the country around, and thus depriving the inhabitants of their means of subsistence. And in the two great sieges of the legendary time, Troy and Thêbes, the former is captured by the stratagem of the wooden horse, while the latter is evacuated by its citizens, under the warning of the gods, after their defeat in the field.

This decided superiority of the means of defence over those of attack, in rude ages, has been one of the grand promotive causes both of the growth of civic life, and of the general march of human improvement. It has enabled the progressive portions of mankind not only to maintain their acquisitions against the predatory instincts of the ruder and poorer, and to surmount the difficulties of incipient organisation,—but ultimately, when their organisation has been matured, both to acquire predominance, and to uphold it until their own disciplined habits have in part passed to their enemies. The important truth here stated is illustrated not less by the history of ancient Greece, than by that of modern Europe during the middle ages. The Homeric chief, combining superior rank with superior force, and ready to rob at every convenient opportunity, greatly resembles the feudal baron of the middle ages; but circumstances absorb him more easily into a city life, and convert the independent potentate into the member of a governing aristocracy.[1]

[1] Nägelsbach, Homerische Theologie, Abschn. v. sect. 54. Hesiod strongly condemns robbery—Δώς ἀγαθῇ, ἅρπαξ δὲ κακῇ, θανάτοιο δότειρα (Opp. Di. 356, comp. 320); but the sentiment of the Grecian heroic poetry seems not to go against it—it is looked upon as a natural employment of superior force—Αὐτόματοι δ' ἀγαθοὶ δειλῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἵασιν (Athenæ. v. p. 178; comp. Pindar, Fragm. 48, ed. Dissen.): the long spear, sword and breastplate, of the Kretan Hybreas, constitute his wealth (Skolion 27, p. 877; Poet. Lyric. ed. Bergk), wherewith he ploughs and reaps—while the unwarlike, who dare not or cannot wield these weapons, fall at his feet, and call him The Great King. The feeling is different in the later age of Demêtrius Poliorkêtês (about 310 B.C.); in the Ithyphallic Ode addressed to him at his entrance into Athens, robbery is treated as worthy only of Ætolians—

> Αἰτωλικὸν γὰρ ἁρπάσαι τὰ τῶν πέλας,
> Νυνὶ δέ, καὶ τὰ πόρρω.—
> (Poet. Lyr. xxv. p. 453, ed. Schneid.)

The robberies of powerful men, and even highway robbery generally, found considerable approving sentiment in the middle ages. "All Europe (observes Mr. Hallam, Hist. Mid. Ag. ch. viii. part 3, p. 247) was a scene of intestine anarchy during the middle ages; and though England was far less exposed to the scourge of private war than most nations on the conti-

Traffic by sea continued to be beset with danger from pirates, long after it had become tolerably assured by land: the "wet ways" have always been the last resort of lawlessness and violence, and the Ægean in particular has in all times suffered more than other waters under this calamity.

Aggressions of the sort here described were of course most numerous in those earliest times when the Ægean was not yet an Hellenic sea, and when many of the Cyclades were occupied, not by Greeks, but by Karians—perhaps by Phœnicians: the number of Karian sepulchres discovered in the sacred island of Delus seems to attest such occupation as an historical fact.[1] According to the legendary account, espoused both by Herodotus and by Thucydidês, it was the Kretan Minôs who subdued these islands and established his sons as rulers in them; either expelling the Karians or reducing them to servitude and tribute.[2] Thucydidês presumes that he must of course have put down piracy, in order to enable his tribute to be remitted in safety, like the Athenians during the time of their hegemony.[3] Upon the legendary thalassocraty of Minôs I have

nent, we should find, could we recover the local annals of every country, such an accumulation of petty rapine and tumult, as would almost alienate us from the liberty which served to engender it. . . . Highway robbery was from the earliest times a sort of national crime. . . . We know how long the outlaws of Sherwood lived in tradition; men who, like some of their betters, have been permitted to redeem by a few acts of generosity the just ignominy of extensive crimes. These indeed were the heroes of vulgar applause: but when such a judge as Sir John Fortescue could exult, that more Englishmen were hanged for robbery in one year than French in seven—and that, *if an Englishman be poor, and see another having riches, which may be taken from him by might, he will not spare to do so*,—it may be perceived how thoroughly these sentiments had pervaded the public mind."

The robberies habitually committed by the noblesse of France and Germany during the middle ages, so much worse than anything in England—and those of the Highland chiefs even in later times—are too well known to need any references: as to France, an ample catalogue is set forth in Dulaure's Histoire de la Noblesse (Paris, 1792). The confederations of the German cities chiefly originated in the necessity of keeping the roads and rivers open for the transit of men and goods against the nobles who infested the high roads. Scaliger might have found a parallel to the λησταί of the heroic ages in the noblesse of la Rouergue as it stood even in the 16th century, which he thus describes:—"In Comitatu Rodez pessimi sunt: nobilitas ibi latrocinatur: nec possunt reprimi" (ap. Dulaure, c. 9).

[1] Thucyd. i. 4, 8. τῆς νῦν Ἑλληνικῆς θαλάσσης.

[2] Herodot. i. 171; Thucyd. i. 4–8. Isokratês (Panathenaic. p. 241) takes credit to Athens for having finally expelled the Karians out of these islands at the time of the Ionic emigration.

[3] Thucyd. i. 4. τό τε λῃστικὸν ὡς εἰκός, καθήρει ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐφ' ὅσον ἠδύνατο, τοῦ τὰς προσόδους μᾶλλον ἰέναι αὐτῷ.

already remarked in another place:[1] it is sufficient here to repeat, that in the Homeric poems (long subsequent to Minôs in the current chronology) we find piracy both frequent and held in honourable estimation, as Thucydidês himself emphatically tells us—remarking moreover that the vessels of those early days were only half-decked, built and equipped after the piratical fashion,[2] in a manner upon which the nautical men of his time looked back with disdain. Improved and enlarged shipbuilding, and the trireme, or ship with three banks of oars, common for warlike purposes during the Persian invasion, began only with the growing skill, activity and importance of the Corinthians, three quarters of a century after the first Olympiad.[3] Corinth, even in the Homeric poems, is distinguished by the epithet of wealthy, which it acquired principally from its remarkable situation on the Isthmus, and from its two harbours of Lechæum and Kenchreæ, the one on the Corinthian, the other on the Sarônic gulf. It thus supplied a convenient connexion between Epirus and Italy on the one side, and the Ægean sea on the other, without imposing upon the unskilful and timid navigator of those days the necessity of circumnavigating Peloponnêsus.

The extension of Grecian traffic and shipping is manifested by a comparison of the Homeric with the Hesiodic poems; in respect to knowledge of places and countries—the latter being probably referable to dates between B.C. 740 and B.C. 640. In Homer, acquaintance is shown (the accuracy of such acquaintance however being exaggerated by Strabo and other friendly critics) with continental Greece and its neighbouring islands, with Krête and the principal islands of the Ægean, and with Thrace, the Troad, the Hellespont, and Asia Minor between Paphlagonia northward and Lykia southward. The Sikels are mentioned in the Odyssey, and Sikania in the last book of that poem, but nothing is said to evince a knowledge of Italy or the realities of the western world. Libya, Egypt and Phœnike, are known by name and by vague hearsay, but the Nile is only mentioned as "the river Egypt:" while the Euxine sea is not mentioned at all.[4] In the Hesiodic poems, on the

[1] See vol. i. chap. xii.

[2] Thucyd. i. 10. τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ λῃστικώτερον παρεσκευασμένα.

[3] Thucyd. i. 13.

[4] See Voelcker, Homerische Geographie, ch. iii. sect. 55–63. He has brought to bear much learning and ingenuity to identify the places visited by Odysseus with real lands, but the attempt is not successful. Compare also Ukert, Hom. Geog. vol. i. p. 14, and the valuable treatises of J. H. Voss, *Alte Weltkunde*, annexed to the second volume of his Kritische

other hand, the Nile, the Ister, the Phasis and the Eridanus, are all specified by name;[1] Mount Ætna, and the island of Ortygia near to Syracuse, the Tyrrhenians and Ligurians in the west, and the Scythians in the north, were also noticed.[2] Indeed within forty years after the first Olympiad, the cities of Korkyra and Syracuse were founded from Corinth—the first of a numerous and powerful series of colonies, destined to impart a new character both to the south of Italy and to Sicily.

In reference to the astronomy and physics of the Homeric Greek, it has already been remarked that he connected together the sensible phænomena which form the subject matter of these sciences by threads of religious and personifying fancy, to which the real analogies among them were made subordinate; and that these analogies did not begin to be studied by themselves, apart from the religious element by which they had been at first overlaid, until the age of Thales, coinciding as that period did with the increased opportunities for visiting Egypt and the interior of Asia. The Greeks obtained access in both of these countries to an enlarged stock of astronomical observations, to the use of the gnomon or sun-dial,[3] and to a more exact determination of the length of the solar year[4] than that which served

Blätter (Stuttgard, 1828), p. 245–413. Voss is the father of just views respecting Homeric geography.

[1] Hesiod, Theog. 338–340.

[2] Hesiod, Theogon. 1016; Hesiod, Fragm. 190–194, ed. Göttling; Strabo, i. p. 16; vii. p. 300. Compare Ukert, Geographie der Griechen und Römer, i. p. 37.

[3] The Greeks learnt from the Babylonians *πόλον καὶ γνώμονα καὶ τὰ δυώδεκα μέρεα τῆς ἡμέρης* (Herodot. ii. 109). The word *πόλον* means the same as *horologium*, the circular plate upon which the vertical gnomon projected its shadow, marked so as to indicate the hour of the day—twelve hours between sunrise and sunset: see Ideler, Handbuch der Chronologie, vol. i. p. 233. Respecting the opinions of Thales, see the same work, part ii. p. 18–57; Plutarch. de Placit. Philosophor. ii. c. 12; Aristot. de Cœlo, ii. 13. Costard, Rise and Progress of Astronomy among the Ancients, p. 99.

[4] We have very little information respecting the early Grecian mode of computing time, and we know that though all the different states computed by lunar periods, yet most, if not all, of them had different names of months as well as different days of beginning and ending their months. All their immediate computations however were made by months: the lunar period was their immediate standard of reference for determining their festivals and for other purposes, the solar period being resorted to only as a corrective, to bring the same months constantly into the same seasons of the year. Their original month had thirty days, and was divided into three decades, as it continued to be during the times of historical Athens (Hesiod, Opp. Di. 766). In order to bring this lunar period more nearly into harmony with the sun, they intercalated every second year an additional month: so that their years included alternately

as the basis of their various lunar periods. It is pretended that Thales was the first who predicted an eclipse of the sun—not indeed accurately, but with large limits of error as to the time of its occurrence—and that he also possessed so profound an acquaintance with meteorological phænomena and probabilities, as to be able to foretell an abundant crop of olives for the coming year, and to realise a large sum of money by an olive speculation.[1] From Thales downward we trace a succession of astronomical and physical theories, more or less successful, into which I do not intend here to enter. It is sufficient at present to contrast the father of the Ionic philosophy with the times preceding him, and to mark the first commencement of scientific prediction among the Greeks, however imperfect at the outset, as distinguished from the inspired dicta of prophets or oracles, and from those special signs of the purposes of the gods, which formed the habitual reliance of the Homeric man.[2] We shall see these two modes of anticipating the future—one based upon the philosophical, the other upon the religious appreciation of nature—running simultaneously on throughout Grecian history, and sharing between them in unequal portions the empire of the Greek mind; the former acquiring both greater predominance and wider application among the intellectual men, and partially restricting, but never abolishing, the spontaneous employment of the latter among the vulgar.

twelve months and thirteen months, each month of thirty days. This period was called a Dieteris—sometimes a Trieteris. Solon is said to have first introduced the fashion of months differing in length, varying alternately from thirty to twenty-nine days. It appears however that Herodotus had present to his mind the Dieteric cycle, or years alternating between thirteen months and twelve months (each month of thirty days), and no other (Herodot. i. 32; compare ii. 104). As astronomical knowledge improved, longer and more elaborate periods were calculated, exhibiting a nearer correspondence between an integral number of lunations and an integral number of solar years. First, we find a period of four years: next, the Octaëteris, or period of eight years, or ninety-nine lunar months: lastly, the Metonic period of nineteen years, or 235 lunar months. How far any of these larger periods were ever legally authorised or brought into civil usage even at Athens, is matter of much doubt. See Ideler, Uber die Astronomischen Beobachtungen der Alten, p. 175–195; Macrobius, Saturnal. i. 13.

[1] Herodot. i. 74; Aristot. Polit. i. 4, 5.

[2] Odyss. iii. 173—

> Ἤτέομεν δὲ θεὸν φαινειν τέρας· αὐτὰρ ὄγ' ἡμῖν
> Δεῖξε, καὶ ἠνώγει πέλαγος μέσον εἰς Εὔβοιαν
> Τέμνειν, &c.

Compare Odyss. xx. 100; Illiad, i. 62; Eurip. Suppl. 216–230.

Neither coined money, nor the art of writing,[1] nor painting nor sculpture, nor imaginative architecture, belong to the Homeric and Hesiodic times. Such rudiments of arts, destined ultimately to acquire great development in Greece, as may have existed in these early days, served only as a sort of nucleus to the fancy of the poet, to shape out for himself the fabulous creations ascribed to Hephæstus or Dædalus. No statues of the gods, not even of wood, are mentioned in the Homeric poems. All the many varieties, in Grecian music, poetry and dancing—the former chiefly borrowed from Lydia and Phrygia—date from a period considerably later than the first Olympiad. Terpander, the earliest musician whose date is assigned—and the inventor of the harp with seven strings instead of that with four strings—does not come until the 26th Olympiad, or 676 B.C.: the poet Archilochus is nearly of the same date. The iambic and elegiac metres—the first deviations from the primitive epic strain and subject—do not reach up to the year 700 B.C.

It is this epic poetry which forms at once both the undoubted prerogative and the solitary jewel of the earliest æra of Greece. Of the many epic poems which existed in Greece during the eighth century before the Christian æra, none have been preserved except the Iliad and Odyssey: the Æthiopis of Arktinus, the Ilias Minor of Lesches, the Cyprian Verses, the Capture of Œchalia, the Returns of the Heroes from Troy, the Thêbaïs and the Epigoni—several of them passing in antiquity under the name of Homer—have all been lost. But the two which remain are quite sufficient to demonstrate in the primitive Greeks, a mental organisation unparalleled in any other people, and powers of invention and expression which prepared, as well as foreboded, the future eminence of the nation in all the various departments to which thought and language can be applied. Great as the power of thought afterwards became among the Greeks, their power of expression was still greater; in the former, other nations have built upon their foundations and surpassed them—in the latter they still remain unrivalled. It is not too much to say that this flexible, emphatic and transparent character of the language as an instrument of communication—its perfect aptitude for narrative and discussion, as well as for stirring all the veins of human emotion without ever forfeiting that character of simplicity which adapts it to all men

[1] The *σήματα λυγρά* mentioned in Iliad, vi. 168, if they prove anything, are rather an evidence against, than for, the existence of alphabetical writing at the times when the Iliad was composed.

and all times—may be traced mainly to the existence and the wide-spread influence of the Iliad and Odyssey. To us these compositions are interesting as beautiful poems, depicting life and manners, and unfolding certain types of character, with the utmost vivacity and artlessness: to their original hearer, they possessed all these sources of attraction, together with others more powerful still, to which we are now strangers. Upon him they bore with the full weight and solemnity of history and religion combined, while the charm of the poetry was only secondary and instrumental. The poet was then the teacher and preacher of the community, not simply the amuser of their leisure hours: they looked to him for revelations of the unknown past and for expositions of the attributes and dispensations of the gods, just as they consulted the prophet for his privileged insight into the future. The ancient epic comprised many different poets and poetical compositions, which fulfilled this purpose with more or less completeness. But it is the exclusive prerogative of the Iliad and Odyssey, that after the minds of men had ceased to be in full harmony with their original design, they yet retained their empire by the mere force of secondary excellences; while the remaining epics—though serving as food for the curious, and as storehouses for logographers, tragedians, and artists—never seem to have acquired very wide popularity even among intellectual Greeks.

I shall, in the succeeding chapter, give some account of the epic cycle, of its relation to the Homeric poems, and of the general evidences respecting the latter, both as to antiquity and authorship.

## CHAPTER XXI

### GRECIAN EPIC—HOMERIC POEMS

At the head of the once abundant epical compositions of Greece, most of them unfortunately lost, stand the Iliad and Odyssey, with the immortal name of Homer attached to each of them, embracing separate portions of the comprehensive legend of Troy. They form the type of what may be called the heroic epic of the Greeks, as distinguished from the genealogical, in which latter species some of the Hesiodic poems—the Catalogue of Women, the Eoiai, and the Naupaktia—stood

conspicuous. Poems of the Homeric character (if so it may be called, though the expression is very indefinite)—being confined to one of the great events or great personages of Grecian legendary antiquity, and comprising a limited number of characters all contemporaneous—made some approach, more or less successful, to a certain poetical unity; while the Hesiodic poems, tamer in their spirit and unconfined both as to time and as to persons, strung together distinct events without any obvious view to concentration of interest—without legitimate beginning or end.[1] Between these two extremes there were many gradations. Biographical poems, such as the Herakleia or Theseis, recounting all the principal exploits performed by one single hero, present a character intermediate between the two, but bordering more closely on the Hesiodic. Even the hymns to the gods, which pass under the name of Homer, are epical fragments, narrating particular exploits or adventures of the god commemorated.

Both the didactic and the mystico-religious poetry of Greece began in Hexameter verse—the characteristic and consecrated measure of the epic:[2] but they belong to a different species, and burst out from a different vein in the Grecian mind. It seems to have been the more common belief among the historical Greeks that such mystic effusions were more ancient than their narrative poems; and that Orpheus, Musæus, Linus, Olên, Pamphus, and even Hesiod, &c., &c., the reputed composers of the former, were of earlier date than Homer. But there is no evidence to sustain this opinion, and the presumptions are all against it. Those compositions, which in the sixth century before the Christian æra passed under the name of Orpheus and Musæus, seem to have been unquestionably post-Homeric. We cannot even admit the modified conclusion of Hermann, Ulrici, and others, that the mystic poetry as a genus (putting aside the particular compositions falsely ascribed to Orpheus and others) preceded in order of time the narrative.[3]

[1] Aristot. Poet. c. 17–37. He points out and explains the superior structure of the Iliad and Odyssey, as compared with the semi-Homeric and biographical poems: but he takes no notice of the Hesiodic or genealogical.

[2] Aristot. Poetic. c. 41. He considers the Hexameter to be the *natural* measure of narrative poetry: any other would be unseemly.

[3] Ulrici, Geschichte der Griechischen Epos, 5te Vorlesung, p. 96–108; G. Hermann, Ueber Homer und Sappho, in his Opuscula, tom. vi. p. 89.

The superior antiquity of Orpheus as compared with Homer passed as a received position to the classical Romans (Horat. Art. Poet. 392).

Besides the Iliad and Odyssey, we make out the titles of about thirty lost epic poems, sometimes with a brief hint of their contents.

Concerning the legend of Troy there were five—the Cyprian Verses, the Æthiopis and the Capture of Troy, both ascribed to Arktinus; the Lesser Iliad, ascribed to Leschês; the Returns (of the Heroes from Troy), to which the name of Hagias of Trœzên is attached; and the Telegonia, by Eugammôn, a continuation of the Odyssey. Two poems—the Thebaïs and the Epigoni (perhaps two parts of one and the same poem) were devoted to the legend of Thêbes—the two sieges of that city by the Argeians. Another poem, called Œdipodia, had for its subject the tragical destiny of Œdipus and his family; and perhaps that which is cited as Eurôpia, or verses on Eurôpa, may have comprehended the tale of her brother Kadmus, the mythical founder of Thêbes.[1]

The exploits of Hêraklês were celebrated in two compositions, each called Hêrakleia, by Kinæthôn and Pisander—probably also in many others of which the memory has not been preserved. The capture of Œchalia by Hêraklês formed the subject of a separate epic. Two other poems, the Ægimius and the Minyas, are supposed to have been founded on other achievements of this hero—the effective aid which he lent to the Dorian king Ægimius against the Lapithæ, his descent to the under-world for the purpose of rescuing the imprisoned Thêseus, and his conquest of the city of the Minyæ, the powerful Orchomenus.[2]

Other epic poems—the Phorônis, the Danaïs, the Alkmæônis, the Atthis, the Amazonia[3]—we know only by name. We can just guess obscurely at their contents so far as the name indicates. The Titanomachia, the Gigantomachia, and the Corinthiaca, three compositions all ascribed to Eumêlus, afford by means of their titles an idea somewhat clearer of the matter which they comprised. The Theogony ascribed to Hesiod

[1] Respecting these lost epics, see Düntzer, Collection of the Fragmenta Epicor. Græcorum; Wüllner, De Cyclo Epico, p. 43-66*; and Mr. Fynes Clinton's Chronology, vol. iii. p. 349-359.

[2] Welcker, Der Epische Kyklus, p. 256-266; Apollodôr. ii. 7, 7; Diodôr. iv. 37; O. Müller, Dorians, i. 28.

[3] Welcker (Der Epische Kyklus, p. 209) considers the Alkmæônis as the same with the Epigoni, and the Atthis of Hegesinous the same with the Amazonia: in Suidas (v. Ὅμηρος) the latter is among the poems ascribed to Homer.

Leutsch (Thebaidos Cyclicæ Reliquiæ, p. 12-14) views the Thebaïs and the Epigoni as different parts of the same poem.

still exists, though partially corrupt and mutilated: but there seem to have been other poems, now lost, of the like import and title.

Of the poems composed in the Hesiodic style, diffusive and full of genealogical detail, the principal were, the Catalogue of Women and the Great Eoiai; the latter of which indeed seems to have been a continuation of the former. A large number of the celebrated women of heroic Greece were commemorated in these poems, one after the other, without any other than an arbitrary bond of connexion. The Marriage of Kêyx—the Melampodia—and a string of fables called Astronomia, are further ascribed to Hesiod: and the poem above mentioned, called Ægimius, is also sometimes connected with his name, sometimes with that of Kerkops. The Naupaktian Verses (so called probably from the birth-place of their author), and the genealogies of Kinæthôn and Asius, were compositions of the same rambling character, as far as we can judge from the scanty fragments remaining.[1] The Orchomenian epic poet Chersias, of whom two lines only are preserved to us by Pausanias, may reasonably be referred to the same category.[2]

The oldest of the epic poets, to whom any date, carrying with it the semblance of authority, is assigned, is Arktinus of Milêtus, who is placed by Eusebius in the first Olympiad, and by Suidas in the ninth. Eugammôn, the author of the Telegonia, and the latest of the catalogue, is placed in the fifty-third Olympiad, B.C. 566. Between these two we find Asius and Leschês, about the thirtieth Olympiad,—a time when the vein of the ancient epic was drying up, and when other forms of poetry—elegiac, iambic, lyric and choric—had either already arisen, or were on the point of arising, to compete with it.[3]

It has already been stated in a former chapter, that in the early commencements of prose-writing, Hekatæus, Pherekydês, and other logographers, made it their business to extract from the ancient fables something like a continuous narrative chronologically arranged. It was upon a principle somewhat analogous that the Alexandrine literati, about the second century before

[1] See the Fragments of Hesiod, Eumêlus, Kinæthon, and Asius, in the collections of Marktscheffel, Düntzer, Göttling and Gaisford.

I have already, in going over the ground of Grecian legend, referred to all these lost poems in their proper places.

[2] Pausan. ix. 38, 6; Plutarch, Sept. Sap. Conv. p. 156.

[3] See Mr. Clinton's Fasti Hellenici, about the date of Arktinus, vol. i. p. 350.

the Christian æra,[1] arranged the multitude of old epic poets into a series founded on the supposed order of time in the events narrated—beginning with the intermarriage of Uranus and Gæa, and the Theogony—and concluding with the death of Odysseus by the hands of his son Telegonus. This collection passed by the name of the Epic Cycle, and the poets, whose compositions were embodied in it, were termed Cycle poets. Doubtless the epical treasures of the Alexandrine library were larger than had ever before been brought together and submitted to men both of learning and leisure; so that multiplication of such compositions in the same museum rendered it advisable to establish some fixed order of perusal, and to copy them in one corrected and uniform edition.[2] It pleased the critics to determine precedence neither by antiquity nor by excellence of the compositions themselves, but by the supposed sequence of narrative, so that the whole taken together constituted a readable aggregate of epical antiquity.

Much obscurity[3] exists, and many different opinions have been expressed, respecting this Epic Cycle: I view it, not as

[1] Perhaps Zenodotus, the superintendent of the Alexandrine library under Ptolemy Philadelphus, in the third century B.C.: there is a Scholion on Plautus, published not many years ago by Osann, and since more fully by Ritschl,—"Cæcius in commento Comœdiarum Aristophanis in Pluto—Alexander Ætolus, et Lycophron Chalcidensis, et Zenodotus Ephesius, impulsu regis Ptolemæi, Philadelphi cognomento, artis poeticae libros in unum collegerunt et in ordinem redegerunt; Alexander tragœdias, Lycophron comœdias, Zenodotus vero Homeri poemata et reliquorum illustrium poetarum." See Lange, Ueber die Kyklischen Dichter, p. 56 (Mainz. 1837); Welcker, Der Epische Kyklus, p. 8; Ritschl, Die Alexandrinischen Bibliotheken, p. 3 (Breslau, 1838).

Lange disputes the sufficiency of this passage as proof that Zenodotus was the framer of the Epic Cycle: his grounds are however unsatisfactory to me.

[2] That there existed a cyclic copy or edition of the Odyssey (ἡ κυκλικὴ) is proved by two passages in the Scholia (xvi. 195; xvii. 25), with Boeckh's remark in Buttmann's edition: this was the Odyssey copied or edited along with the other poems of the cycle.

Our word to *edit*—or *edition*—suggests ideas not exactly suited to the proceedings of the Alexandrine library, in which we cannot expect to find anything like what is now called *publication*. That magnificent establishment, possessing a large collection of epical manuscripts, and ample means of every kind at command, would naturally desire to have these compositions put in order and corrected by skilful hands, and then carefully copied for the use of the library. Such copy constitutes the cyclic *edition*: they might perhaps cause or permit duplicates to be made, but the ἔκδοσις or edition was complete without them.

[3] Respecting the great confusion in which the Epic Cycle is involved, see the striking declaration of Buttmann, Addenda ad Scholia in Odysseum, p. 575: compare the opinions of the different critics, as enumerated at the end of Welcker's treatise, Episch. Kyk. p. 420–453.

an exclusive canon, but simply as an all-comprehensive classification, with a new edition founded thereupon. It would include all the epic poems in the library older than the Telegonia, and apt for continuous narrative: it would exclude only two classes —first, the recent epic poets, such as Panyasis and Antimachus; next, the genealogical and desultory poems, such as the Catalogue of Women, the Eoiai, and others, which could not be made to fit in to any chronological sequence of events.[1] Both the Iliad and the Odyssey were comprised in the Cycle, so that the denomination of cyclic poet did not originally or designedly carry with it any association of contempt. But as the great and capital poems were chiefly spoken of by themselves, or by the title of their own separate authors, so the general name of *poets of the Cycle* came gradually to be applied only to the worst, and thus to imply vulgarity or common-place; the more so as many of the inferior compositions included in the collection seem to have been anonymous, and their authors in consequence describable only under some such common designation as that of the cyclic poets. It is in this manner that we are to explain the disparaging sentiment connected by Horace and others with the idea of a cyclic writer, though no such sentiment was implied in the original meaning of the Epic Cycle.

The poems of the Cycle were thus mentioned in contrast and

[1] Our information respecting the Epic Cycle is derived from Eutychius Proclus, a literary man of Sicca during the second century of the Christian æra, and tutor of Marcus Antoninus (Jul. Capitolin. Vit. Marc. c. 2)—not from Proclus, called Diadochus, the new-Platonic philosopher of the fifth century, as Heyne, Mr. Clinton, and others have imagined. The fragments from his work called Chrestomathia give arguments of several of the lost cyclic poems connected with the siege of Troy, communicating the important fact that the Iliad and Odyssey were included in the cycle, and giving the following description of the principle upon which it was arranged:—Διαλαμβάνει δὲ περὶ τοῦ λεγομένου ἐπικοῦ κύκλου, ὃς ἄρχεται μὲν ἐκ τῆς Οὐρανοῦ καὶ Γῆς ὁμολογουμένης μίξεως . . . . καὶ κεραιοῦται ὁ ἐπικὸς κύκλος, ἐκ διαφόρων ποιητῶν συμπληρούμενος, μέχρι τῆς ἀποβάσεως Ὀδυσσέως . . . . Λέγει δὲ ὡς τοῦ ἐπικοῦ κύκλου τὰ ποιήματα διασώζεται καὶ σπουδάζεται τοῖς πολλοῖς, οὐχ οὕτω διὰ τὴν ἀρετήν, ὡς διὰ τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ πραγμάτων (ap. Photium, cod. 239).

This much-commented passage, while it clearly marks out the cardinal principle of the Epic Cycle (ἀκολουθία πραγμάτων), neither affirms nor denies anything respecting the excellence of the constituent poems. Proclus speaks of the taste common in his own time (σπουδάζεται τοῖς πολλοῖς): there was not much relish in his time for these poems as such, but people were much interested in the sequence of epical events.

The abstracts, which he himself drew up in the form of arguments of several poems, show that he adapted himself to this taste. We cannot collect from his words that he intended to express any opinion of his own respecting the goodness or badness of the cyclic poems.

antithesis with Homer,[1] though originally the Iliad and Odyssey had both been included among them: and this alteration of the meaning of the word has given birth to a mistake as to the primary purpose of the classification, as if it had been designed especially to part off the inferior epic productions from Homer. But while some critics are disposed to distinguish the cyclic poets too pointedly from Homer, I conceive that Welcker goes too much into the other extreme, and identifies the cycle too closely with that poet. He construes it as a classification deliberately framed to comprise all the various productions of the Homeric epic, with its unity of action and comparative paucity both of persons and adventures—as opposed to the Hesiodic epic, crowded with separate persons and pedigrees, and destitute of central action as well as of closing catastrophe. This opinion does indeed coincide to a great degree with the fact, inasmuch as few of the Hesiodic epics appear to have been included in the Cycle. To say that *none* were included, would be too much, for we cannot venture to set aside either

[1] The gradual growth of a contemptuous feeling towards the *scriptor cyclicus* (Horat. Ars Poetic. 136), which was not originally implied in the name, is well set forth by Lange (Ueber die Kyklisch. Dicht. p. 53–56).

Both Lange (p. 36–41) however and Ulrici (Geschichte des Griech. Epos, 9te Vorles. p. 418) adopt another opinion with respect to the cycle, which I think unsupported and inadmissible,—that the several constituent poems were not received into it entire (*i. e.* with only such changes as were requisite for a corrected text), but cut down and abridged in such manner as to produce an *exact* continuity of narrative. Lange even imagines that the cyclic Odyssey was thus dealt with. But there seems no evidence to countenance this theory, which would convert the Alexandrine literati from critics into logographers. That the cyclic Iliad and Odyssey were the same in the main (allowing for corrections of text) as the common Iliad and Odyssey, is shown by the fact, that Proclus merely names them in the series without giving any abstract of their contents: they were too well known to render such a process necessary. Nor does either the language of Proclus or that of Cæcius as applied to Zenodotus, indicate any transformation applied to the poets whose works are described to have been brought together and put into a certain order.

The hypothesis of Lange is founded upon the idea that the (ἀκολουθία πραγμάτων) continuity of narrated events must necessarily have been exact and without break, as if the whole constituted one work. But this would not be possible, let the framers do what they might: moreover, in the attempt, the individuality of all the constituent poets must have been sacrificed, in such manner that it would be absurd to discuss their separate merits.

The continuity of narrative in the Epic Cycle could not have been more than approximative,—as complete as the poems composing it would admit: nevertheless it would be correct to say that the poems were arranged in series upon this principle and upon no other. The librarians might have arranged in like manner the vast mass of tragedies in their possession (if they had chosen to do so) upon the principle of sequence in the subjects: had they done so, the series would have formed a *Tragic Cycle*.

the Theogony or the Ægimius; but we may account for their absence perfectly well without supposing any design to exclude them, for it is obvious that their rambling character (like that of the Metamorphoses of Ovid) forbade the possibility of interweaving them in any continuous series. Continuity in the series of narrated events, coupled with a certain degree of antiquity in the poems, being the principle on which the arrangement called the Epic Cycle was based, the Hesiodic poems generally were excluded, not from any pre-conceived intention, but because they could not be brought into harmony with such orderly reading.

What were the particular poems which it comprised, we cannot now determine with exactness. Welcker arranges them as follows:—Titanomachia, Danaïs, Amazonia (or Atthis), Œdipodia, Thebaïs (or expedition of Amphiaräus), Epigoni (or Alkmæônis), Minyas (or Phokaïs), Capture of Œchalia, Cyprian Verses, Iliad, Æthiopis, Lesser Iliad, Iliupersis or the Taking of Troy, Returns of the Heroes, Odyssey, and Telegonia. Wuellner, Lange, and Mr. Fynes Clinton enlarge the list of cyclic poems still further.[1] But all such reconstructions of the Cycle are conjectural and destitute of authority. The only poems which we can affirm on positive grounds to have been comprehended in it, are, first, the series respecting the heroes of Troy, from the Cypria to the Telegonia, of which Proclus has preserved the arguments, and which includes the Iliad and Odyssey—next, the old Thebaïs, which is expressly termed cyclic[2] in order to distinguish it from the poem of the same name composed by Antimachus. In regard to other particular compositions, we have no evidence to guide us, either for admission or exclusion, except our general views as to the scheme upon which the Cycle was framed. If my idea of that scheme be correct, the Alexandrine critics arranged therein *all* their old epical treasures, down to the Telegonia—the good as well as the bad; gold, silver, and iron—provided only they could be pieced in with the narrative series. But I cannot venture to include, as Mr. Clinton does, the Eurôpia, the Phorônis, and other poems of which we know only the names, because it is uncertain whether their contents were such as to fulfil that primary condition. Nor can I concur with him in thinking that, where there were two or more poems of the

[1] Welcker, Der Epische Kyklus, p. 37–41; Wuellner, De Cyclo Epico, p. 43 *seq.*; Lange, Ueber die Kyklischen Dichter, p. 47; Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, vol. i. p. 349.

[2] Schol. Pindar. Olymp. vi. 26; Athenæ. xi. p. 465.

same title and subject, one of them must necessarily have been adopted into the Cycle to the exclusion of the others. There may have been two Theogonies, or two Herakleias, both comprehended in the Cycle; the purpose being (as I before remarked), not to sift the better from the worse, but to determine some fixed order, convenient for reading and reference, amidst a multiplicity of scattered compositions, as the basis of a new, entire, and corrected edition.

Whatever may have been the principle on which the cyclic poems were originally strung together, they are all now lost, except those two unrivalled diamonds, whose brightness, dimming all the rest, has alone sufficed to confer imperishable glory even upon the earliest phase of Grecian life. It has been the natural privilege of the Iliad and Odyssey, from the rise of Grecian philology down to the present day, to provoke an intense curiosity, which, even in the historical and literary days of Greece, there were no assured facts to satisfy. These compositions are the monuments of an age essentially religious and poetical, but essentially also unphilosophical, unreflecting, and unrecording. The nature of the case forbids our having any authentic transmitted knowledge respecting such a period; and the lesson must be learnt, hard and painful though it be, that no imaginable reach of critical acumen will of itself enable us to discriminate fancy from reality, in the absence of a tolerable stock of evidence. After the numberless comments and acrimonious controversies[1] to which the Homeric poems have given rise, it can hardly be said that any of the points originally doubtful have obtained a solution such as to command universal acquiescence. To glance at all these controversies, however briefly, would far transcend the limits of the present work. But the most abridged Grecian history would be incomplete without some inquiry respecting *the Poet* (so the Greek critics in their veneration denominated Homer), and the productions which pass now, or have heretofore passed, under his name.

Who or what was Homer? What date is to be assigned to him? What were his compositions?

[1] It is a memorable illustration of that bitterness which has so much disgraced the controversies of literary men in *all* ages (I fear we can make no exception), when we find Pausanias saying that he had examined into the ages of Hesiod and Homer with the most laborious scrutiny, but that he knew too well the calumnious dispositions of contemporary critics and poets, to declare what conclusion he had come to (Paus. ix. 30, 2): Περὶ δὲ Ἡσιόδου τε ἡλικίας καὶ Ὁμήρου, πολυπραγμονήσαντι ἐς τὸ ἀκριβέστατον οὔ μοι γράφειν ἡδὺ ἦν, ἐπισταμένῳ τὸ φιλαίτιον ἄλλων τε καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα ὅσοι κατ' ἐμὲ ἐπὶ ποιήσει τῶν ἐπῶν καθειστήκεσαν.

A person, putting these questions to Greeks of different towns and ages, would have obtained answers widely discrepant and contradictory. Since the invaluable labours of Aristarchus and the other Alexandrine critics on the text of the Iliad and Odyssey, it has indeed been customary to regard those two (putting aside the Hymns and a few other minor poems) as being the only genuine Homeric compositions: and the literary men called Chorizontes, or the Separators, at the head of whom were Xenôn and Hellanikus, endeavoured still further to reduce the number by disconnecting the Iliad and Odyssey, and pointing out that both could not be the work of the same author. Throughout the whole course of Grecian antiquity, the Iliad and the Odyssey, and the Hymns have been received as Homeric. But if we go back to the time of Herodotus or still earlier, we find that several other epics also were ascribed to Homer—and there were not wanting[1] critics, earlier than the Alexandrine age, who regarded the whole Epic Cycle, together with the satirical poem called Margitês, the Batrachomyomachia, and other smaller pieces, as Homeric works. The cyclic Thebaïs and the Epigoni (whether they be two separate poems, or the latter a second part of the former) were in early days currently ascribed to Homer: the same was the case with the Cyprian Verses: some even attributed to him several other poems,[2] the Capture of Œchalia, the Lesser Iliad, the Phokaïs, and the Amazonia. The title of the poem called Thebaïs to be styled Homeric depends upon evidence more ancient than any which can be produced to authenticate the Iliad and the Odyssey: for Kallinus, the ancient elegiac poet (B.C. 640), mentioned Homer as the author of it—and his opinion was shared by many other competent judges.[3] From the remarkable description given by Herodotus of the expulsion of the rhapsodes from Sikyôn, by the despot Kleisthenês, in the time

[1] See the extract of Proclus, in Photius Cod. 239.

[2] Suidas, v. *Ὅμηρος*. Eustath. ad Iliad. ii. p. 330.

[3] Pausan. ix. 9, 3. The name of Kallinus in that passage seems certainly correct: *Τὰ δὲ ἔπη ταῦτα* (the Thebaïs) *Καλλῖνος ἀφικόμενος αὐτῶν ἐς μνήμην, ἔφησεν Ὅμηρον τὸν ποιήσαντα εἶναι· Καλλίνῳ δὲ πολλοί τε καὶ ἄξιοι λόγου κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔγνωσαν. Ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν ποίησιν ταύτην μετά γε Ἰλιάδα καὶ Ὀδύσσειαν ἐπαινῶ μάλιστα.*

To the same purpose the author of the Certamen of Hesiod and Homer, and the pseudo-Herodotus (Vit. Homer. c. 9). The *Ἀμφιαρέω ἐξελασία*, alluded to in Suidas as the production of Homer, may be reasonably identified with the Thebaïs (Suidas, v. *Ὅμηρος*).

The cyclographer Dionysius, who affirmed that Homer had lived both in the Theban and the Trojan wars, must have recognised that poet as author of the Thebaïs as well as of the Iliad (ap. Procl. ad Hesiod. p. 3).

of Solôn (about B.C. 580), we may form a probable judgement that the Thebaïs and the Epigoni were then rhapsodised at Sikyôn as Homeric productions.[1] And it is clear from the

[1] Herodot. v. 67. Κλεισθένης γὰρ Ἀργείοισι πολεμήσας—τοῦτο μέν, ῥαψῳδοὺς ἔπαυσε ἐν Σικυῶνι ἀγωνίζεσθαι, τῶν Ὁμηρείων ἐπέων εἵνεκα, ὅτι Ἀργεῖοί τε καὶ Ἄργος τὰ πολλὰ πάντα ὑμνέαται—τοῦτο δέ, ἡρῷον γὰρ ἦν καὶ ἐστι ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀγορῇ τῶν Σικυωνίων Ἀδρήστου τοῦ Ταλαοῦ, τοῦτον ἐπεθύμησε ὁ Κλεισθένης, ἐόντα Ἀργεῖον, ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς χώρης. Herodotus then goes on to relate how Kleisthenês carried into effect his purpose of banishing the hero Adrastus: first, he applied to the Delphian Apollo for permission to do so directly and avowedly; next, on that permission being refused, he made application to the Thebans to allow him to introduce into Sikyôn their hero Melanippus, the bitter enemy of Adrastus in the old Theban legend; by their consent, he consecrated a chapel to Melanippus in the most commanding part of the Sikyonian agora, and then transferred to the newly-imported hero the rites and festivals which had before been given to Adrastus.

Taking in conjunction all the points of this very curious tale, I venture to think that the rhapsodes incurred the displeasure of Kleisthenês by reciting, not the Homeric Iliad, but the *Homeric Thebaïs and Epigoni*. The former does not answer the conditions of the narrative: the latter fulfils them accurately.

1. It cannot be said even by the utmost latitude of speech, that in the Iliad "Little else is sung except Argos and the Argeians"—("in illis ubique fere nonnisi Argos et Argivi celebrantur"—is the translation of Schweighhäuser): Argos is rarely mentioned in it, and never exalted into any primary importance: the Argeians, as inhabitants of Argos separately, are never noticed at all: that name is applied in the Iliad, in common with *Achæans* and *Danaans*, only to the general body of Greeks—and even applied to them much less frequently than the name of *Achæans*.

2. Adrastus is twice, and only twice, mentioned in the Iliad, as master of the wonderful horse Areion and as father-in-law of Tydeus; but he makes no figure in the poem, and attracts no interest.

Wherefore, though Kleisthenês might have been ever so much incensed against Argos and Adrastus, there seems no reason why he should have interdicted the rhapsodes from reciting the Iliad. On the other hand, the Thebaïs and Epigoni could not fail to provoke him especially. For,

1. Argos and its inhabitants were the grand subject of the poem, and the proclaimed assailants in the expedition against Thêbes. Though the poem itself is lost, the first line of it has been preserved (Leutsch, Theb. Cycl. Reliq. p. 5; compare Sophoklês, Œd. Col. 380 with Scholia)—

Ἄργος ἄειδε, θεά, πολυδίψιον, ἔνθεν ἄνακτες, &c.

2. Adrastus was king of Argos, and the chief of the expedition.

It is therefore literally true, that Argos and the Argeians were "the burden of the song" in these two poems.

To this we may add—

1. The rhapsodes would have the strongest motive to recite the Thebaïs and Epigoni at Sikyôn, where Adrastus was worshipped and enjoyed so vast a popularity, and where he even attracted to himself the choric solemnities which in other towns were given to Dionysus.

2. The means which Kleisthenês took to get rid of Adrastus indicates a special reference to the Thebaïs: he invited from Thêbes the hero Melanippus, the *Hector* of Thêbes in that very poem.

language of Herodotus, that in his time the general opinion ascribed to Homer both the Cyprian Verses and the Epigoni, though he himself dissents.[1] In spite of such dissent, however, that historian must have conceived the names of Homer and Hesiod to be nearly co-extensive with the whole of the ancient epic, otherwise he would hardly have delivered his memorable judgement, that they two were the framers of Grecian Theogony.

That many different cities laid claim to the birth of Homer, (seven is rather below the truth, and Smyrna and Chios are the most prominent among them) is well known, and most of them had legends to tell respecting his romantic parentage, his alleged blindness, and his life of an itinerant bard acquainted with poverty and sorrow.[2] The discrepancies of statement respect-

For these reasons I think we may conclude that the Ὁμήρεια ἔπη alluded to in this very illustrative story of Herodotus are the Thebaïs and the Epigoni, not the Iliad.

[1] Herodot. ii. 117; iv. 32. The words in which Herodotus intimates his own dissent from the reigning opinion are treated as spurious by F. A. Wolf, but vindicated by Schweighhäuser: whether they be admitted or not, the general currency of the opinion adverted to is equally evident.

[2] The Life of Homer, which passes falsely under the name of Herodotus, contains a collection of these different stories: it is supposed to have been written about the second century after the Christian æra, but the statements which it furnishes are probably several of them as old as Ephorus (compare also Proclus ap. Photium, c. 239).

The belief in the blindness of Homer is doubtless of far more ancient date, since the circumstance appears mentioned in the Homeric Hymn to the Delian Apollo, where the bard of Chios, in some very touching lines, recommends himself and his strains to the favour of the Delian maidens employed in the worship of Apollo. This hymn is cited by Thucydidês as unquestionably authentic, and he doubtless accepted the lines as a description of the personal condition and relations of the author of the Iliad and Odyssey (Thucyd. iii. 104): Simonidês of Keôs also calls Homer a Chian (Frag. 69, Schneidewin).

There were also tales which represented Homer as the contemporary, the cousin, and the rival in recited composition, of Hesiod, who (it was pretended) had vanquished him. See the Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi, annexed to the works of the latter (p. 314, ed. Göttling; and Plutarch, Conviv. Sept. Sapient, c. 10), in which also various stories respecting the life of Homer are scattered. The emperor Hadrian consulted the Delphian oracle to know who Homer was; the answer of the priestess reported him to be a native of Ithaca, the son of Telemachus and Epikastê, daughter of Nestôr (Certamen Hom. et Hes. p. 314). The author of this Certamen tells us that the authority of the Delphian oracle deserves implicit confidence.

Hellanikus, Damastes, and Pherekydês traced both Homer and Hesiod up to Orpheus, through a pedigree of ten generations (see Sturz, Fragment. Hellanic. fr. 75–144; compare also Lobeck's remarks—*Aglaophamus*, p. 322—on the subject of these genealogies). The computations of these authors earlier than Herodotus are of value, because they illustrate the

ing the date of his reputed existence are no less worthy of remark; for out of the eight different epochs assigned to him, the oldest differs from the most recent by a period of 460 years.

Thus conflicting would have been the answers returned in different portions of the Grecian world to any questions respecting the person of Homer. But there were a poetical gens (fraternity or guild) in the Ionic island of Chios, who, if the question had been put to them, would have answered in another manner. To them Homer was not a mere antecedent man, of kindred nature with themselves, but a divine or semi-divine eponymus and progenitor, whom they worshipped in their gentile sacrifices, and in whose ascendent name and glory the individuality of every member of the gens was merged. The compositions of each separate Homêrid, or the combined efforts of many of them in conjunction, were the works of Homer: the name of the individual bard perishes and his authorship is forgotten, but the common gentile father lives and grows in renown, from generation to generation, by the genius of his self-renewing sons.

Such was the conception entertained of Homer by the poetical gens called Homêridæ or Homêrids; and in the general obscurity of the whole case, I lean towards it as the most plausible conception. Homer is not only the reputed author of the various compositions emanating from the gentile members, but also the recipient of the many different legends and of the divine genealogy, which it pleases their imagination to confer upon him. Such manufacture of fictitious personality, and such perfect incorporation of the entities of religion and fancy with the real world, is a process familiar and even habitual in the retrospective vision of the Greeks.[1]

It is to be remarked that the poetical gens here brought to

habits of mind in which Grecian chronology began: the genealogy might be easily continued backward to any length in the past. To trace Homer up to Orpheus, however, would not have been consonant to the belief of the Homêrids.

The contentions of the different cities which disputed for the birth of Homer, and indeed all the legendary anecdotes circulated in antiquity respecting the poet, are copiously discussed in Welcker, Der Epische Kyklos (p. 194–199).

[1] Even Aristotle ascribed to Homer a divine parentage: a damsel of the isle of Ios, pregnant by some god, was carried off by pirates to Smyrna at the time of the Ionic emigration, and there gave birth to the poet (Aristotel. ap. Plutarch. Vit. Homer. p. 1059).

Plato seems to have considered Homer as having been an itinerant rhapsode, poor and almost friendless (Republ. p. 600).

view, the Homêrids, are of indisputable authenticity. Their existence and their considerations were maintained down to the historical times in the island of Chios.[1] If the Homêrids were still conspicuous even in the days of Akusilaus, Pindar, Hellanikus and Plato, when their productive invention had ceased, and when they had become only guardians and distributors, in common with others, of the treasures bequeathed by their predecessors—far more exalted must their position have been three centuries before, while they were still the inspired creators of epic novelty, and when the absence of writing assured to them the undisputed monopoly of their own compositions.[2]

Homer, then, is no individual man, but the divine of heroic father (the ideas of worship and ancestry coalescing, as they constantly did in the Grecian mind) of the gentile Homêrids, and he is the author of the Thebaïs, the Epigoni, the Cyprian Verses, the Procems or Hymns, and other poems in the same sense in which he is the author of the Iliad and

[1] Pindar, Nem. ii. 1, and Scholia; Akusilaus, Fragm. 31, Didot; Harpokration, v. Ὁμηρίδαι; Hellanic. Fr. 55, Didot; Strabo, xiv. p. 645. It seems by a passage of Plato (Phædrus, p. 252), that the Homêridæ professed to possess unpublished verses of their ancestral poet—ἔστι ἀπόῤῥητα. Compare Plato, Republic. p. 599, and Isocrat. Helen. p. 218.

[2] Nitzsch (De Historiâ Homeri, Fascic. 1, p. 128, Fascic. 2, p. 71), and Ulrici (Geschichte der Episch. Poesie, vol. i. p. 240–381) question the antiquity of the Homêrid gens, and limit their functions to simple reciters, denying that they ever composed songs or poems of their own. Yet these *gentes*, such as the Eunеidæ, the Lykomidæ, the Butadæ, the Talthybiadæ, the descendants of Cheirôn at Peliôn, &c., the Hesychidæ (Schol. Sophocl. Œdip. Col. 489) (the acknowledged parallels of the Homêridæ), may be surely all considered as belonging to the earliest known elements of Grecian history: rarely at least, if ever, can such gens, with its tripartite character of civil, religious, and professional, be shown to have commenced at any recent period. And in the early times, composer and singer were one person: often at least, though probably not always, the bard combined both functions. The Homeric ἀοιδὸς sings his own compositions; and it is reasonable to imagine that many of the early Homêrids did the same.

See Niebuhr, Römisch. Gesch. vol. i. p. 324; and the treatise, Ueber die Sikeler in der Odyssee—in the Rheinisches Museum, 1828, p. 257; and Boeckh, in the Index of Contents to his Lectures of 1834.

"The Sage Vyasa (observes Professor Wilson, System of Hindu Mythology, Introd. p. lxii.) is represented, not as the author, but as the arranger and compiler of the Vedas and the Puránás. His name denotes his character, meaning *the arranger or distributor* (Welcker gives the same meaning to the name *Homer*); and the recurrence of many Vyasas,—many individuals who new modelled the Hindu scriptures,—has nothing in it that is improbable, except the fabulous intervals by which their labours are separated." Individual authorship and the thirst of personal distinction are in this case also buried under one great and common name, as in the case of Homer.

Odyssey—assuming that these various compositions emanate, as perhaps they may, from different individuals numbered among the Homêrids. But this disallowance of the historical personality of Homer is quite distinct from the question, with which it has been often confounded, whether the Iliad and Odyssey are originally entire poems, and whether by one author or otherwise. To us, the name of Homer means these two poems, and little else: we desire to know as much as can be learnt respecting their date, their original composition, their preservation, and their mode of communication to the public. All these questions are more or less complicated one with the other.

Concerning the date of the poems, we have no other information except the various affirmations, respecting the age of Homer, which differ among themselves (as I have before observed) by an interval of 460 years, and which for the most part determine the date of Homer by reference to some other event, itself fabulous and unauthenticated—such as the Trojan war, the Return of the Hêrakleids, or the Ionic migration. Kratês placed Homer earlier than the Return of the Hêrakleids and less than eighty years after the Trojan war: Eratosthenês put him 100 years after the Trojan war: Aristotle, Aristarchus and Castor made his birth contemporary with the Ionic migration, while Apollodôrus brings him down to 100 years after that event, or 240 years after the taking of Troy. Thucydidês assigns to him a date much subsequent to the Trojan war.[1] On the other hand, Theopompus and Euphoriôn refer his age to the far more recent period of the Lydian king Gygês (Ol. 18–23, B.C. 708–688), and put him 500 years after the Trojan epoch.[2] What were the grounds of these various conjectures, we do not know, though, in the statements of Kratês and Eratosthenês, we may pretty well divine. But the oldest dictum preserved to us respecting the date of Homer—meaning

[1] Thucyd. i. 3.

[2] See the statements and citations respecting the age of Homer, collected in Mr. Clinton's Chronology, vol. i. p. 146. He prefers the view of Aristotle, and places the Iliad and Odyssey a century earlier than I am inclined to do,—940–927 B.C.

Kratês probably placed the poet anterior to the Return of the Hêrakleids, because the Iliad makes no mention of Dorians in Peloponnêsus: Eratosthenês may be supposed to have grounded his date on the passage of the Iliad which mentions the three generations descended from Æneas. We should have been glad to know the grounds of the very low date assigned by Theopompus and Euphoriôn.

The Pseudo-Herodotus, in his life of Homer, puts the birth of the poet 168 years after the Trojan war.

thereby the date of the Iliad and Odyssey—appears to me at the same time the most credible, and the most consistent with the general history of the ancient epic. Herodotus places Homer 400 years before himself; taking his departure, not from any fabulous event, but from a point of real and authentic time.[1] Four centuries anterior to Herodotus would be a period commencing with 880 B.C.: so that the composition of the Homeric poems would thus fall in a space between 850 and 800 B.C. We may gather from the language of Herodotus that this was his own judgement, opposed to a current opinion which assigned the poet to an earlier epoch.

To place the Iliad and Odyssey at some periods between 850 B.C. and 776 B.C., appears to me more probable than any other date, anterior or posterior—more probable than the latter, because we are justified in believing these two poems to be older than Arktinus, who comes shortly after the first Olympiad—more probable than the former, because the further we push the poems back, the more do we enhance the wonder of their preservation, already sufficiently great, down from such an age and society to the historical times.

The mode in which these poems, and indeed all poems, epic as well as lyric, down to the age (probably) of Peisistratus, were circulated and brought to bear upon the public, deserves particular attention. They were not read by individuals alone and apart, but sung or recited at festivals or to assembled companies. This seems to be one of the few undisputed facts with regard to the great poet: for even those who maintain that the Iliad and Odyssey were preserved by means of writing, seldom contend that they were read.

In appreciating the effect of the poems, we must always take account of this great difference between early Greece and our own times—between the congregation mustered at a solemn festival, stimulated by community of sympathy, listening to a measured and musical recital from the lips of trained bards or rhapsodes, whose matter was supposed to have been inspired by the Muse—and the solitary reader with a manuscript before him; such manuscript being, down to a very late period in Greek literature, indifferently written, without division into parts and without marks of punctuation. As in the case of

[1] Herodot. ii. 53. Herakleidês Ponticus affirmed that Lykurgus had brought into Peloponnêsus the Homeric poems, which had before been unknown out of Ionia. The supposed epoch of Lykurgus has sometimes been employed to sustain the date here assigned to the Homeric poems; but everything respecting Lykurgus is too doubtful to serve as evidence in other inquiries.

dramatic performances in all ages, so in that of the early Grecian epic—a very large proportion of its impressive effect was derived from the talent of the reciter and the force of the general accompaniments, and would have disappeared altogether in solitary reading. Originally the bard sung his own epical narrative commencing with a procemium or hymn to one of the gods:[1] his profession was separate and special, like that of the carpenter, the leech, or the prophet: his manner and enunciation must have required particular training no less than his imaginative faculty. His character presents itself in the Odyssey as one highly esteemed; and in the Iliad, even Achilles does not disdain to touch the lyre with his own hands, and to sing heroic deeds.[2] Not only did the Iliad and Odyssey, and the poems embodied in the Epic Cycle, produce all their impression and gain all their renown by this process of oral delivery, but even the lyric and choric poets who succeeded them were known and felt in the same way by the general public, even after the full establishment of habits of reading among lettered men. While in the case of the epic, the recitation or singing had been extremely simple and the measure comparatively little diversified, with no other accompaniment than that of the four-stringed harp—all the variations superinduced upon the original hexameter, beginning with the pentameter and iambus, and proceeding step by step to the complicated strophês of Pindar and the tragic writers, still left the general effect of the poetry greatly dependent upon voice and accompaniments and pointedly distinguished from mere solitary reading of the words. And in the dramatic poetry, the last in order of time, the declamation and gesture of the

[1] The Homeric hymns are procems of this sort, some very short, consisting only of a few lines—others of considerable length. The Hymn (or rather one of the two hymns) to Apollo is cited by Thucydidês as the Procem of Apollo.

The Hymns to Aphroditê, Apollo, Hermês, Dêmêtêr and Dionysus, are genuine epical narratives. Hermann (Præf. ad Hymn. p. lxxxix.) pronounces the Hymn to Aphroditê to be the oldest and most genuine; portions of the Hymn to Apollo (Herm. p. xx.) are also very old, but both that hymn and the others are largely interpolated. His opinion respecting these interpolations, however, is disputed by Franke (Præfat. ad Hymn. Homeric. p. ix.-xix.); and the distinction between what is genuine and what is spurious depends upon criteria not very distinctly assignable. Compare Ulrici, Gesch. der Ep. Poes. p. 385–391.

[2] Phemius, Demodokus, and the nameless bard who guarded the fidelity of Klytæmnêstra, bear out this position (Odyss. i. 155; iii. 267; viii. 490; xxi. 330; Achilles in Iliad, ix. 190).

A degree of inviolability seems attached to the person of the bard as well as to that of the herald (Odyss. xxii. 355–357).

speaking actor alternated with the song and dance of the Chorus, and with the instruments of musicians, the whole being set off by imposing visible decorations. Now both dramatic effect and song are familiar in modern times, so that every man knows the difference between reading the words and hearing them under the appropriate circumstances: but poetry, as such, is, and has now long been, so exclusively enjoyed by reading, that it requires an especial memento to bring us back to the time when the Iliad and Odyssey were addressed only to the ear and feelings of a promiscuous and sympathising multitude. Readers there were none, at least until the century preceding Solôn and Peisistratus: from that time forward, they gradually increased both in number and influence; though doubtless small, even in the most literary period of Greece, as compared with modern European society. So far as the production of beautiful epic poetry was concerned, however, the select body of instructed readers furnished a less potent stimulus than the unlettered and listening crowd of the earlier periods. The poems of Chœrilus and Antimachus, towards the close of the Peloponnesian war, though admired by erudite men, never acquired popularity; and the emperor Hadrian failed in his attempt to bring the latter poet into fashion at the expense of Homer.[1]

It will be seen by what has been here stated, that that class of men, who formed the medium of communication between the verse and the ear, were of the highest importance in the ancient world, and especially in the earlier periods of its career —the bards and rhapsodes for the epic, the singers for the lyric, the actors and singers jointly with the dancers for the

[1] Spartian, Vit. Hadrian. p. 8; Dio Cass. lxix. 4.; Plut. Tim. c. 36. There are some good observations on this point in Näke's comments on Chœrilus, ch. viii. p. 59—

"Habet hoc epica poesis, vera illa, cujus perfectissimam normam agnoscimus Homericam—habet hoc proprium, ut non in possessione virorum eruditorum, sed quasi viva sit et coram populo recitanda: ut cum populo crescat, et si populus Deorum et antiquorum heroum facinora, quod præcipuum est epicæ poeseos argumentum, audire et secum repetere dedidicerit, obmutescat. Id vero tum factum est in Græciâ, quum populus eâ ætate, quam pueritiam dicere possis, peractâ, partim ad res serias tristesque, politicas maxime—easque multo, quam antea, impeditiores—abstrahebatur: partim epicæ poeseos pertæsus, ex aliis poeseos generibus, quæ tum nascebantur, novum et diversum oblectamenti genus primo præsagire, sibi, deinde haurire, cœpit."

Näke remarks too that the "splendidissima et propria Homericæ poeseos ætas, ea quæ sponte quasi suâ inter populum et quasi cum populo viveret," did not reach below Peisistratus. It did not, I think, reach even so low as that period.

chorus and drama. The lyric and dramatic poets taught with their own lips the delivery of their compositions, and so prominently did this business of teaching present itself to the view of the public, that the name Didaskalia, by which the dramatic exhibition was commonly designated, derived from thence its origin.

Among the number of rhapsodes who frequented the festivals at a time when Grecian cities were multiplied and easy of access, for the recitation of the ancient epic, there must have been of course great differences of excellence; but that the more considerable individuals of the class were elaborately trained and highly accomplished in the exercise of their profession, we may assume as certain. But it happens that Sokratês with his two pupils Plato and Xenophon speak contemptuously of their merits, and many persons have been disposed, somewhat too readily, to admit this sentence of condemnation as conclusive, without taking account of the point of view from which it was delivered.[1] These philosophers considered Homer and other poets with a view to instruction, ethical doctrine, and virtuous practice: they analysed the characters whom the poet described, sifted the value of the lessons conveyed, and often struggled to discover a hidden meaning, where they disapproved that which was apparent. When they found a man like the rhapsode, who professed to

[1] Xenoph. Memorab. iv. 2, 10; and Sympos. iii. 6. *Οἶσθά τι οὖν ἔθνος ἠλιθιώτερον ῥαψῳδῶν; . . . . Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὰς ὑπονοίας οὐκ ἐπίστανται. Σὺ δὲ Ἀντισθένει τε καὶ Ἀναξιμάνδρῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς πολὺ δέδωκας ἀργύριον, ὥστε οὐδέν σε τῶν πολλοῦ ἀξίων λέληθε.*

These *ὑπονοίαι* are the hidden meanings or allegories which a certain set of philosophers undertook to discover in Homer, and which the rhapsodes were no way called upon to study.

The Platonic dialogue called Iôn ascribes to Iôn the double function of a rhapsode or impressive reciter, and a critical expositor of the poet (Isokratês also indicates the same double character in the rhapsodes of his time—Panathenaic. p. 240); but it conveys no solid grounds for a mean estimate of the class of rhapsodes, while it attests remarkably the striking effect produced by their recitation (c. 6, p. 535). That this class of men came to combine the habit of expository comment on the poet with their original profession of reciting, proves the tendencies of the age; probably it also brought them into rivalry with the philosophers.

The grounds taken by Aristotle (Problem. xxx. 10; compare Aul. Gellius, xx. 14) against the actors, singers, musicians, &c., of his time are more serious, and have more the air of truth.

If it be correct in Lehrs (de Studiis Aristarchi, Diss. ii. p. 46) to identify those early glossographers of Homer, whose explanations the Alexandrine critics so severely condemned, with the rhapsodes, this only proves that the rhapsodes had come to undertake a double duty, of which their predecessors before Solôn would never have dreamt.

impress the Homeric narrative upon an audience, and yet either never meddled at all, or meddled unsuccessfully, with the business of exposition, they treated him with contempt; indeed Sokratês depreciates the poets themselves much upon the same principle, as dealing with matters of which they could render no rational account.[1] It was also the habit of Plato and Xenophon to disparage generally professional exertion of talent for the purpose of gaining a livelihood, contrasting it often in an indelicate manner with the gratuitous teaching and ostentatious poverty of their master. But we are not warranted in judging the rhapsodes by such a standard. Though they were not philosophers or moralists, it was their province—and it had been so, long before the philosophical point of view was opened—to bring their poet home to the bosoms and emotions of an assembled crowd, and to penetrate themselves with his meaning so far as was suitable for that purpose, adapting to it the appropriate graces of action and intonation. In this their genuine task they were valuable members of the Grecian community, and seemed to have possessed all the qualities necessary for success.

These rhapsodes, the successors of the primitive Acœdi or Bards, seem to have been distinguished from them by the discontinuance of all musical accompaniment. Originally the bard sung, enlivening the song with occasional touches of the simple four-stringed harp: his successor the rhapsode, recited, holding in his hand nothing but a branch of laurel, and depending for effect upon voice and manner,—a species of musical and rhythmical declamation,[2] which gradually increased

[1] Plato, Apolog. Socrat. p. 22, c. 7.

[2] Aristotel. Poetic. c. 47; Welcker, Der Episch. Kyklos; Ueber den Vortrag der Homerischen Gedichte, p. 340–406, which collects all the facts respecting the Acœdi and the rhapsodes. Unfortunately the ascertained points are very few.

The laurel branch in the hand of the singer or reciter (for the two expressions are often confounded) seems to have been peculiar to the recitation of Homer and Hesiod (Hesiod, Theog. 30; Schol. ad Aristophan. Nub. 1367; Pausan. x. 7, 2). "Poemata omne genus (says Apuleius, Florid. p. 122, Bipont.) apta *virgæ*, lyræ, socco, cothurno."

Not only Homer and Hesiod, but also Archilochus, were recited by rhapsodes (Athenæ. xii. 620; also Plato, Legg. ii. p. 658). Consult, besides, Nitzsch, De Historiâ Homeri, Fascic. 2, p. 114, *seq.*, respecting the rhapsodes; and O. Müller, History of the Literature of ancient Greece, ch. iv. s. 3.

The ideas of singing and speech are however often confounded, in reference to any verse solemnly and emphatically delivered (Thucydid. ii. 54)—φάσκοντες οἱ πρεσβύτεροι πάλαι ξ δ ε σ θ α ι, Ἥξει Δωριακὸς πόλεμος καὶ λοιμὸς ἅμ' αὐτῷ. And the rhapsodes are said to *sing* Homer (Plato,

in vehement emphasis and gesticulation until it approached to that of the dramatic actor. At what time this change took place, or whether the two different modes of enunciating the ancient epic may for a certain period have gone on simultaneously, we have no means of determining. Hesiod receives from the Muse a branch of laurel, as a token of his ordination into their service, which marks him for a rhapsode; while the ancient bard with his harp is still recognised in the Homeric Hymn to the Delian Apollo, as efficient and popular at the Panionic festivals in the island of Delos.[1] Perhaps the improvements made in the harp, to which three strings, in addition to the original four, were attached by Terpander (B.C. 660), and the growing complication of instrumental music generally, may have contributed to discredit the primitive accompaniment, and thus to promote the practice of recital: the story, that Terpander himself composed music not only for hexameter poems of his own, but also for those of Homer, seems to indicate that the music which preceded him was ceasing to

Eryxias, c. 13; Heysch. v. Βραυρωνίοις); Strabo (i. p. 18) has a good passage upon song and speech.

William Grimm (Deutsche Heldensage, p. 373) supposes the ancient German heroic romances to have been recited or declaimed in a similar manner with a simple accompaniment of the harp, as the Servian heroic lays are even at this time delivered.

Fauriel also tells us, respecting the French Carlovingian Epic (Romans de Chevalerie, Revue des Deux Mondes, xiii. p. 559): "The romances of the 12th and 13th centuries were really sung: the *jongleur* invited his audience to hear a *belle chanson et histoire*,—'le mot chanter ne manque jamais dans la formule initiale,'—and it is to be understood literally; the music was simple and intermittent, more like a recitative; the jongleur carried a rebek, or violin with three strings, an Arabic instrument; when he wished to rest his voice, he played an air or retournelle upon this; he went thus about from place to place, and the romances had no existence among the people except through the aid and recitation of these jongleurs."

It appears that there had once been rhapsodic exhibitions at the festivals of Dionysus, but they were discontinued (Klearchus ap. Athenæ. vii. p. 275)—probably superseded by the dithyramb and the tragedy.

The etymology of ῥαψῳδός is a disputed point: Welcker traces it to ῥάβδος; most critics derive it from ῥάπτειν ἀοιδήν, which O. Müller explains "to denote the coupling together of verses without any considerable divisions or pauses,—the even, unbroken, continuous flow of the epic poem," as contrasted with the strophic or choric periods (*l. c.*).

[1] Homer, Hymn to Apoll. 170. The κίθαρις, ἀοιδή, ὀρχηθμός, are constantly put together in that hymn: evidently the instrumental accompaniment was essential to the hymns at the Ionic festival. Compare also the Hymn to Hermês (430), where the function ascribed to the Muses can hardly be understood to include non-musical recitation. The Hymn to Hermês is more recent than Terpander, inasmuch as it mentions the seven strings of the lyre, v. 50.

find favour.[1] By whatever steps the change from the bard to the rhapsode took place, certain it is that before the time of Solôn the latter was the recognised and exclusive organ of the old Epic; sometimes in short fragments before private companies, by single rhapsodes—sometimes several rhapsodes in continuous succession at a public festival.

Respecting the mode in which the Homeric poems were preserved, during the two centuries (or, as some think, longer interval) between their original composition and the period shortly preceding Solôn—and respecting their original composition and subsequent changes—there are wide differences of opinion among able critics. Were they preserved with, or without, being written? Was the Iliad originally composed as one poem, and the Odyssey in like manner, or is each of them an aggregation of parts originally self-existent and unconnected? Was the authorship of each poem single-headed or many-headed?

Either tacitly or explicitly, these questions have been generally coupled together and discussed with reference to each other, by inquiries into the Homeric poems; though Mr. Payne Knight's Prolegomena have the merit of keeping them distinct. Half a century ago, the acute and valuable Prolegomena of F. A. Wolf, turning to account the Venetian Scholia which had then been recently published, first opened philosophical discussion as to the history of the Homeric text. A considerable part of that dissertation (though by no means the whole) is employed in vindicating the position, previously announced by Bentley amongst others, that the separate constituent portions of the Iliad and Odyssey had not been cemented together into any compact body and unchangeable order until the days of Peisistratus, in the sixth century before Christ. As a step towards that conclusion, Wolf maintained that no written copies of either poem could be shown to have existed during

[1] Terpander—see Plutarch. de Musicâ, c. 3-4; the facts respecting him are collected in Plehn's Lesbiaca, p. 140-160; but very little can be authenticated.

Stesander at the Pythian festivals sang the Homeric battles, with a harp accompaniment of his own composition (Athenæ. xiv. p. 638).

The principal testimonies respecting the rhapsodising of the Homeric poems at Athens, chiefly at the Panathenaic festival, are Isokratês, Panegyric. p. 74; Lycurgus contra Leocrat. p. 161; Plato, Hipparch. p. 228; Diogen. Laërt. Vit. Solon. i. 57.

Inscriptions attest that rhapsodising continued in great esteem, down to a late period of the historical age, both at Chios and Teôs, especially the former: it was the subject of competition by trained youth, and of prizes for the victor, at periodical religious solemnities: see Corp. Inscript. Boeckh, No. 2214-3088.

the earlier times to which their composition is referred—and that without writing, neither the perfect symmetry of so complicated a work could have been originally conceived by any poet, nor, if realised by him, transmitted with assurance to posterity. The absence of easy and convenient writing, such as must be indispensably supposed for long manuscripts, among the early Greeks, was thus one of the points in Wolf's case against the primitive integrity of the Iliad and Odyssey. By Nitzsch and other leading opponents of Wolf, the connexion of the one with the other seems to have been accepted as he originally put it, and it has been considered incumbent on those, who defended the ancient aggregate character of the Iliad and Odyssey, to maintain that they were written poems from the beginning.

To me it appears that the architectonic functions ascribed by Wolf to Peisistratus and his associates in reference to the Homeric poems, are nowise admissible. But much would undoubtedly be gained towards that view of the question, if it could be shown that in order to controvert it, we were driven to the necessity of admitting long written poems in the ninth century before the Christian æra. Few things, in my opinion, can be more improbable: and Mr. Payne Knight, opposed as he is to the Wolfian hypothesis, admits this no less than Wolf himself.[1] The traces of writing in Greece, even in

[1] Knight, Prolegom. Hom. c. xxxviii.-xl. "Haud tamen ullum Homericorum carminum exemplar Pisistrati seculo antiquius extitisse, aut sexcentesimo prius anno ante C.N. scriptum fuisse, facile credam: rara enim et perdifficilis erat iis temporibus scriptura ob penuriam materiæ scribendo idoneæ, quum literas aut lapidibus exarare, aut tabulis ligneis aut laminis metalli alicujus insculpere oporteret . . . . Atque ideo memoriter retenta sunt, et hæc et alia veterum poetarum carmina, et per urbes et vicos et in principum virorum ædibus, decantata a rhapsodis. Neque mirandum est, ea per tot sæcula sic integra conservata esse, quoniam—per eos tradita erant, qui ab omnibus Græciæ et coloniarum regibus et civitatibus mercede satis amplâ conducti, omnia sua studia in iis ediscendis, retinendis, et rite recitandis, conferebant." Compare Wolf, Prolegom. xxiv.-xxv.

The evidences of early writing among the Greeks, and of written poems even anterior to Homer, may be seen collected in Kreuser (Vorfragen ueber Homeros, p. 127–159, Frankfort, 1828). His proofs appear to me altogether inconclusive. Nitzsch maintains the same opinion (Histor. Homeri, Fasc. i. sect. xl. xvii. xviii.)—in my opinion, not more successfully: nor does Franz (Epigraphicê Græc. Introd. s. iv.) produce any new arguments.

I do not quite subscribe to Mr. Knight's language, when he says that *there is nothing wonderful* in the long preservation of the Homeric poems *unwritten*. It is enough to maintain that the existence and practical use of long manuscripts by all the rhapsodes, under the condition and circumstances of the 8th and 9th centuries among the Greeks, would be a greater wonder.

the seventh century before the Christian æra, are exceedingly trifling. We have no remaining inscription earlier than the 40th Olympiad, and the early inscriptions are rude and unskilfully executed: nor can we even assure ourselves whether Archilochus, Simonidês of Amorgus, Kallinus, Tyrtæus, Xanthus, and the other early elegiac and lyric poets, committed their compositions to writing, or at what time the practice of doing so became familiar. The first positive ground, which authorises us to presume the existence of a manuscript of Homer, is in the famous ordinance of Solôn with regard to the rhapsodes at the Panathenæa; but for what length of time, previously, manuscripts had existed, we are unable to say.

Those who maintain the Homeric poems to have been written from the beginning, rest their case, not upon positive proofs—nor yet upon the existing habits of society with regard to poetry, for they admit generally that the Iliad and Odyssey were not read, but recited and heard—but upon the supposed necessity that there must have been manuscripts,[1] to ensure the preservation of the poems,—the unassisted memory of reciters being neither sufficient nor trustworthy. But here we only escape a smaller difficulty by running into a greater; for the existence of trained bards, gifted with extraordinary memory, is far less astonishing than that of long manuscripts in an age essentially non-reading and non-writing, and when even suitable instruments and materials for the process are not obvious. Moreover there is a strong positive reason for believing that the bard was under no necessity of refreshing his memory by consulting a manuscript. For if such had been the fact, blindness would have been a disqualification for the profession, which we know that it was not: as well from the example of Demodokus in the Odyssey, as from that of the blind bard of Chios, in the Hymn to the Delian Apollo, whom Thucydidês, as well as the general tenor of Grecian legend, identifies with Homer himself.[2] The author of that Hymn, be he who he may, could never have described a blind man as attaining the

[1] See this argument strongly put by Nitzsch, in the prefatory remarks at the beginning of his second volume of Commentaries on the Odyssey (p. x.-xxix.). He takes great pains to discard all idea that the poems were written in order to be read. To the same purpose Franz (Epigraphicê Græc. Introd. p. 32), who adopts Nitzsch's positions,—"Audituris enim, non lecturis, carmina parabant."

[2] Odyss. vii. 65; Hymn. ad Apoll. 172; Pseudo-Herodot. Vit. Homer. c. 3; Thucyd. iii. 104.

Various commentators on Homer imagined that under the misfortune of Demodokus the poet in reality described his own (Schol. ad Odyss. i, 1; Maxim. Tyr. xxxviii. 1).

utmost perfection in his art, if he had been conscious that the memory of the bard was only maintained by constant reference to the manuscript in his chest.

Nor will it be found, after all, that the effort of memory required either from bards or rhapsodes, even for the longest of these old epic poems,—though doubtless great,—was at all superhuman. Taking the case with reference to the entire Iliad and Odyssey, we know that there were educated gentlemen at Athens who could repeat both poems by heart:[1] but

[1] Xenoph. Sympos. iii. 5. Compare, respecting the laborious discipline of the Gallic Druids, and the number of unwritten verses which they retained in their memories, Cæsar. B. G. vi. 14: Mela, iii. 2: also Wolf, Prolegg. s. xxiv. and Herod. ii. 77, about the prodigious memory of the Egyptian priests at Heliopolis.

I transcribe, from the interesting Discours of M. Fauriel (prefixed to his Chants Populaires de la Grèce Moderne, Paris, 1824), a few particulars respecting the number, the mnemonic power, and the popularity of those itinerant singers or rhapsodes who frequent the festivals or *paneghyris* of modern Greece: it is curious to learn that this profession is habitually exercised by *blind* men (p. xc. *seq.*).

"Les aveugles exercent en Grèce une profession qui les rend non seulement agréables, mais nécessaires; le caractère, l'imagination, et la condition du peuple, étant ce qu'ils sont: c'est la profession de chanteurs ambulans . . . Ils sont dans l'usage, tant sur le continent que dans les îles, de la Grèce, d'apprendre par cœur le plus grand nombre qu'ils peuvent de chansons populaires de tout genre et de toute époque. Quelques uns finissent par en savoir une quantité prodigieuse, et tous en savent beaucoup. Avec ce trésor dans leur mémoire, ils sont toujours en marche, traversent la Grèce en tout sens; ils s'en vont de ville en ville, de village en village, chantant à l'auditoire qui se forme aussitôt autour d'eux, partout où ils se montrent, celles de leurs chansons qu'ils jugent convenir le mieux, soit à la localité, soit à la circonstance, et reçoivent une petite rétribution qui fait tout leur revenu. Ils ont l'air de chercher de préférence, en tout lieu, la partie la plus inculte de la population, qui en est toujours la plus curieuse, la plus avide d'impressions, et la moins difficile dans le choix de ceux qui leur sont offertes. Les Turcs seuls ne les écoutent pas. C'est aux réunions nombreuses, aux fêtes de village connues sous le nom de *Paneghyris*, que ces chanteurs ambulans accourent le plus volontiers. Ils chantent en s'accompagnant d'un instrument à cordes que l'on touche avec un archet, et qui est exactement l'ancienne lyre des Grecs, dont il a conservé le nom comme la forme.

"Cette lyre, pour être entière, doit avoir cinq cordes: mais souvent elle n'en a que deux ou trois, dont les sons, comme il est aisé de présumer, n'ont rien de bien harmonieux. Les chanteurs aveugles vont ordinairement isolés, et chacun d'eux chante à part des autres: mais quelquefois aussi ils se réunissent par groupes de deux ou de trois, pour dire ensemble les mêmes chansons . . . Ces modernes rhapsodes doivent être divisés en deux classes. Les uns (et ce sont, selon toute apparence, les plus nombreux) se bornent à la fonction de recueillir, d'apprendre par cœur, et de mettre en circulation, des pièces qu'ils n'ont point composées. Les autres (et ce sont ceux qui forment l'ordre le plus distingué de leurs corps), à cette

in the professional recitations, we are not to imagine that the same person did go through the whole: the recitation was essentially a joint undertaking, and the rhapsodes who visited a festival would naturally understand among themselves which part of the poem should devolve upon each particular individual. Under such circumstances, and with such means of preparation beforehand, the quantity of verse which a rhapsode could deliver would be measured, not so much by the exhaustion of his memory, as by the physical sufficiency of his voice, having reference to the sonorous, emphatic, and rhythmical pronunciation required from him.[1]

But what guarantee have we for the exact transmission of the text for a space of two centuries by simply oral means? It may be replied that oral transmission would hand down the text as exactly as in point of fact it was handed down. The great lines of each poem—the order of parts—the vein of Homeric feeling and the general style of locution, and for the most part, the true words—would be maintained: for the professional training of the rhapsode, over and above the precision of his actual memory, would tend to Homerise his mind (if the expression may be permitted), and to restrain him within this magic circle. On the other hand, in respect to the details of the text, we should expect that there would be wide differences and numerous inaccuracies: and so there really were, as the records contained in the Scholia, together with the passages

fonction de répétiteurs et de colporteurs des poésies d'autrui, joignent celle de poëtes, et ajoutent à la masse des chansons appriscs d'autres chants de leur façon . . . . Ces rhapsodes aveugles sont les nouvellistes et les historiens, en même temps que les poëtes du peuple, en cela parfaitement semblables aux rhapsodes anciens de la Grèce."

To pass to another country—Persia, once the great rival of Greece:—"The Kurroglian rhapsodes are called *Kurroglou-Khans*, from *khaunden*, to sing. Their duty is to know by heart all the *mejjlisses* (meetings) of Kurroglou, narrate them, or sing them with the accompaniment of the favourite instrument of Kurroglou, the chungur or sitar, a three-stringed guitar. Ferdausi has also his *Shah-nama-Khans*, and the prophet Mahommed his *Koran-Khans*. The memory of those singers is truly astonishing. At every request they recite in one breath for some hours, without stammering, beginning the tale at the passage or verse pointed out by the hearers." (Specimens of the Popular Poetry of Persia, as found in the Adventures and Improvisations of Kurroglou, the Bandit Minstrel of Northern Persia, by Alexander Chodsko: London, 1842, Introd. p. 13.)

"One of the songs of the Calmuck national bards sometimes lasts a whole day." (Ibid. p. 37z.)

[1] There are just remarks of Mr. Mitford on the possibility that the Homeric poems might have been preserved without writing (History of Greece, vol. i. p. 135–137).

cited in ancient authors, but not found in our Homeric text, abundantly testify.[1]

Moreover the state of the Iliad and Odyssey in respect to the letter called the Digamma affords a proof that they were recited for a considerable period before they were committed to writing, insomuch that the oral pronunciation underwent during the interval a sensible change.[2] At the time when these poems were composed, the Digamma was an effective consonant, and figured as such in the structure of the verse: at the time when they were committed to writing, it had ceased to be pronounced, and therefore never found a place in any of the manuscripts—insomuch that the Alexandrine critics, though they knew of its existence in the much later poems of Alkæus and Sapphô, never recognised it in Homer. The hiatus, and the various perplexities of metre, occasioned by the loss of the Digamma, were corrected by different grammatical stratagems. But the whole history of this lost letter is very curious, and is rendered intelligible only by the supposition that the Iliad and Odyssey belonged for a wide space of time to the memory, the voice and the ear, exclusively.

At what period these poems, or indeed any other Greek poems, first began to be written, must be matter of conjecture, though there is ground for assurance that it was before the time of Solôn. If in the absence of evidence we may venture upon naming any more determinate period, the question at once suggests itself, what were the purposes which in that stage of society, a manuscript at its first commencement must have

[1] Villoison, Prolegomen. p. xxxiv.-lvi.; Wolf, Prolegomen. p. 37. Düntzer, in the Epicor. Græc. Fragm. p. 27–29, gives a considerable list of the Homeric passages cited by ancient authors, but not found either in the Iliad or Odyssey. It is hardly to be doubted, however, that many of these passages belonged to other epic poems which passed under the name of Homer. Welcker (Der Episch. Kyklus, p. 20–133) enforces this opinion very justly, and it harmonises with his view of the name of Homer as co-extensive with the whole Epic cycle.

[2] See this argument strongly maintained in Giese (Ueber den Æolischen Dialekt, sect. 14, p. 160 *seqq.*). He notices several other particulars in the Homeric language—the plenitude and variety of interchangeable grammatical forms—the numerous metrical licences, set right by appropriate oral intonations—which indicate a language as yet not constrained by the fixity of written authority.

The same line of argument is taken by O. Müller (History of the Literature of Ancient Greece, ch. iv. s. 5).

Giese has shown also, in the same chapter, that all the manuscripts of Homer mentioned in the Scholia, were written in the Ionic alphabet (with Η and Ω as marks for the long vowels, and no special mark for the rough breathing), in so far as the special citations out of them enable us to verify.

been intended to answer? For whom was a written Iliad necessary? Not for the rhapsodes; for with them it was not only planted in the memory, but also interwoven with the feelings, and conceived in conjunction with all those flexions and intonations of voice, pauses and other oral artifices, which were required for emphatic delivery, and which the naked manuscript could never reproduce. Not for the general public—*they* were accustomed to receive it with its rhapsodic delivery, and with its accompaniments of a solemn and crowded festival. The only persons for whom the written Iliad would be suitable, would be a select few; studious and curious men—a class of readers, capable of analysing the complicated emotions which they had experienced as hearers in the crowd, and who would on perusing the written words realise in their imaginations a sensible portion of the impression communicated by the reciter.[1]

Incredible as the statement may seem in an age like the present, there is in all early societies, and there was in early Greece, a time when no such reading class existed. If we could discover at what time such a class first began to be

[1] Nitzsch and Welcker argue, that because the Homeric poems were *heard* with great delight and interest, therefore the first rudiments of the art of writing, even while beset by a thousand mechanical difficulties, would be employed to record them. I cannot adopt this opinion, which appears to me to derive all its plausibility from our present familiarity with reading and writing. The first step from the recited to the written poem is really one of great violence, as well as useless for any want then actually felt. I much more agree with Wolf when he says: "Diu enim illorum hominum vita et simplicitas nihil admodum habuit, quod scripturâ dignum videretur: in aliis omnibus occupati agunt illi, quæ posteri scribunt, vel (ut de quibusdam populis accepimus) etiam monstratam operam hanc spernunt tanquam indecori otii: carmina autem quæ pangunt, longo usu sic ore fundere et excipere consueverunt ut cantu et recitatione cum maxime vigentia deducere ad mutas notas, ex illius ætatis sensu nihil aliud esset, quam perimere ea et vitali vi ac spiritu privare." (Prolegom. s. xv. p. 59.)

Some good remarks on this subject are to be found in William Humboldt's Introduction to his elaborate treatise *Ueber die Kawi-Sprache*, in reference to the oral tales current among the Basques. He too observes how great and repulsive a proceeding it is, to pass at first from verse sung or recited, to verse written; implying that the words are conceived detached from the *Vortrag*, the accompanying music and the surrounding and sympathising assembly. The Basque tales have no charm for the people themselves when put in Spanish words and read (Introduction, sect. xx. p. 258–259).

Unwritten prose tales, preserved in the memory and said to be repeated nearly in the same words from age to age, are mentioned by Mariner in the Tonga Islands (Mariner's Account, vol. ii. p. 377).

The Druidical poems were kept unwritten by design, after writing was in established use for other purposes (Cæsar, B. G. vi. 13).

formed, we should be able to make a guess at the time when the old Epic poems were first committed to writing. Now the period which may with the greatest probability be fixed upon as having first witnessed the formation even of the narrowest reading class in Greece, is the middle of the seventh century before the Christian æra (B.C. 660 to B.C. 630),—the age of Terpander, Kallinus, Archilochus, Simonidês of Amorgus, &c. I ground this supposition on the change then operated in the character and tendencies of Grecian poetry and music,—the elegiac and iambic measures having been introduced as rivals to the primitive hexameter, and poetical compositions having been transferred from the epical past to the affairs of present and real life. Such a change was important at a time when poetry was the only known mode of publication (to use a modern phrase not altogether suitable, yet the nearest approaching to the sense). It argued a new way of looking at the old epical treasures of the people, as well as a thirst for new poetical effect; and the men who stood forward in it may well be considered as desirous to study, and competent to criticise, from their own individual point of view, the written words of the Homeric rhapsodes, just as we are told that Kallinus both noticed and eulogised the Thebaïs as the production of Homer. There seems therefore ground for conjecturing, that (for the use of this newly-formed and important, but very narrow class) manuscripts of the Homeric poems and other old epics—the Thebaïs and the Cypria as well as the Iliad and the Odyssey—began to be compiled towards the middle of the seventh century B.C.:[1] and the opening of Egypt to Grecian commerce, which took place about the same period, would furnish increased facilities for obtaining the requisite papyrus to write upon. A reading class, when once formed, would doubtless slowly increase, and the number of manuscripts along with it; so that before the time of Solôn, fifty years afterwards, both readers and manuscripts, though still comparatively few, might have attained a certain recognised

[1] Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellenici, vol. i. p. 368–373) treats it as a matter of *certainty* that Archilochus and Alkman *wrote* their poems. I am not aware of any evidence for announcing this as positively known—except indeed an admission of Wolf, which is doubtless good as an *argumentum ad hominem*, but is not to be received as proof (Wolf, Proleg. p. 50). The evidences mentioned by Mr. Clinton (p. 368) certainly cannot be regarded as proving anything to the point.

Giese (Ueber den Æolischen Dialekt, p. 172) places the first writing of the separate rhapsodies composing the Iliad in the seventh century B.C.

authority, and formed a tribunal of reference, against the carelessness of individual rhapsodes.

We may, I think, consider the Iliad and Odyssey to have been preserved without the aid of writing for a period near upon two centuries.[1] But is it true, as Wolf imagined, and as other able critics have imagined also, that the separate portions of which these two poems are composed were originally distinct epical ballads, each constituting a separate whole and intended for separate recitation? Is it true that they had not only no common author, but originally neither common purpose nor fixed order, and that their first permanent arrangement and integration was delayed for three centuries, and accomplished at last only by the taste of Peisistratus conjoined with various lettered friends?[2]

This hypothesis—to which the genius of Wolf first gave celebrity, but which has been since enforced more in detail by others, especially by William Müller and Lachmann—appears to me not only unsupported by any sufficient testimony, but also opposed to other testimony as well as to a strong force of internal probability. The authorities quoted by Wolf are

[1] The songs of the Icelandic Skalds were preserved orally for a period longer than two centuries,—P. A. Müller thinks very much longer,—before they were collected or embodied in written story by Snorro and Sæmund (Lange, Untersuchungen über die Gesch. der Nordischen Heldensage, p. 98; also Introduct. p. xx.-xxviii.). He confounds, however, often, the preservation of the songs from old time—with the question whether they have or have not an historical basis.

And there were doubtless many old bards and rhapsodes in ancient Greece, of whom the same might be said which Saxo Grammaticus affirms of an Englishman named Lucas, that he was "literis quidem tenuiter instructus, sed historiarum scientiâ apprime eruditus" (Dahlmann, Historische Forschungen, vol. ii. p. 176).

[2] "Homer wrote a sequel of songs and rhapsodies, to be sung by himself for small earnings and good cheer, at festivals and other days of merriment; the Iliad he made for the men, the Odysseis for the other sex. These loose songs were not collected together into the form of an epic poem until 500 years after."

Such is the naked language in which Wolf's main hypothesis had been previously set forth by Bentley, in his "Remarks on a late Discourse of Free-thinking, by Phileleutherus Lipsiensis," published in 1713: the passage remained unaltered in the seventh edition of that treatise published in 1737. See Wolf's Prolegg. xxvii. p. 115.

The same hypothesis may be seen more amply developed, partly in the work of Wolf's pupil and admirer, William Müller, *Homerische Vorschule* (the second edition of which was published at Leipsic 1836, with an excellent introduction and notes by Baumgarten-Crusius, adding greatly to the value of the original work by its dispassionate review of the whole controversy), partly in two valuable Dissertations of Lachmann, published in the Philological Transactions of the Berlin Academy for 1837 and 1841.

Josephus, Cicero, and Pausanias:[1] Josephus mentions nothing about Peisistratus, but merely states (what we may accept as the probable fact) that the Homeric poems were originally unwritten, and preserved only in songs or recitations, from which they were at a subsequent period put into writing: hence many of the discrepancies in the text. On the other hand, Cicero and Pausanias go further, and affirm that Peisistratus both collected, and arranged in the existing order, the rhapsodies of the Iliad and Odyssey (implied as poems originally entire and subsequently broken into pieces), which he found partly confused and partly isolated from each other—each part being then remembered only in its own portion of the Grecian world. Respecting Hipparchus the son of Peisistratus, too, we are told in the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue which bears his name, that he was the first to introduce into Attica the poetry of Homer, and that he prescribed to the rhapsodes to recite the parts at the Panathenaic festival in regular sequence.[2]

Wolf and William Müller occasionally speak as if they admitted something like an Iliad and Odyssey as established aggregates prior to Peisistratus; but for the most part they represent him or his associates as having been the first to put together Homeric poems which were before distinct and self-existent compositions. And Lachmann, the recent expositor of the same theory, ascribes to Peisistratus still more unequivocally this original integration of parts in reference to the Iliad—distributing the first twenty-two books of the poem into sixteen separate songs, and treating it as ridiculous to imagine that the fusion of these songs into an order such as we now read, belongs to any date earlier than Peisistratus.[3]

[1] Joseph. cont. Apion. i. 2; Cicero de Orator. iii. 34; Pausan. vii. 26, 6; compare the Scholion on Plautus in Ritschl, Die Alexandrin. Bibliothek, p. 4. Ælian (V. H. xiii. 14), who mentions both the introduction of the Homeric poems into Peloponnesus by Lykurgus, and the compilation by Peisistratus, can hardly be considered as adding to the value of the testimony: still less Libanius and Suidas. What we learn is, that some literary and critical men of the Alexandrine age (more or fewer, as the case may be; but Wolf exaggerates when he talks of an *unanimous* conviction) spoke of Peisistratus as having first put together the fractional parts of the Iliad and Odyssey into entire poems.

[2] Plato, Hipparch. p. 228.

[3] "Doch ich komme mir bald lächerlich vor, wenn ich noch immer die Möglichkeit gelten lasse, dass unsere Ilias in dem gegenwärtigen Zusammenhange der bedeutenden Theile, und nicht blos der wenigen bedeutendsten, jemals vor der Arbeit des Pisistratus gedacht worden sey." (Lachmann, Fernere Betrachtungen über die Ilias, sect. xxviii. p. 32; Abhandlungen Berlin. Academ. 1841.) How far this admission—that for the *few most*

Upon this theory we may remark, first, that it stands opposed to the testimony existing respecting the regulations of Solôn; who, before the time of Peisistratus, had enforced a fixed order of recitation on the rhapsodes of the Iliad at the Panathenaic festival: not only directing that they should go through the rhapsodies *seriatim* and without omission or corruption, but also establishing a prompter or censorial authority to ensure obedience,[1]—which implies the existence (at the same time

*important* portions of the Iliad there *did* exist an established order of succession prior to Peisistratus—is intended to reach, I do not know; but the language of Lachmann goes further than either Wolf or William Müller. (See Wolf, Prolegomen. p. cxli.-cxlii., and W. Müller, Homerische Vorschule, Abschnitt. vii. pp. 96, 98, 100, 102.) The latter admits that neither Peisistratus nor the Diaskeuasts could have made any considerable changes in the Iliad and Odyssey, either in the way of addition or of transposition; the poems as aggregates being too well known, and the Homeric vein of invention too completely extinct, to admit of such novelties.

I confess I do not see how these last-mentioned admissions can be reconciled with the main doctrine of Wolf, in so far as regards Peisistratus.

[1] Diogen. Laërt. i. 57.—Τὰ δὲ Ὁμήρου ἐξ ὑποβολῆς γέγραφε (Σόλων) ῥαψῳδεῖσθαι, οἷον ὅπου ὁ πρῶτος ἔληξεν, ἐκεῖθεν ἄρχεσθαι τὸν ἀρχόμενον, ὡς φησὶ Διευχίδας ἐν τοῖς Μεγαρικοῖς.

Respecting Hipparchus, son of Peisistratus, the Pseudo-Plato tells us (in the dialogue so called, p. 228)—καὶ τὰ Ὁμήρου ἔπη πρῶτος ἐκόμισεν εἰς τὴν γῆν ταυτηνί, καὶ ἠνάγκασε τοὺς ῥαψῳδοὺς Παναθηναίοις ἐξ ὑπολήψεως ἐφεξῆς αὐτὰ διιέναι, ὥσπερ νῦν ἔτι οἴδε ποιοῦσι.

These words have provoked multiplied criticisms from all the learned men who have touched upon the theory of the Homeric poems—to determine what was the practice which Solôn found existing, and what was the change which he introduced. Our information is too scanty to pretend to certainty, but I think the explanation of Hermann the most satisfactory ("*Quid sit* ὑποβολή *et* ὑποβλήδην."—*Opuscula*, t. v. p. 300, t. vii. p. 162).

Ὑποβολεύς is the technical term for the prompter at a theatrical representation (Plutarch, Præcept. gerend. Reip. p. 813); ὑποβολή and ὑποβάλλειν have corresponding meanings, of aiding the memory of a speaker and keeping him in accordance with a certain standard, in possession of the prompter; see the words ἐξ ὑποβολῆς, Xenophon. Cyropæd. iii. 3, 37. Ὑποβολή therefore has no necessary connexion with a *series* of rhapsodes, but would apply just as much to one alone; although it happens in this case to be brought to bear upon several in succession. Ὑπόληψις, again, means "the taking up in succession of one rhapsode by another:" though the two words, therefore, have not the same meaning, yet the proceeding described in the two passages in reference both to Solôn and Hipparchus appears to be in substance the same—*i. e.* to ensure, by compulsory supervision, a correct and orderly recitation by the successive rhapsodes who went through the different parts of the poem.

There is good reason to conclude from this passage that the rhapsodes before Solôn were guilty both of negligence and of omission in their recital of Homer, but no reason to imagine either that they transposed the books, or that the legitimate order was not previously recognised.

that it proclaims the occasional infringement) of an orderly aggregate, as well as of manuscripts professedly complete. Next, the theory ascribes to Peisistratus a character not only materially different from what is indicated by Cicero and Pausanias—who represent him, not as having put together atoms originally distinct, but as the renovator of an ancient order subsequently lost—but also in itself unintelligible and inconsistent with Grecian habit and feeling. That Peisistratus should take pains to repress the licence, or make up for the unfaithful memory, of individual rhapsodes, and to ennoble the Panathenaic festival by the most correct recital of a great and venerable poem, according to the standard received among the best judges in Greece—this is a task both suitable to his position, and requiring nothing more than an improved recension, together with exact adherence to it on the part of the rhapsodes. But what motive had he to string together several poems, previously known only as separate, into one new whole? What feeling could he gratify by introducing the extensive changes and transpositions surmised by Lachmann, for the purpose of binding together sixteen songs which the rhapsodes are assumed to have been accustomed to recite, and the people to hear, each by itself apart? Peisistratus was not a poet, seeking to interest the public mind, by new creations and com-

The appointment of a systematic ὑποβολεύς or prompter plainly indicates the existence of complete manuscripts.

The direction of Solôn, that Homer should be rhapsodised under the security of a prompter with his manuscript, appears just the same as that of the orator Lykurgus in reference to Æschylus, Sophoklês, and Euripidês (Pseudo-Plutarch. Vit. X. Rhetor. Lycurgi Vit.)—εἰσήνεγκε δὲ καὶ νόμους—ὡς χαλκᾶς εἰκόνας ἀναθεῖναι τῶν ποιητῶν Αἰσχύλου, Σοφοκλέους, Εὐριπίδου, καὶ τὰς τραγῳδίας αὐτῶν ἐν κοινῷ γραψαμένους φυλάττειν, καὶ τὸν τῆς πόλεως γραμματέα παραναγινώσκειν τοῖς ὑποκρινομένοις· οὐ γὰρ ἐξῆν αὐτὰς (ἄλλως) ὑποκρίνεσθαι. The word ἄλλως which occurs last but one is introduced by the conjecture of Grysar, who has cited and explained the above passage of the Pseudo-Plutarch in a valuable dissertation—*De Græcorum Tragœdiâ, qualis fuit circa tempora Demosthenis* (Cologne 1830). All the critics admit the text as it now stands to be unintelligible, and various corrections have been proposed, among which that of Grysar seems the best. From his Dissertation I transcribe the following passage, which illustrates the rhapsodising of Homer ἐξ ὑποβολῆς—

"Quum histriones fabulis interpolandis ægre abstinerent, Lycurgus legem supra indicatam eo tulit consilio, ut recitationes histrionum cum publico illo exemplo omnino congruas redderet. Quod ut assequeretur, constituit, ut dum fabulæ in scenâ recitarentur, scriba publicus simul exemplum civitatis inspiceret, juxta sive in theatro sive in postscenio sedens. Hæc enim verbi παραναγινώσκειν est significatio, posita præcipue in præpositione παρὰ ut idem sit, quod *contra* sive *juxta* legere; id quod faciunt ii, *qui lecta ab altero vel recitata cum suis conferre cupiunt.*" (Grysar, p. 7.)

binations, but a ruler desirous to impart solemnity to a great religious festival in his native city. Now such a purpose would be answered by selecting, amidst the divergences of rhapsodes in different parts of Greece, that order of text which intelligent men could approve as a return to the pure and pristine Iliad; but it would be defeated if he attempted large innovations of his own, and brought out for the first time a new Iliad by blending together, altering, and transposing, many old and well-known songs. A novelty so bold would have been more likely to offend than to please both the critics and the multitude. And if it were even enforced, by authority, at Athens, no probable reason can be given why all the other towns and all the rhapsodes throughout Greece should abnegate their previous habits in favour of it, since Athens at that time enjoyed no political ascendency such as she acquired during the following century. On the whole, it will appear that the character and position of Peisistratus himself go far to negative the function which Wolf and Lachmann put upon him. His interference presupposes a certain foreknown and ancient aggregate, the main lineaments of which were familiar to the Grecian public, although many of the rhapsodes in their practice may have deviated from it both by omission and interpolation. In correcting the Athenian recitations conformably with such understood general type, he might hope both to procure respect for Athens and to constitute a fashion for the rest of Greece. But this step of "collecting the torn body of sacred Homer" is something generically different from the composition of a new Iliad out of pre-existing songs: the former is as easy, suitable, and promising, as the latter is violent and gratuitous.[1]

[1] That the Iliad or Odyssey were ever recited with all the parts entire, at any time anterior to Solôn, is a point which Ritschl denies (Die Alexandrin. Bibliothek. p. 67–70). He thinks that before Solôn, they were always recited in parts, and without any fixed order among the parts. Nor did Solôn determine (as he thinks) the order of the parts: he only checked the license of the rhapsodes as to the recitation of the separate books; it was Peisistratus, who, with the help of Onomakritus and others, first settled the order of the parts and bound each poem into a whole, with some corrections and interpolations. Nevertheless he admits that the parts were originally composed by the same poet, and adapted to form a whole amongst each other: but the primitive entireness (he asserts) was only maintained as a sort of traditional belief, never realised in recitation, and never reduced to an obvious, unequivocal, and permanent fact—until the time of Peisistratus.

There is no sufficient ground, I think, for denying all entire recitation previous to Solôn, and we only interpose a new difficulty, both grave and gratuitous, by doing so.

To sustain the inference, that Peisistratus was the first architect of the Iliad and Odyssey, it ought at least to be shown that no other long and continuous poems existed during the earlier centuries. But the contrary of this is known to be the fact. The Æthiopis of Arktinus, which contained 9100 verses, dates from a period more than two centuries earlier than Peisistratus: several other of the lost cyclic epics, some among them of considerable length, appear during the century succeeding Arktinus; and it is important to notice that three or four at least of these poems passed currently under the name of Homer.[1] There is no greater intrinsic difficulty in supposing long epics to have begun with the Iliad and Odyssey than with the Æthiopis: the ascendency of the name of Homer, and the subordinate position of Arktinus, in the history of early Grecian poetry, tend to prove the former in preference to the latter.

Moreover, we find particular portions of the Iliad, which expressly pronounce themselves, by their own internal evidence, as belonging to a large whole, and not as separate integers. We can hardly conceive the catalogue in the second book except as a fractional composition, and with reference to a series of approaching exploits; for taken apart by itself, such a barren enumeration of names could have stimulated neither the fancy of the poet nor the attention of the listeners. But the Homeric Catalogue had acquired a sort of canonical authority even in the time of Solôn, insomuch that he interpolated a line into it, or was accused of doing so, for the purpose of gaining

[1] The Æthiopis of Arktinus contained 9100 verses, as we learn from the Tabula Iliaca: yet Proklus assigns to it only four books. The Ilias Minor had *four* books, the Cyprian verses *eleven*, though we do not know the number of lines in either.

Nitzsch states it as a certain matter of fact, that Arktinus recited his own poem *alone*, though it was too long to admit of his doing so without interruption. (See his Vorrede to the 2nd vol. of the Odyssey, p. xxiv.) There is no evidence for this assertion, and it appears to me highly improbable.

In reference to the Romances of the Middle Ages, belonging to the Cycle of the Round Table, M. Fauriel tells us that the German *Perceval* has nearly 25,000 verses (more than half as long again as the Iliad); the *Perceval* of Christian of Troyes probably more; the German *Tristan*, of Godfrey of Strasburg, has more than 23,000; sometimes the poem is begun by one author and continued by another. (Fauriel, Romans de Chevalerie, Revue des Deux Mondes, t. xiii. p. 695–697.)

The ancient unwritten poems of the Icelandic Skalds are as much lyric as epic: the longest of them does not exceed 800 lines, and they are for the most part much shorter (Untersuchungen über die Geschichte der Nördischen Heldensage, aus P. A. Müller's Sagabibliothek von G. Lange, Frankf. 1832. Introduct. p. xlii.).

a disputed point against the Megarians, who on their side set forth another version.[1] No such established reverence could have been felt for this document, unless there had existed, for a long time prior to Peisistratus, the habit of regarding and listening to the Iliad as a continuous poem. And when the philosopher Xenophanês, contemporary with Peisistratus, noticed Homer as the universal teacher, and denounced him as an unworthy describer of the gods, he must have connected this great mental sway, not with a number of unconnected rhapsodies, but with an aggregate Iliad and Odyssey; probably with other poems also, ascribed to the same author, such as the Cypria, Epigoni, and Thebaïs.

We find, it is true, references in various authors to portions of the Iliad each by its own separate name, such as the Teichomachy, the Aristeia (pre-eminent exploits) of Diomedês or of Agamemnôn, the Doloneia or Night-expedition (of Dolon as well as of Odysseus and Diomedês), &c., and hence it has been concluded that these portions originally existed as separate poems, before they were cemented together into an Iliad. But such references prove nothing to the point; for until the Iliad was divided by Aristarchus and his colleagues into a given number of books or rhapsodies, designated by the series of letters in the alphabet, there was no method of calling attention to any particular portion of the poem except by special indication of its subject-matter.[2] Authors subsequent to Peisistratus, such as Herodotus and Plato, who unquestionably conceived the Iliad as a whole, cite the separate fractions of it by designations of this sort.

The foregoing remarks on the Wolfian hypothesis respecting the text of the Iliad, tend to separate two points which are by no means necessarily connected, though that hypothesis, as set forth by Wolf himself, by W. Müller, and by Lachmann, presents the two in conjunction. First, was the Iliad originally projected and composed by one author and as one poem, or were the different parts composed separately and by unconnected authors, and subsequently strung together into an aggregate? Secondly, assuming that the internal evidences of the poem negative the former supposition, and drive us upon the latter, was the construction of the whole poem deferred, and did the parts exist only in their separate state, until a period so late as the reign of Peisistratus? It is obvious that these two

[1] Plutarch, Solôn, 10.

[2] The Homeric Scholiast refers to Quintus Calaber ἐν τῇ Ἀμαζονομαχίᾳ, which was only one portion of his long poem (Schol. ad Iliad. ii. 220).

questions are essentially separate, and that a man may believe the Iliad to have been put together out of pre-existing songs, without recognising the age of Peisistratus as the period of its first compilation. Now whatever may be the steps through which the poem passed to its ultimate integrity, there is sufficient reason for believing that they had been accomplished long before that period: the friends of Peisistratus found an Iliad already existing, and already ancient in their time, even granting that the poem had not been originally born in a state of unity. Moreover, the Alexandrine critics, whose remarks are preserved in the Scholia, do not even notice the Peisistratic recension among the many manuscripts which they had before them: and Mr. Payne Knight justly infers from their silence that either they did not possess it, or it was in their eyes of no great authority;[1] which could never have been the case if it had been the prime originator of Homeric unity.

The line of argument, by which the advocates of Wolf's hypothesis negative the primitive unity of the poem, consists in exposing gaps, incongruities, contradictions, &c. between the separate parts. Now, if in spite of all these incoherencies, standing mementos of an antecedent state of separation, the component poems were made to coalesce so intimately as to appear as if they had been one from the beginning, we can better understand the complete success of the proceeding and the universal prevalence of the illusion, by supposing such coalescence to have taken place at a very early period, during the productive days of epical genius, and before the growth of reading and criticism. The longer the aggregation of the

[1] Knight, Prolegg. Homer. xxxii. xxxvi. xxxvii. That Peisistratus caused a corrected MS. of the Iliad to be prepared, there seems good reason to believe, and the Scholion on Plautus edited by Ritschl (see Die Alexandrinische Bibliothek, p. 4) specifies the four persons (Onomakritus was one) employed on the task. Ritschl fancies that it served as a sort of Vulgate for the text of the Alexandrine critics, who named specially other MSS. (of Chiôs, Sinôpê, Massalia, &c.) only when they diverged from this Vulgate: he thinks also that it formed the original from whence those other MSS. were first drawn, which are called in the Homeric Scholia *αἱ κοιναί, κοινότεραι* (p. 59–60).

Welcker supposes the Peisistratic MS. to have been either lost or carried away when Xerxes took Athens (Der Epische Kyklus, p. 382–388).

Compare Nitzsch, Histor. Homer. Fasc. i. p. 165–167; also his commentary on Odyss. xi. 604, the alleged interpolation of Onomakritus; and Ulrici, Geschichte der Hellen. Poes. Part i. s. vii. p. 252–255.

The main facts respecting the Peisistratic recension are collected and discussed by Gräfenhan, Geschichte der Philologie, sect. 54–64, vol. i. p. 266–311. Unfortunately we cannot get beyond mere conjecture and possibility.

separate poems was deferred, the harder it would be to obliterate in men's minds the previous state of separation, and to make them accept the new aggregate as an original unity. The bards or rhapsodes might have found comparatively little difficulty in thus piecing together distinct songs, during the ninth or eighth century before Christ; but if we suppose the process to be deferred until the latter half of the sixth century —if we imagine that Solôn, with all his contemporaries and predecessors, knew nothing about any aggregate Iliad, but was accustomed to read and hear only those sixteen distinct epical pieces into which Lachmann would dissect the Iliad, each of the sixteen bearing a separate name of its own—no compilation then for the first time made by the friends of Peisistratus could have effaced the established habit, and planted itself in the general convictions of Greece as that primitive Homeric production. Had the sixteen pieces remained disunited and individualised down to the time of Peisistratus, they would in all probability have continued so ever afterwards; nor could the extensive changes and transpositions which (according to Lachmann's theory) were required to melt them down into our present Iliad, have obtained at that late period universal acceptance. Assuming it to be true that such changes and transpositions did really take place, they must at least be referred to a period greatly earlier than Peisistratus or Solôn.

The whole tenor of the poems themselves confirms what is here remarked. There is nothing either in the Iliad or Odyssey which savours of *modernism*, applying that term to the age of Peisistratus; nothing which brings to our view the alterations, brought about by two centuries, in the Greek language, the coined money, the habits of writing and reading, the despotisms and republican governments, the close military array, the improved construction of ships, the Amphiktyonic convocations, the mutual frequentation of religious festivals, the Oriental and Egyptian veins of religion, &c., familiar to the latter epoch. These alterations Onomakritus and the other literary friends of Peisistratus could hardly have failed to notice even without design, had they then for the first time undertaken the task of piecing together many self-existent epics into one large aggregate.[1] Everything in the two great Homeric poems,

[1] Wolf allows both the uniformity of colouring and the antiquity of colouring which pervade the Homeric poems, also the strong line by which they stand distinguished from the other Greek poets:—"Immo congruunt in iis omnia ferme in idem ingenium, in eosdem mores, in eandem formam sentiendi et loquendi." (Prolegom. p. cclxv.; compare p. cxxxviii.)

He thinks indeed that this harmony was *restored* by the ability and care

both in substance and in language, belongs to an age two or three centuries earlier than Peisistratus. Indeed even the interpolations (or those passages which on the best grounds are pronounced to be such) betray no trace of the sixth century before Christ, and may well have been heard by Archilochus and Kallinus—in some cases even by Arktinus and Hesiod—as genuine Homeric matter. As far as the evidences on the case, as well internal as external, enable us to judge, we seem warranted in believing that the Iliad and Odyssey were recited substantially as they now stand (always allowing for partial divergences of text and interpolations) in 776 B.C., our first trustworthy mark of Grecian time. And this ancient date—let it be added—as it is the best authenticated fact, so it is also the most important attribute of the Homeric poems, considered in reference to Grecian history. For they thus afford us an insight into the ante-historical character of the Greeks—enabling us to trace the subsequent forward march of the nation, and to seize instructive contrasts between their former and their later condition.

Rejecting therefore the idea of compilation by Peisistratus, and referring the present state of the Iliad and Odyssey to a period more than two centuries earlier, the question still remains, by what process, or through whose agency, they reached that state? Is each poem the work of one author, or of several? If the latter, do all the parts belong to the same age? What ground is there for believing, that any or all of these parts existed before as separate poems, and have been accommodated to the place in which they now appear by more or less systematic alteration?

The acute and valuable Prolegomena of Wolf, half a century ago, powerfully turned the attention of scholars to the necessity of considering the Iliad and Odyssey with reference to the age and society in which they arose, and to the material differences in this respect between Homer and more recent epic poets.[1]

of Aristarchus ("mirificum illum concentum revocatum Aristarcho imprimis debemus"). This is a very exaggerated estimate of the interference of Aristarchus: but at any rate the *concentus* itself was ancient and original, and Aristarchus only *restored* it when it had been spoiled by intervening accidents; at least, if we are to construe *revocatum* strictly, which perhaps is hardly consistent with Wolf's main theory.

[1] See Wolf, Prolegg. c. xii. p. xliii. "Nondum enim prorsus ejecta et explosa est eorum ratio, qui Homerum et Callimachum et Virgilium et Nonnum et Miltonum eodem animo legunt, nec quid uniuscujusque ætas ferat, expendere legendo et computare laborant," &c.

A similar and earlier attempt to construe the Homeric poems with reference to their age, is to be seen in the treatise called *Il Vero Omero* of

Since that time an elaborate study has been bestowed upon the early manifestations of poetry (Sagen-poesie) among other nations; and the German critics especially, among whom this description of literature has been most cultivated, have selected it as the only appropriate analogy for the Homeric poems. Such poetry, consisting for the most part of short, artless effusions, with little of deliberate or far-sighted combination, has been assumed by many critics as a fit standard to apply for measuring the capacities of the Homeric age; an age exclusively of speakers, singers, and hearers, not of readers or writers. In place of the unbounded admiration which was felt for Homer, not merely as a poet of detail, but as constructor of a long epic, at the time when Wolf wrote his Prolegomena, the tone of criticism passed to the opposite extreme, and attention was fixed entirely upon the defects in the arrangement of the Iliad and Odyssey. Whatever was to be found in them of symmetry or pervading system, was pronounced to be decidedly post-Homeric. Under such preconceived anticipations Homer seems to have been generally studied in Germany, during the generation succeeding Wolf, the negative portion of whose theory was usually admitted, though as to the positive substitute—what explanation was to be given of the history and present constitution of the Homeric poems—there was by no means the like agreement. During the last ten years, however, a contrary tendency has manifested itself; the Wolfian theory has been re-examined and shaken by Nitzsch, who, as well as O. Müller, Welcker, and other scholars, have revived the idea of original Homeric unity, under certain modifications. The change in Goethe's opinion, coincident with this new direction, is recorded in one of his latest works.[1] On the other hand, the original opinion of Wolf has also been reproduced within the last five years, and fortified with several new observations on the text of the Iliad, by Lachmann.

Vico,—marked with a good deal of original thought, but not strong in erudition (Opere di Vico, ed. Milan, vol. v. p. 437–497).

An interesting and instructive review of the course of Homeric criticism during the last fifty years, comprising some new details on the gradual development of the theories both of Wolf and of Lachmann, will be found in a recent Dissertation published at Königsberg—"Die Homerische Kritik von Wolf bis Grote"—by Dr. Ludwig Friedländer, Berlin, 1853. Dr. Friedländer approves several of the opinions which I have ventured to advance respecting the probable structure of the Iliad, and sustains them by new reasons of his own.

[1] In the 46th volume of his collected works, in the little treatise "*Homer, noch einmal*": compare G. Lange, Ueber die Kyklischen Dichter (Mainz. 1837), Preface, p. vi.

The point is thus still under controversy among able scholars, and is probably destined to remain so. For in truth our means of knowledge are so limited, that no man can produce arguments sufficiently cogent to contend against opposing preconceptions; and it creates a painful sentiment of diffidence when we read the expressions of equal and absolute persuasion with which the two opposite conclusions have both been advanced.[1] We have nothing to teach us the history of these poems except the poems themselves. Not only do we possess no collateral information respecting them or their authors, but we have no one to describe to us the people or the age in which they originated: our knowledge respecting contemporary Homeric society is collected exclusively from the Homeric compositions themselves. We are ignorant whether any other, or what other, poems preceded them or divided with them the public favour, nor have we anything better than conjecture to determine either the circumstances under which they were brought before the hearers, or the conditions which a bard of that day was required to satisfy. On all these points, moreover, the age

[1] "Non esse totam Iliadem aut Odysseam unius poetæ opus, ita extra dubitationem positam puto, ut qui secus sentiat, eum non satis lectitasse illa carmina contendam." (Godf. Hermann, Præfat. ad Odysseam, Lips. 1825, p. iv.) See the language of the same eminent critic in his treatise "Ueber Homer und Sappho," Opuscula, vol. v. p. 74.

Lachmann, after having dissected the 2200 lines in the Iliad, between the beginning of the eleventh book and line 590 of the fifteenth, into four songs "in the highest degree different in their spirit" ("ihrem Geiste nach höchst verschiedene Lieder"), tells us that whosoever thinks this difference of spirit inconsiderable,—whosoever does not feel it at once when pointed out,—whosoever can believe that the parts as they stand now belong to one artistically constructed Epos,—"will do well not to trouble himself any more either with my criticisms or with epic poetry, because he is too weak to understand anything about it" ("weil er zu schwach ist etwas darin zu verstehen"): Fernere Betrachtungen Ueber die Ilias: Abhandl. Berlin. Acad. 1841, p. 18, § xxiii.

On the contrary, Ulrici, after having shown (or tried to show) that the composition of Homer satisfies perfectly, in the main, all the exigencies of an artistic epic—adds, that this will make itself at once evident to all those who have any sense of artistical symmetry; but that for those to whom that sense is wanting, no conclusive demonstration can be given. He warns the latter, however, that they are not to deny the existence of that which their shortsighted vision cannot distinguish, for everything cannot be made clear to children, which the mature man sees through at a glance (Ulrici, Geschichte des Griechischen Epos, Part i. ch. vii. p. 260–261). Read also Payne Knight, Proleg. c. xxvii., about the insanity of the Wolfian school, obvious even to the "homunculus e trivio."

I have the misfortune to dissent from both Lachmann and Ulrici; for it appears to me a mistake to put the Iliad and Odyssey on the same footing, as Ulrici does, and as is too frequently done by others.

of Thucydidês[1] and Plato seems to have been no better informed than we are, except in so far as they could profit by the analogies of the cyclic and other epic poems, which would doubtless in many cases have afforded valuable aid.

Nevertheless no classical scholar can be easy without *some* opinion respecting the authorship of these immortal poems. And the more defective the evidence we possess, the more essential is it that all that evidence should be marshalled in the clearest order, and its bearing upon the points in controversy distinctly understood beforehand. Both these conditions seem to have been often neglected, throughout the long-continued Homeric discussion.

To illustrate the first point:—Since two poems are comprehended in the problem to be solved, the natural process would be, first to study the easier of the two, and then to apply the conclusions thence deduced as a means of explaining the other. Now the Odyssey, looking at its aggregate character, is incomparably more easy to comprehend than the Iliad. Yet most Homeric critics apply the microscope at once, and in the first instance, to the Iliad.

To illustrate the second point:—What evidence is sufficient to negative the supposition that the Iliad or the Odyssey is a poem originally and intentionally one? Not simply particular gaps and contradictions, though they be even gross and numerous; but the preponderance of these proofs of mere unprepared coalescence over the other proofs of designed adaptation scattered throughout the whole poem. For the poet (or the co-operating poets, if more than one) may have intended to compose an harmonious whole, but may have realised their intention incompletely, and left partial faults; or perhaps the contradictory lines may have crept in through a corrupt text. A survey of the whole poem is necessary to determine the question; and this necessity, too, has not always been attended to.

If it had happened that the Odyssey had been preserved to us alone, without the Iliad, I think the dispute respecting Homeric unity would never have been raised. For the former is, in my judgement, pervaded almost from beginning to end by marks of designed adaptation; and the special faults which

[1] Plato, Aristotle, and their contemporaries generally, read the most suspicious portions of the Homeric poems as genuine (Nitzsch, Plan und Gang der Odyssee, in the Preface to his second vol. of Comments on the Odyssey, p. lx.–lxiv.).

Thucydidês accepts the Hymn to Apollo as a composition by the author of the Iliad.

Wolf, W. Müller, and B. Thiersch,[1] have singled out for the purpose of disproving such unity of intention, are so few and of so little importance, that they would have been universally regarded as mere instances of haste or unskilfulness on the part of the poet, had they not been seconded by the far more powerful battery opened against the Iliad. These critics, having laid down their general presumptions against the antiquity of the long epopee, illustrate their principles by exposing the many flaws and fissures in the Iliad, and then think it sufficient if they can show a few similar defects in the Odyssey—as if the breaking up of Homeric unity in the former naturally entailed a similar necessity with regard to the latter; and their method of proceeding, contrary to the rule above laid down, puts the more difficult problem in the foreground, as a means of solution for the easier. We can hardly wonder, however, that they have applied their observations in the first instance to the Iliad, because it is in every man's esteem the more marked, striking and impressive poem of the two—and the character of Homer is more intimately identified with it than with the Odyssey. This may serve as an explanation of the course pursued; but be the case as it may in respect to comparative poetical merit, it is not the less true, that as an aggregate, the Odyssey is more simple and easily understood, and therefore ought to come first in the order of analysis.

Now, looking at the Odyssey by itself, the proofs of a unity of design seem unequivocal and everywhere to be found. A premeditated structure, and a concentration of interest upon one prime hero under well-defined circumstances, may be traced from the first book to the twenty-third. Odysseus is always either directly or indirectly kept before the reader, as a warrior returning from the fulness of glory at Troy, exposed to manifold and protracted calamities during his return home, on which his whole soul is so bent that he refuses even the immortality offered by Calypsô;—a victim, moreover, even after his return, to mingled injury and insult from the suitors, who have long been plundering his property and dishonouring his house; but at length obtaining, by valour and cunning united, a signal revenge which restores him to all that he had lost. All the persons and all the events in the poem are subsidiary to this main plot: and the divine agency, necessary to satisfy the feeling of the Homeric man, is put forth by Poseidôn and Athênê, in both cases from dispositions directly bearing upon Odysseus.

[1] Bernhard Thiersch, Ueber das Zeitalter und Vaterland des Homer (Halberstadt 1832), Einleitung, p. 4–18.

To appreciate the unity of the Odyssey, we have only to read the objections taken against that of the Iliad—especially in regard to the long withdrawal of Achilles, not only from the scene, but from the memory—together with the independent prominence of Ajax, Diomêdês and other heroes. How far we are entitled from hence to infer the want of premeditated unity in the Iliad, will be presently considered; but it is certain that the constitution of the Odyssey in this respect everywhere demonstrates the presence of such unity. Whatever may be the interest attached to Penelopê, Telemachus, or Eumæus, we never disconnect them from their association with Odysseus. The present is not the place for collecting the many marks of artistical structure dispersed throughout this poem: but it may be worth while to remark, that the final catastrophe realised in the twenty-second book—the slaughter of the suitors in the very house which they were profaning—is distinctly and prominently marked out in the first and second books, promised by Teiresias in the eleventh, by Athênê in the thirteenth, and by Helen in the fifteenth, and gradually matured by a series of suitable preliminaries, throughout the eight books preceding its occurrence.[1] Indeed what is principally evident, and what has been often noticed, in the Odyssey, is, the equable flow both of the narrative and the events; the absence of that rise and fall of interest which is sufficiently conspicuous in the Iliad.

To set against these evidences of unity, there ought at least to be some strong cases produced of occasional incoherence or contradiction. But it is remarkable how little of such counter-evidence is to be found, although the arguments of Wolf, W. Müller, and B. Thiersch stand so much in need of it. They have discovered only one instance of undeniable inconsistency in the parts—the number of days occupied by the absence of Telemachus at Pylus and Sparta. That young prince, though represented as in great haste to depart, and refusing pressing invitations to prolong his stay, must nevertheless be supposed to have continued for thirty days the guest of Menelaus, in order to bring his proceedings into chronological harmony with those of Odysseus, and to explain the first meeting of father and son in the swine-fold of Eumæus. Here is undoubtedly an inaccuracy (so Nitzsch[2] treats it, and I think justly) on the

[1] Compare i. 295; ii. 145 (*νήποινοι κεν ἔπειτα δόμων ἔντοσθεν ὄλοισθε*); xi. 118; xiii. 395; xv. 178; also xiv. 162.

[2] Nitzsch, Plan und Gang der Odyssee, p. xliii., prefixed to the second vol. of his Commentary on the Odysseis.

"At carminum primi auditores non adeo curiosi erant (observes Mr. Payne Knight, Prolegg. c. xxiii.), ut ejusmodi rerum rationes aut exquirerent

part of the poet, who did not anticipate, and did not experience in ancient times, so strict a scrutiny; an inaccuracy certainly not at all wonderful; the matter of real wonder is, that it stands almost alone, and that there are no others in the poem.

Now this is one of the main points on which W. Müller and B. Thiersch rest their theory—explaining the chronological confusion by supposing that the journey of Telemachus to Pylus and Sparta constituted the subject of an epic originally separate (comprising the first four books and a portion of the fifteenth), and incorporated at second-hand with the remaining poem. And they conceive this view to be further confirmed by the double assembly of the gods (at the beginning of the first book as well as of the fifth), which they treat as an awkward repetition, such as could not have formed part of the primary scheme of any epic poet. But here they only escape a small difficulty by running into another and a greater. For it is impossible to comprehend how the first four books and part of the fifteenth can ever have constituted a distinct epic; since the adventures of Telemachus have no satisfactory termination, except at the point of confluence with those of his father, when the unexpected meeting and recognition takes place under the roof of Eumæus—nor can any epic poem ever have described that meeting and recognition without giving some account how Odysseus came thither. Moreover the first two books of the Odyssey distinctly lay the ground, and carry expectation forward, to the final catastrophe of the poem—treating Telemachus as a subordinate person, and his expedition as merely provisional towards an ulterior result. Nor can I agree with W. Müller, that the real Odyssey might well be supposed to begin with the fifth book. On the contrary, the exhibition of the suitors and the Ithakesian agora, presented to us in the second book, is absolutely essential to the full comprehension of the books subsequent to the thirteenth. The suitors are far too important personages in the poem to allow of their being first introduced in so informal a manner as we read in the sixteenth book: indeed the passing allusions of Athênê

aut expenderent: neque eorum fides e subtilioribus congruentiis omnino pendebat. Monendi enim sunt etiam atque etiam Homericorum studiosi, veteres illos ἀοιδοὺς non linguâ professoriâ inter viros criticos et grammaticos, aut alios quoscunque argutiarum captatores, carmina cantitasse, sed inter eos qui sensibus animorum libere, incaute, et effuse indulgerent," &c. Chap. xxii.–xxvii. of Mr. Knight's Prolegomena are valuable to the same purpose, showing the "homines rudes et agrestes" of that day as excellent judges of what fell under their senses and observation, but careless, credulous, and unobservant of contradiction, in matters which came only under the mind's eye.

(xiii. 310, 375) and Eumæus (xiv. 41, 81) to the suitors, presuppose cognisance of them on the part of the hearer.

Lastly, the twofold discussion of the gods, at the beginning of the first and fifth books, and the double interference of Athênê, far from being a needless repetition, may be shown to suit perfectly both the genuine epical conditions and the unity of the poem.[1] For although the final consummation, and the organisation of measures against the suitors, was to be accomplished by Odysseus and Telemachus jointly, yet the march and adventures of the two, until the moment of their meeting in the dwelling of Eumæus, were essentially distinct. But according to the religious ideas of the old epic, the presiding direction of Athênê was necessary for the safety and success of both of them. Her first interference arouses and inspires the son, her second produces the liberation of the father—constituting a point of union and common origination for two lines of adventures in both of which she takes earnest interest, but which are necessarily for a time kept apart in order to coincide at the proper moment.

It will thus appear that the twice-repeated agora of the gods in the Odyssey, bringing home as it does to one and the same divine agent that double start which is essential to the scheme of the poem, consists better with the supposition of premeditated unity than with that of distinct self-existent parts. And assuredly the manner in which Telemachus and Odysseus, both by different roads, are brought into meeting and conjunction, at the dwelling of Eumæus, is something not only contrived, but very skilfully contrived. It is needless to advert to the highly interesting character of Eumæus, rendered available as a rallying point, though in different ways both to the father and the son, over and above the sympathy which he himself inspires.

If the Odyssey be not an original unity, of what self-existent parts can we imagine it to have consisted? To this question it is difficult to imagine a satisfactory reply: for the supposition that Telemachus and his adventures may once have formed the subject of a separate epos, apart from Odysseus, appears inconsistent with the whole character of that youth as it stands

[1] W. Müller is not correct in saying that in the first assembly of the gods, Zeus promises something which he does not perform: Zeus does not *promise* to send Hermês as messenger to Kalypsô, in the first book, though Athênê urges him to do so. Zeus indeed requires to be urged twice before he dictates to Kalypsô the release of Odysseus, but he had already intimated in the first book that he felt great difficulty in protecting the hero, because of the wrath manifested against him by Poseidôn.

in the poem, and with the events in which he is made to take part. We could better imagine the distribution of the adventures of Odysseus himself into two parts—one containing his wanderings and return, the other handling his ill-treatment by the suitors and his final triumph. But though either of these two subjects might have been adequate to furnish out a separate poem, it is nevertheless certain, that as they are presented in the Odyssey, the former cannot be divorced from the latter. The simple return of Odysseus, as it now stands in the poem, could satisfy no one as a final close, so long as the suitors remain in possession of his house and forbid his reunion with his wife. Any poem which treated his wanderings and return separately, must have represented his reunion with Penelopê and restoration to his house as following naturally upon his arrival in Ithaka—thus taking little or no notice of the suitors. But this would be a capital mutilation of the actual epical narrative, which considers the suitors at home as an essential portion of the destiny of the much-suffering hero, not less than his shipwrecks and trials at sea. His return (separately taken) is foredoomed, according to the curse of Polyphemus executed by Poseidôn, to be long-deferred, miserable, solitary, and ending with destruction in his house to greet him;[1] and the ground is thus laid, in the very recital of his wanderings, for a new series of events which are to happen to him after his arrival in Ithaka. There is no tenable halting-place between the departure of Odysseus from Troy and the final restoration to his house and his wife. The distance between these two events may indeed be widened, by accumulating new distresses and impediments, but any separate portion of it cannot be otherwise treated than as a fraction of the whole. The beginning and end are here the data in respect to epical genesis, though the intermediate events admit of being conceived as variables, more or less numerous: so that the conception of the whole may be said without impropriety both to precede and to govern that of the constituent parts.

The general result of a study of the Odyssey may be set down as follows:—1. The poem as it now stands exhibits unequivocally adaptation of parts and continuity of structure, whether by one or by several consentient hands: it may perhaps be a secondary formation, out of a pre-existing Odyssey

[1] Odyss. ix. 534—

Ὀψὲ κακῶς ἔλθοι, ὀλέσας ἅπο πάντας ἑταίρους,
Νηὸς ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίης, εὗροι δ' ἐν πήματα οἴκῳ—
Ὣς ἔφατ' εὐχόμενος· (the Cyclops to Poseidôn) τοῦ δ' ἔκλυε Κυανοχαίτης.

of smaller dimensions; but if so, the parts of the smaller whole must have been so far recast as to make them suitable members of the larger, and are noway recognisable by us. 2. The subject-matter of the poem not only does not favour, but goes far to exclude, the possibility of the Wolfian hypothesis. Its events cannot be so arranged as to have composed several antecedent substantive epics, afterwards put together into the present aggregate. Its authors cannot have been mere compilers of pre-existing materials, such as Peisistratus and his friends: they must have been poets, competent to work such matter as they found into a new and enlarged design of their own. Nor can the age in which this long poem, of so many thousand lines, was turned out as a continuous aggregate, be separated from the ancient, productive, inspired age of Grecian epic.

Arriving at such conclusions from the internal evidence of the Odyssey,[1] we can apply them by analogy to the Iliad. We learn something respecting the character and capacities of that early age which has left no other mementos except these two poems. Long continuous epics (it is observed by those who support the views of Wolf), with an artistical structure, are inconsistent with the capacities of a rude and non-writing age. Such epics (we may reply) are *not inconsistent* with the early age of the Greeks, and the Odyssey is a proof of it; for in that poem the integration of the whole, and the composition of the parts, must have been simultaneous. The analogy of the Odyssey enables us to rebut that preconception under which many ingenious critics sit down to the study of the Iliad, and which induces them to explain all the incoherences of the latter by breaking it up into smaller unities, as if short epics were the only manifestation of poetical power which the age admitted. There ought to be no reluctance in admitting a presiding scheme and premeditated unity of parts, in so far as the parts themselves point to such a conclusion.

That the Iliad is not so essentially one piece as the Odyssey,

[1] Wolf admits, in most unequivocal language, the compact and artful structure of the Odyssey. Against this positive internal evidence he sets the general presumption, that no such constructive art can possibly have belonged to a poet of the age of Homer:—"De Odyssea maxime, cujus admirabilis summa et compages pro præclarissimo monumento Græci ingenii habenda est. . . . Unde fit ut Odysseam nemo, cui omnino priscus vates placeat, nisi perlectam e manu deponere queat. At illa ars id ipsum est, quod *vix ac ne vix quidem cadere* videtur in vatem, singulas tantum rhapsodias decantantem," &c. (Prolegomena, p. cxviii.–cxx.; compare cxii.).

every man agrees. It includes a much greater multiplicity of events, and, what is yet more important, a greater multiplicity of prominent personages: the very indefinite title which it bears, as contrasted with the speciality of the name *Odyssey*, marks the difference at once. The parts stand out more conspicuously from the whole, and admit more readily of being felt and appreciated in detached recitation. We may also add, that it is of more unequal execution than the Odyssey—often rising to a far higher pitch of grandeur, but also occasionally tamer: the story does not move on continuously; incidents occur without plausible motive, nor can we shut our eyes to evidences of incoherence and contradiction.

To a certain extent, the Iliad is open to all these remarks, though Wolf and William Müller, and above all Lachmann, exaggerate the case in degree. And from hence has been deduced the hypothesis which treats the parts in their original state as separate integers, independent of and unconnected with each other, and forced into unity only by the afterthought of a subsequent age; or sometimes not even themselves as integers, but as aggregates grouped together out of fragments still smaller—short epics formed by the coalescence of still shorter songs. Now there is some plausibility in these reasonings, so long as the discrepancies are looked upon as the whole of the case. But in point of fact they are not the whole of the case: for it is not less true, that there are large portions of the Iliad which present positive and undeniable evidences of coherence as antecedent and consequent, though we are occasionally perplexed by inconsistencies of detail. To deal with these latter, is a portion of the duties of a critic. But he is not to treat the Iliad as if inconsistency prevailed everywhere throughout its parts; for coherence of parts—symmetrical antecedence and consequence is discernible throughout the larger half of the poem.

Now the Wolfian theory explains the gaps and contradictions throughout the narrative, but it explains nothing else. If (as Lachmann thinks) the Iliad originally consisted of sixteen songs or little substantive epics (Lachmann's sixteen songs cover the space only as far as the 22nd book or the death of Hector, and two more songs would have to be admitted for the 23rd and 24th books)—not only composed by different authors, but by each[1] without any view to conjunction with the rest—we have

[1] Lachmann seems to admit one case in which the composer of one song manifests cognisance of another song, and a disposition to give what will form a sequel to it. His fifteenth song (the Patrokleia) lasts from xv. 592

then no right to expect any intrinsic continuity between them; and all that continuity which we now find must be of extraneous origin. Where are we to look for the origin? Lachmann follows Wolf in ascribing the whole constructive process to Peisistratus and his associates, at a period when the creative epical faculty is admitted to have died out. But upon this supposition Peisistratus (or his associates) must have done much more than omit, transpose, and interpolate, here and there; he must have gone far to rewrite the whole poem. A great poet might have recast pre-existing separate songs into one comprehensive whole, but no mere arrangers or compilers would be competent to do so: and we are thus left without any means of accounting for that degree of continuity and consistence which runs through so large a portion of the Iliad, though not through the whole. The idea that the poem as we read it grew out of atoms not originally designed for the places which they now occupy, involves us in new and inextricable difficulties when we seek to elucidate either the mode of coalescence or the degree of existing unity.[1]

Admitting then premeditated adaptation of parts to a certain

down to the end of the 17th book: the sixteenth song (including the four next books, from 18 to 22 inclusive) is a continuation of the fifteenth, but by a different poet. (Fernere Betrachtungen über die Ilias, Abhandl. Berlin. Acad. 1841, sect. xxvi. xxviii. xxix. pp. 24, 34, 42).

This admission of premeditated adaptation to a certain extent breaks up the integrity of the Wolfian hypothesis.

[1] The advocates of the Wolfian theory appear to feel the difficulties which beset it; for their language is wavering in respect to these supposed primary constituent atoms. Sometimes Lachmann tells us, that the original pieces were much finer poetry than the Iliad as we now read it; at another time, that it cannot be now discovered what they originally were: nay, he further admits (as remarked in the preceding note) that the poet of the sixteenth song had cognisance of the fifteenth.

But if it be granted that the original constituent songs were so composed, though by different poets, as that the more recent were adapted to the earlier, with more or less dexterity and success, this brings us into totally different conditions of the problem. It is a virtual surrender of the Wolfian hypothesis, which however Lachmann both means to defend, and does defend with ability; though his vindication of it has, to my mind, only the effect of exposing its inherent weakness by carrying it out into something detailed and positive. I will add, in respect to his Dissertations, so instructive as a microscopic examination of the poem,—1. That I find myself constantly dissenting from that critical feeling, on the strength of which he cuts out parts as interpolations, and discovers traces of the hand of distinct poets; 2. that his objections against the continuity of the narrative are often founded upon lines which the ancient scholiasts and Mr. Payne Knight had already pronounced to be interpolations; 3. that such of his objections as are founded upon lines undisputed, admit in many cases of a complete and satisfactory reply.

extent as essential to the Iliad, we may yet inquire whether it was produced all at once or gradually enlarged—whether by one author or by several; and if the parts be of different age, which is the primitive kernel, and which are the additions.

Welcker, Lange, and Nitzsch[1] treat the Homeric poems as representing a second step in advance, in the progress of popular poetry. First comes the age of short narrative songs; next, when these have become numerous, there arise constructive minds who recast and blend together many of them into a larger aggregate conceived upon some scheme of their own. The age of the epos is followed by that of the epopee—short spontaneous effusions preparing the way, and furnishing materials, for the architectonic genius of the poet. It is further presumed by the above-mentioned authors that the pre-Homeric epic included a great abundance of such smaller songs,—a fact which admits of no proof, but which seems countenanced by some passages in Homer, and is in itself noway improbable. But the transition from such songs, assuming them to be ever so numerous, to a combined and continuous poem, forms an epoch in the intellectual history of the nation, implying mental qualities of a higher order than those upon which the songs themselves depend. Nor is it to be imagined that the materials pass unaltered from their first state of isolation into their second state of combination. They must of necessity be recast, and undergo an adapting process, in which the genius of the organising poet consists; nor can we hope, by simply knowing them as they exist in the second stage, ever to divine how they stood in the first. Such, in my judgement, is the right conception of the Homeric epoch,—an organising poetical mind, still preserving that freshness of observation and vivacity of details which constitutes the charm of the ballad.

Nothing is gained by studying the Iliad as a congeries of fragments once independent of each other: no portion of the poem can be shown to have ever been so, and the supposition introduces difficulties greater than those which it removes. But it is not necessary to affirm that the whole poem as we now read it belonged to the original and preconceived plan.[2]

[1] Lange, in his letter to Goethe, Ueber die Einheit der Iliade, p. 33 (1826); Nitzsch, Historia Homeri, Fasciculus 2. Præfat. p. x.

[2] Even Aristotle, the great builder-up of the celebrity of Homer as to epical aggregation, found some occasions (it appears) on which he was obliged to be content with simply excusing, without admiring, the poet (Poet. 44. τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς ὁ ποιητὴς ἡδύνων ἀφανίζει τὸ ἄτοπον).

And Hermann observes justly, in his acute treatise De Interpolationibus

In this respect the Iliad produces upon my mind an impression totally different from the Odyssey. In the latter poem, the characters and incidents are fewer, and the whole plot appears of one projection, from the beginning down to the death of the suitors: none of the parts look as if they had been composed separately and inserted by way of addition into a pre-existing smaller poem. But the Iliad, on the contrary, presents the appearance of a house built upon a plan comparatively narrow and subsequently enlarged by successive additions. The first book, together with the eighth, and the books from the eleventh to the twenty-second inclusive, seem to form the primary organisation of the poem, then properly an Achillêis: the twenty-third and twenty-fourth books are, perhaps, additions at the tail of this primitive poem, which still leave it nothing more than an enlarged Achillêis. But the books from the second to the seventh inclusive, together with the tenth, are of a wider and more comprehensive character, and convert the poem from an Achillêis into an Iliad.[1] The primitive frontispicce, inscribed with the anger of Achilles and its direct consequences, yet remains after it has ceased to be coextensive with the poem. The parts added, however, are not necessarily inferior in merit to the original poem: so far is this from being the case, that amongst them are comprehended some of the noblest efforts of the Grecian epic. Nor are they more recent in date than the original; strictly speaking, they must be a little more recent, but they belong to the same generation and state of society as the primitive Achillêis. These qualifications are necessary to keep apart different questions which, in discussions of Homeric criticism, are but too often confounded.

If we take those portions of the poem which I imagine to have constituted the original Achillêis, it will be found that the sequence of events contained in them is more rapid, more unbroken, and more intimately knit together in the way of cause and effect, than in the other books. Heyne and Lachmann indeed, with other objecting critics, complain of the

Homeri (Opuscula, t. v. p. 53),—"Nisi admirabilis illa Homericorum carminum suavitas lectorum animos quasi incantationibus quibusdam captos teneret, non tam facile delitescerent, quæ accuratius considerata, et multo minus apte quam quis jure postulet composita esse apparere necesse est."

This treatise contains many criticisms on the structure of the Iliad, some of them very well founded, though there are many from which I dissent.

[1] In reference to the books from the second to the seventh inclusive, I agree with the observations of William Müller, Homerische Vorschule, Abschnit. viii. p. 116–118.

action in them as being too much crowded and hurried, since one day lasts from the beginning of the eleventh book to the middle of the eighteenth, without any sensible halt in the march throughout so large a portion of the journey. Lachmann likewise admits that those separate songs, into which he imagines that the whole Iliad may be dissected, cannot be severed with the same sharpness, in the books subsequent to the eleventh, as in those before it.[1] There is only one real halting-place from the eleventh book to the twenty-second—the death of Patroclus; and this can never be conceived as the end of a separate poem,[2] though it is a capital step in the development of the Achillêis, and brings about that entire revolution in the temper of Achilles which was essential for the purpose of the poet. It would be a mistake to imagine that there ever could have existed a separate poem called Patrocleia, though a part of the Iliad was designated by that name. For Patroclus has no substantive position: he is the attached friend and second of Achilles, but nothing else,—standing to the latter in a relation of dependence resembling that of Telemachus to Odysseus. And the way in which Patroclus is dealt with in the Iliad is (in my judgement) the most dexterous and artistical contrivance in the poem—that which approaches nearest to the neat tissue of the Odyssey.[3]

[1] Lachmann, Fernere Betrachtungen über die Ilias, Abhandlungen Berlin. Acad. 141, p. 4.

After having pointed out certain discrepancies which he maintains to prove different composing hands, he adds,—"Nevertheless, we must be careful not to regard the single constituent songs in this part of the poem as being distinct and separable in a degree equal to those in the first half; for they all with one accord harmonise in one particular circumstance, which with reference to the story of the Iliad is not less important even than the anger of Achilles, viz. that the three most distinguished heroes, Agamemnôn, Odysseus, and Diomêdês, all become disabled throughout the whole duration of the battles."

Important for the story of the *Achillêis*, I should say, not for that of the *Iliad*. This remark of Lachmann is highly illustrative for the distinction between the original and the enlarged poem.

[2] I confess my astonishment that a man of so much genius and power of thought as M. Benjamin Constant, should have imagined the original Iliad to have concluded with the death of Patroclus, on the ground that Achilles then becomes reconciled with Agamemnôn. See the review of B. Constant's work De la Religion, &c., by O. Müller, in the Kleine Schriften of the latter, vol. ii. p. 74.

[3] He appears as the mediator between the insulted Achilles and the Greeks, manifesting kindly sympathies for the latter without renouncing his fidelity to the former. The wounded Machaon, an object of interest to the whole camp, being carried off the field by Nestor—Achilles, looking on from his distant ship, sends Patroclus to inquire whether it be really

The great and capital misfortune which prostrates the strength of the Greeks and renders them incapable of defending themselves without Achilles, is the disablement by wounds of Agamemnôn, Diomêdês, and Odysseus: so that the defence of the wall and of the ships is left only to heroes of the second magnitude (Ajax alone excepted), such as Idomeneus, Leonteus, Polypœtês, Merionês, Menelaus, &c. Now it is remarkable that all these three first-rate chiefs are in full force at the beginning of the eleventh book: all three are wounded in the battle which that book describes, and at the commencement of which Agamemnôn is full of spirits and courage.

Nothing can be more striking than the manner in which Homer concentrates our attention in the first book upon Achilles as the hero, his quarrel with Agamemnôn, and the calamities to the Greeks which are held out as about to ensue from it, through the intercession of Thetis with Zeus. But the incidents dwelt upon from the beginning of the second book down to the combat between Hector and Ajax in the seventh, animated and interesting as they are, do nothing to realise this promise. They are a splendid picture of the Trojan war generally, and eminently suitable to that larger title under which the poem has been immortalised—but the consequences of the anger of Achilles do not appear until the eighth book. The tenth book, or Doloneia, is also a portion of the Iliad, but not of the Achillêis; while the ninth book appears to me a subsequent addition, nowise harmonising with that main stream of the Achillêis which flows from the eleventh book to the twenty-second. The eighth book ought to be read in immediate

Machaon; which enables Nestor to lay before Patroclus the deplorable state of the Grecian host, as a motive to induce him and Achilles again to take arms. The compassionate feelings of Patroclus being powerfully touched, he is hastening to enforce upon Achilles the urgent necessity of giving help, when he meets Eurypylus crawling out of the field, helpless with a severe wound, and imploring his succour. He supports the wounded warrior to his tent, and ministers to his suffering; but before this operation is fully completed, the Grecian host has been totally driven back, and the Trojans are on the point of setting fire to the ships: Patroclus then hurries to Achilles to proclaim the desperate peril which hangs over them all, and succeeds in obtaining his permission to take the field at the head of the Myrmidons. The way in which Patroclus is kept present to the hearer, as a prelude to his brilliant but short-lived display when he comes forth in arms,—the contrast between his characteristic gentleness and the ferocity of Achilles,—and the natural train of circumstances whereby he is made the vehicle of reconciliation on the part of his offended friend, and rescue to his imperilled countrymen,—all these exhibit a degree of epical skill, in the author of the primitive Achillêis, to which nothing is found parallel in the added books of the Iliad.

connexion with the eleventh, in order to see the structure of what seems the primitive Achillêis; for there are several passages in the eleventh and the following books,[1] which prove that the

[1] Observe, for example, the following passages—

1. Achilles, standing on the prow of his ship, sees the general army of Greeks undergoing defeat by the Trojans, and also sees Nestor conveying in his chariot a wounded warrior from the field. He sends Patroclus to find out who the wounded man is: in calling forth Patroclus, he says (xi. 607)—

> Δῖε Μενοιτιάδη, τῷ 'μῷ κεχαρισμένε θυμῷ,
> Νῦν οἴω περὶ γούναθ' ἑμὰ στήσεσθαι Ἀχαιοὺς
> Λισσομένους· χρειὼ γὰρ ἱκάνεται οὐκέτ' ἀνεκτός·

Heyne, in his comment, asks the question, not unnaturally, "Pœnituerat igitur asperitatis erga priorem legationem, an homo arrogans expectaverat alteram ad se missam iri?" I answer—neither one nor the other: the words imply that he had received *no embassy* at all. He is still the same Achilles who in the first book paced alone by the sea-shore, devouring his own soul under a sense of bitter affront, and praying to Thetis to aid his revenge: this revenge is now about to be realised, and he hails its approach with delight. But if we admit the embassy of the ninth book to intervene, the passage becomes a glaring inconsistency: for that which Achilles anticipates as future, and even yet as contingent, *had actually occurred* on the previous evening; the Greeks *had* supplicated at his feet,—they *had proclaimed* their intolerable need,—and he had spurned them. The Scholiast, in his explanation of these lines, after giving the plain meaning, that "Achilles shows what he has long been desiring, to see the Greeks in a state of supplication to him"—seems to recollect that this is in contradiction to the ninth book, and tries to remove the contradiction by saying "that he had been previously mollified by conversation with Phœnix"—ἤδη δὲ προμαλαχθεὶς ἦν ἐκ τῶν Φοίνικος λόγων—a supposition neither countenanced by any thing in the poet, nor sufficient to remove the difficulty.

2. The speech of Poseidôn (xiii. 115) to encourage the dispirited Grecian heroes, in which, after having admitted the injury done to Achilles by Agamemnôn, he recommends an effort to heal the sore, and intimates "that the minds of good men admit of this healing process" (Ἀλλ' ἀκεώμεθα θᾶσσον· ἀκέσασθαί τε φρένες ἐσθλῶν), is certainly not very consistent with the supposition that this attempt to heal *had been made* in the best possible way, and that Achilles had manifested a mind implacable in the extreme on the evening before—while the mind of Agamemnôn was already brought to proclaimed humiliation and needed no further healing.

3. And what shall we say to the language of Achilles and Patroclus at the beginning of the sixteenth book, just at the moment when the danger has reached its maximum, and when Achilles is about to send forth his friend?

Neither Nestor, when he invokes and instructs Patroclus as intercessor with Achilles (xi. 654–790), nor Patroclus himself, though in the extreme of anxiety to work upon the mind of Achilles, and reproaching him with hardness of heart—ever bring to remembrance the ample atonement which had been tendered to him; while Achilles himself repeats the original ground of quarrel, the wrong offered to him in taking away Brisêis, continuing the language of the first book; then without the least allusion to the atonement and restitution since tendered, he yields to his friend's pro-

poet who composed them could not have had present to his mind the main event of the ninth book,—the outpouring of

position just like a man whose wrong remained unredressed, but who was nevertheless forced to take arms by necessity (xvi. 60–63)—

> Ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν προτετύχθαι ἐάσομεν, οὐδ' ἄρα πως ἦν
> Ἀσπερχὲς κεχολῶσθαι ἐνὶ φρεσίν· ἦτοι ἔφην γε
> Οὐ πρὶν μηνιθμὸν καταπαυσέμεν, ἀλλ' ὁπόταν δὴ
> Νῆας ἐμὰς ἀφίκηται ἀϋτή τε πτόλεμός τε.

I agree with the Scholiast and Heyne in interpreting ἔφην γε as equivalent to διενοήθην—not as referring to any express antecedent declaration.

Again, further on in the same speech, "The Trojans (Achilles says) now press boldly forward upon the ships, for they no longer see the blaze of my helmet: but if Agamemnôn *were favourably disposed towards me*, they would presently run away and fill the ditches with their dead bodies" (71)—

> . . . . . τάχα κεν φεύγοντες ἐναύλους
> Πλήσειαν νεκύων, εἴ μοι κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων
> Ἵππια εἰδείη· νῦν δὲ στρατὸν ἀμφιμάχονται.

Now here again, if we take our start from the first book, omitting the ninth, the sentiment is perfectly just. But assume the ninth book, and it becomes false and misplaced; for Agamemnôn is then a prostrate and repentant man, not merely "favourably disposed" towards Achilles, but offering to pay any price for the purpose of appeasing him.

4. Again, a few lines further, in the same speech, Achilles permits Patroclus to go forth, in consideration of the extreme peril of the fleet, but restricts him simply to avert this peril and do nothing more: "Obey my words, so that you may procure *for me honour* and glory from *the body of Greeks*, and that they may send back to me the damsel, giving me ample presents besides: when you have driven the Trojans from the ships, come back again"—

> Ὡς ἄν μοι τιμὴν μεγάλην καὶ κῦδος ἄρηαι
> Πρὸς πάντων Δαναῶν· ἀτὰρ οἱ περικαλλέα κούρην
> Λύψ' ἀπονάσσωσι, προρὶ δ' ἀγλαὰ δῶρα πόρωσιν·
> Ἐκ νηῶν ἐλάσας, ἰέναι πάλιν (84–87).

How are we to reconcile this with the ninth book, where Achilles declares that he does not care for being honoured by the Greeks, ix. 604? In the mouth of the affronted Achilles of the first book such words are apt enough: he will grant succour, but only to the extent necessary for the emergency, and in such a way as to ensure redress for his own wrong,—which redress he has no reason as yet to conclude that Agamemnôn is willing to grant. But the ninth book *has actually* tendered to him everything which he here demands and even more (the daughter of Agamemnôn in marriage, without the price usually paid for a bride, &c.): Briséis, whom now he is so anxious to re-possess, was then offered in restitution, and he disdained the offer. Mr. Knight in fact strikes out these lines as spurious; partly because they contradict the ninth book, where Achilles has actually rejected what he here thirsts for ("Dona cum puellâ jam antea oblata aspernatus erat")—partly because he thinks that they express a sentiment unworthy of Achilles; in which latter criticism I do not concur.

5. We proceed a little further to the address of Patroclus to the Myrmidons, as he is conducting them forth to the battle: "Fight bravely, Myrmidons, that we may bring honour to Achilles; and that the wide-

profound humiliation by the Greeks, and from Agamemnôn especially, before Achilles, coupled with formal offers to restore

ruling Agamemnôn may know the mad folly which he committed when he dishonoured the bravest of the Greeks."

To impress this knowledge upon Agamemnôn was no longer necessary. The ninth book records his humiliating confession of it, accompanied by atonement and reparation. To teach him the lesson a second time is to break the bruised reed,—to slay the slain. But leave out the ninth book, and the motive is the natural one,—both for Patroclus to offer, and for the Myrmidons to obey: Achilles still remains a dishonoured man, and to humble the rival who has dishonoured him is the first of all objects, as well with his friends as with himself.

6. Lastly, the time comes when Achilles, in deep anguish for the death of Patroclus, looks back with aversion and repentance to the past. To what point should we expect that his repentance would naturally turn? Not to his primary quarrel with Agamemnôn, in which he had been undeniably wronged—but to the scene in the ninth book, where the maximum of atonement for the previous wrong is tendered to him and scornfully rejected. Yet when we turn to xviii. 108, and xix. 55, 68, 270, we find him reverting to the primitive quarrel in the first book, just as if it had been the last incident in his relations with Agamemnôn: moreover, Agamemnôn (xix. 86), in *his* speech of reconciliation, treats the past just in the same way,—deplores his original insanity in wronging Achilles.

7. When we look to the prayers of Achilles and Thetis, addressed to Zeus in the first book, we find that the consummation prayed for is,—honour to Achilles,—redress for the wrong offered to him,—victory to the Trojans until Agamemnôn and the Greeks shall be made bitterly sensible of the wrong which they have done to their bravest warrior (i. 409–509). Now this consummation is brought about in the ninth book. Achilles can get no more, nor does he ultimately get more, either in the way of redress to himself or remorseful humiliation of Agamemnôn, than what is here tendered. The defeat which the Greeks suffer in the battle of the eighth book (Κῆλος Μάχη) has brought about the consummation. The subsequent and much more destructive defeats which they undergo are thus causeless: yet Zeus is represented as inflicting them reluctantly, and only because they are necessary to honour Achilles (xiii. 350; xv. 75, 235, 598; compare also viii. 372 and 475).

If we reflect upon the constitution of the poem, we shall see that the fundamental sequence of events in it is, a series of misfortunes to the Greeks, brought on by Zeus for the special purpose of procuring atonement to Achilles and bringing humiliation on Agamemnôn: the introduction of Patroclus superadds new motives of the utmost interest, but it is most harmoniously worked into the fundamental sequence. Now the intrusion of the ninth book breaks up the scheme of the poem by disuniting this sequence: Agamemnôn is on his knees before Achilles, entreating pardon and proffering reparation, yet the calamities of the Greeks become more and more dreadful. The atonement of the ninth book comes at the wrong time and in the wrong manner.

There are four passages (and only four, so far as I am aware) in which the embassy of the ninth book is alluded to in the subsequent books: one in xviii. 444–456, which was expunged as spurious by Aristarchus (see the Scholia and Knight's commentary *ad loc.*); and three others in the following book, wherein the gifts previously tendered by Odysseus as the envoy of Agamemnôn are noticed as identical with the gifts actually given in the

Brisêis and pay the amplest compensation for past wrong. The words of Achilles (not less than those of Patroclus and Nestor) in the eleventh and in the following books, plainly imply that the humiliation of the Greeks before him, for which he thirsts, is as yet future and contingent; that no plenary apology has yet been tendered, nor any offer made of restoring Brisêis; while both Nestor and Patroclus, with all their wish to induce him to take arms, never take notice of the offered atonement and restitution, but view him as one whose ground for quarrel stands still the same as it did at the beginning. Moreover, if we look at the first book—the opening of the Achillêis—we shall see that this prostration of Agamemnôn and the chief Grecian heroes before Achilles would really be the termination of the whole poem; for Achilles asks nothing more from Thetis, nor Thetis anything more from Zeus, than that Agamemnôn and the Greeks may be brought to know the wrong that they have done to their capital warrior, and humbled in the dust in expiation of it. We may add, that the abject terror, in which Agamemnôn appears in the ninth book when he sends the supplicatory message to Achilles, as it is not adequately accounted for by the degree of calamity which the Greeks have experienced in the preceding (eighth) book, so it is inconsistent with the gallantry and high spirit with which he shines at the beginning of the eleventh.[1] The situation of the

nineteenth book. I feel persuaded that these passages (vv. 140–141, 192–195, and 243) are specially inserted for the purpose of establishing a connexion between the ninth book and the nineteenth. The four lines (192–195) are decidedly better away: the first two lines (140–141) are noway necessary; while the word χθιζός (which occurs in both passages) is only rendered admissible by being stretched to mean *nudius tertius* (Heyne *ad loc.*).

I will only further remark with respect to the ninth book, that the speech of Agamemnôn (17–28), the theme for the rebuke of Diomêdês and the obscure commonplace of Nestor, is taken verbatim from his speech in the second book, in which place the proposition, of leaving the place and flying, is made, not seriously, but as a stratagem (ii. 110, 118, 140).

The length of this note can only be excused by its direct bearing upon the structure of the Iliad. To show that the books from the eleventh downwards are composed by a poet who has no knowledge of the ninth book; is, in my judgement, a very important point of evidence in aiding us to understand what the original Achillêis was. The books from the second to the seventh inclusive are insertions into the Achillêis and lie apart from its plot, but do not violently contradict it, except in regard to the agora of the gods at the beginning of the fourth book, and the almost mortal wound of Sarpêdon in his battle with Tlepolemus. But the ninth book overthrows the fundamental scheme of the poem.

[1] Helbig (*Sittl. Zustände des Heldenalters*, p. 30) says, "The consciousness in the bosom of Agamemnôn that he has offered atonement to

Greeks only becomes desperate when the three great chiefs, Agamemnôn, Odysseus, and Diomêdês, are disabled by wounds;[1] this is the irreparable calamity which works upon Patroclus, and through him upon Achilles. The ninth book as it now stands seems to me an addition, by a different hand, to the original Achillêis, framed so as both to forestall and to spoil the nineteenth book, which is the real reconciliation of the two inimical heroes: I will venture to add that it carries the pride and egotism of Achilles beyond even the largest exigencies of insulted honour, and is shocking to that sentiment of Nemesis which was so deeply seated in the Grecian mind. We forgive any excess of fury against the Trojans and Hector, after the death of Patroclus; but that he should remain unmoved by restitution, by abject supplications, and by the richest atoning presents, tendered from the Greeks, indicates an implacability such as neither the first book, nor the books between the eleventh and the seventeenth, convey.[2]

It is with the Grecian agora in the beginning of the second book that the Iliad (as distinguished from the Achillêis) commences,—continued through the Catalogue, the muster of the two armies, the single combat between Menelaus and Paris, the renewed promiscuous battle caused by the arrow of Pandarus, the (Epipôlêsis or) personal circuit of Agamemnôn round the army, the Aristeia or brilliant exploits of Diomêdês, the visit of Hector to Troy for purposes of sacrifice, his interview with Andromachê, and his combat with Ajax—down to the seventh book. All these are beautiful poetry, presenting to us the general Trojan war and its conspicuous individuals under different points of view, but leaving no room in the reader's mind for the thought of Achilles. Now the difficulty for an

Achilles strengthens his confidence and valour," &c. This is the idea of the critic, not of the poet. It does not occur in the Iliad, though the critic not unnaturally imagines that it *must* occur. Agamemnôn never says—"I was wrong in provoking Achilles, but you see I have done everything which man could do to beg his pardon." Assuming the ninth book to be a part of the original conception, this feeling is so natural, that we could hardly fail to find it at the beginning of the eleventh book, numbered among the motives of Agamemnôn.

[1] Iliad. xi. 659; xiv. 128; xvi. 25.

[2] In respect to the ninth book of the Iliad, Friedländer (Die Homerische Kritik von Wolf bis Grote, p. 37) cites a passage from Kaiser (De Interpretatione Homericâ, p. 11) to the following effect—"Nonum librum a sextodecimo adeo discrepare in gravissimis rebus quæ pro cardine totius Iliadis habentur, ut uniius poetæ Πρεσβεία et Πατρόκλεια esse nequeant. Recentior autem, ni magnopere fallor, Πρεσβεία." He also alludes to a similar expression of opinion by Nägelsbach in the Münchner Gelehrten Anzeigen, 1842, p. 314.

enlarging poet was, to pass from the Achillêis in the first book to the Iliad in the second, and it will accordingly be found that here is an awkwardness in the structure of the poem which counsel on the poet's behalf (ancient or modern) do not satisfactorily explain.

In the first book, Zeus has promised Thetis that he will punish the Greeks for the wrong done to Achilles: in the beginning of the second book, he deliberates how he shall fulfil the promise, and sends down for that purpose "mischievous Oneirus" (the Dream-God) to visit Agamemnôn in his sleep, to assure him that the gods have now with one accord consented to put Troy into his hands, and to exhort him forthwith to the assembling of his army for the attack. The ancient commentators were here perplexed by the circumstance that Zeus puts a falsehood into the mouth of Oneirus. But there seems no more difficulty in explaining this than in the narrative of the book of 1 Kings (chap. xxii. 20), where Jehovah is mentioned to have put a lying spirit into the mouth of Ahab's prophets—the real awkwardness is, that Oneirus and his falsehood produce no effect. For in the first place Agamemnôn takes a step very different from that which his dream recommends—and in the next place, when the Grecian army is at length armed and goes forth to battle, it does not experience defeat (which would be the case if the exhortation of Oneirus really proved mischievous), but carries on a successful day's battle, chiefly through the heroism of Diomêdês. Instead of arming the Greeks forthwith, Agamemnôn convokes first a council of chiefs, and next an agora of the host. And though himself in a temper of mind highly elate with the deceitful assurances of Oneirus, he deliberately assumes the language of despair in addressing the troops, having previously prepared Nestor and Odysseus for his doing so—merely in order to try the courage of the men, and with formal instructions given to these two other chiefs that they are to speak in opposition to him. Now this intervention of Zeus and Oneirus, eminently unsatisfactory when coupled with the incidents which now follow it, and making Zeus appear, but only appear, to realise his promise of honouring Achilles as well as of hurting the Greeks,—forms exactly the point of junction between the Achillêis and the Iliad.[1]

[1] The intervention of Oneirus ought rather to come as an immediate preliminary to book viii. than to book ii. The first forty-seven lines of book ii. would fit on and read consistently at the beginning of book viii., the events of which book form a proper sequel to the mission of Oneirus.

The freak which Agamemnôn plays off upon the temper of his army, though in itself childish, serves a sufficient purpose, not only because it provides a special matter of interest to be submitted to the Greeks, but also because it calls forth the splendid description, so teeming with vivacious detail, of the sudden breaking up of the assembly after Agamemnôn's harangue, and of the decisive interference of Odysseus to bring the men back, as well as to put down Thersitês. This picture of the Greeks in agora, bringing out the two chief speaking and counselling heroes, was so important a part of the general Trojan war, that the poet has permitted himself to introduce it by assuming an inexplicable folly on the part of Agamemnôn; just as he has ushered in another fine scene in the third book—the Teichoskopy or conversation between Priam and Helen on the walls of Troy—by admitting the supposition that the old king in the tenth year of the war did not know the persons of Agamemnôn and the other Grecian chiefs. This may serve as an explanation of the delusion practised by Agamemnôn towards his assembled host; but it does not at all explain the tame and empty intervention of Oneirus.[1]

If the initial incident of the second book, whereby we pass out of the Achillêis into the Iliad, is awkward, so also the final incident of the seventh book, immediately before we come back

[1] O. Müller (History of Greek Literature, ch. v. § 8) doubts whether the beginning of the second book was written "by the ancient Homer, or by one of the latter Homerids:" he thinks the speech of Agamemnôn, wherein he plays off the deceit upon his army, is "a copious parody (of the same words used in the ninth book) composed by a later Homerid, and inserted in the room of an originally shorter account of the arming of the Greeks." He treats the scene in the Grecian agora as "an entire mythical comedy, full of fine irony and with an amusing plot, in which the deceiving and deceived Agamemnôn is the chief character."

The comic or ironical character which is here ascribed to the second book appears to me fanciful and incorrect; but Müller evidently felt the awkwardness of the opening incident, though his way of accounting for it is not successful. The second book seems to my judgement just as serious as any part of the poem.

I think also that the words alluded to by O. Müller in the ninth book are a transcript of those in the second, instead of the reverse, as he believes—because it seems probable that the ninth book is an addition made to the poem after the books between the first and the eighth had been already inserted—it is certainly introduced after the account of the fortification, contained in the seventh book, had become a part of the poem: see ix. 349. The author of the Embassy to Achilles fancied that that hero had been too long out of sight and out of mind,—a supposition for which there was no room in the original Achillêis; when the eighth and eleventh books followed in immediate succession to the first, but which offers itself naturally to any one on reading our present Iliad.

into the Achillêis, is not less unsatisfactory—I mean the construction of the wall and ditch round the Greek camp. As the poem now stands, no plausible reason is assigned why this should be done. Nestor proposes it without any constraining necessity: for the Greeks are in a career of victory, and the Trojans are making offers of compromise which imply conscious weakness—while Diomêdês is so confident of the approaching ruin of Troy, that he dissuades his comrades from receiving even Helen herself if the surrender should be tendered. "Many Greeks have been slain," it is true,[1] as Nestor observes; but an equal or greater number of Trojans have been slain, and all the Grecian heroes are yet in full force: the absence of Achilles is not even adverted to.

Now this account of the building of the fortification seems to be an after-thought, arising out of the enlargement of the poem beyond its original scheme. The original Achillêis, passing at once from the first to the eighth,[2] and from thence to the eleventh book, might well assume the fortification—and talk of it as a thing existing, without adducing any special reason why it was erected. The hearer would naturally comprehend and follow the existence of a ditch and wall round the ships, as a matter of course, provided there was nothing in the previous narrative to make him believe that the Greeks had originally been without these bulwarks. And since the Achillêis, immediately after the promise of Zeus to Thetis at the close of the first book, went on to describe the fulfilment of that promise and the ensuing disasters of the Greeks, there was nothing to surprise any one in hearing that their camp was fortified. But the case was altered when the first and the

[1] Iliad, vii. 327.

[2] Heyne treats the eighth book as decidedly a separate song or epic; a supposition which the language of Zeus and the agora of the gods at the beginning are alone sufficient to refute in my judgement (Excursus I. ad lib. xi. vol. vi. p. 269). This Excursus, in describing the sequence of events in the Iliad, passes at once and naturally from book viii. to book xi.

And Mr. Payne Knight, when he defends book xi. against Heyne, says, "Quæ in undecimâ rhapsodiâ *Iliadis* narrata sunt, haud minus ex ante narratis pendent: neque rationem pugnæ commissæ, neque rerum in eâ gestarum nexum atque ordinem, quisquam intelligere posset, nisi *iram et secessum* Achillis, et *victoriam* quam Trojani inde consecuti erant, antea cognosset." (Prolegom. c. xxix.)

Perfectly true: to understand the eleventh book, we must have before us the first and the eighth (which are those that describe the anger and withdrawal of Achilles, and the defeat which the Greeks experience in consequence of it); we may dispense with the rest.

eighth books were parted asunder in order to make room for descriptions of temporary success and glory on the part of the besieging army. The brilliant scenes sketched in the books from the second to the seventh, mention no fortification, and even imply its non-existence; yet since notice of it occurs amidst the first description of Grecian disasters in the eighth book, the hearer who had the earlier books present to his memory might be surprised to find a fortification mentioned immediately afterwards, unless the construction of it were specially announced to have intervened. But it will at once appear, that there was some difficulty in finding a good reason why the Greeks should begin to fortify at this juncture, and that the poet who discovered the gap might not be enabled to fill it up with success. As the Greeks have got on up to this moment without the wall, and as we have heard nothing but tales of their success, why should they now think further laborious precautions for security necessary? we will not ask, why the Trojans should stand quietly by and permit a wall to be built, since the truce was concluded expressly for burying the dead.[1]

[1] O. Müller (Hist. Greek Literat. ch. v. § 6) says about this wall,—"Nor is it until the Greeks are *taught by the experience of the first day's fighting*, that the Trojans *can* resist them in open battle, that the Greeks build the wall round their ships. . . . This appeared to Thucydidês so little conformable to historical probability, that without regard to the authority of Homer, he placed the building of these walls immediately after the landing."

It is to be lamented, I think, that Thucydidês took upon him to determine the point at all as a matter of history; but when he once undertook this, the account in the Iliad was not of a nature to give him much satisfaction, nor does the reason assigned by Müller make it better. It is implied in Müller's reason that before the first day's battle the Greeks did not believe that the Trojans *could* resist them in open battle: the Trojans (according to him) never had maintained the field so long as Achilles was up and fighting on the Grecian side, and therefore the Greeks were quite astonished to find how, for the first time, that they *could* do so.

Now nothing can be more at variance with the tenor of the second and following books than this supposition. The Trojans come forth readily and fight gallantly; neither Agamemnôn, nor Nestôr, nor Odysseus consider them as enemies who cannot hold front; and the circuit of exhortation by Agamemnôn (Epipôlêsis), so strikingly described in the fourth book, proves that *he* does not anticipate a very easy victory. Nor does Nestôr, in proposing the construction of the wall, give the smallest hint that the power of the Trojans to resist in the open field was to the Greeks an unexpected discovery.

The reason assigned by Müller, then, is a fancy of his own, proceeding from the same source of mistake as others among his remarks; because he tries to find, in the books between the first and eighth, a governing reference to Achilles (the point of view of the Achillêis), which those books distinctly refuse. The Achillêis was a poem of Grecian disasters up to the time when

The tenth book (or Doloneia) was considered by some of the ancient scholiasts,[1] and has been confidently set forth by the modern Wolfian critics, as originally a separate poem, inserted by Peisistratus into the Iliad. How it can ever have been a separate poem, I do not understand. It is framed with great specialty for the antecedent circumstances under which it occurs, and would suit for no other place; though capable of being separately recited, inasmuch as it has a definite beginning and end, like the story of Nisus and Euryalus in the Æneid. But while distinctly presupposing and resting upon the incidents in the eighth book, and in line 88 of the ninth (probably, the appointment of sentinels on the part of the Greeks as well as of the Trojans formed the close of the battle described in the eighth book), it has not the slightest bearing upon the events of the eleventh or the following books: it goes to make up the general picture of the Trojan war, but lies quite apart from the Achillêis. And this is one mark of a portion subsequently inserted—that though fitted on to the parts which precede, it has no influence on those which follow.

If the proceedings of the combatants on the plain of Troy, between the first and the eighth book, have no reference either to Achilles or to an Achillêis, we find Zeus in Olympus still more completely putting that hero out of the question, at the beginning of the fourth book. He is in this last-mentioned passage the Zeus of the Iliad, not of the Achillêis. Forgetful of his promise to Thetis in the first book he discusses nothing but the question of continuance or termination of the war, and manifests anxiety only for the salvation of Troy, in opposition to the miso-Trojan goddesses, who prevent him from giving effect to the victory of Menelaus over Paris and the stipulated restitution of Helen—in which case of course the wrong offered to Achilles would remain unexpiated. An attentive comparison will render it evident that the poet who composed the discussion among the gods, at the beginning of the fourth book, has

Achilles sent forth Patroclus: and during those disasters, it might suit the poet to refer by contrast to the past time when Achilles was active, and to say that *then* the Trojans did not dare even to present themselves in battle array in the field, whereas *now* they were assailing the ships. But the author of books ii. to vii. has no wish to glorify Achilles; he gives us a picture of the Trojan war generally, and describes the Trojans not only as brave and equal enemies, but well known by the Greeks themselves to be so.

The building of the Grecian wall, as it now stands described, is an unexplained proceeding which Müller's ingenuity does not render consistent.

[1] Schol. ad Iliad. x. i.

not been careful to put himself in harmony either with the Zeus of the first book or with the Zeus of the eighth.

So soon as we enter upon the eleventh book, the march of the poem becomes quite different. We are then in a series of events, each paving the way for that which follows, and all conducing to the result promised in the first book—the re-appearance of Achilles, as the only means of saving the Greeks from ruin—preceded by ample atonement,[1] and followed by the maximum both of glory and revenge. The intermediate career of Patroclus introduces new elements, which however are admirably woven into the scheme of the poem as disclosed in the first book. I shall not deny that there are perplexities in the detail of events, as described in the battles at the Grecian wall and before the ships, from the eleventh to the sixteenth books, but they appear only cases of partial confusion, such as may be reasonably ascribed to imperfections of text: the main sequence remains coherent and intelligible. We find no considerable events which could be left out without breaking the thread, nor any incongruity between one considerable event and another. There is nothing between the eleventh and twenty-second books which is at all comparable to the incongruity between the Zeus of the fourth book and the Zeus of the first and eighth. It may perhaps be true that the shield of Achilles is a superadded amplification of that which was originally announced in general terms—because the poet, from the eleventh to the twenty-second books, has observed such good economy of his materials, that he is hardly likely to have introduced one particular description of such disproportionate length, and having so little connexion with the series of events. But I see no reason for believing that it is an addition materially later than the rest of the poem.

It must be confessed that the supposition here advanced, in reference to the structure of the Iliad, is not altogether free from difficulties, because the parts constituting the original Achillêis[2] have been more or less altered or interpolated to

[1] Agamemnôn, after deploring the misguiding influence of Atê, which induced him to do the original wrong to Achilles, says (xix. 88-137)—

'Αλλ' ἐπεὶ ἀασάμην καὶ μεν φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεὺς,
Ἄτη βέλλων ἀρέσαι, δόμεναί τ' ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα, &c.

[2] The supposition of a smaller original Iliad, enlarged by successive additions to the present dimensions, and more or less interpolated (we must distinguish *enlargement* from *interpolation*,—the insertion of a new rhapsody from that of a new line), seems to be a sort of intermediate compromise, towards which the opposing views of Wolf, J. H. Voss, Nitzsch,

suit the additions made to it, particularly in the eighth book. But it presents fewer difficulties than any other supposition, and it is the only means, so far as I know, of explaining the difference between one part of the Iliad and another; both the continuity of structure, and the conformity to the opening promise, which are manifest when we read the books in the order i. viii. xi. to xxii., as contrasted with the absence of these two qualities in books ii. to vii., ix. and x. An entire organisation, preconceived from the beginning, would not be likely to produce any such disparity, nor is any such visible in the Odyssey;[1] still less would the result be explained by

Hermann, and Boeckh all converge. Baumgarten-Crusius calls this smaller poem an Achillêis.

Wolf, Preface to the Göschen edit. of the Iliad, p. xii.–xxiii.; Voss, Anti-Symbolik, part. ii. p. 234; Nitzsch, Histor. Homeri, Fasciculus i. p. 112; and Vorrede to the second volume of his Comments on the Odyssey, p. xxvi.: "In the Iliad (he there says) many single portions may very easily be imagined as parts of another whole, or as having been once separately sung." (See Baumgarten-Crusius, Preface to his edition of W. Müller's Homerische Vorschule, p. xlv.–xlix.)

Nitzsch distinguishes the Odyssey from the Iliad, and I think justly, in respect to this supposed enlargement. The reasons which warrant us in applying this theory to the Iliad have no bearing upon the Odyssey. If there ever was an Ur-Odyssee, we have no means of determining what it contained.

[1] The remarks of O. Müller on the Iliad (in his History of Greek Literature) are highly deserving of perusal: with much of them I agree, but there is also much which seems to me unfounded. The range of combination, and the far-fetched narrative stratagem which he ascribes to the primitive author, are in my view inadmissible (chap. v. § 5–11)—

"The internal connexion of the Iliad (he observes, § 6) rests upon the union of certain parts; and neither the interesting introduction describing the defeat of the Greeks up to the burning of the ship of Protesilaus, nor the turn of affairs brought about by the death of Patroclus, nor the final pacification of the anger of Achilles, could be spared from the Iliad, when the fruitful seed of such a poem had once been sown in the soul of Homer and had begun to develope its growth. But the plan of the Iliad is certainly very much extended beyond what was actually necessary; and in particular the preparatory part, consisting of the *attempts* on the part of *the other heroes to compensate for the absence of Achilles*, has, it must be owned, been drawn out to a disproportionate length, so that the suspicion that there were later insertions of importance applies with greater probability to the first than to the last books. . . . A design manifested itself at an early period to make this point complete in itself, so that all the subjects, descriptions, and actions, which could alone give interest to a poem *on the entire war*, might find a place within the limits of its composition. For this purpose it is not improbable that many lays of earlier bards, who had sung single adventures of the Trojan war, were laid under contribution, and the finest parts of them incorporated in the new poem."

These remarks of O. Müller intimate what is (in my judgement) the right view, inasmuch as they recognise an extension of the plan of the poem beyond its original limit, manifested by insertions in the first half; and it is

supposing integers originally separate and brought together without any designed organisation. And it is between these

to be observed that in his enumeration of those parts, the union of which is necessary to the internal connexion of the Iliad, nothing is mentioned except what is comprised in books i. viii. xi. to xxii. or xxiv. But his description of "the *preparatory part*," as "*the attempts of the other heroes to compensate for the absence of Achilles*," is noway borne out by the poet himself. From the second to the seventh book, Achilles is scarcely alluded to; moreover the Greeks do perfectly well without him. This portion of the poem displays not "the *insufficiency* of all the other heroes without Achilles," as Müller had observed in the preceding section, but the perfect *sufficiency* of the Greeks under Diomêdês, Agamemnôn, &c., to make head against Troy; it is only in the eighth book that their *insufficiency* begins to be manifested, and only in the eleventh book that it is consummated by the wounds of the three great heroes. Diomêdês is in fact exalted to a pitch of glory in regard to contests with the gods, which even Achilles himself never obtains afterwards, and Helenus the Trojan puts him above Achilles (vi. 99) in terrific prowess. Achilles is mentioned two or three times as absent, and Agamemnôn in his speech to the Grecian agora regrets the quarrel (ii. 377), but we never hear any such exhortation as "Let us do our best to make up for the absence of Achilles,"—not even in the Epipôlêsis of Agamemnôn, where it would most naturally be found. "Attempts to compensate for the absence of Achilles" must therefore be treated as the idea of the critic, not of the poet.

Though O. Müller has glanced at the distinction between the two parts of the poem (an original part, having chief reference to *Achilles and the Greeks*; and a superinduced part, having reference to *the entire war*), he had not conceived it clearly, nor carried it out consistently. If we are to distinguish these two points of view at all, we ought to draw the lines at the end of the first book and at the beginning of the eighth, thus regarding the intermediate six books as belonging to the picture of *the entire war* (or the Iliad as distinguished from the Achillêis); the point of view of the Achillêis, dropt at the end of the first book, is resumed at the beginning of the eighth. The natural fitting together of these two parts is noticed in the comment of Heyne ad viii. 1: "Cæterum *nunc* Jupiter aperte solvit Thetidi promissa, dum reddit causam Trojanorum bello superiorem, ut Achillis desiderium Achivos, et pœnitentia injuriæ ei illatæ Agamemnonem incessat (cf. i. 5). Nam quæ *adhuc* narrata sunt, partim continebantur in fortunâ belli utrinque tentatâ . . . partim valebant ad narrationem variandam," &c. The first and the eighth books belong to one and the same point of view, while *all* the intermediate books belong to the other. But O. Müller seeks to prove that a portion of these intermediate books belongs to one common point of view with the first and eighth, though he admits that they have been enlarged by insertions. Here I think he is mistaken. Strike out anything which can be reasonably allowed for enlargement in the books between the first and eighth, and the same difficulty will still remain in respect to the remainder; for *all* the incidents between those two points are brought out in a spirit altogether indifferent to Achilles or his anger. The Zeus of the fourth book, as contrasted with Zeus in the first or eighth, marks the difference; and this description of Zeus is absolutely indispensable as the connecting link between book iii. on the one side, and books iv. and v. on the other. Moreover the attempt of O. Müller, to force upon the larger portion of what is between the first and eighth books the point of

three suppositions that our choice has to be made. A scheme, and a large scheme too, must unquestionably be admitted as the basis of any sufficient hypothesis. But the Achillêis would have been a long poem, half the length of the present Iliad, and probably not less compact in its structure than the Odyssey. Moreover being parted off only by an imaginary line from the boundless range of the Trojan war, it would admit of enlargement more easily, and with greater relish to hearers, than the adventures of one single hero; while the expansion would naturally take place by adding new Grecian victory—since the original poem arrived at the exaltation of Achilles only through a painful series of Grecian disasters. That the poem under these circumstances should have received additions, is no very violent hypothesis: in fact when we recollect that the integrity both of the Achillêis and of the Odyssey was neither guarded by printing nor writing, we shall perhaps think it less wonderful that the former was enlarged,[1]

view of the Achillêis, is never successful: the poet does not exhibit in those books "insufficient efforts of other heroes to compensate for the absence of Achilles," but a general and highly interesting picture of the Trojan war, with prominent reference to the original ground of quarrel. In this picture the duel between Paris and Menelaus forms naturally the foremost item—but how far-fetched is the reasoning whereby O. Müller brings that striking recital within the scheme of the Achillêis! "The Greeks and Trojans are for the first time struck by an idea, which might have occurred in the previous nine years, if the Greeks, *when assisted by Achilles*, had not, from *confidence in their superior strength*, considered every compromise as unworthy of them,—namely, to decide the war by a single combat between the authors of it." Here the causality of Achilles is dragged in by main force, and unsupported either by any actual statement in the poem or by any reasonable presumption; for it is *the Trojans* who propose the single combat, and we are not told that they had ever proposed it before—though they would have had stronger reasons for proposing it during the presence of Achilles than during his absence.

O. Müller himself remarks (§ 7), "that from the second to the seventh book Zeus appears as it were to have forgotten his resolution and his promise to Thetis." In other words, the poet during this part of the poem drops the point of view of the Achillêis to take up that of the more comprehensive Iliad: the Achillêis reappears in book viii.—again disappears in book x.—and is resumed from book xi. to the end of the poem.

[1] This tendency to insert new homogeneous matter by new poets into poems already existing, is noticed by M. Fauriel in reference to the *Romans* of the Middle Ages—

"C'est un phénomène remarquable dans l'histoire de la poésie épique, que cette disposition, cette tendance constante du goût populaire à amalgamer, à lier en une seule et même composition le plus possible des compositions diverses,—cette disposition persiste chez un peuple, tant que la poésie conserve un reste de vie; tant qu'elle s'y transmet par la tradition et qu'elle y circule à l'aide du chant ou des récitations publiques. Elle cesse partout où la poésie est une fois fixée dans les livres, et n'agit plus

than that the latter was not. Any relaxation of the laws of epical unity is a small price to pay for that splendid poetry, of which we find so much between the first and the eighth books of our Iliad.

The question respecting unity of authorship is different, and more difficult to determine, than that respecting consistency of parts, and sequence in the narrative. A poem conceived on a comparatively narrow scale may be enlarged afterwards by its original author, with greater or less coherence and success: the Faust of Goethe affords an example even in our own generation. On the other hand, a systematic poem may well have been conceived and executed by pre-arranged concert between several poets; among whom probably one will be the governing mind, though the rest may be effective, and perhaps equally effective, in respect to execution of the parts. And the age of the early Grecian epic was favourable to such fraternisation of poets, of which the Gens called Homerids probably exhibited many specimens. In the recital or singing of a long unwritten poem, many bards must have conspired together, and in the earliest times the composer and the singer were one and the same person.[1] Now the individuals comprised in the Homeric Gens, though doubtless very different among themselves in respect of mental capacity, were yet homogeneous in respect of training, means of observation and instruction, social experience, religious feelings and theories,

que par la lecture,—cette dernière époque est, pour ainsi dire, celle de la propriété poétique—celle où chaque poëte pretend à une existence, à une gloire, personnelles; et où la poésie cesse d'être une espèce de trésor commun dont le peuple jouit et dispose à sa manière, sans s'inquieter des individus qui le lui ont fait." (Fauriel, Sur les Romans Chevaleresques, leçon 5me, Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. xiii. p. 707.)

M. Fauriel thinks that the Shah Nameh of Ferdusi was an amalgamation of epic poems originally separate, and that probably the Mahabharat was so also (ib. p. 708).

[1] The remarks of Boeckh, upon the possibility of such co-operation of poets towards one and the same scheme, are perfectly just—

"Atqui quomodo componi a variis auctoribus successu temporum rhapsodiæ potuerint, quæ post prima initia directæ jam ad idem consilium et quam vocant unitatem carminis sint . . . . missis istorum declamationibus qui populi universi opus Homerum esse jactant . . . . tum potissimum intelligetur, ubi gentis civilis Homeridarum propriam et peculiarem Homericam poesin fuisse, veteribus ipsis si non testibus, at certe ducibus, concedetur . . . . Quæ quum ita sint, non erit adeo difficile ad intelligendum, quomodo, post prima initia ab egregio vate facta, in gente sacrorum et artis communione sociatâ, multæ rhapsodiæ ad unum potuerint consilium dirigi." (Index Lection. 1834, p. 12.)

I transcribe this passage from Giese (Ueber den Æolischen Dialekt, p. 157), not having been able to see the essay of which it forms a part.

&c., to a degree much greater than individuals in modern times. Fallible as our inferences are on this point, where we have only internal evidence to guide us, without any contemporary points of comparison, or any species of collateral information respecting the age, the society, the poets, the hearers, or the language—we must nevertheless in the present case take coherence of structure, together with consistency in the tone of thought, feeling, language, customs, &c., as presumptions of one author; and the contrary as presumptions of severalty; allowing as well as we can for that inequality of excellence which the same author may at different times present.

Now the case made out against single-headed authorship of the Odyssey appears to me very weak; and those who dispute it are guided more by their *à priori* rejection of ancient epical unity than by any positive evidence which the poem itself affords. It is otherwise with regard to the Iliad. Whatever presumptions a disjointed structure, several apparent inconsistencies of parts, and large excrescence of actual matter beyond the opening promise, can sanction—may reasonably be indulged against the supposition that this poem all proceeds from a single author. There is a difference of opinion on the subject among the best critics which is probably not destined to be adjusted, since so much depends partly upon critical feeling, partly upon the general reasonings, in respect to ancient epical unity, with which a man sits down to the study. For the champions of unity, such as Mr. Payne Knight, are very ready to strike out numerous and often considerable passages as interpolations, thus meeting the objections raised against unity of authorship on the ground of special inconsistencies. Hermann and Boeckh, though not going the length of Lachmann in maintaining the original theory of Wolf, agree with the latter in recognising diversity of authors in the poem, to an extent overpassing the limit of what can fairly be called interpolation. Payne Knight and Nitzsch are equally persuaded of the contrary. Here then is a decided contradiction among critics, all of whom have minutely studied the poems since the Wolfian question was raised. And it is such critics alone who can be said to constitute authority; for the cursory reader, who dwells upon the parts simply long enough to relish their poetical beauty, is struck only by that general sameness of colouring which Wolf himself admits to pervade the poem.[1]

[1] Wolf, Prolegom. p. cxxxviii. "Quippe *in universum* idem sonus est omnibus libris; idem habitus sententiarum, orationis, numerorum," &c.

Having already intimated that, in my judgement, no theory of the structure of the poem is admissible which does not admit an original and preconcerted Achillêis—a stream which begins at the first book and ends with the death of Hector in the twenty-second, although the higher parts of it now remain only in the condition of two detached lakes, the first book and the eighth—I reason upon the same basis with respect to the authorship. Assuming continuity of structure as a presumptive proof, the whole of this Achillêis must be treated as composed by one author. Wolf indeed affirmed, that he never read the poem continuously through without being painfully impressed with the inferiority [1] and altered style of the last six books—and Lachmann carries this feeling further back, so as to commence with the seventeenth book. If I could enter fully into this sentiment, I should then be compelled, not to deny the existence of a preconceived scheme, but to imagine that the books from the eighteenth to the twenty-second, though forming part of that scheme or Achillêis, had yet been executed by another and an inferior poet. But it is to be remarked, first, that inferiority of poetical merit to a certain extent is quite reconcileable with unity of authorship; and secondly, that the very circumstances upon which Wolf's unfavourable judgement is built, seem to arise out of increased difficulty in the poet's task, when he came to the crowning cantoes of his designed Achillêis. For that which chiefly distinguishes these books is, the direct, incessant, and manual, intervention of the gods and goddesses, formally permitted by Zeus—and the repetition of vast and fantastic conceptions to which such superhuman agency gives occasion; not omitting the battle of Achilles against Skamander and Simois, and the burning up of these rivers by Hephæstus. Now looking at this vein of ideas with the eyes of a modern reader, or even with those of a Grecian critic of the literary ages, it is certain that the effect is unpleasing: the gods, sublime elements of poetry when kept in due proportion, are here somewhat vulgarised. But though the poet here has not succeeded, and probably success was impossible, in the task which he has

[1] Wolf, Prolegom. p. cxxxvii. "Equidem certe quoties in continenti lectione ad istas partes (*i. e.* the last six books) deveni, nunquam non in iis talia quædam sensi, quæ nisi illæ tam mature cum ceteris coaluissent, quovis pignore contendam, dudum ab eruditis detecta et animadversa fuisse, immo multa ejus generis, ut cum nunc Ὁμηρικώτατα habeantur, si tantummodo in Hymnis legerentur, ipsa sola eos suspicionibus *νοθείας* adspersura essent." Compare the sequel, p. cxxxviii. "ubi nervi deficiant et spiritus Homericus—jejunum et frigidum in locis multis," &c.

prescribed to himself—yet the mere fact of his undertaking it, and the manifest distinction between his employment of divine agency in these latter cantoes as compared with the preceding, seems explicable only on the supposition that they *are* the latter cantoes and come in designed sequence, as the continuance of a previous plan. The poet wishes to surround the coming forth of Achilles with the maximum of glorious and terrific circumstance: no Trojan enemy can for a moment hold out against him:[1] the gods must descend to the plain of Troy and fight in person, while Zeus, who at the beginning of the eighth book had forbidden them to take part, expressly encourages them to do so at the beginning of the twentieth. If then the nineteenth book (which contains the reconciliation between Achilles and Agamemnôn, a subject naturally somewhat tame) and the three following books (where we have before us only the gods, Achilles, and the Trojans without hope or courage) are inferior in execution and interest to the seven preceding books (which describe the long-disputed and often doubtful death-struggle between the Greeks and Trojans without Achilles), as Wolf and other critics affirm—we may explain the difference without supposing a new poet as composer: for the conditions of the poem had become essentially more difficult, and the subject more unpromising. The necessity of keeping Achilles above the level, even of heroic prowess, restricted the poet's means of acting upon the sympathy of his hearers.[2]

[1] Iliad, xx. 25. Zeus addresses the agora of the gods—

> Ἀμφοτέροισι δ' ἀρήγεθ', ὅπη νόος ἐστὶν ἑκάστου·
> Εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς οἷος ἐπὶ Τρώεσσι μαχεῖται,
> Οὐδὲ μίνυνθ' ἕξουσι ποδώκεα Πηλεϊωνα.
> Καὶ δέ τέ μιν καὶ πρόσθεν ὑποτρομέεσκον ἅπαντες·
> Νῦν δ', ὅτε δὴ καὶ θυμὸν ἑταίρου χώεται αἰνῶς,
> Δείδω μὴ καὶ τεῖχος ὑπὲρ μόρον ἐξαλαπάξῃ.

The formal restriction put upon the gods by Zeus at the beginning of the eighth book, and the removal of that restriction at the beginning of the twentieth, are evidently parts of one preconceived scheme.

It is difficult to determine whether the battle of the gods and goddesses in book xxi. (385–520) is to be expunged as spurious, or only to be blamed as of inferior merit ("improbanda tantum, non resecanda—hoc enim est illud, quo plerumque summa criseôs Homericæ redit," as Heyne observes in another place, Obss. Iliad. xviii. 444). The objections on the score of non-Homeric locution are not forcible (see P. Knight *ad loc.*), and the scene belongs to that vein of conception which animates the poet in the closing act of his Achillêis.

[2] While admitting that these last books of the Iliad are not equal in interest to those between the eleventh and eighteenth, we may add that they exhibit many striking beauties, both of plan and execution, and one in particular may be noticed as an example of happy epical adaptation. The Trojans are on the point of ravishing from the Greeks the dead body

The last two books of the Iliad may have formed part of the original Achillêis. But the probability rather is, that they are additions; for the death of Hector satisfies the exigencies of a coherent scheme, and we are not entitled to extend the oldest poem beyond the limit which such necessity prescribes. It has been argued on one side by Nitzsch and O. Müller, that the mind could not leave off with satisfaction at the moment in which Achilles sates his revenge, and while the bodies of Patroclus and Hector are lying unburied—also, that the more merciful temper which he exhibits in the twenty-fourth book must always have been an indispensable sequel, in order to create proper sympathy with his triumph. Other critics, on the contrary, have taken special grounds of exception against the last book, and have endeavoured to set it aside as different from the other books both in tone and language. To a certain extent the peculiarities of the last book appear to me undeniable, though it is plainly a designed continuance and not a substantive poem. Some weight also is due to the remark about the twenty-third book, that Odysseus and Diomêdês, who have been wounded and disabled during the fight, now reappear in perfect force, and contend in the games: here is no case of miraculous healing, and the inconsistency is more likely to have been admitted by a separate enlarging poet than by the schemer of the Achillêis.

of Patroclus, when Achilles (by the inspiration of Hêrê and Iris) shows himself unarmed on the Grecian mound, and by his mere figure and voice strikes such terror into the Trojans that they relinquish the dead body. As soon as night arrives, Polydamus proposes in the Trojan agora that the Trojans shall retire without further delay from the ships to the town, and shelter themselves within the walls, without awaiting the assault of Achilles armed on the next morning. Hector repels this counsel of Polydamus with expressions—not merely of overweening confidence in his own force, even against Achilles—but also of extreme contempt and harshness towards the giver; whose wisdom however is proved by the utter discomfiture of the Trojans the next day. Now this angry deportment and mistake on the part of Hector is made to tell strikingly in the twenty-second book, just before his death. There yet remains a moment for him to retire within the walls, and thus obtain shelter against the near approach of his irresistible enemy,—but he is struck with the recollection of that fatal moment when he repelled the counsel which would have saved his countrymen: "If I enter the town, Polydamus will be the first to reproach me as having brought destruction upon Troy on that fatal night when Achilles came forth, and when I resisted his better counsel" (compare xviii. 250-315; xxii. 100-110; and Aristot. Ethic. iii. 8).

In a discussion respecting the structure of the Iliad, and in reference to arguments which deny all designed concatenation of parts, it is not out of place to notice this affecting touch of poetry, belonging to those books which are reproached as the feeblest.

The splendid books from the second to v. 322 of the seventh[1] are equal in most parts to any portions of the Achillêis, and are pointedly distinguished from the latter by the broad view which they exhibit of the general Trojan war, with all its principal personages, localities, and causes—yet without advancing the result promised in the first book, or indeed any final purpose whatever. Even the desperate wound inflicted by Tlepolemus on Sarpedôn is forgotten, when the latter hero is called forth in the subsequent Achillêis.[2] The arguments of Lachmann, who dissects these six books into three or four separate songs,[3] carry no conviction to my mind; and I see no reason why we should not consider all of them to be by the same author, bound together by the common purpose of giving a great collective picture which may properly be termed an Iliad. The tenth book, or Doloneia, though adapted specially to the place in which it stands, agrees with the books between the first and eighth in belonging only to the general picture of the war, without helping forward the march of the Achillêis; yet it seems conceived in a lower vein, in so far as we can trust our modern ethical sentiment. One is unwilling to believe that the author of the fifth book (or Aristeia of Diomêdês) would condescend to employ the hero whom he there so brightly glorifies—the victor even over Arês himself—in slaughtering newly-arrived Thracian sleepers, without any large purpose or necessity.[4] The ninth book, of which I have

[1] The latter portion of the seventh book is spoiled by the very unsatisfactory addition introduced to explain the construction of the wall and ditch: all the other incidents (the agora and embassy of the Trojans, the truce for burial, the arrival of wine-ships from Lemnos, &c.) suit perfectly with the scheme of the poet of these books, to depict the Trojan war generally,

[2] Unless indeed we are to imagine the combat between Tlepolemus and Sarpedôn, and that between Glaukus and Diomêdês, to be separate songs; and they are among the very few passages in the Iliad which are completely separable, implying no special antecedents.

[3] Compare also Heyne, Excursus II. sect. ii. ad Iliad. xxiv. vol. viii. p. 783.

[4] Subsequent poets, seemingly thinking that the naked story (of Diomêdês slaughtering Rhêsus and his companions in their sleep) as it now stands in the Iliad, was too displeasing, adopted different ways of dressing it up. Thus according to Pindar (ap. Schol. Iliad. x. 435), Rhêsus fought one day as the ally of Troy, and did such terrific damage, that the Greeks had no other means of averting total destruction from his hand on the next day, except by killing him during the night. And the Euripidean drama called *Rhêsus*, though representing the latter as a new-comer, yet puts into the mouth of Athênê the like overwhelming predictions of what he would do on the coming day if suffered to live; so that to kill him in the night is the only way of saving the Greeks (Eurip. Rhês. 602): moreover Rhêsus

already spoken at length, belongs to a different vein of conception, and seems to me more likely to have emanated from a separate composer.

While intimating these views respecting the authorship of the Iliad as being in my judgement the most probable, I must repeat, that though the study of the poem carries to my mind a sufficient conviction respecting its structure, the question between unity and plurality of authors is essentially less determinable. The poem consists of a part original and other parts superadded; yet it is certainly not impossible that the author of the former may himself have composed the latter: and such would be my belief, if I regarded plurality of composers as an inadmissible idea. On this supposition we must conclude that the poet, while anxious for the addition of new and for the most part highly interesting matter, has not thought fit to re-cast the parts and events in such manner as to impart to the whole a pervading thread of *consensus* and organisation, such as we see in the Odyssey.

That the Odyssey is of later date than the Iliad, and by a different author, seems to be now the opinion of most critics, especially of Payne Knight[1] and Nitzsch; though O. Müller leans to a contrary conclusion, at the same time adding that he thinks the arguments either way not very decisive. There are considerable differences of statement in the two poems in regard to some of the gods: Iris is messenger of the gods in the Iliad, and Hermês in the Odyssey: Æolus, the dispenser of the winds in the Odyssey, is not noticed in the twenty-third book of the Iliad, but on the contrary, Iris invites the winds as independent gods to come and kindle the funeral pile of

himself is there brought forward as talking with such overweening insolence, that the sympathies of man, and the envy of the gods, are turned against him (ib. 458).

But the story is best known in the form and with the addition (equally unknown to the Iliad) which Virgil has adopted. It was decreed by fate that if the splendid horses of Rhêsus were permitted once either to taste the Trojan provender, or to drink of the river Xanthus, nothing could preserve the Greeks from ruin (Æneid, i. 468, with Servius *ad loc.*):—

> "Nec procul hinc Rhesi niveis tentoria velis
> Agnoscit lacrymans; primo quæ prodita somno
> Tydides multâ vastabat cæde cruentus:
> Ardentesque avertit equos in castra, priusquam
> Pabula gustassent Trojæ, Xanthumque bibissent."

All these versions are certainly improvements upon the story as it stands in the Iliad.

[1] Mr. Knight places the Iliad about two centuries, and the Odyssey one century, anterior to Hesiod: a century between the two poems (Prolegg. c. lxi.).

Patroclus; and unless we are to expunge the song of Demodokus in the eighth book of the Odyssey as spurious, Aphroditê there appears as the wife of Hêphæstus—a relationship not known to the Iliad. There are also some other points of difference enumerated by Mr. Knight and others, which tend to justify the presumption that the author of the Odyssey is not identical either with the author of the Achillêis or his enlargers, which G. Hermann considers to be a point unquestionable.[1] Indeed, the difficulty of supposing a long coherent poem to have been conceived, composed, and retained, without any aid of writing, appears to many critics even now insurmountable, though the evidences on the other side are in my view sufficient to outweigh any negative presumption thus suggested. But it is improbable that the same person should have powers of memorial combination sufficient for composing two such poems, nor is there any proof to force upon us such a supposition.

Presuming a difference of authorship between the two poems, I feel less convinced about the supposed juniority of the Odyssey. The discrepancies in manners and language in the one and the other are so little important, that two different persons, in the same age and society, might well be imagined to exhibit as great or even greater. It is to be recollected that the subjects of the two are heterogeneous, so as to conduct the poet, even were he the same man, into totally different veins of imagination and illustration. The pictures of the Odyssey seem to delineate the same heroic life as the Iliad, though looked at from a distinct point of view: and the circumstances surrounding the residence of Odysseus in Ithaka are just such as we may suppose him to have left in order to attack Troy. If the scenes presented to us are for the most part pacific, as contrasted with the incessant fighting of the Iliad, this is not to be ascribed to any greater sociality or civilisation in the real hearers of the Odyssey, but to the circumstances of the hero whom the poet undertakes to adorn: nor can we doubt that the poems of Arktinus and Leschês, of a later date than the Odyssey, would have given us as much combat and bloodshed as the Iliad. I am not struck by those proofs of improved civilisation which some critics affirm the Odyssey to present: Mr. Knight, who is of this opinion, nevertheless admits that the mutilation of Melanthius, and the hanging up of the female slaves by Odysseus, in that poem, indicate greater barbarity than any incidents in the fights before Troy.[2] The more

[1] Hermann, Præfat. ad Odyss. p. vii.
[2] Knight, Prolegg. l. c. Odyss. xxii. 465-478.

skilful and compact structure of the Odyssey has been often considered as a proof of its juniority in age: and in the case of two poems by the same author, we might plausibly contend that practice would bring with it improvement in the combining faculty. But in reference to the poems before us, we must recollect, first, that in all probability the Iliad (with which the comparison is taken) is not a primitive but an enlarged poem, and that the primitive Achillêis might well have been quite as coherent as the Odyssey;—secondly, that between different authors, superiority in structure is not a proof of subsequent composition, inasmuch as on that hypothesis we should be compelled to admit that the later poem of Arktinus would be an improvement upon the Odyssey;—thirdly, that even if it were so, we could only infer that the author of the Odyssey had *heard* the Achillêis or the Iliad; we could not infer that he lived one or two generations afterwards.[1]

On the whole, the balance of probabilities seems in favour of distinct authorship of the two poems, but the same age—and that age a very early one, anterior to the first Olympiad. And they may thus be used as evidences, and contemporary evidences, for the phænomena of primitive Greek civilisation; while they also show that the power of constructing long premeditated epics, without the aid of writing, is to be taken as a characteristic of the earliest known Greek mind. This was the point controverted by Wolf, which a full review of the case (in my judgement) decides against him; it is moreover a valuable resort for the historian of the Greeks, inasmuch as it marks out to him the ground from which he is to start in appreciating their ulterior progress.[2]

[1] The arguments, upon the faith of which Payne Knight and other critics have maintained the Odyssey to be younger than the Iliad, are well stated and examined in Bernard Thiersch—Quæstio de Diversâ Iliadis et Odysseæ Ætate—in the Anhang (p. 306) to his work Ueber das Zeitalter und Vaterland des Homer.

He shows all such arguments to be very inconclusive; though the grounds upon which he himself maintains identity of age between the two appear to me not at all more satisfactory (p. 327): we can infer nothing to the point from the mention of Telemachus in the Iliad.

Welcker thinks that there is a great difference of age, and an evident difference of authorship, between the two poems (Der Episch. Kyklus, p. 295).

O. Müller admits the more recent date of the Odyssey, but considers it "difficult and hazardous to raise upon this foundation any definite conclusions as to the person and age of the poet" (History of the Literature of Ancient Greece, ch. v. s. 13).

[2] Dr. Thirlwall has added to the second edition of his History of Greece a valuable Appendix, on the early history of the Homeric poems (vol. i. p.

Whatever there may be of truth in the different conjectures of critics respecting the authorship and structure of these unrivalled poems, we are not to imagine that it is the perfection of their epical symmetry which has given them their indissoluble hold upon the human mind, as well modern as ancient. There is some tendency in critics, from Aristotle downwards,[1] to invert the order of attributes in respect to the Homeric poems, so as to dwell most on recondite excellences which escape the unaided reader, and which are even to a great degree disputable. But it is given to few minds (as Goethe has remarked[2]) to appreciate fully the mechanism of a long poem, and many feel the beauty of the separate parts, who have no sentiment for the aggregate perfection of the whole.

Nor were the Homeric poems originally addressed to minds of the rarer stamp. They are intended for those feelings which the critic has in common with the unlettered mass, not for that enlarged range of vision and peculiar standard which he has acquired to himself. They are of all poems the most absolutely and unreservedly popular: had they been otherwise they could

500–516); which contains copious information respecting the discrepant opinions of German critics, with a brief comparative examination of their reasons. I could have wished that so excellent a judge had superadded, to his enumeration of the views of others, an ampler exposition of his own. Dr. Thirlwall seems decidedly convinced upon that which appears to me the most important point in the Homeric controversy: "That before the appearance of the earliest of the poems of the Epic Cycle, the Iliad and Odyssey, even if they did not exist precisely in their present form, had at least reached their present compass, and were regarded each as a complete and well-defined whole, not as a fluctuating aggregate of fugitive pieces" (p. 509).

This marks out the Homeric poems as ancient both in the items and in the total, and includes negation of the theory of Wolf and Lachmann, who contend that as a total they only date from the age of Peisistratus. It is then safe to treat the poems as unquestionable evidences of Grecian antiquity (meaning thereby 776 B.C.), which we could not do if we regarded all congruity of parts in the poems as brought about through alterations of Peisistratus and his friends.

There is also a very just admonition of Dr. Thirlwall (p. 516) as to the difficulty of measuring what degree of discrepancy or inaccuracy might or might not have escaped the poet's attention, in an age so imperfectly known to us.

[1] There are just remarks on this point in Heyne's Excursus ii. sect. 2 and 4, ad Il. xxiv. vol. viii. p. 771–800.

[2] "Wenige Deutsche, und vielleicht nur wenige Menschen aller *neuern* Nationen, haben Gefühl für ein æsthetisches Ganzes; sie loben und tadeln nur stellenweise, sie entzücken sich nur stellenweise." (Goethe, Wilhelm Meister: I transcribe this from Welcker's Æschyl. Trilogie, p. 306.)

What ground there is for restricting this proposition to *modern* as contrasted with *ancient* nations, I am unable to conceive.

not have lived so long in the mouth of the rhapsodes, and the ear and memory of the people: and it was *then* that their influence was first acquired, never afterwards to be shaken. Their beauties belong to the parts taken separately, which revealed themselves spontaneously to the listening crowd at the festival—far more than to the whole poem taken together, which could hardly be appreciated unless the parts were dwelt upon and suffered to expand in the mind. The most unlettered hearer of those times could readily seize, while the most instructed reader can still recognise the characteristic excellence of Homeric narrative—its straightforward, unconscious, unstudied simplicity—its concrete forms of speech [1] and

[1] The κινούμενα ὀνόματα of Homer were extolled by Aristotle: see Schol. ad Iliad. i. 481; compare Dionys. Halicarn. De Compos. Verbor. c. 20. ὥστε μηδὲν ἡμῖν διαφέρειν γινόμενα τὰ πράγματα ἢ λεγόμενα ὁρᾶν. Respecting the undisguised bursts of feeling by the heroes, the Scholiast ad Iliad. i. 349 tells us—ἕτοιμον τὸ ἠρωϊκὸν πρὸς δάκρυα—compare Euripid. Helen. 959, and the severe censures of Plato, Republ. ii. p. 388.

The Homeric poems were the best understood, and the most widely popular of all Grecian composition, even among the least instructed persons, such (for example) as the semibarbarians who had acquired the Greek language in addition to their own mother tongue. (Dio Chrysost. Or. xviii. vol. i. p. 478; Or. liii. vol. ii. p. 277, Reisk.) Respecting the simplicity and perspicuity of the narrative style, implied in this extensive popularity, Porphyry made a singular remark: he said that the sentences of Homer *really* presented much difficulty and obscurity, but that ordinary readers fancied they understood him, "because of the general clearness *which appeared* to run through the poems." (See the Prolegomena of Villoison's edition of the Iliad, p. xli.) This remark affords the key to a good deal of the Homeric criticism. There doubtless were real obscurities in the poems, arising from altered associations, customs, religion, language, &c., as well as from corrupt text; but while the critics did good service in elucidating these difficulties, they also introduced artificially many others, altogether of their own creating. Refusing to be satisfied with the plain and obvious meaning, they sought in Homer hidden purposes, elaborate innuendo, recondite motives, even with regard to petty details, deep-laid rhetorical artifices (see a specimen in Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhetor. c. 15, p. 316, Reiske; nor is even Aristotle exempt from similar tendencies, Schol. ad Iliad. iii. 441, x. 198), or a substratum of philosophy allegorised. No wonder that passages, quite perspicuous to the vulgar reader, seemed difficult to them.

There could not be so sure a way of missing the real Homer as by searching for him in these devious recesses. He is essentially the poet of the broad highway and the market-place, touching the common sympathies and satisfying the mental appetencies of his countrymen with unrivalled effect, but exempt from ulterior views, either selfish or didactic, and immersed in the same medium of practical life and experience religiously construed, as his auditors. No nation has ever yet had so perfect and touching an exposition of its early social mind as the Iliad and Odyssey exhibit.

In the verbal criticism of Homer the Alexandrine literati seem to have

happy alternation of action with dialogue—its vivid pictures of living agents, always clearly and sharply individualised, whether in the commanding proportions of Achilles and Odysseus, in the graceful presence of Helen and Penelope, or in the more humble contrast of Eumæus and Melanthius; and always moreover animated by the frankness with which his heroes give utterance to all their transient emotions and even all their infirmities—its constant reference to those coarser veins of feeling and palpable motives which belong to all men in common—its fulness of graphic details, freshly drawn from the visible and audible world, and though often homely, never tame nor trenching upon that limit of satiety to which the Greek mind was so keenly alive—lastly, its perpetual junction of gods and men in the same picture, and familiar appeal to ever-present divine agency, in harmony with the interpretation of nature at that time universal.

It is undoubtedly easier to feel than to describe the impressive influence of Homeric narrative: but the time and circumstances under which that influence was first, and most powerfully felt, preclude the possibility of explaining it by comprehensive and elaborate comparisons, such as are implied in Aristotle's remarks upon the structure of the poems. The critic who seeks the explanation in the right place will not depart widely from the point of view of those rude auditors to whom the poems were originally addressed, or from the susceptibilities and capacities common to the human bosom in every stage of progressive culture. And though the refinements and delicacies of the poems, as well as their general structure, are a subject of highly interesting criticism – yet it is not to these that Homer owes his wide-spread and imperishable popularity. Still less is it true, as the well-known observations of Horace would lead us to believe, that Homer is a teacher of ethical wisdom akin and superior to Chrysippus or Crantor.[1] No didactic purpose is to

made a very great advance, as compared with the glossographers who preceded them. (See Lehrs, De Studiis Aristarchi, Dissert. ii. p. 42.)

[1] Horat. Epist. i. 2, v. 1–26—

"Sirenum voces, et Circes pocula nosti;
Quæ si cum sociis stultus cupidusque bibisset,
Vixisset canis immundus, vel amica luto sus."

Horace contrasts the folly and greediness of the companions of Ulysses in accepting the refreshments tendered to them by Circe, with the self-command of Ulysses himself in refusing them. But in the incident as described in the original poem, neither the praise, nor the blame here implied, finds any countenance. The companions of Ulysses follow the universal practice in accepting hospitality tendered to strangers, the fatal consequences of which, in their particular case, they could have no grounds for suspecting;

be found in the Iliad and Odyssey: a philosopher may dc less extract, from the incidents and strongly-marked chara which it contains, much illustrative matter for his exhortat. —but the ethical doctrine which he applies must emanate fr his own reflection. The Homeric hero manifests virtues infirmities, fierceness or compassion, with the same straigh forward and simple-minded vivacity, unconscious of any idea standard by which his conduct is to be tried;[1] nor can we trace in the poet any ulterior function beyond that of the inspired organ of the Muse, and the nameless, but eloquent, herald of lost adventures out of the darkness of the past.

while Ulysses is preserved from a similar fate, not by any self-command of his own, but by a previous divine warning and a special antidote, which had not been vouchsafed to the rest (see Odyss. x. 285). And the incident of the Sirens, if it is to be taken as evidence of anything, indicates rather the absence, than the presence, of self-command on the part of Ulysses.

Of the violent mutations of text, whereby the *Grammatici* or critics tried to efface from Homer bad ethical tendencies (we must remember that many of these men were lecturers to youth), a remarkable specimen is afforded by the Venet. Schol. ad Iliad. ix. 453; compare Plutarch, de Audiendis Poetis, p. 95. Phœnix describes the calamitous family tragedy in which he himself had been partly the agent, partly the victim. Now that an Homeric hero should confess guilty proceedings and still more guilty designs, without any expression of shame or contrition, was insupportable to the feeling of the critics. One of them, Aristodemus, thrust two negative particles into one of the lines; and though he thereby ruined not only the sense bu the metre, his emendation procured for him universal applause, because h had maintained the innocence of the hero (*καὶ οὐ μόνον ηὐδοκίμησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐτιμήθη, ὡς εὐσεβῆ τηρήσας τὸν ἥρωα*). And Aristarchus thought the case so alarming, that he struck out from the text four lines which have only been preserved to us by Plutarch (Ὁ μὲν Ἀρίσταρχος ἐξεῖλε τὰ ἔπη ταῦτα, *φοβηθείς*). See the Fragment of Dioscorides (*περὶ τῶν παρ' Ὁμήρῳ Νόμων*) in Didot's Fragmenta Historicor. Græcor. vol. ii. p. 193.

[1] "C'est un tableau idéal, à coup sûr, que celui de la société Grecque dans les chants qui portent le nom d'Homère: et pourtant cette société y est toute entière reproduite, avec la rusticité, la férocité de ses mœurs, ses bonnes et ses mauvaises passions, sans dessein de faire particulièrement ressortir, de célébrer tel ou tel de ses mérites, de ses avantages, ou de laisser dans l'ombre ses vices et ses maux. Ce mélange du bien et du mal, du fort et du faible—cette simultanéité d'idées et de sentimens en apparence contraires—cette variété, cette incohérence, ce développement inégal de la nature et de la destinée humaine—c'est précisément là ce qu'il y a de plus poétique, car c'est le fond même des choses, c'est la vérité sur l'homme et le monde: et dans les peintures idéales qu'en veulent faire la poésie, le roman et même l'histoire, cet ensemble, si divers et pourtant si harmonieux, doit se retrouver: sans quoi l'idéal véritable y manque aussi bien que la réalité." (Guizot, Cours d'Histoire Moderne, Leçon 7me, vol. i. p. 285.)

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